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Abstract 
This thesis is primarily concerned with a study of social control in Liverpool city 
centre. As a case study the thesis explores the development of, and meaning ZI 
attributed to, social control practices by those at the centre of the implementation 
and management of these practices. In this sense the thesis is a study of the locally 
powerful, their organisation through the local state, and their perceptions of order 
and disorder in the city centre. Liverpool's closed circuit television network is 
focused on as emblematic of the developments in social control that the thesis 
wishes to explore. As an investigation in contemporary social control, the thesis 
fulfils three aims. 
First, it contributes to the theoretical debates around social control, in particular, by 
placing the analysis of closed circuit television within an understanding of the 
social relations in which the technology emerged. In this instance the thesis 
examines the contours of city centre or urban rule that underpin an understanding 
of the trajectory of power relations that shape the urban form, give it meaning and 
strategic direction. 
Second, it analyses close circuit television as a normative tool of social control and 
not merely as a piece of crime prevention technology. This analysis stresses a 
qualitative understanding of control processes, sensitive to the articulations of 
locally powerful agents involved in the management of city centre space and the 
instigation of control measures. In deconstructing the ideological outlooks of those 
ii 
powerful groups and individuals the thesis places social control within social and 
political struggles occurring within a locality, and challenges understandings of 
social control that have focused on the merely technical aspects of control 
strategies and, therefore, decontexualised the wider social significance of such 
strategies. 
Thirdly, it considers how social scientists and criminologists think about and 
understand social control in the contemporary setting. Far from closed circuit 
television being able to empower a local citizenry, the thesis argues that it has 
emerged out of interests with particular concerns and visions for order. Following 
this, an argument is made for an understanding of these visions for order as vested 
in and indicative of a neo-liberal state form from which contemporary social 
control strategies are rendered practicable and meaningful. 
iii 
Power fortifies itself not just by what it destroys, but also by what it 
creates. Not just by what it takes, but by what it gives 
(Arundhati Roy, 1999: 100). 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
LIVERPOOL, England - it was just before 3 P. M. when the call 
came crackling over the walkie-talkie in the control center: four 
young males walking through the downtown shopping area, 
behaving suspiciously. "There we go", the guard said, staring at a 
crystal clear picture of four youths as they swaggered down the 
street, stealing apples from street vendors, unaware they were being 
watched intently. [... ] The main concern of the guards on duty ... 
was tracking the movements of known shoplifters, prostitutes and 
muggers. For 20 minutes the cameras followed the four young men. 
Several times, one of the men would enter a store, while the others 
stood outside as if standing watch. The guards in the control room 
watched carefully for any signs of stealing [and] on this afternoon 
radioed the police. Then as the young men rounded a comer, they 
ran into a waiting police officer. He took down their names and 
asked by radio if arrests warrants were outstanding on any of them. 
He seemed to give them a bit of a chewing out, and then sent them 
on their way. They trudged away from the downtown area, out of 
sight of the cameras, a bit less swagger in their step ('They're 
Capturing Suspects on Candid Camera', New York Times 
Intemational, 11 March, 1995). 
[In Liverpool] the moral hangover from Victorian England, as well 
as the demands of the respectable shopkeeping class, required that 
street life be policed - whether it be passing the time 'doing 
nothing' on the street comer or threatening the profits of the 
shopkeepers by itinerant trading (Brogden, 1991: 118). 
The material reproduction of urban society depends on the continual 
reproduction of space in a fairly concentrated geographical area. 
Certainly the prime factors have to do with land, labour and capital. 
Yet the production of space depends in turn on decisions about what 
should be visible and what should not; concepts of order and 
disorder; and a strategic interplay between aesthetics and function 
(Zukin, 1996a: 44). 
The pulp fiction narrative in the opening quote represents a view of modem visual 
surveillance in Liverpool as an unproblematic surveyor of the public realm - 
targeting the wrongdoer, trapping and removing the villain and petty criminal so 
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that "people feel safer on downtown streets, even at night" (New York Times 
Intemational, op. cit. ). All of this, the article reported, facilitating wider changes in 
Liverpool - "a gritty, industrial port city" that "has worked hard to revive and clean 
up its downtown", into a "gleaming new shopping center" (Ibid). In this sense the 
('role' of closed circuit television (CCTV), as some writers have noted, has been 
more than a tool in crime prevention (Bannister et al, 1998: Norris and Armstrong, 
1999). Instead CCTV has played a part in a broader schema of contemporary urban 
management and 'renaissance', and acted as an important signifier in ideologically 
positioning 'crime' and 'disorder' as key managerial priorities of effective urban 
rule. Indeed, developments around CCTV have taken place under a shift towards 
4 entrepreneurial' forms of urban rule underway in the UK since the early 1980s 
(Hall and Hubbard, 1996). As a prolific discursive form of representation, the 
4 entrepreneurial city' has prioritised a politics of competitiveness between city 
regions, along with the re-imaging and re-design of the urban form. With these 
shifts have been changes to the institutional mechanisms and relations of power at 
the local level deemed appropriate for urban rule that have included the 
mobilisation of private expertise and knowledge in order to govern the urban centre 
and shape decision-making through the notion of 'partnership'. Many writers have 
characterised these shifts as neo-liberal and, for Jessop (1997: 29), this 
"strategically selective" institutional terrain has thrown up problems in the political 
sphere where attempts have been "made to (re)define a 'collective will' and to 
(re)articulate various mechanisms and practices of government and governance in 
pursuit of objects deemed to serve it". It is the contention of this thesis that the 
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development and use of CCTV as a contemporary technique of social control be 
placed within an analysis of the political and ideological terrain of the locally 
powerful and of how their articulation of local order has been organised through 
the local state. 
The desire and drive for the social control of the streets in the centre of Liverpool 
has been a feature of political and economic rule in the growth of the city since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. The concept of social control has itself, to 
varying degrees, been associated with, and positioned as a key mechanism in, the 
development and rule of modem industrial and post-industrial cities. It is here 
where images and the organised filtration and pursuit of the 'dangerous', the 
'criminal' and 'deviant' have been most acute within official and popular 
discourse. In general historical terms therefore, concerns around the city as a 
governable entity have dovetailed with strategies of social control. Furthermore, 
developments in social control techniques geared towards the demarcation of space 
and the policing of social boundaries have played their part in the political 
domination and material reproduction of the urban centre. Governing agents in the 
urban realm, bestowed with material and ideological power, have attempted to 
shape the 'meaning' of the city - its preferred function and form. Such city 
'visions' have sat alongside processes that have identified and attempted to counter 
those individuals, groups and behaviours perceived to hinder progress toward an 
4 orderly' urban centre as defined by locally powerful actors. The linkage between 
images and discourses of crime and images of the city are nothing new when 
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considering the management and organisation of space in the nineteenth century 
city (Taylor, 1999). Since that time debates about urban malaise have at the same 
time been debates about the 'quality' and 'experience' of the urban form, its utility 
and potential for disorder and criminality. 
In the light of these points, the advent of CCTV to monitor urban public space in 
the late twentieth century has posed problems in the interpretation of contemporary 
social control; in particular, debates concerning its nature, rationale and 
relationship to wider social relations have continued to "demonstrate ... the 
vitality, richness, and importance of the study of social control" (Hudson, 1997: 
467). Moreover, this 'vitality' has continued to highlight stark differences in the 
interpretation of the relations between social control, power, the state and social 
order. In examining the development of a local CCTV network, this thesis will 
seek to contribute to these interpretive debates in exploring the nature and direction 
of social control at the beginning of the twenty first century. 
Since 1994, when the first major public CCTV systems were established, official 
discourses on CCTV surveillance have continued to proffer the view that the 
technology has provided policing agencies with an effective tool in the fight 
against crime and a harbour of public safety (Home Office, 1994). 1 From 1994 
1 At the same time these developments were coupled with rises in recorded crime alongside an 
increased public anxiety about becoming victims of crime. Such observations have dovetailed with a 
broad acknowledgement that policing and criminal justice agencies alone are limited in combating 
crime alongside an expansion in expectations of what the public and other agencies can contribute in 
this area (Garland, 1996). 
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Liverpool city centre and surrounding areas have been wired up to a CCTV 
network with the aid of public and private financing. In 1998, the legislative 
framework of the Crime and Disorder Act provided the means for the extension 
and formalisation of the network. Launched in 1994, the privately monitored 20- 
camera city centre system was extended in October 2000 through a fl. 7 million 
injection of government money under the Crime Reduction Programme (Citysafe, 
2000). The long-term aim of this expansion has been the integration of comparable 
CCTV systems linked to a master control room overseeing 240 cameras in the city 
centre and outlying areas of Kensington, Old Swan and Dingle, as well as links to 
cameras in stores, public houses and night clubs (Daily Post, 22 August, 2000). 
Within the city centre this will incorporate "revolutionary talking cameras" so the 
"operators will be able to shout at would-be attackers to warn them they are being 
filmed" (Liverpool Echo, 24 March, 2001). In Liverpool and at national level the 
'friendly eye in the sky' has been depicted as a neutral observer in the fight against 
crime and social incivility; a technical-fix for an unease about urban disorder and 
degeneration. 
Local level developments concerning CCTV have been mirrored at the national 
level. Under both John Major's Conservative administration and then New Labour, 
CCTV has played a key role in crime control policy. Between 1994 and 1999 f38.5 
million was dispensed from the Home Office with an estimated f5l. million from 
the private sector to establish CCTV systems (Hansard, Written Answers, 2 nd 
November, 1999, Column 112). Under New Labour in particular the allocation of 
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E170 million of Home Office funds to extend CCTV by 40,000 extra cameras was 
announced in 1999 (Home Office, 1999). Competitive bidding for the money has 
involved the building of local partnerships involving private sector expertise and 
finance (Coleman and Sim, 1998), making the UK the largest market for CCTV in 
Europe (Graham, 2000: 45). 2 During the 1990s politicians, police, security pundits 
and media personnel have all contributed to a largely uncritical discourse on the 
need for, and unproblematic effectiveness of, CCTV systems. This more expansive 
crime control agenda, that has placed CCTV at its kernel, began to be identified for 
many writers as signalling an 'advanced liberal' project concerned with bestowing 
responsibility upon a range of agencies in the task of regenerating the urban centres 
and, in the process, reconfiguring how urban spaces were governed. 3 But what do 
these developments signify about the nature of social control in contemporary 
society? 
It is the contention of this thesis that the development of street surveillance 
cameras in the UK has reinforced processes tied to the reconfiguration of agents, 
institutions and accredited bodies in the task of urban rule and, as a consequence of 
2 These developments have contributed to shifts in the institutional terrain of criminal justice 
alongside an intensified politicisation of law and order, underway since the early 1980s, and can be 
placed within both right and left political agendas which have been concerned to deregulate the 
market economy (Hay, 1996) whilst increasing control and regulation in the social sphere (Gamble, 
1988; Elliott, 1996). 
3 It has been argued that such projects, involving public and private partnerships, media and public 
opinion indexes have "not simply ... [been] ... attempts to govern crime and criminals" but a set of 
initiatives towards "government through crime" (Stenson, 2001: 22). In this context the salience of 
street crime and other forms of disorderly conduct thought to be blighting the public realm have 
received sustained attention by local and national authorities under the Crime and Disorder Act 
(1998). 
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this, relocated the tasks and responsibilities for social control. According to 
McMahon (1992: 205-206), "the locus of social control in the penal sphere" has 
shifted during the second half of the twentieth century "beyond the ambit of 
criminal justice popularly conceived". This has led to the fostering of new areas of 
intervention, novel strategies and technologies of control culminating in a form of 
social surveillance engaged with "the pursuit and management of actual, and 
potential, petty violations" (Ibid: 206). From McMahon's observation, three 
interrelated processes can be identified as pivotal in the contextualisation of this 
thesis. First, new geographical areas have been opened up for monitoring and 
surveillance (the private malls, shopping complexes and publicly accessible 
consumption zones of the urban centre); second, new control strategies have been 
created involving partnership building between public and private powers and the 
reordering of responsibility for the identification and management of crime and 
deviance; and third, in this process, new technologies of surveillance and control 
have been utilised, notably the development of CCTV networks. Scholars have 
been concerned with these related processes, which have formed the broad context 
for thinking about contemporary social control -a context which Sumner surmised 
as a shift from a post liberal-welfare social control to one based on a free market- 
enterprise culture (1997a: 132-133). In broad terms social control analysts have 
asked what is novel about contemporary control strategies and what, if any, are the 
marked differences in the organising rationale underpinning current control 
initiatives. Contemporary social control has been thought to intensify the blurring 
of distinctions between public and private authorities, and fundamentally altered 
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the nature of social control as conceptually understood by theorists in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and by later critical theorists from the 1960s 
onwards. 
Debates around contemporary social control have highlighted problems concerned 
with formulating research aims regarding CCTV and the questions asked of it. For 
example, is CCTV representative of a form of social control outside the scope and 
influence of the state? Does the development of this technology present a shift 
away from normative rationalities of control? What is the relationship between 
CCTV and social order - how, where and by whom is 'order' articulated? 
These questions will be elaborated upon and will remain central guiding themes 
within the thesis. A number of interrelated aims underpin the thesis. The first aim 
will be to provide a material account of the development of CCTV in one city 
centre as an instance of social control located within the powerful coalitions of 
interest that emerged in the 1990s to instigate a strategy of rule under the auspices 
of 'regeneration'. Thus CCTV will be understood not as a mere technical 
development of social control nor as representing a watershed in the rationale of 
control practices, but rather in terms of its potential as a vehicle for the ideological 
and normative ordering of physical and symbolic space. Thus CCTV will not be 
analysed in terms of its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool but as part of a 
more broadly conceived set of 'social ordering practices' (Lacey, 1994) which have 
involved the participation of locally recognised 'primary definers' outside of 
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criminal justice popularly understood, but who, never-the-less, make up a network 
of powerful agents within a neo-liberal state form. 
The second aim will be to identify and illuminate the social relations within which 
social control strategies are developed and enacted. Thus in Liverpool city centre 
this will involve an exploration and mapping of the partnership forms of rule and 
the normative terms of that rule articulated by the locally powerful. This will 
highlight the problem of developing an understanding of the local state that has 
undergone a process of ideological and institutional restructuring (Peck and 
Tickell, 1995). The input of business interests through public-private partnerships 
has carved out a political space for 'new primary definers' to articulate the meaning 
attributed to city centre space, its rule and legitimate uses. Thus as a forerunner to 
understanding the CCTV network the ideological terms of 'order' and 'rule' more 
broadly will be explored. What is the meaning of 'partnership' in the city centre? 
How is 'regeneration' articulated? What is the meaning of 'order' - how is it 
signified, for example, through whom and what has been defined as 'responsible'? 
In other words the thesis aims to illuminate the "proper objects of power" (Fiske, 
1993: 235) as articulated by key partnership players involved in the 
implementation and definition of a local politics of growth (Molotch and Logan, 
1985) and, related to this, of how visions of renaissance for the city have produced 
a context for the identification and targeting of groups and behaviours deemed to 
hinder the regeneration project. 
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Thirdly the thesis aims to provide a local case study of social control in order to 
avoid an ahistorical. and universalised account of social control that has plagued 
much of the literature (McMahon, 1992; Sumner, 1997a). The thesis will develop a 
theoretically informed analysis of CCTV as a social ordering practice, which will 
be interrelated with extra-local developments and issues in contemporary social 
control. In this sense the thesis can be contextualised within a wider set of 
considerations affecting the rule of cities more generally, and the practices of social 
control therein, in that: 
Research is ... beginning to examine the way that entrepreneurial landscapes - both real and imaginary - are ideologically charged 
and, moreover, to consider how urban regimes are capable of 
organising space and mobilising its meaning so as to give a 
semblance of democratic legitimacy to their activities (Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996: 163) 
Within much of the social control literature the 'rationalities' or 'mentalities' of 
control, as characterised particularly within the 'governmentality' literature, have 
been assumed rather than demonstrated. The reading of official texts and 
pronouncements - what Cohen (1979) identified as 'social-control talk' - can be an 
important source of understanding the activity of 'social control agents' or the 
proclivities derivative of neo-liberal rule. However, a more qualitative 
understanding of 'social control' would require moving beyond assumptions found 
only in official discourse. The development of CCTV in Liverpool will therefore 
be illuminated through the use of qualitative interviews undertaken with those at 
the hub of city centre management and rule. In adopting this line of inquiry the 
thesis will seek to explore critically the 'mentalities', social processes and 
ideologies of those agents in the social ordering process. This will further reinforce 
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the focus of the thesis upon not just the technologies and techniques of social 
control but also their deeper social and normative rationalisation. 
In order to achieve the aims outlined above the thesis will be organised as follows. 
Chapter Two will provide an overview of the theoretical issues surrounding the 
concept of social control with particular reference to post-Foucaildian 
contributions. More particularly, the chapter will focus on how the relations 
between social control, power, state and social order has been theorised within and 
between perspectives. Within the post-Foucauldian literature a shift in 
understanding social control and social order hinged around a 'post-statist' 
conceptualisation has had an important bearing on an understanding of what drives 
contemporary control practices. These new theorisations deemed social control to 
be underpinned by an a-moral and risk bound rationale within a conceptualisation 
of power that is diffuse and multiple. These important theoretical assumptions will 
be outlined before being critically examined in the next and subsequent chapters. 
In the light of material in Chapter Two it will be important to set out the theoretical 
framework for this study. In order to analytically approach CCTV in Liverpool and 
materialise its position within particular social relations, Chapter Three will set out 
the theoretical framework for rethinking the relationships between the state, power 
and social order. The power of the state, and its scope for action, has never 
followed a static or fixed strategic path but has constituted a creative field of 
II 
institutional arrangement and experimentation with the aim of managing and 
ordering social relations. The chapter will identify the processes of material and 
ideological power and their manifestation within the public-private partnerships of 
neo-liberal rule. Indeed, it is a contention of the thesis that these partnership 
arrangements have rescaled the state form and reconfigured the power to define 
and enact local social ordering strategies within which CCTV has played a central 
part. 
Chapter Four will provide a methodological discussion concerning the rationale 
adopted for the study of CCTV which, in the thesis, moves beyond an evaluative 
methodology and into a critical investigation of the normative nature of social 
control practice. The chapter will provide a critical examination of social ordering 
agents - the locally powerful. In 'studying up' the research asked 'who are the 
powerful'? This is particularly important given the reconfigured field of power 
discussed in the previous chapter and in the next. 
Chapter Five will provide a general discussion of the growth of the modem city 
from the nineteenth century to the present and the development of social control 
therein. In particular the chapter will focus on the rise of the 'entrepreneurial city' 
of the late twentieth century and what many writers have identified as an 
intensification in the discourses and practices of 'security' and 'order' within this 
city form. Within the UK a number of government initiatives have appeared to 
reflect these broad trends and set in place various mechanisms for urban partners to 
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engineer and formalise social control strategies. The chapter will discuss how 
various writers have understood changes in urban rule and social control. 
Chapter Six will begin the case study by providing an overview of social control 
and governance in Liverpool between 1800 and the 1980s. The chapter will 
illustrate the particular problems of controlling the streets of Liverpool and the 
targets of control, as perceived by various writers. This will be important in 
illuminating historical continuities and discontinuities in social control practice. 
The chapter will conclude with a focus on the 'image problem' peculiar to 
Liverpool. The label of 'problem city' became an issue for neo-liberal city 
managers, marketing strategists and policing agencies concerned with restructuring 
the city's political economy towards the millennium. 
In seeking to place the CCTV network within wider social relations, Chapter Seven 
will utilise interview material to discuss the development and trajectory of the neo- 
liberal state in Liverpool city centre. This will be done in order to illuminate the 
problems that were identified by the locally powerful in bringing 'partners' 
together, and to how those problems were managed, in part, through the 
formulation of strategic city visions and the promotion of an idealised urban 
aesthetic and function. These broad visions of city centre rule form the normative 
backdrop and the context within which to understand the development of the 
CCTV network. 
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Having explored the wider social relations and strategies of rule in contemporary 
Liverpool, Chapter Eight will focus on the development and rationale for the 
CCTV network. Utilising interview data, the chapter places CCTV within the 
wider material and ideological repositioning and re-imaging of Liverpool through 
the local state. The chapter will focus upon the management and targeting of the 
camera network as articulated by the locally powerful and urban security managers. 
As other writers have suggested, the practice of social control has rarely or ever 
unfolded in a seamless and always coherent manner. In recognition of this, Chapter 
Eight will discuss the tensions and contradictions within the surveillance network 
of the neo-liberal state that produced fractures and conflict within and between 
locally powerful networks. 
In conclusion, Chapter Nine will revisit and draw together the central themes and 
arguments of the thesis. The chapter will provide a discussion of the implications 
arising from this local study in terms of their contribution to contemporary debates 
around the interrelationship between social control, social order and power. 
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Chapter Two 
Social Control, Social Order and the City 
The aim of this chapter is to shed theoretical light upon the key concerns of this 
thesis through an examination of conceptions of social control that emerged 
particularly in the second half of the twentieth century. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, central to this investigation are the processes of social control that 
have increased in their sophistication and complexity in the modem city (Davis, 
1990; Fyfe, 1995 
This chapter will briefly review the early social scientific literature on social 
control before focusing upon contemporary debates inspired by governmentality 
theorists who have radically shifted our understanding away from these earlier 
formulations. 
Liberal and functionalist theories of social control 
Social control has been and remains a historically and politically informed concept 
tied to utopian and dystopian visions of social order (Sumner, 1997: 6-7). Early 
writings formulated the problem of social control within a broader political drive to 
secure a popular commitment to the social and moral order. The "dizzying effects 
of rapid change" in the early twentieth century pointed to "the apparent lack of an 
overweening moral force to guide people towards co-operative, peaceful and 
harmonious adaptations to this maelstrom of modernity" (Sumner, 1997: 1-2). The 
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new sociologies of social control were concerned with the breakdown of traditional 
communal ties and controls in the face of a laissez-faire and unregulated capitalism. 
The lack of regulation and order within complex industrial societies proved a 
central focus for a liberal sociology that viewed "the powers of the state" as 
performing an effective role in reconciling or regulating conflicts between 'interest 
groups' within the framework of capitalism" (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 
1975: 129). 
Armed with new conceptions about the nature and role of the state, community and 
the individual, and the relationships between them, the sociologies of social order 
developed the concept of social control. These developments underpinned liberal 
and functionalist perspectives that dominated the field of social control up until the 
1960s. The work of Emile Durkheim was indicative in this respect, in its focus on 
the necessity of social solidarity through moral unity, provided an analytical context 
within which early trajectories of social control developed. 
For Durkheim the great 'industrial centres' or cities represented the rapidity of 
social change and possibilities for destabilising social order. For him, the problem 
of modem industrial society was to be found in the weakening of earlier communal 
collective sentiments in the face of growing sectional solidarities associated with 
the complex division of labour under industrialisation. The complex and 
functionally differentiated inter-human relations found in the city were 
characteristic of organic solidarity and it was here that the 'anomic' character of 
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modem societies is most apparent. The development of the modem city was 
thought to undermine traditional moral ties and segment them into less unified and 
isolated moral communities. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, writers after Durkheim further stressed the 
relations between the city, disorganization and social control. These concerns were 
developed in the work of the 'Chicago school' in the 1920s, where a sociological 
critique was pioneered to explore the prevailing social conditions in the expanding 
cities. The 'social ecology' approach to the understanding of cities, particularly in 
the work of Park, highlighted the notion of social control as "the central fact and 
the central problem of society" (Park, 1921 cited in Sumner, 1994: 45). The 
inevitable 'march of progress', changes in industrial organization and movements 
in population were thought to correspond to shifts in "the habits, sentiments and 
character of the urban population" (Park, 1967a: 23). The processes of atornisation 
and individualism dissolved the moral order as it was spontaneously derived 
through the family and church (Park, 1967a: 24). The problem of social control 
became pronounced as the growth of the city loosened traditional moral ties to 
produce both "good and evil in human nature in excess" (Park, 1967a: 46). The 
progressive aspect of city growth brought with it a downside in the form of "social 
junk" as evidenced in poverty, vice and crime amongst those who "have fallen out 
of line of industrial progress" (Park, 1967b: 109). In this way, Park echoed those 
nineteenth century concerns with the 'dangerous classes' when he wrote of the de- 
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moralized city zones, where the population tended "to suppress characters which 
unite them with the normal types about them" (Park, 1967a: 45). 
The work of Durkheim and Park postulated social control as a reaction to the 
fragmentation of morality and culture associated with modem urbanism. These 
writers presented a subtle criticism of laissez-faire policies which were seen to 
encourage economic, political and moral de-regulation. The concept of social 
control after 1945, however, was developed in a qualitatively different way through 
the work of Talcott Parsons. Parsons stated that; "deviance if tolerated beyond 
certain limits will tend to change or disintegrate the [social] system" (1951: 206). 
Put simply, social control was necessary as a "preventative" or "forestalling" 
mechanism in order to re-motivate "the actor not to embark on processes of 
deviance" (Parsons, 1951: 298). The normative patterns of "common culture" were 
46more or less institutionalized" (1951: 250) and, following Durkheim, were also 
reflected in the integrative functions of law and other social control mechanisms 
(Cotterrell, 1984: 88). 
The liberal and functionalist proponents of social control argued for a moral and/or 
rational binding between the individual and the social. Indeed, without such bonds 
the idea of 'the social' would collapse. Such visions of social control expressed a 
desire for social harmony and consensus. Within the liberal and functional 
traditions, 'social control' has been depicted as a set of more or less co-ordinated 
practices that arise to reflect 'community values' and 'social norms' that are usually 
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perceived as uncontested social entities. ' Though all express a concern with the 
means and ends of social control, these theorists are less concerned to investigate 
the powerful forces underpinning communal fragmentation and social 
disintegration, i. e., the very process they lament. 
Social reaction and neo-Marxist theories of social control 
During the 1960s and in contrast to liberal and functionalist perspectives, social 
control came to be theorised as sectoral, serving particular powerful interests at the 
expense of the collective good (Cohen, 1983). Liberal and functionalist accounts 
were questioned forcefully by social reaction theorists for their view of social 
control that "started and finished with the lack of control-leads-to-crime causal 
sequence" (Hudson, 1997: 454), Becker (1963), Lemert (1967) and Goffman 
(1961), challenged the orthodoxy of previous control theories in order to raise a 
different set of questions around the nature of social control. The focus switched 
from the deviant act itself to those moral entrepreneurs, rule makers, and rule 
enforcers that operated inside and outside of the state and served to create deviant 
categories as pre-requisites in the processes of criminalisation (Becker, 1963; 
Gusfield, 1963). The power to label some acts as deviant and others as not 
necessitated a reconsideration of social control not as a neutral reactive force but as 
an active process that selectively defined deviance in line with the particular 
interests of controlling agents and institutions. The activities of control agents in 
1 This view of social control in many respects mirrored how the locally powerful represented control 
practices in Liverpool city centre - namely, as reflective of an idealised 'common good'. Chapter 
Seven discusses the articulations of the locally powerful more fully. 
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influencing the criminalisation process, legislative change and patterns of 
enforcement need not necessarily reflect a consensus of interest amongst the wider 
population (Becker, 1963). Within this perspective, social control intensified and 
amplified deviance through the organs of a wider 'control culture' that bestowed 
key roles for the media, community 'leaders', as well as formal control agents in 
the generation of moral panics and the identification of societal folk-devils (Cohen, 
1972). 
In recognising the advances made by social reaction theory in focusing on the 
activities of control agents, the emerging neo-Marxist analysis in the early 1970s 
sought to broaden the theorisation of social control and deviance in order to explain 
how: 
... particular historical periods, characterized by particular sets of 
social relationships and means of production, give rise to attempts 
by the economically and politically powerful to order society in 
particular ways (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973: 220). 
Thus the activities of control agents needed to be situated within a broader 
recognition and critique of capitalist power and inequality along with an 
acknowledgment that the power to label "is determined extraneously" (Taylor, 
Walton and Young, 1973: 161). In situating the problem of social control within 
the reproductive processes of capitalist social relations, neo-Marxist theories 
incorporated a revisionist critique of control strategies that further challenged the 
progressive perspectives associated with liberal and functionalist accounts. For 
these writers the disciplinary regularities of the nineteenth century factory system 
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served as a basis for the development of more widely situated forms of social 
control aimed at producing a disciplined existence upon the workforce through 
placing time and space constraints within the school, prison and other institutions. 
Other neo-Marxist analysts within a structuralist tradition stressed the wider role of 
the state and law as lying at the centre of understanding control strategies in the 
twentieth century. Important in this respect was Poulantzas (1978) who drew 
attention to the monopoly of physical violence within the capitalist state and its role 
in keeping internal social order. This particular form of neo-Marxist analysis has 
sought to straddle the problems of consent and coercion in understanding the 
relationship between social control and the popular masses. Neo-Marxists have 
tended to stress the coercive aspects of social control (Poulantzas, 1978: 81). More 
accurately, the latter concept has been conceptually subordinated within Marxism 
to state control. 
This form of analysis was not acceptable to all Marxists who sought a complex 
theorisation of the combinations "of force and authority, of regulation and liberties, 
of coercive habit and legitimate consent" which had become dissolved in 
perspectives that caricatured police, social workers, teachers, philanthropists and 
reformers as "simply and solely the unconscious agents of state repression" (Hall 
and Scraton, 1981: 470). The neo-Gramscian approach of Hall et al (1978) offered 
a more sophisticated analysis of social control within a more general theorisation of 
the capitalist state. Consent does not arise spontaneously as in liberal theories; it is, 
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on the contrary, something which is organised through powerful institutions 
charged with managing the social terrain. Such institutions of the state thus become 
important sites for an investigation of the organisation of social control and the 
form it may take. 2 Hall et al (1978) developed this view of the state in terms of how 
it enlarges the cultural and social basis of its rule. For these authors the concept of 
social control served only a "general descriptive" purpose and lacked historical 
specificity. Previous social control theories were thought to be limited in that they 
were not "premised on a theory of the state ... of a particular phase of capitalist 
development" (Hall et al, 1978: 195). The specific form of the state must be 
understood not only for its legal and coercive capacity but in its "role of leadership, 
of direction, of education and tutelage - the sphere, not of domination by force, but 
by the 'production of consent"' (Hall et al, 1978: 202). This led to forms of analysis 
of the ideological aspects of social and/or state control - of how popular consent for 
state coercion was produced and struggled over; of how the hegemony of ruling 
economic and political alliances was established through negotiation and 
compromise; and of how, ultimately, in times of economic crisis, the popular 
masses come to support the "processes of criminalisation through which consensus 
is forced rather than forged" (Sim et al, 1987: 63). Shifts in the control apparatus of 
the state are underpinned by processes of criminalisation fuelled by recurring moral 
panics, law and order crusades, and a more intensive penalization aimed at 
2 In illuminating this point Chapter Three will discuss the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis 
for thinking about the state, its form and role in shaping the contours of contemporary social control. 
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'enemies within' - 'the underclass', criminals, the 'workshy', illegal immigrants, 
militant feminists and those with alternative lifestyles. More repressive legal 
censures against such categories have been built upon and legitimated by a social 
authoritarianism that has fed a growing 'fear of crime' buttressed with a decline in 
social discipline. Thus state control, within the parameters of a 'critical 
criminology', has served to manage dissent within an established order rooted in 
the 'determining contexts' of class relations, patriarchy and neo-colonialism 
(Scraton and Chadwick, 1991). 
3 
However, critical theories of social control that emerged from the 1960s were 
subsequently challenged from the late 1970s by perspectives with radically 
different questions and approaches to thinking about social control, social order and 
power. The 1980s witnessed a proliferation of post- structuralist and post-Marxist 
theories that attacked the theoretical tenets of the critical social science that 
emerged in the post war period, particularly for: its focus on the relationship 
between class power and social control; its prioritisation of state activity; its 
universalistic explanatory framework; and the typically negative view conferred 
3 In contrast 'left-realist' perspectives have challenged the 'idealism' within the above account - 
particularly in terms of the omnipresent authoritarian state. Left realists have stressed the reality of 
rising crime rates as a consequence of economic marginalisation affecting lower working class 
conimunities (particularly in black areas) in the inner cities in the 1980's (Lea and Young, 1984). 
The authors acknowledge penal severity as a feature of state responses towards the economically 
marginal. However, left realists have retained a notion of social control in what they have described 
as a progressive multi-agency strategy towards the creation of welfare interventions, community 
associations and a 'democratic' policing policy in the deprived areas of the city (Young, 1991). 
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upon social control processes. It is to these theoretical developments that the next 
part of the chapter turns. 
Neo-Foucauldian Perspectives on Social Control 
In his concern to construct a 'micro-physics of power', Foucault (1977) focused 
upon the 'technologies' of 'disciplinary power' that were developed as new 
rationalities for punishment in the prisons that emerged between 1760 and 1840. In 
studying this earlier particular period and beyond, Foucault set out to examine the 
shifts in the nature, rationale and techniques of punishment - from the public 
spectacles of torture and execution (monarchical punishment) to the techniques of 
4soul training' towards the production of obedient individuals (carceral 
punishment). Disciplinary power, aimed at training the 'soul' of criminals and 
delinquents, developed in the new prisons where human existence through space 
and time became subject to processes of classification, surveillance and 
routinisation. Underpinning these mechanisms of control was the exercise of a 
normalising judgement carried out by emergent professional groups armed with a 
new scientific knowledge developed within the disciplines of psychology and 
criminology. With the development of the prison, the professional gaze instilled a 
new form of disciplinary power under the principle of panopticism. This ensured a 
more intense, efficient and automatic functioning of power (Foucault, 1977: 206). 
Panopticism was built into the architecture of the prison, but was also primarily a 
I 
"political technology" that provided a laboratory to monitor, train and correct 
individual behaviour (Ibid: 203-205). Under a panoptic prison regime "of conscious 
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and permanent visibility", inmates were encouraged to regulate and discipline their 
own behaviour under conditions of constant, yet unverifiable, observation 
(Foucault, 1977: 201). Thus panoptic power functioned 'automatically': 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power 
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection (Foucault, 1977: 202-203). 
For Foucault, disciplinary power displayed a tendency to become operative outside 
of the prison walls as a new instrument of government that sought "not to punish 
less, but to punish better", and with "more universality and necessity; to insert the 
power to punish more deeply into the social body" (Foucault, 1977: 82). The spread 
of disciplinary power brought with it the possibility of "the utopia of the perfectly 
govemed city" (Foucault, 1977: 198), where the process of normalisation would 
proliferate and spread throughout carceral institutions. 
The project of normalisation was thought to filter throughout the social body and 
create power-knowledge spirals that have as their object the creation of categories 
of 'delinquency', 'deviancy' and a host of other 'abnormalities' to be made 
'knowable' and controlled. Thus the disciplines of the social sciences are 
implicated in control processes towards the management of entire human 
populations - what Foucault termed bio-power. Both the sites and targets of social 
control are understood as varied and involve, for example, the identification and 
segregation of the sane from the insane, the criminal from the law abiding and the 
sexually normal from the abnormal (Foucault, 1973; 1977; 1978). For Foucault, 
25 
control processes are bound up with the power to label, classify, segregate and 
rehabilitate towards the production of the correctly functioning and productive 
individual. The promise of panoptic power is thus the disciplined society -a 
knowable, regulated and controlled society with a new economy of efficiency: 
In each of its applications, [panopticism] makes it possible to perfect 
the operation of power. It does this in several ways: because it can 
reduce the number of those who exercise it, while increasing the 
number on whom it is exercised. Because it is possible to intervene 
at any moment and because the constant pressure acts even before 
the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed (Foucault, 
1977: 206). 
Foucault's writings suggested the existence of a set of complex relationships 
between social control. ) power and social order. His theorisation of these 
relationships differentiated him from liberal, functionalist and Neo-Marxist 
perspectives. Foucault challenged the idea that social control develops in line with 
prevailing and established political and economic interests. At the very least, the 
relationship between control mechanisms and wider structures of power was 
rendered unclear. This in part was due to the way Foucault theorised power in 
modem societies: 
In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 
'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the 
overall effect of its strategic positions - an effect that is manifested 
and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated 
(Foucault, 1977: 26-27). 
Power is also conceived of as creative and not merely repressive and negative in its 
effects: "power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and 
rituals of truth" (Foucault, 1977: 194). For Foucault, an analysis of social control 
and its disciplinary mechanisms must therefore direct attention to those local, 
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regional and "relatively autonomous" institutions in order to try and "locate power 
at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character" 
(Foucault, 1984: 211). Furthermore, "let us not, therefore, ask why certain people 
want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy" and instead 
"attempt to study the myriad bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as 
a result of the effects of power" (Foucault, 1984: 212). This view radically altered 
how the state is positioned in theories of social control and its role in reproducing 
relations of domination. It is not that the state is irrelevant as a centre of power, but 
neither is it to be accorded a privileged location from where power and social 
control emanate. 
A unitary and unifying concept of social control is, therefore, rejected with 
particular reference to the determinism identified in Marxist theories of the state 
(Lacombe, 1996: 540). Within Foucault's writings, a strict separation can be 
identified between powerful interests in society and circulating forms of 
disciplinary control (Garland, 1990). Indeed, the interests and values which may 
underpin social control practices (a central concern of all previous theories) are not 
the prime focus of analysis at all, in that: 
The bourgeoisie could not care less about delinquents, about their 
punishment and rehabilitation, which economically have little 
importance, but it is concerned about the complex of mechanisms 
with which delinquency is controlled, pursued, punished and 
reformed etc (Foucault, 1984: 216). 
It is precisely these mechanisms, diversely situated and de-centred, that provide the 
focus for an "ascending analysis of power, starting ... from its infinitesimal 
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mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own 
techniques and tactics ... " (Foucault, 1984: 213). The fragmentary and complex 
networks of social control with their "methods of observation, techniques of 
registration, procedures of investigation and research, apparatus of control" are 
distinguished from a "juridical edifice of sovereignty" (the state) and as such 
cannot be considered "ideological constructs" that fulfil the requirements of a 
"generalized bourgeoisie" (Foucault, 1984: 215-216). 
Foucault was always at pains to point out the localised and autonomous forms of 
social control that lie beyond the state and which are targeted at a range of 
'illegalities'. His work undermined the differences thought to exist between 
punitive and non-punitive institutions, as the spread of disciplinary power invests 
itself deeper into the social body in creating "hundreds of tiny theatres of 
punishment" within the geography of the "punitive city" (Foucault, 1977; 113). 
These theoretical insights have been refined, developed and adapted by various 
writers within criminology. It is to these 'post-Foucauldian' perspectives that the 
chapter will now turn. 
A dispersal of discipline? 
In a range of work, Cohen (1979; 1983; 1985; 1987) critically developed Foucault's 
ideas around what became known as the 'dispersal of discipline thesis'. This thesis 
focused on: a move away from state control and intervention towards informal 
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control; a move away from the impulse to rigidly classify and segregate the 
'dangerous' towards de-professionalised and less remote forms of control; the 
gradual replacement of the closed institution with more benign forms of community 
controls; and a shift in the understanding and response to crime from rehabilitation 
to behavioural forms of control. For Cohen (1985: 79), "the most fundamental fact 
"'bout what is going on in the new agencies is that it is much the same as what went 
on and is still going on in the old systems". Thus the dispersal of social control into 
various sites - community corrections; intermediate treatment; neighbourhood 
watch; private security patrols and the use of surveillance cameras to monitor 
public space - had produced a number of developments of which Cohen was highly 
critical. Firstly, the move to informal, private and communal controls was thought 
to be 'widening the net' of the formal system and bringing about "an increase in the 
total number of deviants getting into the system in first place". Secondly, this led to 
a 'thinning of the mesh' and increased "the overall level of intervention, with old 
and new deviants being subject to levels of intervention (including traditional 
institutionalization) which they might not have previously received" (Cohen, 1985: 
44). Thirdly, the dispersal of social control had blurred the 'old' boundaries 
between formal/informal and public/private forms of control, and this has further 
amplified the problem of disorder. 
Finally, the upshot of these developments was thought to be the enhanced 
i penetration P of the state into ever more areas of social life. Through these 
developments "community control has supplemented rather than replaced 
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traditional methods" of social control (1985: 44). The dispersal of discipline, it was 
thought, would attempt to keep the deviant within the community through 
preventative measures and monitoring, and promote a "utopia of the invisibly 
controlling city" (1985: 230). 
These developments also worked around an "exclusionary" impulse towards the 
stigmatization and segregation of those deviants who cannot or will not be 
nlý absorbed. This represented the "utopia of the visibly purified city" with suitable 
"metaphors of banishment ... separation ... reservations and barriers" (Cohen, 
1985: 230). The 'soft' and 'hard' edges of social control were seen to work towards 
inclusionary and exclusionary ideals in order to segregate the 'undesirable' and 
incapacitate the persistent criminal, thus reassuring the public "that the state means 
business" (1985: 234). 
Thus the dispersal of discipline thesis has pointed to important developments in the 
nature of social control. Following on from Cohen's observations these debates 
have focused around the supposed intensification of economic and political 
'globalisation', and the impact this is thought to be having on the restructuring of 
the relations between the central and local state and consequently the shifts 
occurring in the provision of policing and social control. The pressures emanating 
from managerialism, privatisation policies and the competing forces of 
'globalisation' and 'localisation' are thought to be undermining the central state's 
111" ability to co-ordinate and manage a range of social programmes -a form of 
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(. governing without government' - that amounts to a 'hollowing out' of the state 
(Rhodes, 1997). For Jessop (1993: 22), "the hollow state metaphor" has displayed 
two trends. Firstly, the national state retains its 'headquarter functions' of executive 
authority and national sovereignty. Secondly, the translation of this authority into 
control is "becoming limited by a complex displacement of powers". 
For many scholars, state intervention and power has been considerably curtailed in 
the decades running up to the twenty-first century. Other writers, however, have 
been less committed to the idea of a demise in the importance of the state. The 
proliferation of 'new', and local, policing and crime prevention 'partnerships' 
during the 1990s between community, voluntary, corporate and policing agencies 
may not amount to a demise in state power but rather "may be better understood as 
representing new, partial elements within the existing economic and political 
formation which co-exist alongside other (older) modes of administration and 
regulation" (Crawford, 1997: 233). Overall, these debates have highlighted the 
difficulties in theorising developments in policing and social control at the local 
level and render improbable generalised perspectives on these changes. The state 
has never assumed an outright monopoly on policing and social control (Johnson, 
1992) and those theories that posit a definite break with previous developments are 
limited in this respect. However, it is clear that an understanding of these shifts and 
their possible direction entails an understanding of what is meant by 'the state', 
along with an understanding of the changes in the state form. Thus the emergence 
and meaning of specific 'partnerships' and the local socio-political landscape 
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through which they operate will remain important for state theorists. These issues 
will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
The social scientific debates highlighted in this section have pointed to late 
twentieth century changes in the political economy of social control that ushered in 
(, new' institutional arrangements and domains of expertise and blurred the 
boundaries between formal/informal, public/private and coercive/consensual. The 
increase in 'security' patrols, closed circuit television, consumer surveillance and 
the ubiquitous spread in responsibility for crime prevention has led a number of 
writers to theorise a 'new' social control in a manner which has been influenced by 
the writers discussed in this chapter so far. It is to these theoretical developments 
the chapter now turns. 
Social control and 'risk' 
Cohen (1985) identified the seeds of a "new behaviourism" that emerged during the 
1970s to challenge the hegemony of rehabilitation and treatment of offenders. The 
new behaviourism' was increasingly being used to legitimate a form of preventative 
social control. This 'new realism' was not concerned with the motivations and 
causes of crime and instead concerned itself with formulating strategies toward the 
containment and surveillance of intractable environments and groups. Within this 
discourse, crime became no more than a legal infraction, while deviance became 
conceptualized as that which strayed from 'natural' majoritarian values. If crime 
was perceived as an inevitable and normal social fact then the agencies of social 
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control, it was argued, would come to be concerned with the minimisation and 
containment of 'criminality' and its harms. 
Feeley and Simon (1992; 1994) crystallised these developments in risk based social 
control. They identified an emerging scepticism towards liberal interventionist 
strategies of social control. Such strategies emphasised rehabilitation and the 
proportioning of responsibility, regarding "making the guilty 'pay for their crime' 
or changing them" (Feeley and Simon, 1994: 173). For these writers, a 'new 
penology' was under development that was 'actuarial', and orientated through 
"techniques identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by 
dangerousness" (1994: 173). The emphasis on the management of crime made this 
form of control different from disciplinary control: 
Disciplinary practices focus on the distribution of a behaviour within 
a limited population ... this distribution is around a norm... [I'll. Actuarial techniques seek instead to maximize the efficiency of the 
population as it stands. Rather than seeking to change people 
('normalize them, in Foucault's apt phrase) an actuarial regime 
seeks to manage them in place (Simon, 1988 cited in Hudson, 1996: 
154). 
The importation of risk assessment into the field of crime control has a resonance 
with neo-classical understandings of individual behaviour (Wilson, 1975) and with 
neo-liberal notions of choice and responsibility (Murray, 1990). The management 
of the 'intractable crime problem' promises greater efficiency through risk 
assessment and loss prevention strategies. 
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The rise of actuarialism and risk-based technologies has raised a number of 
important issues in the conceptualisation and interpretation of social control 
practices. First, actuarialism is thought to be displacing the moral underpinnings of 
control and order with new technical modes of intervention that are both "extra- 
judicial" (Defert, 1991: 212) and concerned with the economics of probability 
(Ewald, 1991). Shearing and Stenning (1985) argued that disciplinary techniques 
could assume various forms without necessarily being moral in orientation. The 
growth of private policing and mass private property is signalling a "reconstruction 
in the social world" towards "instrumental" ordering practices. The shift to 
preventive strategies has hinged around the "language of profit and loss" which 
has, it is thought, replaced questions of right and wrong (1985: 338). This has led to 
a "restructuring of our institutions for the maintenance of order and a substantial 
erosion by the private sector of the state's assumed monopoly over policing and, by 
implication, justice" (1985: 496). For these authors it has been the rise of large 
commercial complexes - such as Disneyland - that has undern-iined the unitary 
order of a sovereign state. The spread of disciplinary power, confirmed and driven 
by a new instrumentalism, has sought the maximisation of profit and brought with 
it "not one conception of order but many" (Shearing and Stenning, 1985: 497). 
Secondly, as well as appearing to be uninterested in moral questions, 4 these new 
penal practices, based as they are within authoritative expert domains, contribute to 
4 The 'apparent' a-morality of these practices will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight and 
returned to in the Conclusion to the thesis. 
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an appearance of functioning outside of politics. As will be explored in Chapter 
Seven these institutional relationships are not merely technical, but are underpinned 
by a normative set of relations that depict idealised representations of local social 
order. Indeed, the development of cost-effective risk control strategies has moved 
crime control to "a de-politicized and hence uncontentious, scientific/technical 
realm" (Pitts, 1992: 142). 
Thirdly, the operation of an amorphous new penological venture has encouraged 
new sites of responsibility for crime control and questioned once again fixed 
distinctions between state and civil society, public and private spheres. These 
developments have informed the theoretical contours of an influential body of 
literature that has drawn upon Foucault's 'govemmentality thesis'. In its 
application this work has challenged the analytical use of sociological concepts K, 
such as social control. ) the state and social order to understand strategies of 
4governmental rule' in the contemporary setting. It is to a consideration of this 
literature that the chapter now turns. 
Governmentality: power and social control beyond the state 
In recent years a body of work has emerged under the banner of the 'history of the 
present' group (Barry et al, 1996) that has extended Foucault's notion of 
'governmentality', and provided a broader consideration of his earlier concerns 
around the spread of disciplinary control throughout the social body. This work has 
by no means been homogenous in its approach to social control. Indeed, it is more 
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accurate to see it as a contested terrain around, for example, issues to do with the 
continuing role of sovereign and coercive techniques of rule (Stenson, 1999) as 
well as a general neglect in this work of processes of political economy (Stenson, 
2002). 
Foucault's later writings laid some of the foundations for an approach to studying 
what he called governmentality. He argued that in order to understand how 
societies are governed it is necessary to move beyond an analytical focus on the 
state: 
The excessive value attributed to the problem of the state is 
expressed ... (in) ... the form of analysis that exists in reducing the 
state to a certain number of functions ... yet this reductionist vision 
of the relative importance of the state's role never the less invariably 
renders it absolutely as a target needing to be attacked and a 
privileged position needing to be occupied. But the state, no more 
probably today than at any other time in its history, does not have 
this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor ... this 
importance; maybe after all the state is no more than a composite 
reality and mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more 
limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important is our 
modernity - that is for the present - is not so much the etatisation of 
society, as the 'governmentalisation' of the state (Foucault, 1991: 
103). 
For Foucault 'technologies of government' have allowed the state to survive and as 
mechanisms of rule do not emanate from 'a state' they need to be theorised as "at 
once internal and external to the state" Jbid: 103). Thus the focus on technologies 
of rule re-poses the problem of control as the problem of government - that is, 
"finding answers to the question of what it is for an individual, and for a society or 
population of individuals, to be governed or governable" (Gordon, 1991: 36). With 
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these objectives in mind governmental rationalities can be investigated in terms of 
how they operate as strategies of power that not only constrain action but also "act 
upon the possibilities of action of other people" (Foucault cited in Hunt and 
Wickham, 1994: 24). In broad terms, governmentality refers to the targeting of the 
population as an object of social scientific knowledge in both social and individual 
settings, and is orientated towards the maximisation of health, wealth, economic 
production and social stability. Governmentality operates through a triangle of 
power: "sovereignty - discipline - government, which has as its primary target the 
population and its essential mechanism the apparatus of security" (Foucault, 1991: 
102). The rationalities and practices of rule towards shaping and regulating conduct 
represent a "pluralisation of modem government" that is most apparent in forms of 
liberal and neo-liberal rule. The 'pluralisation' of government contributes "towards 
the relativisation of the notional boundary line between state and civil society": 
Among these processes might be numbered the initiating roles of 
private individuals and organizations in the exploring and defining 
of new governmental tasks (many aspects of social hygiene and 
medicine, social work, the collection of statistics, etc); the cross 
fertilizing interplay between different agencies and expertises, 
public and private alike (criminal anthropology and accident 
insurance; industrial sociology and psychotherapy); the propensity 
of public institutions of government to secrete within themselves 
their own multiple spaces of partly autonomous authority; the 
different forms of delegation represented by the 'quango' ... whose 
functioning as governing institutions rests on their positioning 
exterior to the state apparatus (Gordon, 1991: 36). 
Investigations into these forms of rule have developed a focus on how sovereign 
power is checked and consequently how rule through 'freedom' and 'liberty' can be 
encouraged beyond the state within a range of institutional settings. 'Freedom' is 
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not viewed as an "ideological fiction nor an existential feature of existence" but as 
a vehicle for government through procedures that attempt to enact a 
'responsibilised liberty' (Barry et al, 1996: 8). In this sense neo-liberal rule 
attempts to mobilise the individual citizen as 'player and partner', to maximise self- 
potential as a consumer who makes choices in the market. Self-regulation, 'care of 
the self' and individual training are the optimising technologies of rule within neo- 
liberal government strategies (Gordon, 1991). Rose and Miller (1992: 175) have 
developed this further, to argue that neo-liberal: 
... government is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, 
whose role is not one of weaving an all-pervasive web of 'social 
control', but of enacting assorted attempts at the calculated 
administration of diverse aspects of conduct through countless, often 
competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, inducement, 
management, incitement, motivation and encouragement (Rose and 
Miller, 1992: 175). 
Miller and Rose (1990), Rose and Miller (1992) and Barry et al (1996) have 
elaborated the governmentality thesis through the linked notions of 'power beyond 
the state', 'action at a distance' and the role of expertise in understanding neo- 
liberal forms of political regulation. These writers have considered governmentality 
as being first of all a discursive activity: "a kind of intellectual machinery or 
apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way as it is amenable to political 
programming" (Miller and Rose, 1990: 42). Forms of reasoning produce 
technologies of government which under "advanced liberalism" include 
government by audit, marketisation, privatisation, quangoisation and the devolution 
of responsibility for the management of various risks - "for health, wealth and 
happiness" - to non-state institutions and private individuals (Rose, 1996: 54-57). 
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Studies in this area have focused on the objects of governmentality - the city (Hunt, 
1996), welfare (Rose and Miller, 1992), empire (Barry, 1996), the school (Hunter, 
1996) - that in becoming knowable lend themselves more "amenable to 
intervention and regulation" (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5). Technologies of rule 
aimed at regulating the movement of goods, persons, the health of the population 
and criminality have become pluralised across a range of expert domains, and this 
has important implications for understanding political power and the possibilities 
for realising social order. Under neo-liberal conditions, therefore, a state centred 
model of power is inadequate where "centres of government are multiple" (Rose 
and Miller, 1992: 185). Furthermore: 
The technologies and devices that are assembled into the apparatus 
of a state have neither the functionality nor unity often ascribed to 
them. The 'power of the state' is a resultant not a cause, an outcome 
of the composition and assembling of actors, flows, buildings, 
relations of authority into relatively durable associations mobilized, 
to a greater or lesser extent, towards the achievement of particular 
objectives by common means. This is not a matter of the domination 
of a 'network' by 'the state' but rather a matter of translation (Rose, 
1996: 42-43) 
'Translation' refers to the process of linkage between "loose and flexible" political 
programmes within specific localities whereby "diversity becomes composed" and 
actors forge common interests, understandings and goals through flexible networks 
that establish commonality regarding the "nature, character and causes of problems 
facing various individuals and groups" (Rose and Miller, 1992: 184). Under neo- 
liberal conditions, 'community' or the plurality of communities becomes the means 
of government in encouraging self-responsibilisation, choice and empowerment. 
Thus 'social control' is really to be understood as something exercised not on a 
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fully social and inclusive terrain ('the death of the social'), but through diverse 
moral and/or lifestyle-based communities whose power of self-regulation can be 
nurtured through neo-liberal rule. Furthermore, centres of government are multiple 
and "seek to employ forms of expertise in order to govern society at a distance, 
without recourse to any forms of direct repression or intervention" (Barry et al, 
1996: 14). The notion of 'distance' is viewed as "real as well as metaphorical" 
(Thud). 
The literature in this area has highlighted key problems for the study of regulation 
(government) and political cohesiveness in focusing on the emergence of alliances 
of authority that foster relations of expertise both within and beyond the state. It is 
not social control that is being dispersed here but rather political authority that 
seeks positively to enable, responsibilise and empower "sectors and agencies 
distant from the centre, yet tied to it through a complex of alignments and 
translations" (Barry et al, 1996: 12). 
Within this work there are those who have explicitly rejected the analytical concept 
of ideology in favour of an analysis of the technical aspects of neo-liberal rule 
(Ibid: 11). 5 The governmentality literature has thus forced a reconsideration of 
social control: its relationship to the exercise of power, the state and social order. 
5 More generally the governmentality thesis of Rose and Miller (1992: 177) has rejected the 'realist' 
traditions within sociology that have attempted to identify relations of causation, unearth 'real' 
interests behind political regulation or seek out ideological frameworks. Those analysts working in this 
area admit that studies in governmentality will not "help us know if we should be 'for' or 'against' the 
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Conclusion 
In summary the analysis of contemporary social control has, following Foucault, 
developed around the concept of govemmentality. This form of analysis has been 
influential in the attempt to understand forms of rule that appear to have complex 
relations to, or fall outside of, forms of state rule. This chapter has outlined this 
analysis of 'government' that has drawn attention to the localised public and private 
coalitions that employ "tactics rather than laws" and "the use of laws themselves as 
tactics" (Foucault, 1991: 95). 
The theoretical contours and insights of the governmentality literature and the 
literature around risk will be further assessed in the next chapter. This will be done 
in relation to a series of questions at the heart of this thesis. Thus the key theoretical 
insights discussed above will be placed in the context of the emergence of 
partnerships developed between public and private bodies charged with urban rule 
generally and the instigation of control strategies in particular. How are these 
developments to be understood? Do they, conceptually speaking, fall outside of an 
analysis of the state? What is their relationship to the exercise of power and, 
following this, the exercise of social control in the contemporary city? The next 
chapter will make a series of theoretical arguments that challenge some of the 
assumptions of the social control literature discussed in this chapter. In according 
the state a central theoretical position, this thesis will argue for a material analysis 
present; such judgement should be left to other, perhaps more immediate, contexts and occasions" 
(Barry et al, 1996 16). 
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of social control that is attentive to the ideological, normative and 
sovereign/territorial components of social control strategies as developed through a 
neo-liberal state form. It is to a consideration of these issues that the next chapter 
will tum. 
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Chapter Three 
Social Control and the Neo-Liberal State: A Theoretical Discussion 
Some commentators have ... confused a hollowing-out of the 
state form with a hollowing-out of state power (MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999a: 522). 
... state management should be understood as completing 
some circuits of power and disrupting others (Ling, 1998: 
218). 
This chapter will set out a theoretical framework for analysing contemporary social 
control practices within a neo-liberal state form. I In doing this a number of critical 
steps will be taken to move the analysis away from the risk and governmentality 
theorisations of social control, discussed in the previous chapter. The literature 
around risk and governmentality has made a number of important contributions to 
understanding contemporary social control. Not least of these has been to draw 
attention to the nuances in the techniques and rationales applied in the exercise of 
social control. Allied to this has been the attention given to a range of private 
('non-state') authorities involved in the development and construction of risk 
categories as the driving force for strategies of social control. In short, social 
control within public spaces has been understood as decentred and responsibilised 
across a range of agencies who possess and act upon divergent institutional logics. 
Given this dispersal of power in the field of social control, the possibilities for a 
1 Neo-liberalism is understood here as a political force that has been as ideologically unified as it has 
been contradictory, in its role in recasting the politics of locality. It is however "a class relation and a 
product of class struggle, an attempt to impose value discipline into society" (Eisenschitz and Gough, 
1998: 761). This is in contrast to largely descriptive and technical understandings of neo-liberalism 
discussed in Chapter Two. In this thesis neo-liberalism will infer recognition of political and moral 
struggle at the centre of strategies of rule. 
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coherent and unified social order and a sovereign power over territory have been 
minimised both between and within particular locations. In the light of 
theorisations of risk and contemporary governmentality a number of related 
theoretical questions and difficulties remain for those investigating social control: 
do developments towards a 'new penology' present a fundamental break with 
previous control strategies; are we witnessing a 'death of the social', with the 
development of private and local domains of governance; are sovereign and 
disciplinary control strategies redundant with the rise of risk management? 
Furthermore, is the category of the 'state' outmoded as an object of inquiry when 
investigating the operation of power and rule; and what is the material 
manifestation of this power - its ideological orientation in aiding the process of 
constructing and sustaining particular social relations and powerful representations 
of social order? These latter questions will inform the empirical material presented 
in Chapters Seven and Eight, where interview data accrued from 'new' state 
managers in Liverpool will be discussed. This chapter, in seeking to 'bring the state 
back in' (Thomas, 2000), will argue for a focus on the ideological reference points 
and material context in researching the relations between surveillance, power and 
social order in the dual sense of how these categories have been socially defined 
and institutionally embedded. Therefore, the location of technologies and 
programmes of social control within 'the political' will necessitate an analysis of 
the latter as social relations (Pearce and Tombs, 1998: 568). This position 
reinforces an argument made elsewhere in that "studies in governmentality 
[should] occasionally stand back from the technical and engage with the political" 
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(Ivison, 1998: 562). Therefore this chapter will argue for revisiting the relations 
between social control, the state form, sovereign power and nonnative conceptions 
of social order. 
Revisiting these relations will be important because, as will be argued, it is not the 
'technologies' or 'programmes' that possess the power to act, but the social 
interests and forces that articulate, organise and render as operational particular 
technologies and programmes in a manner deemed to serve the broad purposes of a 
ruling social bloc - however contingent, contradictory and fragmented these 
interests might be. Thus, particular political programmes (their predominance in 
articulating and organising space within a locality) will be reflected and reinforced 
within processes of state formation, ideological representation and restructuring. 
Chapters Seven and Eight will analyse the formation of locally powerful alliances 
that came together to instigate a strategy of rule for Liverpool's regeneration. The 
public and private authorities involved in this process not only set out a programme 
of 'orderly regeneration' but in this programme, reordered - through the idea and 
practice of 'partnership' - the state form itself. Analytically, the thesis is concerned 
with mapping the contours of social control within the neo-liberal state form. The 
power to shape the urban form and forge an 'urban identity' through the imagery of 
6regeneration9 - "a powerful and particularly encompassing metaphor" (Furbey, 
1999: 420) - has sat alongside the power to shape and administer social control 
strategies in the 'reconstituted' urban centre. This chapter discusses the neo-liberal 
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state form and its links to sovereignty, social order and strategies of social control 
in the urban centre. It is important to note that the discourses and practices that 
have given shape to this neo-liberal state have been indicative of a 'managerial 
state' form explored by Clarke and Newman (1997). Foregrounding the discourses 
of 'business expertise', 'entrepreneurialism' and 'effectiveness' has reshaped the 
rationale for state action and power but also, at the same time, mystified - through 
a technicist aura - the diktats of state power. This point will be particularly 
important when exploring CCTV in Liverpool which, as an 'entrepreneurial' form 
of state rule, cannot be understood simply for its technical character, but rather 
through how it has been positioned within a highly political process of urban 
restructuring. Thus the agents and agencies in the contemporary neo-liberal state 
have been "getting on with 'business as usual"' but this has "always [implied] 
some conception of a social settlement: a normative view of the social order" 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997: 159). 
In exploring these issues in contemporary state formation and rationale this chapter 
is divided into four interrelated sections. The first section will explore the 
relationship between state institutions and strategies of territorial control. Secondly, 
the chapter will explore the state as a set of institutions charged with the 
responsibility for sovereign control over territory. The third section will explore 
contemporary state restructuring towards the rule of 'entrepreneurial' cities or 
regions. Fourthly, the chapter will explore the empirical basis for analysing the 
contemporary state and strategies of social control within it. These strategies will 
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be understood as constituted by particular normative frameworks of power, which 
endow the state and social control with meaning and strategic direction. 
State and sovereignty 
The literature in the previous chapter has opened up a series of debates in thinking 
11'k about social control and its relationship to state sovereignty. While important, this 
literature has been limited in its theorisation of this relationship and neglected to 
explore social control and its interrelationship with strategies of sovereignty 
located within state processes. Some writers have questioned any 'clean break' 
thought to be underpinning a 'new' penological venture and devolved forms of 
rule. For example, Stenson (1997: 12) has argued that "while the recognition of a 
renewed emphasis on governing the local spheres is important, it is misleading and 
over-simplified to characterize this within a narrative which exaggerates a shift 
from the social to the local and communal". He has pointed to the co-existence of 
sovereign control over territory with the devolution in responsibility for preventive 
and risk management strategies. Thus he has argued that a more critical approach 
to understanding liberal forms of rule will be required than the 'governmentality 
thesis' and its over-emphasis on the 'freedom to act' has allowed: 
The price paid for the entrepreneurial and individualist consumerist 
freedoms of the majority may be a growing reliance on the more 
punitive disciplinary and sovereign powers used to contain the 
recalcitrant and disaffected minorities. Whilst we may not want to 
embrace a full functionalist theory of the state, it may be necessary 
to recognise some of the key strengths of ... the reconstituted state, 
in helping us to grasp the changing character of liberal rule 
(Stenson, 1997: 13, emphasis added). 
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Similarly O'Malley (1996) argued against the idea that sovereign punitive power is 
incompatible with 'new' actuarial techniques, seeing them as "mutually 
supportive" systems of power (1996: 198). The state is not 'giving up' its claims to 
territorial dominance or moral authority, and indeed neo-liberal attacks on 
collective and universal social provisions are couched within a highly developed 
political and moral rhetoric. These observations are, according to O'Malley, lost in 
much of the actuarial and governmentality literature: 
In such models there is no recognition of the increasing severity and 
scope of the sovereign dispositions that have accompanied the 
changes in the delivery of welfare. As levels of imprisonment now 
surpass those extant for generations, and the rationales for 
imprisonment increasingly tend towards the punitive and away from 
the correctional (especially in resurgent philosophies of 'just 
deserts' and 'truth in sentencing'), it is unsatisfactory to see 
actuarial forms of power as efficiently managing the population, and 
other forms (disciplinary and sovereign) merely as 'surviving' or 
6persisting' in the face of a tide of actuarial power (O'Malley, 
1996: 197). 
For others, governmentality theorists have remained silent on "the endless forms of 
coercion deployed by [a] repressive state apparatus" against those who show 
dissent and resistance towards neo-liberal forms of rule (Frankel, 1987: 83). 
More broadly, 'sovereignty' can be thought of not just in terms of coercive power, 
but also in terms of the power to define and administer a given territory. Useful 
here has been what Latham (2000) has called "social sovereignty" which 
historically has been the outcome of the interaction between state forces and 
economic forces working in contingent "term setting" alliances, able to make 
claims for sovereignty over particular domains. The contemporary fracturing of 
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sovereignty through a range of institutional sites and practices should not be 
mistaken for a disempowered state (Ibid: 1). In other words the analytical focus 
should move beyond zero-sum dualities between state and non-state actors to 
explore instead, "forms of cooperation and conflict between various agents in 
constructing and maintaining social sovereignties" (Ibid: 13). This important 
theoretical point will be illuminated in Chapters Seven and Eight, which investigate 
how the powerful coalitions that have underpinned CCTV have been engaged in 
setting the ideological and material limits for establishing and sustaining a social 
sovereignty in Liverpool city centre. In this sense, sovereignty may be achieved 
through the mobilisation of discourses pertaining to a contemporary demarcation of 
city spaces and their 'legitimate' uses. In mobilising such discourses, state actors 
can be understood as engaged in the designation of responsibility for sovereign 
control over territory. In other words, responsibilisation strategies are defined and 
articulated within the field of power relations that constitute the state form. The 
power to responsibilise actors in the field of social control points to processes of 
ideological closure and censure -a point explored in Chapter Seven. 
The state and 'responsibilisation' 
Some writers have claimed that the contemporary neo-liberal drive to 
responsibilise actors and agencies in the sphere of crime control has led to a 
situation characterised by 'government at-a-distance' - 'distance', that is, from 'the 
state' in the drive to shape individual and institutional capacities and conduct. 
However, within this literature normative questions remain unanswered. Who and 
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what is to be responsibilised, for what purpose and aims? How do relatively 
enduring forms and sites of power shape these processes? 
Garland (1996) has provided a detailed account of shifts within crime control, 
which remains sensitive to the changing character of central and local relations in 
interpreting emergent forms of control. His analysis begins with the recognition 
among formal crime control agencies that crime has become a normal social fact 
and has assumed the status of an everyday risk - rather than a moral deviation that 
requires explanation - to be managed on a par with other 'unavoidable' risks such 
as road accidents and food safety. The rise of 'the new criminologies of everyday 
life', therefore, have sought to move the programmes for crime control away from 
a concern with the individual offender towards a concern for vulnerable victims 
and the environments that create opportunities for crime. Implied in these emergent 
discourses, and coupled with widespread disaffection with the capabilities of 
formal criminal justice agencies, is the recognition that the state is no longer 
primarily responsible for crime control (Garland, 1996: 450-452). In attempting to 
'adapt to failure' with rising crime rates and steady recidivism rates the crime 
control agencies of the state are faced with "new problems of legitimacy and new 
problems of overload" (1996: 455). In this context, central government has sought 
"to act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state agencies (police, courts, 
prisons, social work, etc. ) but instead by acting indirectly, [through] seeking to 
activate action on the part of non-state agencies and organizations" (ibid: 452). The 
proliferation of 'multi-agency' and 'partnership' initiatives towards crime 
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prevention has been encouraged through schemes such as Safer Cities, the Crime 
and Disorder Act, funding criteria within the Single Regeneration Budget and 
Closed Circuit Television initiatives. These have been characterized by Garland as 
"responsibilization strategies", where by the state is "experimenting with ways of 
acting at a distance, of activating the governmental power of 'private' agencies, of 
co-ordinating interests and setting up chains of co-operative action" which create 
new problems and difficulties as crime prevention and responsibility become 
diffused into ever more disparate parts of the social body (ibid: 454). In this 
climate of "responsibilization" the state is not simply being "hollowed out": 
The state does not diminish or become merely a nightwatchman. On 
the contrary, it retains all its traditional functions - the state agencies 
have actually increased their size and output during the same period 
- and, in addition, take on a new set of co-ordinating and activating 
roles, which in time develop into new structures of support, funding, 
information exchange or co-operation. Where it works - and one 
should not underestimate the difficulties involved in making it work 
- the responsibilization strategy leaves the centralized state machine 
more powerful than before, with an expanded capacity for action 
and influence (Garland, 1996: 454). 
This expanded capacity of the state is not to be confused with Cohen's (1985) 'net- 
widening' thesis in that what is occurring is a 'defining down' of deviance in the 
context of fiscal stringency. This means that minor offences are increasingly 
outside of official interest and there is a growing reluctance to process and penalize 
minor offenders. This process is also about the scaling down of expectations in 
relation to what the state can do, but the process is contradictory in that state 
sovereignty over the problem of crime is simultaneously denied (hence the 
preference for responsibilization strategies) and symbolically reasserted (the 
salience of law and order rhetoric, the evocation of 'folk-devils' and common 
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enemies, and the contemporary rise in incarceration rates) (Garland, 1996: 459- 
461). It will be argued in Chapter Seven that 'responsibilisation' has been 
important not for denying state sovereignty but for restructuring it, along the lines 
denoted by Latham discussed above. Thus responsibility for the enactment of 
social control can be understood as a definitional process arising from particular 
relations of power prescribed within the development of the local state form. The 
chapter will now turn to the theorisation of this state form. 
State rescaling 
The discussion so far has been predicated on the assumption that the state provides 
an arena for the organisation and implementation of control strategies in 
accordance with the circuits of power organised and articulated through the state 
form. Political geographers and other social scientists, more so than criminologists, 
have maintained an analytical scrutiny regarding the state, which has been 
understood as "a rapidly moving target" (Hay, 1996: 3). Some have grappled with 
the 'problem of the state' and how it can be theorized in relation to contemporary 
penal practices and control processes. In an analysis that attempts to understand 
legal pluralism within a range of contexts - 'popular' and informal justice, private 
government and 'semi-autonomous social fields' - De Sousa Santos (1992: 133) 
argues that the state has become a "more problematic social actor": 
The analytical focus must therefore be on the state as contested 
terrain., a social field in which state and non-state, local and 
transnational social relations interact, merge and conflict in dynamic 
and even volatile combinations ... To a certain extent this analytical 
strategy means 'bringing the state back' but, in a sense, the state is 
brought back to a 'place' where it has never been before. Under 
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current conditions the centrality of the state lies in the way the state 
organizes its own de-centering, as in the case of the state sponsored 
back-to-the community policies. The state may thus reproduce itself 
and indeed expand itself in forms which, by their novelty appear as 
non-state, political forms. 
The devolution of authority to 'extra-state' agencies, local crime prevention 
'partnerships' and local security networks may be viewed as a "heterogeneity of 
state action" that results in inconsistencies and disjunctures that makes patterns of 
coherence more difficult to identify. This position needs development, not least in 
terms of identifying both the 'logic' of decentering (though Garland's analysis is 
useful here) and what it is that "holds together the configuration of micro-states" 
(De Sousa Santos, 1992: 134). Weiss (1997) argued that although it has become 
less fashionable to theorize the state in an era of 'globalisation' it has remained a 
key actor in building collaborative power arrangements - with other states, 
transnational institutions and private organisations - to meet new challenges to 
economic stability and social security: 
... both domestic and regional coalitions imply that the state is not 
so much 'devolving' power - in a negative sum manner - to other 
power actors from whom it then maintains a passive distance. 
Rather, the state is constantly seeking power sharing arrangements 
which give it scope for remaining an active centre, hence being a 
(catalytic' state (Weiss, 1997: 26). 
These writers have highlighted the 'elasticity' of the state, which in turn has raised 
the problem of the nature of state boundaries and the authorization of the power to 
act within a given territory and thereby manage and shape social relations. The 
6state', as Jessop (1990: 366-367) has reminded social theorists, is not a 'thing' that 
acts or exercises power, but rather its power and action are characteristic of 
"definite political forces in a specific conjuncture" where power is organised and 
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activated by sets of politicians, officials and managers whose power of action 
defines the state's capacity for action and intervention in social relations. Rather 
than "trying to define the core of the state", research would be best directed to 
analysing how state boundaries "are established through specific practices within 
and outside of the state" (Ibid: 366). In the contemporary setting this argument 
points to the rescaling of the state in terms of its shifting institutional boundaries, 
institutional ensembles and scope for intervention. This has meant theorising state 
power as processual and analysing its boundaries as a product of historically 
variant spatial scales (within and between the local, regional, national and 
supranational). In other words, state power must be contingently analysed as 
64socio-spatial. activity" that represents 6'a series of context- specific - but actively 
constructed - processes" (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999a: 505). The urban and 
regional restructuring underway from the late 1980s across Western Europe has 
become the means by which state rescaling has been implemented in order; "to 
control and mediate, social relations among individuals, classes, class fractions and 
social groups in the context of the maelstrom of perpetual shifts in the global 
economy" (Swyngedouw, 1996: 1502). 'Traditional' state forms were deemed 
inadequate to make possible the creation of 'competitive' and 'entrepreneurial' 
cities and regions. This is important for thinking about the means by which space is 
rendered meaningful for urban managers within partnerships and how such space is 
ordered. The orchestration of partnership rule in Liverpool - shaped by 
6 competitive', 'entrepreneurial' philosophies - will be elaborated in Chapter Seven. 
Placed alongside this will be an exploration of social control within a broader 
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accumulation strategy - which itself may never be fully or coherently realised. 
However, such strategies "are always informed by particular models of the 
capitalist economy and its extra-economic preconditions and a particular 
understanding of the logic of capital" (Jessop, 1990: 354). It is these 'extra- 
economic' preconditions in particular that, it will be argued, have been articulated 
through, and formed the rationale of, the neo-liberal. state form, and set the context 
for the implementation of social control strategies in Liverpool city centre. 
Thinking about state rescaling and its processual nature can provide a corrective to 
theoretical traditions that have wrought fixed distinctions between state and civil 
society. Some theorists have based their analysis of state/society relations "on the 
degree of domination, control or penetration of 'civil society' by 'the state"' 
(Frankel, 1987: 203). Such theoretical and conceptual distinctions have served to 
oversimplify social control processes through their failure "to recognise that state 
institutions are not mere political-administrative apparatuses (that is, there is much 
more to states than the parties, bureaucrats, etc., who make laws), and will continue 
to be involved in many social relations normally defined as belonging to 'civil 
society"' (lbid). This view has echoed Antonio Grarnsci's (1971: 259) expansive 
view of the state as an ethical set of activities and "a multitude of other so-called 
private initiatives and activities" that constitute an "apparatus of 'hegemony' or 
civil society" (Ibid: 261). The contemporary forms of 'responsibilisation", 
4 enrolment chains' and 'empowerment' that have acted as 'distancing' techniques 
of advanced liberal rule (Barry et al, 1996: 11-12) are also political processes 
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involved in the realignment of state power, form and ideological representation. 
Thus the representative individuals whose 'expertise' and professional status have 
been so important in instigating 'partnerships' and in activating 'power at a 
distance' can in fact be understood as 'new primary definers' (Schlesinger and 
Tumber, 1994: 17-21) imbued with an institutional power and authority to act upon 
and order social relations. These new state functionaries and their ideological 
power in shaping the meaning of the 'orderly' urban form will be analysed in 
Chapter Seven. Theoretically, the ascendance of this group and their role within a 
neo-liberal state form can be understood as "constructor[ s], organiser[s], 
'permanent persuader[s] and not just simple orator[s]" (Gramsci, 197 1: 10). Such 
intellectuals, for Gramsci, provide leading social groups with a degree of 
"homogeneity" and "awareness of [their] own function" in organising, for example, 
"the confidence of investors" in business, "customers" for particular products and 
the articulation of a new legality and cultural plane (Ibid: 5). As participants in the 
building of a particular social bloc, itself always contradictory and discordant, the 
new primary definers can be understood as engaged in local political struggles 
designed to forge a "hegemonic project" (Jessop, 1990: 260) between the 
institutional components of a neo-liberal state form. The building of a responsible 
economic, political, intellectual and moral leadership across the rescaled state form 
may be possible to the extent that a "representative regime" can be consolidated 
(Ibid: 345). Such a regime may be realised through the mobilisation of key 
territorial and functional agents, political parties, state managers and the organs of 
popular opinion, namely the local media. It is these processes in state development 
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and formation that form the backdrop for thinking about the nature of social control 
in Liverpool city centre - its authorisation and normative articulation among key 
6 representational' players. Having discussed the theoretical framework for 
understanding the neo-liberal. state, the chapter will now turn to a discussion 
concerning the location of social control practices within this state form, along with 
a more precise outline of how these control practices are to be understood. 
Researching the contemporary state: power and normative ordering 
Thus far the chapter has outlined a set of arguments for thinking about the practice 
of contemporary social control. The latter will be understood as organised and 
initiated through a state form that provides the arena for the actualisation of 
sovereignty over a given territory and the designation of responsibility for 
maintaining that sovereignty. In developing these interrelationships this section 
will outline an approach to the state conceived of as a set of institutions geared 
towards the normative ordering of social relations. 
Jessop (1990: 426) has argued that it is only through empirical analysis that the 
state can be understood and theorised. The state cannot be taken as given and an 
analysis must be directed towards those: 
state practices and projects which define the boundaries of the state 
system and endow it with a degree of internal unity. The state does 
not exist as a fully constituted, internally coherent, organizationally 
pure and operationally closed system but is an emergent, 
contradictory, hybrid and relatively open system. Thus there can be 
no inherent substantive unity to the state qua institutional ensemble: 
its (always relative) unity must be created within the state system 
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itself through specific operational procedures, means of co- 
ordination and guiding purposes. 
This is not an argument for an all-powerful, everywhere present and monolithic 
state but one that urges a careful analysis of changing state forms, fields of action 
and operations of power. Theoretical attention needs to be focused on the 
contingent strategic processes of intervention that endow unity and generate 
fractures within forms of 'partnership' that seek to align social interests, enact 
social control and bring about a relatively coherent social order. Therefore the 
focus should be upon: 
The discourses which define the illusory community whose interests 
and social cohesion are to be managed by the stage [state] within the 
framework of a given historic bloc and hegemonic project. The 
latter provides political, intellectual and moral guidelines for the 
conduct of state policy. This may subsume an accumulation strategy 
but there is no necessary relationship between hegemonic projects 
and accumulation strategies (Jessop, 1990: 346). 
Thus Jessop has offered a framework for understanding state forms and the 
exercise of state power that is neither reductionist, functional nor monolithic but 
relatively open and contingent. The work above suggests that in order to 
understand 'partnership' forms of rule in the field of crime control it is necessary to 
place these alliances within the processual. changes impacting on the effectivity of 
state power and the forms of action open to state actors and agencies to adapt to 
meet challenges in governance. This, as in the case in Liverpool, may mean 
working with the private sector through relatively novel alliances and means of 
communication; for example in the input of the private sector through resourcing 
Closed Circuit Television schemes, the provision of uniformed patrols, and other 
investments in crime prevention. The 'rise' of the private sector therefore should 
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not be exaggerated as something new in that the state and public organs have never 
enjoyed a monopoly in the field of crime control (Johnson, 1992). However, within 
Britain's city centres the challenges for state management are increasingly 
entwined with the ongoing struggles to regenerate local economies, which are 
underpinned by the desire to create secure, and safe city spaces (Oc and Tiesdell, 
1997). This is leading to high investment levels by local businesses, police and 
political elites who are working in partnerships that are unified by the common 
threat of crime as hindering processes of urban regeneration (Taylor, 1997). 
Crucially, another aspect that is often missing from governmentality and new 
penology theories are the processes that construct the problems that governmental 
or risk strategies respond to and seek to remedy. In other words, what are the 
political and moral considerations that inform the work of 'partnerships' in the 
identification of problems and strategic responses towards a secure city centre? To 
borrow Fiske's (1993: 235) phrase, who are the "proper objects of power" that are 
targeted in the attempt to render the city centre secure? To return to these political 
and moral questions means acknowledging yet moving beyond the post- 
Foucauldian concerns with the 'efficient' deployment of technologies of control 
and re-entering questions regarding their legitimacy and general moral 
underpinning. As Garland (1990: 170-1) argued, the Foucauldian conception of 
power is problematic in that it: 
... 
is strangely apolitical. It appears as a kind of empty structure, 
stripped of any agents, interests, or grounding, reduced to a bare 
technological scaffolding. 
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Partnerships involved in the regeneration and reconfiguration of social control 
therefore have to be understood both in terms of the technologies of control they 
employ and the interests and guiding purposes that are integral to their functioning. 
These alliances can be understood as "the outcome of political and moral struggle, 
which will continue to be the objects of major conflict" (O'Malley, 1996: 194). 
The return to ideology, then, is not a reductionist argument per se, but is vital for 
investigating how ideas "facilitate" social relations - "how they come to be 
accepted as true, how they rationalize the strategies of groups and institutions 
and ... how they can lead to the establishment of particular mechanisms of 
social control" (McLennan, 1996: 60). The post-Foucauldian rejection of a state- 
centred analysis - rightly directed at reductionist and homogenizing tendencies - 
and its replacement with a conception of multiple power centres has left itself open 
to the charge of depicting rationalities of power as "free-floating, not anchored in 
relations of domination and subordination, exploitation, or indeed any conditioning 
material conditions" (Curtis, 1995: 586). Thus, for one writer, the role of neo- 
liberal technologies of rule in ordering unequal social relations and preserving 
private wealth at the expense of collective social provision has been ignored in the 
govemmentality literature (Frankel, 1987). Of particular concern for this thesis is 
how 'chains of enrolment' and 'responsibilisation strategies' are cemented - and 
themselves articulated - across authoritative institutions that constitute the neo- 
liberal state. Indeed, the concept of ideology is useful here for its facilitating role in 
instituting and coordinating intra-state relations and informing the kind of 
entrepreneurial strategies of rule discussed in Chapter Five. Building "a hegemony 
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of vision" (Zukin, 1996b: 223) across the rescaled state form not only facilitates the 
"channelling of capital into the built environment" but may also assist in 
"producing, controlling and surveilling social and physical spaces" designed to 
construct "a relative crisis-free and cohesive civic order" (Swyngedouw, 1996: 
1504). 
The above writers have been useful in thinking about partnerships between 
powerful local interests and how these need to be situated within their political and 
economic conditions of emergence. Partnerships can be rendered intelligible 
through understanding their constituent interests and orientation towards the 
problems they have identified as obstacles to good government that is enacted and 
articulated through frameworks of 'normative orders'. In his analysis of urban 
policing Herbert (1997) noted how territorial control and power are at the heart of 
the policing enterprise. Furthermore, he drew attention to how territoriality is 
constructed and construed through the normative orders that constitute the 
institutions charged with policing space: 
Indeed, all organizations or subcultures might be best understood in 
terms of the constellation of formal and informal normative orders 
that constitute them ... Normative orders often cohere, 
but they just 
as frequently clash. For this reason state agencies are best 
understood not as machines but as dynamic and conflict ridden 
organizations in which different agents define situations differently 
based upon their particular normative orientation (Herbert, 1997: 
399). 
This brings the analysis to the problem of partnerships and social control and how 
agents both plan for and act upon an 'orderly space' within a particular locality. 
Social control, as understood in this thesis, needs to be theorized as a set of "social 
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ordering practices" within an extended notion of criminal justice in both its formal 
and informal settings, and within sites that identify and respond to crime and 
deviance in "a related but not entirely co-ordinated set of practices geared towards 
the construction and maintenance of social order" (Lacey, 1994: 28). The 
conceptual frame of 'social ordering practices' is useful here; they do not operate 
within any one agency, and transgress the boundaries of formal criminal justice 
institutions and, in this sense, they are pertinent to the study of the control 
strategies within the local partnerships that form part of the rescaled state. The 
concept can not only link diversely constituted criminal justice practices to 
strategies of social order - "in a symbolic sense: with a society's sense of itself as a 
cohesive, viable, and ethical entity" - but can also point to the conflictual 
ideologies, norms and values that exist within and around criminal justice. This is 
important not only because it renders possible a critique of an ordering strategy "on 
the basis of its own legitimating ideas as well as on the basis of values external to 
it" (Lacey, 1994: 29), but also in pointing to the precise social relations within 
which normative ordering occurs. The strength of this theoretical method over the 
post-Foucauldian perspectives is that it not only re-introduces the normative and 
value-laden aspects of control but it also, in line with a 'social analysis of penality', 
stands outside those terms of reference and official discourses that orientate, define 
and legitimate penal practices (Garland and Young, 1983). 'Social ordering' can 
also imply a certain specificity and attention to 'local' practice -a feature that was 
lacking, as the previous chapter noted, in those homogenizing prescriptions of 
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social control. These issues will be returned to in the next chapter in the discussion 
of the methodology utilised in the thesis. 
To return to the focus of this chapter, it is the city centre where responsibilisation 
strategies are being tried and tested through the re-alignment of public and private 
agencies - local authorities, business, developers, public and private police - 
towards the implementation of regeneration strategies within which formal and 
informal partnerships emerge to create secure and safe city spaces as a key part of 
the rejuvenation process (Davis, 1990; Coleman and Sim, 1998; Taylor, 1997). 
Thus an analysis of the complex relations of social control that operate within a 
particular locality will need to consider the emergent rationales of 'risk' based 
strategies of control alongside 'disciplinary' and 'sovereign' techniques. 
Furthermore those who manage and make decisions within so-called 'multiple' and 
'authoritative power centres' - their values, visions and interests - must be 
considered as an important aspect in properly theorizing contemporary social 
control. This variable has been omitted by those who have argued within a 
'dispersal of discipline' framework, as well as by those who have stressed the 
dispersal of a risk management strategy and the efficacy of neo-liberal rule. These 
latter approaches have retained a focus on the technical and practical aspects of 
control or rule, or in the case of the 'dispersal of discipline thesis' have assumed 
rather than investigated the "correspondence of interests" (Hall and Scraton, 198 1: 
474) that instil social ordering practices with meaning and purpose. In short what is 
missing are the wider power relations and social relations upon which partnerships 
63 
ground their capacity to intervene and act, through the moral as well as the 
technical, and the frameworks within which partnerships construct the objects of 
their power. If risk is a socio-political construct and not merely an objective 
technical term (Douglas, 1992; Sparks, 1992; Adams, 1995), then a social analysis 
must not take the term for granted and instead contextualise it - along with 
concepts such as 'security' and 'responsibility' - within the configuration of 
partnership agencies and underlying interests that operationalise these Concepts as 
part of social ordering strategies. This broader framework of social ordering would 
involve both a wider understanding of social relations of which criminal justice is a 
part, as well as making connections back to the early and expansive conceptions of 
social control - Durkheim, Park and Ross - that sought an integrative, non-coercive 
and civilizing function in the drive for social order. In this sense linking the notions 
of 'social ordering' and the institutional ensemble of partnerships can help to make 
sense of an increasingly varied terrain of criminal justice, which McMahon (1992) 
identified in the introduction to the thesis. The focus on social ordering, 
... entails that criminal justice studies can contribute to our more 
general understanding of societies. It draws our attention to criminal 
justice as an index of how civilized a society is, and to general 
questions of how negative, repressive, or socially disintegrative 
criminal justice power has to be, and to what degree if any it can 
have positive, socially integrative functions (Lacey, 1994: 34). 
Thus the catch-all category of social control that has meant all things to all theorists 
can potentially gain theoretical and analytical clarity in asking what is social about 
social control; whom does it control and for what purposes? 
The constituent elements of social control are always in need of 
specification in each and every instance; it is not a concept that 
speaks for itself with much volume or clarity. What is necessary if 
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we want to continue using the category ... is a relational analysis of 
the forces that are clashing, an account of the circumstances and 
conditions that colour the prejudice of that clash, and a theory of the 
ideological and cultural mediation of those forces and circumstances 
through the categories of social censure (Sumner, 1997b: 142). 
This chapter has presented a theoretical base within which to place Sumner's 
analytical request. Thinking about the contemporary meaning of regeneration, its 
institutional embodiment within a neo-liberal state form and the circuits of power it 
has drawn upon will provide an appreciation of the wider social relations within 
which a mapping of the ideological contours of contemporary social control in the 
urban centre is possible. CCTV - as a contemporary aspect of social control 
practice - can be thought of as more than a piece of crime prevention technology. It 
mediates, and is mediated by, wider social relations. This chapter has provided a 
theoretical map to interpret these social relations as organised through state 
institutions that are concerned with the administration and ordering of physical 
space. In this sense the state can only be understood "relationally" (Jessop, 1990: 
269). Furthermore: 
The state as such has no power - it is merely an institutional 
ensemble; it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities 
which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power of the 
forces acting in and through the state (Ibid: 269-270). 
In Liverpool, locally powerful networks constitute such forces that have 
characterised the power of the local state. These forces will be discussed in the next 
chapter and interview material gathered from them used extensively in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. It is within these contemporary processes in urban rule that the 
trajectory of social control, and more particularly CCTV, will be placed. In the next 
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chapter the methodological issues and questions arising from the theoretical 
discussion in this chapter will be discussed. 
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Chapter Four 
CCTV as a Social Ordering Practice: Investigating the Social Control Agents 
within a Neo-Liberal State 
We need ... to have 
detailed studies of the 'locally powerful' to 
understand how powerful positions in the family or in the workplace 
or in the streets are sustained (Smart, 1984: 15 1). 
... elites need to 
be interviewed. The best way of finding out about 
people is talking to them. It cannot guarantee to secure the truth, 
especially by people well published in the art of discretion, but is 
surely superior to any alternative way of discovering what they 
believe they do (Crewe, 1974: 42-43). 
The previous chapter outlined a set of theoretical arguments for bringing 
conceptions of the state back into an analysis of developments in social control in 
the contemporary city. However, on first embarking on this research project notions 
of 'the state' and 'the locally powerful' were not immediate concepts that sprung to 
mind. The project in which I was employed was entitled 'Security and Insecurity in 
the Modem City'. My first impression was how broad a title this was. One initially 
thought, what does this title mean? Research questions began to take shape as I 
asked what kinds of 'security' I could look at. I decided the research should be 
more than a quantitative counting of 'security measures' in the city, nor should it 
merely be about how 'effective' such measures may or may not be. As with the 
term 'insecurity', these broad concepts potentially pointed to processes outside of 
formal criminal justice practices. Initially, this led to thinking about interviewing 
different audiences. This led to ideas of interviewing 'the public' to get at different 
meanings given to these concepts mediated through categories of 'race', gender, 
sexuality and age. Also, the question of how the terms would be defined by 
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different regulatory agencies in the city was a possible avenue to explore because 
what quickly became clear was that my thesis would explore meaning - how terms 
like 'security' and 'insecurity' were defined and made meaningful by the locally 
powerful: though clearly, for reasons of time and resources, the research was never 
going to investigate 'meaning' derived from all potential subject populations. Thus 
the sample population needed to be chosen in line with factors and issues that 
sprung from my observations of the place (geographically speaking) where the 
research was to be grounded and my own theoretical reasoning. First of all, 'the 
City' in question (i. e., where the research was based) was Liverpool; a city in which 
I was raised in and the 'fortunes' of which I followed. As of August 1995,1 began 
to scan the local press to pick up any news and information about what was 
happening in the city. What struck me instantly were the notions of 'regeneration' 
and 'renaissance' articulated in the local press. Alongside this lay local and national 
coverage of Liverpool's closed circuit television (CCTV) scheme, which was 
placed within the context of the recent high profile murder of a local child. What 
was striking was the fact that the same people and agencies were being routinely 
accessed and hailed in the press to talk about 'regeneration', 'security' and 'safety' 
in Liverpool city centre. In other words, the same named agencies and individuals 
were speaking authoritatively and publicly about the development and use of 
CCTV as well as the rationale for regeneration in the city. What was also striking 
was the seemingly indefinable institutional make up and political location of these 
agencies within the framework of local governance, indicated by their 'new' 
sounding names. These individuals and groups I later understood as 'new primary 
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definers' who, being located within what the previous chapter identified as a neo- 
liberal state, were responsible for articulating a governing strategy for the city 
centre. These initial reflections, along with a need to narrow down and refine the 
research, led me to think about 'the locally powerful' as the target group to focus 
upon. It was this group who seemed to be most vocal about the issues in the initial 
project title. Secondly and related to the above points, this focus also offered the 
prospect of plugging gaps in previous criminological research and theorising 
around social control. In short, one gap to be filled was recognising how social 
control practices are made possible in a qualitative sense and are inseparable from 
meaning - in this case the meaning attributed to control practices by those who 
conceived of and established the practices in question. Furthermore, focusing up 
the social and political hierarchy aided a reintegration of thinking about the state 
and 'the powerful' into research around contemporary social control strategies. In 
this way I had begun to make connections between my theoretical reasoning and 
my chosen sample frame as I orientated my research towards the locally powerful 
rather than the 'public'. 
Building upon this initial discussion, what follows in this chapter will be the 
methodological processes involved in this thesis. In particular the chapter will 
discuss the methodological rationale that was adopted in order to gather qualitative 
data pertaining to the meanings attributed to social control practices as expressed 
by powerful agents within the local neo-liberal state. In developing the earlier 
discussion, a key aim of the research was to map the development of a local 
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security network that emerged as part of the local state in order to gain an 
understanding of the normative frameworks that underpinned the development and 
trajectory of the closed circuit television system. More particularly an emphasis was 
placed upon gaining an understanding of the strategic driving forces and 'visions of 
order' that underpinned the security network and the social control initiatives that 
were put in place alongside an exploration of how problem populations were 
identified as hindering local social order. Thus the research wanted to investigate 
the development and consolidation of CCTV cameras in the city centre as part of a 
wider set of social relations bound up with the problem of urban rule. This chapter 
will discuss the particular research methods that were deemed suitable for a study 
of the normative contours that underpinned the security network and as they 
informed the visions of the 'locally powerful'. The chapter will explore firstly, the 
broad relationship between criminological research and questions of power. 
Secondly, the chapter will discuss the basis for approaching the study of CCTV as a 
component in a set of social ordering practices. Following this, the final section of 
the chapter will discuss the particular methodological procedures adopted for this 
thesis. 
Politics, power and criminological research 
The main investigative contours of criminological knowledge have been directed at 
the search for the causes of 'the problem of crime'. This endeavour has assumed 
rather than analysed the conceptual, behavioural. and politically charged problems 
existing around the category of 'crime' (Muncie, 1996). From the nineteenth 
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century, and under the broad auspices of positivism, criminology has tendentiously 
aligned itself with the agents and agencies of power in an attempt to confer 
legitimacy and credibility for a discipline seeking practical relevance in the field of 
policy and state sponsored crime control strategies (Garland, 1985). Thus the belief 
in the search for the 'objective' causes of crime and its scientific treatment belies 
deeper motivational reasoning behind the development of criminology understood 
as: 
A product of the prison, of the institutions and ideologies which 
individualised and differentiated the criminal, and of the desire to do 
so in a thorough and rigorous image (Garland, 1985: 3). 
Thus mainstream criminology up until the 1960s was dominated by a pragmatic 
empiricism, aimed towards a particular notion of correction and underpinned by a 
positivistic social science (Cohen, 1981). During the 1960s positivism came under 
increasing criticism from radical and right realist criminologies. Such critiques 
pointed to perceived failures in the machinations of "social democratic positivism" 
(Young, 1994: 73). From the late 1970s a new orthodoxy emerged to challenge the 
ideal of individual rehabilitation and collective welfare 'solutions' to crime. The 
predominance of what has been commonly called 'administrative criminology' 
(Young, 1986) consolidated a technical and managerial orientation in the research 
process. Such an approach has appeared to take rising crime rates 'seriously' but in 
a manner which has rejected predispositional theories in favour of the search for 
situational and preventive measures that promise more 'efficient' and 'effective' 
administrative mechanisms to aid the practicalities of controlling crime (Clarke, 
1980). Thus mainstream criminology underwent a theoretical and methodological 
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refinement in the 1980s that dovetailed with wider political and ideological 
developments in its marginalisation of structural factors towards an increased 
concern with fiscal stringency and cost effectiveness in a range of policy areas 
including criminal justice (Walklate, 1997: 44). In this sense criminology has 
further limited its analytical horizons in terms of the questions it asks, the manner 
in which it asks them and in its reluctance to raise or engage with problems and 
issues external to the policy process. Crawford (1997: 1) pointed to some of the 
consequences of this when he stated: 
It is often as a result of the quest to produce research findings which 
have an impact upon immediate (short-term) policy debates that 
criminologists have ignored the larger canvas upon which are 
inscribed more enduring processes of change. Criminology, too 
often, has become disconnected from social and political trends, 
their implications and the theoretical debates aimed at their 
explanation. This narrow focus of criminology, for some, may mark 
the maturing of the discipline but, for others, it constitutes its 
capture by a discourse of administration, whereby criminologists 
increasingly respond to the desire to find more efficient means of 
control. In the consequent battle over 'what works', wider 
arguments have become lost. 
In nourishing the "penal-welfare" complex (Garland, 1985) or, more recently, in 
establishing "the new criminologies of everyday life" (Garland, 1996), 
criminological theorising and research, whether in its positivistic or administrative 
guises, has maintained close working relationships with the organs of formal and 
informal state power. Such close relations will be highlighted in the next chapter, 
when discussing twentieth century criminological interventions concerned to 
understand and respond to crime in the city. Current criminological interest in the 
ubiquitous phenomenon of 'crime prevention' has been dominated and encouraged 
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by administrative criminology and its specific interest in situational strategies of 
crime control (Jupp, 1996; Hughes, 1998). Bottoms and Wiles (1996: 7) pointed to 
four major types of contemporary crime prevention activity, which have 
exemplified the extent and ubiquity of 'crime prevention'. First there are 'defensive 
strategies' which include target hardening, self-help programmes and 
neighbourhood watch. Second there are guardianship and monitoring initiatives 
that include targeted policing, the use of surveillance cameras and the forms of 
private control indicative within the spaces of mass private property. Third the 
creation of new fonns of social order, including the growth of partnerships between 
police and other agencies, public safety schemes and family orientated prevention 
initiatives. Fourth there is 'criminality prevention', which includes diversion 
schemes aimed at 'at risk' young people and 'offence specific' prevention 
programmes. It is argued that research around these forms of prevention has 
focused upon 'what works' in terms of reducing crime. Such work has been 
empirically led rather than developing any strong theoretical frameworks (Jupp, 
1996: 27). Crawford (1997) suggested such research fails to engage with normative 
sets of questions and problems. This failure, along with the concerns of policy 
makers and practitioners of crime control, linked in with the development and 
evaluation of recent crime prevention initiatives such as Neighbourhood Watch, 
target hardening programmes and the use of closed circuit television. Seminal in 
directing and funding this research agenda has been the Home Office Research and 
Planning Unit that has issued grants to academics and private research consultants 
as well as directly employing its own research staff. Therefore, explanations of the 
73 
rise of 'organised' crime prevention have, as Bottoms and Wiles (1996: 4-6) noted, 
been understood as a result of academic research that has encouraged a disinterest 
in causation allied with a scepticism directed toward the capabilities of traditional 
forms of preventative police work in preventing crime. In looking to what is 
feasible and pragmatic much of this work has been 'successful' in terms of 
attracting funding (and therefore generating employment for researchers), but also 
in sustaining a deeper appeal. This kind of research has been, 
... also linked to the important ideological and organisational work 
which it does for the state and other corporate interests. It offers the 
prospect that what 'we' can do can make a difference and thus 
moves on from criminology's pessimism of the 1970s (Hughes, 
1998: 65). 
In line with these developments other changes have led to the centralisation of 
research and to a restriction in the scope of research questions asked. This has been 
referred to as the 'commodification' of the research process as has been widely 
propagated in the academic circles. The narrowing down of the research exercise 
has been fuelled by state funding regimes that prioritise 'managerial pragmatism' in 
the drive for 'relevant research' that has perpetuated and not challenged legal- 
technical discourses (Hillyard and Sim, 1997). The move towards a managerial 
kind of pragmatism within criminological research is exemplified through research 
in the sphere of crime prevention. This shift has marginalised a number of 
important research questions, namely: those questions concerning what crime is to 
be prevented, and whose interests are represented within crime prevention 
strategies? (Walklate, 1997). As Croall (1998) observed, official crime prevention 
discourses and practices have focused exclusively upon conventional crime and 
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offenders while at the same time leaving out crimes that are the cause of wide 
spread victimisation committed by powerful agents. Consequently, the technical 
and administrative momentum in criminology has denoted a denial of political 
processes and problems within and external to the research process, and prioritised 
instead a particular and tendentious perspective on 'the problem of crime': 
... we have witnessed the development of a body of technical and 
pragmatic knowledge aimed at helping those in power to put their 
ideas into practice through technical evaluations ... This 'technicist' 
orientation thus sees crime as a technical and practical problem 
needing an administrative and apolitical 'solution'. This 
'administrative' aim has been prioritised over the broader critical 
questioning of the main assumptions, principles and social 
consequences of the different approaches to crime prevention 
associated with the state and (increasingly) the private sector 
(Hughes, 1998: 4). 1 
In light of the concerns raised in this section, the next part of the chapter will 
discuss the approach taken in this thesis, particularly with regard to the aim of 
moving beyond a narrow technicist focus in order to ask a wider range of questions 
that bring the problem of power into the analysis. 
Approaching CCTV as part of a local security network 
At the outset this thesis wanted to investigate a CCTV scheme not in isolation, but 
as part of the development and functioning of a local security network as it 
I With the field of multi agency crime prevention partnerships, exceptions to this line of enquiry have 
included the work of Crawford (1995; 1997), Crawford and Jones (1995) and Sampson et al (1988). 
Broadly, this work has been concerned to investigate the power relations between and within state 
institutions, multi-agency and 'partnership' initiatives around crime prevention. Such research has 
been contextualised within broader sets of questions regarding: "... where society may be presently 
heading, either by default or by design, under the influence of the emerging forms of governance of 
crime, and secondly, what alternative avenues are, or may be, available? " (Crawford, 1997: 2). 
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emerged as part of the local state in Liverpool city centre. CCTV, therefore, was 
positioned in relation to other policing and security initiatives found within a 
locality and as part of a combined effort towards the enactment of what Lacey 
(1994) called a 'social ordering strategy'. Exploring such a strategy enabled a wider 
social understanding of the development of a local security network within the 
political, ideological and economic imperatives that informed the strategies of 
powerful coalitions and partnerships involved in the regeneration of the city centre. 
Therefore the investigation did not concern itself with the quantitative analysis of 
control strategies but rather the meaning of 'order' and 'control' that emerged 
within and informed the work of the security network at those nodal points where 
public and private control agents met and collaborated. Although some of the 
research cited above does excavate data from local settings it is the nature of the 
local - its peculiar ideological, economic and political context, and its significance 
for the precise development of a security network - that is missing from the 
literature. However., in noting the importance of 'the local' the thesis will not argue 
for closure in terms of a contribution to wider empirical or theoretical debate that 
has emerged around the nature of contemporary social control. Neo-Foucauldian 
approaches to social control discussed in Chapter Two stressed the micro 
techniques of power. These studies have been, at best, contingent and, at worst - in 
the call for attention to the 'local' and 'particular' - so particularistic "that we can 
never know when any particular is particular enough" (McLennan., 1996: 70). 
"Ultimately", Ward (2000: 17 1) has argued, "concrete empirical observations must 
be supplemented by, and integrated in, theoretical developments". Thus in setting 
76 
out the research aims here, and the research findings in Chapters Seven and Eight, 
the thesis will contribute to contemporary debates into the nature of social control 
and its relationship to power and social order. In this sense, as Bryman (1988: 18) 
has argued, "case studies are indeed capable of generality if understood in 
theoretical rather than statistical terms". Given these points it is recognised that a 
study of a local security network is also a study of 'the locally powerful' as 
organised through the public and private partnerships and alliances that constitute 
the local state. 
Researching the powerful: 'Studying up' 
... sociology that 'studies up' often won't be seen as scientific - 
funds will be difficult to obtain, sampling frames non existent, 
access (unlike to the working class) well nigh impossible and so on. 
Indeed, the whole activity may not even be deemed worthy of the 
name of science. Legitimating seals of approval may well be 
withdrawn from a sociology that looks up and not down (Bell, 1978: 
29). 
Most research within social science and indeed criminology is carried out on the 
powerless as opposed to the powerful (Bell, 1978; Hughes, 1996). Bell drew 
attention to the "classic" problems of researching the "locally powerful" that 
included gaining funding and access to relatively closed institutions (Ibid: 34-37). 
However, despite the problems involved in 'studying up', the powerful have been a 
figure and subject of research in criminology. At the beginning of the chapter a 
brief outline was provided regarding the relationship between mainstream 
criminology and the dominant practices and discourses associated with state and 
corporate strategies of 'crime control'. However, this was not meant to suggest that 
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studies within criminology have failed to 'study up' and fix their gaze upon state, 
corporate and other sites and mechanisms of power including decoding the actions 
and articulations of the powerful (Tombs and Whyte, 2002). 
Much of the research that attempts to 'study up' can be grouped under the category 
of 'critical social research' (Harvey, 1990). Harvey attempted to broadly define the 
parameters of this kind of research that cannot be honed down to a single 
perspective or discipline: 
At the heart of critical social research is the idea that knowledge is 
structured by existing sets of social relations. The aim of a critical 
methodology is to provide knowledge which engages the prevailing 
social structures. These social structures are seen by critical social 
researchers, in one way or another, as oppressive structures (Harvey, 
1990: 2). 
A defining characteristic of such research and what may distinguish it from 'non- 
critical' research is that the knowledge it can generate is seen as knowledge as 
critique (lbid: 3). 
Within criminology a critical tradition has been sustained from the 1960s and has 
been dubbed a 'criminology from below' (Sim, Scraton and Gordon, 1987). The 
thrust of this work has been to challenge the state in particular and associated 
official discourses, along with a deconstruction, as well as, influence upon social 
policy in general. In scrutinising key criminal justice agencies, issues of 
2 Furthermore, in contrast to an administrative research agenda, which may attempt to facilitate 
existing practices, a critical agenda may mobilise research findings to push for more substantial change IIIt: ' 
to criminal justice practices either in a reformist sense or in suggesting more fundamental changes. 
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institutional racism, classism and sexism have been raised through, for example, 
neo-Marxist and Feminist theoretical frameworks that have sought to widen an 
understanding of the workings of criminal justice as part of the workings of an 
unequal social order. 3 
The local security network and 'studying up': research concepts 
The investigation of CCTV took place within what I have termed a local security 
network and its development within a particular city centre location. The term 
'security network' has been taken from its use by Shearing as discussed in Johnson 
(1996). The term has been used to highlight the contemporary complex of problems 
around policing provision, structures of accountability and legitimacy during the 
1990s. The term denotes that the public police "would only be one element within 
the total network" (Ibid: 68). The term 'network' is derived from its use by Rhodes 
(1997). For Rhodes, the development of 'networks' referred to an altered state in 
the methods and processes of contemporary rule, which he termed "the new 
govemance": 
Governance blurs the distinction between state and civil society. The 
state becomes a collection of interorganizational networks made up 
of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to 
steer or regulate. A key challenge for government is to enable these 
networks and to seek out new forms of cooperation (Rhodes, 
1997: 57). 
Networks, defined as "self-organising", invoke complex links between public and 
private sectors that can be "indirectly and imperfectly" steered by the state (Ibid: 
3 An overview of some of this work is contained within Sim, Scraton and Gordon (1987: 7-39) and in 
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53). 4 The work of Rhodes and those exploring the notion of Govemmentality, 
discussed in Chapter Two, have both highlighted changes in the mechanisms and 
processes of rule, which in turn has raised methodological questions about the 
approach to be adopted in a study of power and, more particularly, the powerful. 
These problems will be discussed in more detail below. 
In referring to a security network, the thesis was particularly concerned to 
investigate the interconnections, alignments and forms of co-operation that 
developed between public and private agencies towards the construction of 
discourses and practices that constituted a wider notion of 'security', rather than 
being focused on 'policing' in its formalistic and singular institutional sense. The 
thesis concerned itself with an investigation into the emergence of a security 
network not in terms of its administrative efficiency but in terms of the 
development and trajectory of such a network as part of a strategy of local state rule 
that, as Chapter Three indicated, is concerned with the formulation and enactment 
of local social ordering strategies. Thus a number of inter-linked research questions 
and investigative problems can be posed. The thesis investigates: 
Scraton and Chadwick (199 1 ). 
4 Running alongside these observations, but operating a different and wider conceptual I satlo n of 
6government', the governmentality literature pointed to the need to investigate the neo-liberal 
technologies and mentalities of rule. Such mechanisms of rule, it was argued, operate through 
networks and alliances existing beyond 'a state' that have to be "analysed in terms of the strategies, 
techniques and procedures through which different authorities seek to enact programmes of 
government in relation to the materials and forces to hand and the resistances and oppositions 
anticipated or encountered" (Rose, 1996: 42). 
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I the processes by which a security network evolves and develops within locally 
embedded ideological, political and economic practices; 
2 the key players involved in the network and their role in defining and responding 
to (through CCTV) local problems that hinder strategic 'visions' and meanings for 
order; 
3 the tensions and conflicts within the network pertaining to the 'appropriateness' 
of particular security initiatives in the locality. 
These broad investigative concerns make it apparent that the study of the local 
security network in Liverpool city centre is at the same time also a study of the 
locally powerful as they are organised through the 'partnership' forums of the neo- 
liberal state. Crawford (1997) has attempted to trace the development of the 
partnership idea and its meaning for thinking about contemporary control practices. 
He argued that the discursive and practical "appeal" to 'partnerships' in the field of 
crime control heralds a new era in the governance of crime and disorder (Crawford, 
1997: 5): 
In contemporary appeals to ... 'partnerships', crime control 
is no 
longer conceived of as the sole duty of the professional police 
officer or other criminal justice agents. Rather, it is becoming more 
fragmented and dispersed throughout state institutions, private 
organisations, and the public. Responsibility for the crime problem, 
according to current governmental strategies, is now everyone's. It is 
shared property (Crawford, 1997: 25). 
Crawford went on to state that: 
Simultaneously, there is a new found emphasis on informal 
mechanisms of social control rather than the formal mechanisms of 
processing offenders. Loss prevention and security management 
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have been moved to centre stage of the crime control agenda. In 
sum, there appears to be a move towards a much broader conception 
of security and policing, which transcends the capacities and 
competencies of singular modem institutions (Ibid). 
This thesis is not concerned with a general analysis of the phenomena of 
partnerships but more particularly with the conditions of emergence and meanings 
held by urban mangers and attributed to 'partnership' in Liverpool city centre. 
However, within this broader governmental conception of 'policing' and 'security' 
provision - through 'partnership' -a number of questions emerge relating to the 
mapping of particular powerful coalitions in Liverpool city centre and of the 
changing configuration of powerful interests involved in social ordering strategies. 
With regard to Liverpool, the nature of these strategies and the techniques of power 
they mobilise will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
The security network as a 'social ordering practice' 
The analytical concerns expressed above point to a "pressing need for criminology 
to reconnect the 'empirical' with the 'normative"' (Crawford, 1997: 2). In doing 
this it will be possible for researchers of criminal justice to create critical research 
spaces within which to ask questions of a wider and more 'value-laden' nature, that 
link the emergence of particular 'crime control' strategies with wider problems of 
governance and the nature and maintenance of social order. This concurs with an 
imaginative essay written by Lacey (1994) on the need to reconceive the study of 
criminal justice away from a narrow, technical and purely instrumental set of 
concerns. This means less stress on a typology of strictly bounded 'criminal justice' 
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institutions and more of an emphasis upon criminal justice 44as a related but not 
entirely coordinated set of practices geared to the construction and maintenance of 
social order" (Lacey, 1994: 28). Viewing criminal justice as a "social ordering 
practice" (Ibid) has methodological implications: 
... approaching criminal justice as a social ordering practice dictates 
that we pay equal attention to its instrumental and symbolic 
functions. In other words, it suggests that we must attend to criminal 
justice practices themselves but also to the meanings they have for 
their participants, its subjects, their observers, including their appeal 
to emotional and effective attitudes (Lacey, 1994: 30). 
Lacey goes on to state that quantitative and statistical based research is important 
but will "need to be supplemented by qualitative, agent-centred, and institutionally 
focused studies" (lbid: 30). In moving away from an administrative research 
framework the focus is properly attuned to "practices" understood as: "a relatively 
structured field of action or agents or groups of agents, which can only be 
understood in terms of the assumptions, values, goals, and interpretative frames 
which inform the agents' actions and infuse the surrounding actions in which those 
actions take place" (Ibid: 31-32). Thus thinking about and approaching 'criminal 
justice' in this way means attempting to detect and interpret processes that cannot 
simply be read off from written official policy statements: 
... there is a need for research that can 
investigate the power and 
interests of criminal justice agencies. The goals of these agencies 
needs to be discovered by research, and not merely accepted on the 
basis of a mission statement or set of official guidelines (Sanders, 
1997: 195). 
Sanders has made the distinction between research which is 'policy-led' and fails 
"to stand outside categories defined for the intellectual rather than by the 
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intellectual" and more critical research which is "intellectually-led" but still 
"policy-relevant" (Ibid: 187). In noting that much socio-legal research has been 
policy-led, Sanders urged researchers in the field to be "theoretically driven" and 
66not policy driven" (Ibid: 201). Researchers concerned to critically interpret 
powerful strategies of governance in the field of contemporary social control will 
need to acknowledge more than the complex alliances and technological 
innovations that 'governmentality' theorists have reified (see Miller and Rose, 
1990; Rose, 1996). Understanding the motivations and legitimating 'logics' behind 
the governance and control of 'crime' and 'disorder' will necessitate taking a 
methodological step beyond the formal organisation of techniques of rule to focus 
instead upon the powerful actors and their normative articulations that lie behind 
this rule. 
Thus the interviewing and observation of powerful governmental actors can serve 
to qualify official statements and discourses, as well as aid interpretation of their 
techniques of rule. These broad methodological provisos form the framework 
within which the security network will be understood. The network can be 
conceived of as a field of action concerned with ideologically representing and 
practically managing social order, involving both formal and informal networks of 
agents whose aforementioned activities constitute a extended terrain of 'criminal 
jus ice% 
84 
The research process 
The research process was structured around the completion of 20 semi-structured 
interviews and regular attendance at a monthly security forum concerned with the 
management and targeting of the CCTV network. These will be discussed below. 
The field research took place between November 1996 and February 1998. Prior to 
and during the fieldwork a number of questions and issues remained pertinent in 
my mind and served as a source of reflection on the research process whilst it was 
underway. These were issues around identifying the powerful, drawing a sample, 
and gaining access for interviews and observation. 
Who are the powerful? 
In researching a local security network an immediate problem arose regarding 
exactly what agents and agencies constituted the network. More generally, 
according to Crewe (1974: 17), one problem with "British elite studies" is that they 
most commonly only recognise "'obvious' elites made visible by their concrete 
social organisation". Thus: 
... not all elites are embedded 
in tangible organisations with 
identifiable staffs, functions, buildings, etc., and not all power is 
exercised by men (sic) belonging to such elites. This is not a 
preamble to a conspiracy theory, but a reminder of the number of 
important decisions that are made by informal or ad hoc bodies 
which are rarely defined as part of an elite group Jbid). 
In the era of what Jessop (1997) called the 'entrepreneurial city' with its new 
modes of governance, referred to variously as 'partnership' (Edwards, 1997), 'local 
elite' (Taylor, 1997) or the 'networked state' (Collinge and Hall, 1997), the 
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observation by Crewe is particularly relevant. The mushroom growth of 
partnerships aimed toward the governance of a range of local problems has 
highlighted the problem of locating powerful individuals within often dense and 
informal alliances which are - in the case of the security network in the city centre - 
relatively closed off from public access and scrutiny, and involve complex lines of 
delegation between public and private authorities. Thus research in the field has to 
recognise the changing material and ideological nature of 'the powerful' as those 
whose institutional status and informal connections make them key "primary 
definers" (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994: 17) involved in sets of negotiations over 
defining and responding to local problems. However, the composition of a group of 
primary definers is not fixed and will change over time and vary between locations 
(Ibid). Schlesinger and Tumber have argued: 
Writing in the 1970s, it may have been obvious to talk of the CBI 
and TUC as major institutional voices. But with the disappearance 
of corporatism in Britain under successive Conservative 
governments, such interests have lost their one-time prominence. 
What this point reveals is that certain forces are permanently present 
in the power structure. It is thus an atemporal model, underpinned 
by the notion that primary definers are simply 'accredited' to their 
dominant ideological place in virtue of an institutional location. But 
when these are displaced by new forces and their representatives, it 
becomes essential to explain their emergence (Schlesinger and 
Tumber, 1994: 19). 
In the case of researching a local security network within the context of the growth 
of partnership at the local level, new sets of primary definers emerged as the forces 
engaged in constructing powerful discourses mobilised in the process of defining 
and responding to problems of crime and disorder changed. The emergence of 
partnerships and the powerful interests they have mobilised within local 
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regeneration strategies will be discussed in Chapter Five, and, in the context of 
Liverpool, Chapter Seven. These powerful groups have included not only 
established local actors such as the police and local authority but also the public 
and privately sponsored office of City Centre Manager, Urban Development 
Corporation representatives, developers, coalitions of local business and private 
security managers. 
Identifying key players and drawing the sample 
As noted above the notion of partnership has been at the centre of a changed state 
in organisational and governmental strategies that reconfigure public and private 
interests in the processes of governing crime (Crawford, 1997), initiating urban 
regeneration (Edwards, 1997), and, as Chapter Three argued, in reconfiguring the 
state form itself. Although the notion has been given statutory status in the local 
governance of crime under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act the development, idea 
and practice of 'partnership' has been indicative of the establishment of informal 
and what Edwards (Ibid: 829) termed "expedient alliances" between public and 
private interests. It was the nature of these alliances and the meanings attributed by 
key personnel to them, that the thesis investigated. Thus the meanings attributed to 
partnership, and the role of partnership in shaping idealised visions of the city 
centre, were accrued to ascertain the meaning placed on order and social control 
practices (such as CCTV) in the city centre. 
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Interviews were conducted between November 1996 and February 1998 at a time 
when 'partnership' in Liverpool was still very much experimental in practice. 
Interviewees often expressed the notion of 'experimentation' in governing of the 
city centre. In noting these processes the accurate mapping of partnership networks 
at the local level and precisely listing key players prior to engaging in data 
collection was not possible given the relatively fluid and inaccessible nature of such 
alliances. 
The imprecise institutional boundaries, relative invisibility and operational 
flexibility implied in the processes of 'partnership' formation in the city centre 
meant that a precise sample 'hit list' of research subjects was not available at the 
outset of the research. The research had three inter-related target groups as pools 
from which to interview. First, public and private agencies concerned with 
regeneration in the city. Second, public and private policing agencies. Third, the 
business and retail sector. These target groupings had considerable overlap in terms 
of their linkage within various formal and informal partnership forums. For 
example, subjects from each target group were members of the Liverpool City 
Centre Partnership (LCCP), the Government Office for Merseyside and the Stores' 
Committee, discussed in Chapter Seven. The first and third target groups 
established the forums within which public and private police worked together. 
These agencies, Crime Alert and Town Watch, underpinned the CCTV system and 
will be discussed fully in Chapter Eight. In establishing these bodies the agents of 
regeneration were able to directly influence the rationale for the working practices 
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of agents working within Crime Alert and Town Watch. In other words, the 'higher 
level' strategic visions for an orderly city centre had a connection with lower level 
social ordering on the ground. To reiterate: these target sample groups did not have 
hard and static boundaries. For example, a senior Merseyside Police Officer and 
interviewee was employed inside the Government Office in the Urban 
Regeneration Section and was as much a locally recognised 'spokesperson' on, and 
architect of, local 'regeneration' as much as 'policing'. In recognising the fluidity 
and interconnectedness of the 'target groups' the sampling strategy employed here 
coherers with the theoretical approach, outlined in the previous chapter. In that 
chapter the neo-liberal. state was understood as organised both upon an institutional 
flexibility and a normative dimension concerning the social ordering of a given 
territory. Thus it was important to enter these networks and interview those locally 
powerful orchestrators of regeneration. The second target group (i. e., those who 
staffed the new security and policing bodies) were not involved in the process of 
strategic thinking regarding Liverpool's regeneration, but they were agents 
employed and redeployed as part of 'regeneration thinking' (discussed in Chapter 
Seven) and within forums whose origins can only be explained as arising out of 
local higher level strategic decision making. 
This is not to say that the activities of lower level social ordering agents were 
determined mechanically (in any instance) by the locally powerful who were higher 
up the chain of command. Recognising the political origins of these bodies does not 
foreclose a research strategy that seeks to enter the world of lower level social 
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ordering agents to ascertain their views on what it is they think they are doing and 
for what purpose. Thus the meanings that these lower level 'foot soldiers' brought 
to their work were important to investigate for two reasons: firstly, in order to 
identify levels of coherence with, and departures from, the locally powerful visions 
for order that led to the establishment of front-line security networks on the ground 
in the city centre; and secondly, to avoid a reductionist and non-contingent analysis 
- as the meanings attached by those working on the ground in the security network 
need to be demonstrated empirically and not assumed. 
Initial contacts were made with more obvious subjects made publicly visible by 
their prominence in local media reports. These key players were the City Centre 
Manager (as representative of Town Centre Management), the Chair of the Stores' 
Committee and the Government Office for Merseyside. From these initial contacts 
other contacts were offered to the researcher after informal requests for eligible 
interviewees. Thus a strategy of 'network' or 'snowball' sampling proved useful. 
Network sampling has often been used for identifying people and agencies suitable 
for study when no obvious list exists from which to select subjects. This method of 
sampling can apply when "the target sample members are involved in some kind of 
network with others who share the same characteristic of interest" (Arber, 1993: 
74). However: 
This is both a strength and a potential weakness of the method. An 
advantage of snowball sampling is that it reveals a network of 
contacts which can itself be studied. A potential problem is that it 
only includes those within a connected network of individuals 
(Ibid). 
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Thus the problem of a possible skew or bias in the data collected from this form of 
sample was raised with a view to undermining the validity of the research. This was 
offset to some extent by the employment of a range of interdependent research 
methods towards a process of data triangulation. Thus alongside interviewing, the 
researcher collected data from regular attendance at meetings and the recording of 
information through field notes as well as gathering, throughout the research, 
official publications, pamphlets and press releases emanating from the subject 
population. These will be discussed below. In this way the concepts and themes to 
emerge from the interviews could be checked against these other forms of data 
collection, and vice versa. 
In line with the qualitative research strategy of 'theoretical sampling' (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) the sampling process was terminated when it was apparent no new 
concepts or analytical categories were emerging from the research process. The 
issues to emerge from interviews (as identified by subjects) were organised by the 
researcher under broad conceptual themes, which form the basis for Chapters Seven 
and Eight. 
Approaching subjects and access 
Jupp (1989: 19) referred to the problem of access in criminological research in 
noting, "many of the institutions of criminal justice are truly closed, particularly to 
those not doing officially sponsored research": 
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Access means being able to obtain data which is considered relevant 
or appropriate to the research aims of the investigation. The 
individuals who are most closely associated with problems of 
gaining access to data are usually known as gatekeepers (Ibid: 138). 
For Jupp the power of gatekeepers will vary between formal powers of exclusion 
and the denial of access to particular sources of information. Either way the 
problem of access and the role of gatekeepers can have crucial constraining effects 
on the research process concerning the type of research that gets done and the 
nature of research questions themselves (Ibid: 19). Problems regarding the gaining 
of access into organisations reported have also been reported by Bryman (1988). 
Bryman (1988: 14-16) summarises a number of strategies, not without their 
problems, to secure access. These include the promise of feedback to the 
organisation, engendering interest in the research in institutional representatives, 
and a strategy of top level/managerial permission and access. All of these strategies 
were relevant to this research along with the promise of organisational and 
individual confidentiality in the research findings. Cultivating interest among the 
subject population for this research involved scanning local media and partnership 
brochures and news letters to get a flavour of what concerned key players and the 
language they employed in speaking about 'regeneration', alongside visions for the 
city centre and their notions of 'safety' and 'security' there-in. These were 
important to digest in order to become familiar with the powerful vernacular of 
regeneration and to comprehend the ideological mindset of partnership players. In 
this way the researcher was able to grasp the signifiers of regeneration for urban 
managers, for example, in 'talking up' the city as an 'forward looking' 
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entrepreneurial city - economically competitive, 'politically stable' and as a security 
conscious place. These powerful promotional discourses provided the researcher 
with both a linguistic map with which to forage the 'common sense' of partnership 
players and a linguistic glossary to help in the process of approaching subjects. This 
was useful in structuring a letter to potential interviewees as well as in structuring 
the interview itself and avoided the researcher approaching subjects 'blind', as 
someone appearing to be potentially 'irrelevant' to the concerns of regeneration 
agencies. From this initial process of gauging an impression of subject interests a 
standard letter was drawn up for distribution. Thus all agencies who took part (see 
Appendix One) were initially contacted by letter (see Appendix Two) addressed to 
senior management or director level requesting a formal interview that covered 
three key areas: (1) perceptions of security and insecurity in the city centre; (2) 
level of involvement in security and policing initiatives and rationale for being 
involved with them; (3) general views expressed upon the meaning of a 'secure', 
'orderly' and 'regenerated' city centre (see Appendix Three for interview schedule). 
In all, twenty-eight agencies were contacted through my letter explaining the 
research and requesting participation by way of interview. Of this number, eight 
refused. Reasons for refusal varied. Two Retailers (and members of the Stores' 
Committee) thought that talking about aspects of 'security' would compromise 
their business. One stated that he did not think it would be wise to disclose how 
much his organisation contributed annually to Liverpool's CCTV scheme. After 
receiving my letter one private developer (who had during the 1980s worked for the 
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City Council) requested that I phoned him. He asked questions about the research 
(what it was for), who I was and what I wanted to do with the research. He refused 
to take part because he could not be persuaded that the research would not identify 
him and he seemed very concerned about where the research might be discussed. 
The City Centre Commander at Merseyside Police refused an interview on the 
grounds that he was too busy. However, I did interview the police officer who was 
seconded to the Government Office and who provided the main point of contact 
and liaison between police and other partners at senior level. The other four - two 
retailers and two developers - believed they would have nothing to contribute to 
the research as it was explained to them in the letter. There are three arguments as 
to why this refusal rate did not have any major implications for the research sample. 
Firstly, the refusal rate itself is numerically small - below 30% of the overall 
sample. Second, of those I did interview no one thought these refusals particularly 
important except for one of the subjects mentioned above whom I spoke with over 
the telephone. His name had cropped up as a potential interviewee from two other 
interviewees. Thirdly, these refusals came about after 15 interviews had already 
been conducted and a saturation level (as discussed on page 97) was becoming 
apparent regarding themes and concepts to emerge from the interviews. For these 
reasons, the researcher was able to decide that the refusals did not skew the sample 
or render it problematic for the purposes of developing a network sampling 
strategy. 
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Access to the security network involved gaining entry into the networks of the 
locally powerful in terms of interviewing senior representatives and attending 
formal meetings to which 'the public' would not normally have access. No major 
obstructions occurred to gaining entry. Thus, representatives from the police, 
private security, local government, local business and city developers participated 
in the research by way of formal access to meetings and in granting interviews. A 
number of points can be made regarding this relative ease of access. Hughes (1996: 
67) noted a shift in the 1990s towards "a grudging 'perestroika"' regarding criminal 
justice research that has brought a more open system of access for researchers. This 
in part has been fuelled by the rise of auditing in criminal justice, which has 
fostered concerns for the legitimacy of criminal justice practices. More specifically, 
explaining the relative ease of access concerning this research must in part be 
explained by the fact that the institution within which the research was based was 
also a key player at corporate level in the partnership forums concerned with 
regenerating the city centre. The University logo has been highly visible in 
sponsored forms of political management in the city and appears in many 
regeneration and partnership brochures. Liverpool John Moores University has 
been a key representative within Liverpool Vision, a major regeneration agency, 
through which the University has been involved in bringing derelict land and 
buildings back into use as well as part-sponsoring city centre projects. Other 
academics within the University have been involved in partnership work, acting as 
research advisors in the implementation of security and policing initiatives in the 
city, as for example in the City Safe initiative, discussed in Chapter Six. The status 
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of the University as a recognised ideological player was illustrated by the 
appointment of its ex-Vice Chancellor to the position of Chairman of the Liverpool 
Culture Company (a body concerned with the city's Capital of Culture Campaign 
for 2008). These wider symbiotic relations formed the backdrop within which the 
research fieldwork took place. The time period for this (1996-1998) was 
characterised by intense debates that were reflected through local media and local 
conferences concerning the strategic direction and governance of the city centre. 
Consequently, this researcher often felt that he was being welcomed into these 
circles as both someone coming from an institution recognised as a partnership 
player and as an academic who may be 'useful' in some way. For example, one 
interviewee spoke of the problems as he saw them of instigating partnerships and 
managing them towards "security minded" regeneration initiatives: 
Winning hearts and minds can't be done in a day; it's a cultural 
thing. You coming in here is part of the trust. Your paper and 
research will be read by people and there may be some fairly 
powerful messages in it - so the truth needs to come out. It will be 
interesting ... to see how other organisations perceive this - whether 
they align or not with what I have said. The difficulty with this 
[regeneration process] is that we have to tell it convincingly and 
that's difficult (Research Interview 1: Superintendent Merseyside 
Police, Government Office for Merseyside). 5 
fndeed, openness and candour, particularly from the private sector, marked the 
responses of partnership players once the interviews were underway. For this group 
4 red-tape' and bureaucracy - associated with formally accountable political 
decision making arenas - were a non-issue in terms of impeding their views. 
5 Each research interview will be referenced in the text so that interviewees can be identified by 
occupational title and/or institution. A full list of all those interviewed is provided in Appendix One. 
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The confidence of the 'new primary definers' was a reflection of their enhanced 
political power and clout in the city centre, unrestricted by what they described as 
'old style' politics. In this sense, as Chapter Eight will discuss, CCTV was 
expressive of that confidence for its role in reclaiming, both physically and 
discursively, city centre space. 
Attendance of meetings andfield notes 
Access was also granted to the monthly meetings of 'Crime Alert' based in a suite 
of a major city centre retailer. These meetings provided a forum for private security 
and police to collate information and discuss strategies for the coming month. In 
4sitting in' on these meetings (eight were attended each lasting a maximum of one 
hour) the researcher was given the opportunity to observe the course of the 
meetings and talk informally to security and policing personnel (each meeting was 
attended by between twenty five to thirty five people) as well as to establish further 
lines of contact. After introducing myself to the meeting at my first attendance I 
established a pattern at further meetings whereby I would sit at the back to observe 
and take notes. In this context the role of the researcher cohered with what Gold 
(1969: 35-36) referred to as "participant-as-observer". As in other researcher roles 
adopted in the field, the role of participant-as-observer can bring with it problems, 
in this case, "the field worker is often defined by informants as more of a colleague 
than he (sic) feels capable of being" Jbid: 36). This problem may tend to 
compromise self-conceptions and role-conceptions and manifested itself for this 
researcher during one meeting of 'Crime Alert' when I was asked by the 
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chairperson if I would "update the group" on my research, and in particular, 
whether I could "shed any light" on the "problem" they were discussing, namely 
identifying and keeping homeless people out of the stores. I answered that I was 
still interviewing and that no firm findings had emerged as yet. In my field notes I 
recorded that I was taken aback by this and felt uncomfortable in being asked to 
contribute 'positively' to a 'problem', the terms of reference of which I did not 
agree with. My answer was couched in a way that allowed my researcher 'role' to 
act as protection (Gold, Jbid: 3 1). This helped the researcher balance the tensions 
between the irreconcilable perceptions that, on the one hand, I identified my 
research role as one that was not in collaboration with the security network but, on 
the other hand, that subjects within the network identified the researcher as 
'colleague' and 'collaborator' in aspects of their work. 
This aspect of the research also involved the taking of field notes in order to record 
the physical setting, those in attendance, the formal agenda, what was said by 
whom as well as the researcher's own impressions of the proceedings. Verbatim 
quotes were also accrued from this recording exercise to be used in data analysis. 
Field notes were therefore important in helping "keep track of the analysis by 
documenting thinking processes and capturing the ideas that elevate the 
descriptions of empirical events to a theoretical level" (Howell, 1994: 99). Along 
with interview data, my field notes will form the basis of the issues raised in 
Chapter Eight. 
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Collecting official documents and attending relevant local conferences 
The development of the 'entrepreneurial city' has brought with it the production of 
many materials and texts which themselves can be understood as contemporary 
44state discourses" (Jessop, 1990: 347-350). As noted above, prior to and during the 
interview process time was taken to procure a range of literature emanating from 
the subject population and relevant to their management visions of the city centre. 
These included promotional materials, marketing documents and conference 
reports pertaining to Liverpool city centre. It was important to collect this material 
in order to familiarise myself with 'regeneration vernacular' and to enhance my 
own "cultural capital" and "credibility" when interviewing locally powerful actors 
(Arksey and Knight, 1999: 123). Furthermore, the attendance at two major local 
conferences (both of which I was encouraged to attend by several interviewees) 
provided further cultural capital and supplemented my understanding of the 
emergence of the particular partnership network in Liverpool city centre. These 
conferences were organised by and for local regeneration and state managers and 
provided an insight into the discourses pertaining to 'regeneration', the tensions 
between players arising from this, and the linkages these players made between 
'order', 'regeneration' and processes of social control. The conferences provided 
another means of identifying potential interviewees (who would be approached 
informally and then by letter as stated above). I attended two main conferences that 
took place in Liverpool Town Hall titled, 'Ambitions for the City Centre' (August, 
1996) and 'Merseyside: The Future' (July, 1997). 
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In-depth interviews 
In line with the aim to gather qualitative data to access the meanings attributed to 
4social control', the processes involved in enacting security initiatives and the 
obstacles to its realisation in the city centre, twenty semi-structured, in depth 
interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted between one hour and three hours 
and each took place at the subject's working location. The first five minutes of each 
interview was taken with explaining the research (with reference to the three areas 
of concern outlined in the letter), my role within it (as a PhD student who would be 
using interview data for the writing of a dissertation), and to discuss confidentiality 
and anonymity. All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity regarding names and 
personal details. All interviews were tape recorded with the subject's permission. 
Nineteen of the interviewees did not raise questions or issues concerning 
confidentiality. A minority of this number seemed not to be concerned with 
confidentiality. As one interviewee stated: 
My views are well known on this, as are others. It's not a popularity 
contest, so it does not matter to me whether I am named or not 
(Research Interview 2: Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
Another interviewee stated: I hope you realise I am being amazingly frank with 
you. It's quite a relief to do it" (Research Interview 3: Home Office Advisor, 
Govemment Office for Merseyside). This same interviewee expressed concem 
nlý about being "misquoted" and "misunderstood". For him confidentiality was 
important in that he did not want "open wrangling" between himself and other 
partnership players. 
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The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviewing allowed freedom and flexibility 
in the interview process towards the discovery of meaning consistent with the 
social processes the research sought to investigate. Therefore, in-depth research 
interviews were undertaken in order to ascertain the meanings of 'regeneration', 
4 order' and 'security' that were held amongst key partners. Material from the 
interviews form the basis of the discussion in Chapters Seven and Eight which will 
explore the meanings attributed to 'regeneration' and 'order' that impinged upon 
the politics of space, or the process of "spatialisation" (Ryan, 1994: 40), in 
Liverpool city centre. As Ryan argued: 
Assumptions and judgements about space become part of the taken- 
for-grantedness of everyday life. How spaces and places become 
commonly defined for what they are is rooted in discourses and 
practices deeply structured in prevailing relations of power (Ibid). 
Conclusion 
This and the preceding chapter have presented the theoretical and methodological 
perspectives that týnderpin the research for this thesis into the development and 
meaning of a local CCTV network for the locally powerful. This chapter has 
discussed the methodological issues encountered within the research process. The 
process of 'studying up' towards the new primary definers contained particular 
issues for the identification and approach to subjects at a time of experimentation 
and renegotiation of the lines of authority bound up with the strategies of rule in the 
city centre. The ideological character of these strategies, within which the rationale 
for developing a CCTV network was formulated, were themselves made a subject 
of the research in order to identify and illuminate the underlying features of local 
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social order as envisaged by the locally powerful. An examination of the locally 
powerful, it was argued, will enable an understanding of CCTV not merely as a 
piece of crime prevention technology but as a key mechanism in a broader social 
ordering strategy. In studying up, then, the thesis is concerned to situate strategies 
for contemporary social control within the powerful networks that constitute the 
neo-liberal state charged with responsibility for the regeneration of Liverpool city 
centre. Before returning to the case study of Liverpool the next chapter will explore 
the nature of the contemporary city found within the writings of urban geographers 
and criminologists. What many of these writers have been concerned about has 
been the re-constitution of power and rule in North American and British cities and 
a linking of these processes to understandings of the practice of contemporary 
social control. 
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Chapter Five 
Social Control in the 'Modern' and 'Post-Modern' City: 
The Political and Economic Context 
The universal and ineluctable consequence of this crusade to 
secure the city is the destruction of accessible public space [ ... ]. The privatisation of the architectural public realm, moreover, is 
shadowed by parallel restructuring of electronic space, as heavily 
policed, pay-access information orders; elite data-bases and 
subscription cable services appropriate parts of the invisible agora. 
Both processes, of course, mirror the deregulation of the economy 
and the recession of non-market entitlements (Davis: 1990: 226). 
Urban scholars and criminologists alike have drawn attention to the processes 
involved in securing city spaces in terms of the powerful coalitions involved 
(Davis, 1990; Fyfe, 1995; Taylor, 1997) as well as the consequences this may 
have for the construction and legitimate uses of city public space (Sorkin, 1992; 
Goss, 1996; Ruddick, 1996; Sibley, 1995). In the contemporary setting, concerns 
with crime and disorder have been increasingly linked to economic decline in city 
centres that, along with the growth of 'out of town' shopping, has had a 
detrimental impact upon investment and lifestyle within cities (Smith, 1989; Beck 
and Willis, 1995; Fyfe, 1997). Davis argued that there is a connection between 
the kind of social measures he described and broader political and economic 
change. ' 
The previous two chapters outlined the theoretical and methodological course 
adopted in this thesis in order to explore the nature of contemporary social 
If, as Reiner (1992b: 490) noted, police research generally needs to situate itself within processes of 
social, political and economic change both nationally and internationally then, as the previous two 
chapters indicated, an understanding of those processes affecting the functioning and form of cities 
will be a necessary forerunner to a particular study of social control within the contemporary city. 
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control. Following on from this the current chapter will provide a general 
overview of social control practices and their scholarly interpretation within the 
social, political and economic developments purported to be affecting the 
functioning and form of contemporary cities. What follows therefore is, firstly, a 
brief historical sketch of the relations between the development of the modem 
city, crime and order from the middle of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the 
remainder of the chapter will discuss the contemporary material, ideological and 
political changes purported to be impacting on the meaning and experience of 
what various writers have referred to as the post-industrial, post-Fordist or post- 
modem city. Included here are the forms of urban rule and power relations that 
have arisen in responses to national and international economic restructuring, and 
the emergent re-emphasis on social control and security, or what one writer 
tenned the tactics of "risk suppression", which are "restructuring policing and 
with that, the way we use space" (Sheptycki, 1997: 312). A consideration of these 
wider developments will of necessity move away from a narrow focus concerned 
with crime patterns in the city to instead forge a consideration of the processes 
affecting how 'crime' and 'disorder' become particular problems for those 
charged with the development and implementation of initiatives to promote good 
order in the city. 
Social order and policing social boundaries in the nineteenth century city 
Traditionally, urban scholars and criminologists have displayed a concern with the 
uses of urban spaces and the relationship to crime. The social, political and 
economic processes that have shaped the city from the nineteenth century 
onwards have never been far away from the study and explanation of 'crime' as a 
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legal construct and 'dangerousness' as a related notion linked to concerns with 
moral and social order. 
It was the official and bourgeois depiction of the disorderly nineteenth century 
industrial city that spurred debates of the time around urban dystopias. These 
depictions also, as Chapter One revealed, spurred the development of the concept 
of social control. During the 1840s a discourse of "moral environmentalism" had 
as its target the urban poor and was enacted through the studies and observations 
of early modem philanthropists, medical experts and state servants (Mort, 1987). 
Such 'expertise' helped to construct certain places and particular groups as 
'dangerous' and as 'other' - outside of the civilising nonns encapsulated within 
bourgeois thought2 . The complex structure of Victorian morality underpinned 
programmes of intervention aimed at the "Dickensian city-scape of dirty, crowded 
and disorganised clusters of urban villages ... where the "Great Unwashed" lived 
in chaotic alleys, courts and hovels just off the grand thoroughfares" (Walkowitz, 
1992: 119). Victorian refonners sought to classify and counter the perceived 
contagion of the 'rough' elements and places within the industrial working class. 
The multiple threats this group posed were perceived in terms of contagion across 
a range of fronts, most notably health and sanitation, the growth of 'dangerous' 
political ideas, the immorality found in the life-style of the causal poor, and the 
6 rampant criminality' of those on the margins of economic life (Stedman-Jones, 
198 1; Pearson, 1975; Walkawitz, 1992). 
2 In this sense "nineteenth century discourses on the metropolis created an urban topography in which 
the slum, the sewer, the poor and the prostitute were effectively separated from the suburb. This 
separation enabled the social reformer, as part of a process of validation of the bourgeois imagery, to 
survey and classify its own antithesis" (Marriott, 1999: 83, emphasis in originao. 
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Since their development in the nineteenth century, cities have often been 
understood through the use of metaphors and images to promote utopian and 
dystopian representations (Burden and Percy-Smith, 1995). Underpinning urban 
reform programmes in the nineteenth century city were the class and gender 
related polarities that constructed virtue/vice, cleanliness/filth, morality/depravity, 
civilisation/animality (Mort, 1987: 41). These discursive frameworks and their 
role in the promotion of social order displayed explanatory tensions between 
environmentalism and individual morality in understanding the condition of 'the 
poor'. The role of the emergent state of this time, in dealing with identified 
problem groups and behaviours, also displayed tensions between criminalization 
and/or education as the appropriate response (Mort, 1987). The notion of the 
'dangerous classes' was central to discussions of crime, criminality and 
criminalization, and was linked to the discourses and practices regarding what the 
city is and ought to be. The perception of threats to these visions or urban ideals 
were bound up with the contestations between powerful interest groups and 
professions that sought to control, regulate or influence urban life generally and 
the urban poor in particular. 
For each representation depicting an urban utopia ('the heavenly city', 'the city of 
reason", 'the engineered city', 'the city as organism9, as 'ecology', as 
6 entrepreneurial' and 'post-modem') there has existed its dystopian counter part 
(Burden and Percy-Smith, 1995). These discourses can be seen as representing 
both the practical possibilities for the ideal city and the threats to those ideals. 
Many writers have observed how the city has served and continues to serve as a 
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metaphor for the condition of society as a whole but also is representative of a 
distinguished form of social life (Mumford, 1961; Jacobs, 1961). As Cohen 
(1985: 205) put it; "We are haunted by the old idea that the city stands for 
something". The catch-all symbolism of the 'dangerous classes' therefore posed a 
threat to the visions of an orderly city in the nineteenth century. Such visions of 
order were related to the emergent class, gender and racial hierarchies associated 
with Victorian morality, which hegemonically constructed ideas of 'respectability' 
to serve as models of behaviour towards thrift, work discipline and sex and 
sexuality (Mort, 1987; Walkowitz, 1992). 
Fear and benevolence went hand in hand for those reformers concerned to defend 
prevailing notions of civilisation and progress. 3 Such contradictory sentiments 
fuelled the "great fear" of a "bastardized race" within a "class degraded by misery 
whose vices [stood] like an invincible obstacle to the generous intentions that 
wish to combat it" (Foucault, 1977: 275-276). The 'problem of crime' as an 
obstacle to the operation of a tranquil and orderly city has been prevalent in the 
iconography of the twentieth century city (Cohen, 1985) was not recognised or 
formulated as particularly problematic in the eighteenth century. According to 
Gatrell (1990) the notion of 'crime' prior to the nineteenth century was associated 
with personal depravity and did not of necessity pose a threat to social order and 
prevailing hierarchical fonns of authority. However, by the early nineteenth 
3 As the philanthropist Samuel Smith wrote of the urban poor in 1895: 1 am deeply convinced that 
the time is approaching when this seething mass of human rmsery will shake the social fabric, unless 
we grapple more earnestly with it than we have done ... The proletariat may strangle us unless we teach it the same virtues which have elevated the other classes of society" (Cited in Perkin, 1989: 
57). 
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century, and bound up with the developing complexity of penal, police and law 
reform, problems of 'crime' and 'disorder' became heightened particularly in the 
context of London as its population grew along with its importance as a financial 
and commercial centre (Emsley, 1996a: 17). More broadly the emergent political 
economy shaping the form of towns and cities demanded the unfettering of the 
market to establish national and international trading and production centres. One 
consequence of this, it has been argued, was the increasing emphasis on the 
stigmatisation and criminalization of 'legitimate' communal action and protest 
that became increasingly debated as law and order problems, and thus subject to 
criminal sanction (Hobsbawm, 1975: 5-6). In this context therefore: 
Crime was fast becoming 'important'. In the post-war world, and 
on into the 1840's the subject came to be cemented into an 
ideology about the condition of England. Crime was becoming a 
vehicle for articulating mounting anxieties about issues which 
really had nothing to do with crime at all; social change and the 
stability of social hierarchy. These issues invested crime with new 
meanings, justified vastly accelerated action against it, and have 
determined attitudes to it ever since (Gatrell, 1990: 249). 
Thus from this period onwards, 'crime' began to raise general problems for social 
order and for the order of 'the city' in particular. Stedman Jones (198 1) provided 
an illustration of this in his account of Outcast London after 1850 where the 
strategies and perceptions of those involved in moral reform focused upon the 
interlinking of key social factors. Such factors condensed around the spatial 
segregation of classes, the casual labour market and the heightening of political 
class conflict. In this context the uneasy relations between poverty, crime and 
disorder become increasingly apparent for the Victorian moral crusaders and 
reformers. Henry Mayhew's work from the mid-nineteenth century exemplified 
the increasing emphasis on 'alien areas' in terms of the identification of particular 
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parts of the city as criminal, possessing unorthodox economics and unrespectable 
cultural pursuits (Mayhew, 198 1: 160-172). The processes of rapid 
industrialisation and urbanism therefore shaped and concentrated the poor into 
what were perceived to be "intrinsically dangerous masses" who "lived mainly on 
the proceeds of crime" and "enjoyed a lifestyle different from the bourgeoisie and 
the respectable poor" (Sharpe, 1984: 94). Within this context of radical class 
differentiation and social upheaval that hinged around concerns of urban order, 
the 'new police' developed as a distinct institution and qualitatively different in 
character from the goals of earlier 'police science'. 4 
There has been much debate around the role of the 'new police' that developed 
toward the mid-nineteenth century regarding the regulation of such problematic 
areas of social life. 'Orthodox' histories have tended to posit a progressive model 
of police development that stresses an 'orderly fit' between the police function 
and the needs of an advancing industrial society. The 'idea' of the 'new police' 
was to meet "the menace of increase of crime" including stealing, begging and 
general mob violence that threatened "the dignity of Parliament" and "the 
preservation of life and property" (Reith, 1938: 188-189). The fragmentation and 
corruption associated with the parish constables and watchmen were also 
4 The search for 'the good order of public matters' was epitomised within the domains Of 'Police 
science' that emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This expanded notion of police was 
not confined to a particular agency and had as its broad aims the promotion of public tranquillity and 
security, the maintenance of trade and communications in the city as well as the general health and 
prosperity of the population which included the policing of the poor (Pasquale, 199 1: 110). The 
application of 'police science' With its classificatory schema, modes of observation and devices of 
measurement was directed at the model of the city, its population and the problems of its 
administration. As such it is part of a broader notion of 'govemmentality' (Hunt, 1996; Burchell, 
1991). 
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perceived to necessitate a more disciplined and uniform police institution. In such 
accounts the introduction of the police institution from its Metropolitan 
4prototype' served the interests of all social classes and replaced earlier corrupt 
policing forms with a more uniform and consensus based policing framework. 
Orthodox models have suggested that police reform was underpinned by a general 
fear of crime and declining moral standards purported to be adversely effecting 
the 'health of the nation'. Any opposition that surrounded the establishment of the 
4new police' has often been conceived as having no rational basis, despite its 
location within both the urban working class and the landed gentry (see Reiner, 
1992c: 12-24). 'Revisionist' histories on the other hand have sought to locate 
police reform within the political drives to regulate a range of social problems 
perceived to be hindering capitalist development. In this view the police cannot be 
understood outside of the particular political and moral interests that sought to 
maintain social order within which the marriage between constructions of crime 
and emergent legal regulation was derived. The working ground of the police 
thus became those problematic areas and activities identified by the locally 
powerful politicians, state servants and moral reformers. According to one writer, 
the maintenance of order gave the police the role of "domestic missionary" to 
serve as an "all purpose lever to urban discipline" and bring state authority to bear 
upon the custom and popular culture of working class life (Storch, 1976: 48 1). 
From the moment of inception, the police became involved in disputes between 
capital and labour, the control of food protests and anti-Poor Law riots which 
rendered notions of police impartiality questionable and led to the potential for 
further hostility between the police and the working class (Ems1ey, 1996a). For 
Phil Cohen (1979) the modem police force developed as a direct response to the 
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crisis of urban administration in the Victorian city where the criminalization of 
traditional working class street pastimes engendered local hostility to the police 
whose presence into the twentieth century was only grudgingly accepted (Ibid: 
132). Thus, revisionist accounts have questioned the view that the police acted 
under popular control. Brogden's (198 1) work illustrated how the police function 
was both enabled and constrained by local political and economic conditions and 
by the relationship between police chiefs and the local elite power brokers. As 
others have argued, the enforcement role of the new police "was conspicuous in 
regulating the movement of people, in delineating 'appropriate' belongingness to 
the city and in compelling compliance to extant hegemonic standards" 
(McComiick and Visano, 1992: 237). 
The official designation of the police role was laid down in the instruction book of 
the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and stressed "the prevention of crime", "the 
preservation of public tranquillity", and an ever present "vigilance" so as to 
"render it impossible for anyone to commit a crime" within an area under police 
charge (cited in Ernsley, 1996b: 25). This police role was incorporated into the 
provincial forces that were established later in the century and became 
supplemented by the notion of police 'service' in the provision of various duties 
such as the collection of market tolls, the inspection of markets, the changing of 
street signs, the reporting of unsafe buildings and the collection of money owed 
on maintenance orders. As Emsley (1996a: 3) noted, this has led to a rarely 
acknowledged fact that "since their creation the police have become more and 
more responsible for the smooth running of a variety of different aspects of 
society". Further to this argument, the discourse of 'crime prevention' and related 
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6 services' was less to do with stated intentions of police effectiveness and more a 
reflection of the drive for police legitimacy (Emsley, 1996a & b: Crawford, 1997). 
This is particularly pertinent in the light of recurrent criticisms of police 
effectiveness in crime prevention, detection and prosecution, which emerged in 
trenchant form in the early 1990s. Unsurprisingly, the drive for police efficiency 
led to the police targeting of resources towards 'criminal areas' and suspect 
groups - the Irish, prostitutes and the poor generally became the objects of police 
culture and practice (Ernsley, 1996a). 
This has not been an exhaustive account of policing history, but merely a 
discussion to acknowledge that policing 'the city', for both orthodox and 
revisionist perspectives, cannot be divorced from broader perceptions that 
construct the nature of the city and the problems posed for social order. The 
development of the modem police and their role in the maintenance of order 
located policing within the central state and its legal codes that aspired to the 
maintenance of a unitary order, whilst at the same time reproducing "class, ethnic, 
gender and other dimensions of inequality" (Reiner, 1992c: 3). Furthermore, this 
did not mean the complete eclipse of private policing and security provision, 
though these came to play a lesser role in collectivist welfare strategies into the 
twentieth century (Johnson, 1992). The modem police brought forward a strict 
demarcation between themselves as the state's symbolic representatives of order 
and guardians of the community in providing 'policing solutions' (Loader, 1997) 
and the array of citizenry who came to depend on them, not least, to keep 
6enemies' outside. The police therefore developed, with other criminal justice 
agencies, along professionalized lines, as expert knowledge brokers, specialist 
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providers and primary definers around 'crime prevention' (Ericson, 1994). Thus 
into the twentieth century the modem police were able to consolidate this 
powerful position through formal and informal normative imperatives (that 
imbued rank and file cultures and specialist departments) as primary controllers of 
territoriality and space in the urban setting (Herbert, 1997). 
It is these long-standing assumptions around the police role in maintaining urban 
order that have become increasingly challenged - both theoretically and practically 
- by changes wrought within the ideology and practice of contemporary policing 
in the city. These issues will be returned to later in the chapter but for now can be 
noted as changes in the perception that state agencies alone cannot deal with 'the 
crime problem'. The next section will discuss how the city in the twentieth 
century became a focus for criminologists in particular, as a place where the 
notions of crime, disorder and social control could be interlinked and mapped out 
as central practical problems engendered in the contemporary urban form. 
Mapping the disorderly city: some twentieth century criminological 
interventions 
Garland (1985) has argued that criminological discourse as a scientific discipline 
did not develop and expand due to its own internal logic and momentum. On the 
contrary, the criminological endeavour from the nineteenth century has operated 
and continues to operate within a broader context: 
Criminology is continually transformed and directed by external 
factors - by the demands of penal policy, political viability and 
ideological conformity (Garland, 1985: 3). 
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The aim of a positivistic and value free criminology was to achieve the status of a 
socially authorised knowledge with which to gain recognition and press claims 
upon the institutions of the state and criminal justice. Cohen (1985) traced the 
genealogy of early concerns and investigations around crime and its spatial 
character, which from the nineteenth century has sustained the urge to 
differentiate and classify and provided an enduring impact upon criminology and 
crime control: 
At the end of the nineteenth century, phrenologists constructed 
maps of the head, plotting actual areas of good and evil. Their 
social-reform counterparts were preoccupied with streets and 
sewers, plotting out like Mayhew, the domains and contours of 
poverty, despair and pathology. The Chicago School produced 
those famous moral maps of the city: concentric zones onto which 
grids of crime, delinquency, suicide and other forms of social 
disorganisation were projected. Ecological analysis continued in 
criminology, and today's urban geographers, town planners and 
statisticians are all too busy with their maps and target areas, 
defensible spaces, high-crime zones, robbery-trip routes and 
spatial patterns of offenders, and in everyday perception and 
journalistic cliche, we give moral meanings to the territories of 
slum, downtown, safe streets, public park, suburb (Cohen, 1985: 
220). 
Traditionally, criminology has devoted considerable investigative attention to the 
problems of crime, order and the city that can be read as scientific extensions of 
the moral concerns around the 'dangerous classes' in the urban context. As 
Chapter Two demonstrated, the concept of social control developed around the 
end of the nineteenth century as concerns for the disorderly growth of the city 
came to preoccupy social scientists and policy makers alike, in that the city 
presented the greatest problems for social control. Thus the extraordinary growth 
of 'the city' into the twentieth century, through the process often referred to as 
'urbanisation'. became a reference term for the "extension, succession and 
concentration" of the urban form (Burgess, 1996: 97). Within criminology and 
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urban studies, city growth became the context in which the nature of crime could 
be explained through sophisticated theories that pointed to so-called criminogenic 
aspects of 'the city'. In this way urban criminology continued the focus upon 
particular urban locations and behaviours that constituted 'the crime problem7. 
The dystopian imagery of the nineteenth century city and the multiple attempts by 
state and quasi-state agencies at reform, regulation, urban reconstruction and 
policing implied an interpretative discursive framework hinged around the 
language of social disorder and disorganisation. Dystopian representations were 
carried forward into the debates around the social and political order of the 
modem city (Graham and Clarke, 1996). Unsurprisingly, criminology in its drive 
for policy relevance (Garland, 1985) in the early twentieth century began to 
develop sophisticated theories, descriptions and explanations around the nature of 
order in the modem city and the contours of crime. 5 
Graham and Clarke (1996: 145) suggested that the period between 1900 and 1970 
could be seen as a time when crime was almost solely understood and responded 
to as an urban phenomena within the academic and policy arenas. The periodic 
attempts at reconstructing the city from the mid nineteenth century cannot be 
5 The forins of analysis developed here have been described as 'environmental criminology' 
(Bottoms, 1994), 'the ecology of crime' (Shaw and McKay, 1942) and 'the geography of crime' 
(Herbert, 1979). Such work has been concerned with explaining the spatial distribution of crime and 
the spatial distribution of offenders. This form of crirrUnological enterprise was coupled with a 
positivistic analysis, which stressed the causal determination of crime, its differentiation from non- 
criminal behaviour and the pathological states underpinning criminality. Forms of determinism 
developed around individual, biological and psychological forms of causation (Jupp, 1989) up until 
the 1920s, when an ecological variant emerged constructing a sophisticated theory of crime and the 
city environment. The vast bulk of research within this paradigm uncritically relied upon official 
statistical measures of crime and assumed a conservative and consensual framework of law and 
soclo-legal systems (Herbert, 1979). 
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divorced from perceptions of problems within urban space of which crime, 
criminality and criminalization are central. 
Early twentieth century attempts to understand the expansion of the modem city 
laid particular emphasis on social mobility and the social problems this was 
thought to entail. In examining these issues the 'Chicago School' developed zonal 
models of the city where the modem city became defined by its central business 
district outside of which residential zones developed in concentric rings of 
increasing affluence from the centre to the outskirts. Burgess (1996: 95) 
borrowed ideas from the science of plant ecology to describe the "metabolism and 
mobility" of the city to argue that where mobility is greatest social controls break 
down. "The zone of deterioration" was where gangs, vice and demoralisation 
develop (Burgess, 1996: 96). Shaw and McKay (1942) developed this model to 
argue that crime - particularly juvenile crime - was highest in the 'zone of 
transition' defined by high mobility, cultural heterogeneity, lack of social controls 
and normlessness leading to general social disorganisation. The zone of transition 
lacks the order of use and lifestyle of the central business district and the affluent 
outer areas and bestows a still familiar areal characterisation of decaying 
properties, marginal businesses, multi-occupancy and rented accommodation 
which underpins the notion of social disorganisation and the criminal subculture 
(Shaw and McKay, 1942). The work of the Chicago School continued and 
reformulated the nineteenth century visions of the city through the zonal theory of 
mobility and transition. The theory captured the progressive ideals around the 
modem city that was able to absorb and assimilate successive waves of migrants 
who are moved upwards and outwards into the suburbs. On the other hand, the 
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down side of city growth was highlighted by the identification of enduring and 
specific criminal areas which lacked assimilative structures that would link the 
inhabitants to the wider social order. This analysis can be seen as the 
scientification of the moral perceptions of dangerous areas and criminal places 
maintained by empirical study that purport to produce the social/urban 'facts of 
crime' as detern-ýined through natural ecological processes affecting the form of 
the city. The work of the Chicago School can be read as an early twentieth 
century attempt to map the risks pertaining to the occurrence of crime (albeit a 
science of crime tied to a liberal social control project). These risks were 
geographically distributed and associated with particular economic, social and 
cultural status indicators. 
A number of criticisms have been levelled at this work including: its tautology 
and determinism; the assumptions it drew upon to link social disorganisation and 
crime; the marginalisation of wider political, economic and social power effecting 
city life; the problems in generalising research findings to outside the USA; and 
the reliance on official measures of crime (Heathcote, 198 1). So-called 'Natural 
ecological processes' could have been read as "unrestrained capitalist 
development" in the cities of the twentieth century (Bottoms and Wiles, 1994: 7). 
Alongside these qualifications can be placed the observation that this work - and 
its subsequent derivations - continues the fascination and focus upon publicly 
visible street crime, with a particular emphasis on youth (Pearson, 1983). 
However, the impact of the 'Chicago School' cannot be underestimated in 
influencing the development of spatial or areal studies of crime. Such work was 
part of a paradigm for thinking about and responding to crime under the rubric of 
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treatment and rehabilitation. Expert intervention from social workers to town 
planners underpinned a welfare strategy that worked upon the individual and 
social pathologies thought to be responsible for crime. A widespread faith in the 
professional agents working in and through the state to treat and plan away the 
problem of crime in the most deprived areas represented the victory of the liberal 
strategy of social control that became inseparable from the government led social 
and economic programmes of reform after 1945. Thus 'rehabilitation', 4moral 
training' and 'deterrence' provided the discursive and practical cornerstones of a 
developing state led modem penal strategy. 
From the 1970's, the assumptions that prioritised social and/or rehabilitative 
solutions became subject to challenge and scepticism in a climate of rising crime, 
recidivism and financial crisis. The "crisis of penal modernism" (Garland, 1990: 
7) was spurred on by Martinson (1974) when he suggested that rehabilitative 
efforts have no appreciable effect on recidivism. This was widely interpreted as 
'nothing works' - nothing, that is, that the state and penal institutions put into 
practice to counter crime. The work that followed this questioned the long 
standing idea that crime was determined by social factors outside of the 
individual's control, and instead depicted the criminal as 'opportunist', a rational 
creature who made choices in both where and when to engage in offending. 
Wilson (1975) extended this view to shift the focus towards matters of rapid 
migration, race and the decline in parental authority in the city that gave rise to the 
general problem of incivility. In this scenario the most that could be done about 
crime was expressed in preventative terms (proactive policing, stops, searches, 
arrests and environmental design) and authoritative punishment. Wilson's 'broken 
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windows' thesis stood as a metaphor for a wider perception of 'disorder' 
identifiable by the likes of public drunkenness, loitering and urinating in public. in 
this work, and others that followed it, 'order' was constituted as a normative 
concept that was thought to be underpinned by a consensus in the wider 
population. For others, however, 'broken windows' theory "is attractive because it 
claims to prevent crime at relatively low cost". Furthermore, "in arresting, 
searching, interviewing and warrant checking low level offenders, and by 
confiscating their weapons, violent crime is prevented without judicial 
intervention plus imprisonment" (Skolnick, 1999: 239). 
Notwithstanding its critics, this kind of approach led to much criminology in the 
1970s to concern itself with the location of offences as opposed to the 
characteristics of offenders. Thus, the environment, as much as the offender, 
became a focus for corrective practices through criminal opportunity reduction 
and design (Hough et al 1980; Graham and Bennett, 1995). Wilson and Kelling 
(1982) have been particularly influential in directing attention towards what they 
have characterised as the breakdown in infonnal social controls leading to a 
general increase of incivilities. The authors pointed to a vicious cycle of decline in 
particular areas (unrepaired physical deterioration, vandalism, graffiti, gangs of 
youths) that heightened communal withdrawal, fear and insecurity and further 
increased the crime rate. In situations where informal mechanisms have become 
unworkable, the formal control mechanisms become central in stemming disorder 
and incivility before infonual control can be restored (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). 
Studies have developed toward the reduction of the risks in offending through 
target hardening and surveillance techniques towards making it more difficult to 
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commit crime. The high population density of the city is a continuous concern, as 
is the role of policy here in housingg homelessness, employment and 
transportation which can significantly increase the opportunities for crime, 
particularly when placed alongside an absence of 'capable guardians' to exert 
informal social control (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Much of this work towards the 
management of risk has been underpinned by 'routine activities' and 'rational 
choice' theories that have promoted situational measures to combat crime and are 
indicative of the 'new penology' identified in Chapter Three. The variety of 
an roaches that constitute contemporary crime prevention (whether situational, K-P 
social or communal) are less underpinned by theories and ideals regarding 'the 
city' (its dis-spiriting and demoralizing effects) and more about the effective 
management of a particular city problem - namely 'crime'. As identified in 
Chapter Three, such approaches constitute a reworking of the relations between 
agencies thought to be responsible for crime control and imply that the sovereign 
state is no longer primarily responsible for crime prevention, nor been successful 
in the rehabilitation of offenders who are now to be targeted within the 
environment in which they operate (Garland, 1996). Garland (2000) charted these 
developments and argued that the 'routine activities' approach has been informed 
by the practices of "countless unnamed security managers and security staff' 
whose initiatives have grown "out of situated problem solving rather than abstract 
analysis" (Ibid: 365-366). The interrelationship between the practical/policy 
domain of 'relevant' crime prevention and criminological theorising has 
remained: 
In much the same way the nineteenth century penitentiary practice 
formed a surface of emergence for the science of criminology ... 
the present day world private sector crime prevention exists in a 
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reflexive relationship to the theories and prescriptions of 
situational crime prevention. It is in this interchange - between the 
practical recipes of the commercial sector managers and the 
worked out rationalities of academic criminologists and 
government policy makers - that one must locate the strategy of 
preventive partnership and the habits of thought and action upon 
which it depends (Ibid: 366). 
In tenns of the analysis undertaken in this thesis, the 'habits of thought and action' 
can be located, as Chapter Four argued, within the locally powerful networks and 
alliances that underpin contemporary regeneration strategies. The organisation of 
these strategies was discussed in Chapter Three through an examination of the 
neo-liberal state fonn that has sought to govern the regenerated city. Chapter 
Seven will discus this wider context more fully. 
For now it is important to note how the maps and territories of 'the city', 
identified by Cohen earlier, have, for both policy makers and academics alike, 
become the site for the development of increasingly complex forms of social 
control within the contemporary city. Many writers have identified a number of 
issues associated with the restructuring of contemporary cities and the 
implications of this for thinking about social control. Research undertaken for this 
thesis has not been concerned with the spatial distributions and patterns of crime 
within and between localities - important though such studies are (Bottoms and 
Wiles, 1994; Taylor, 1997: 59-60) - but with how the wider processes of urban 
renewal and reconstruction within the late twentieth century city have posed 
problems for the construction of social order within particular places, and of how 
the management of threats and risks to that order is exercised. Thus at a time 
when criminology began to turn its attention to situational crime prevention in the 
urban setting, so the urban form itself became subject to wider transformations in 
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economic and political governance. The next section will explore the notion of the 
entrepreneurial city that emerged in academic debates during the 1990s and the 
impact, in general terms, this is thought to be having on the trajectory of social 
control. 
The making of the entrepreneurial city: themes and issues 
The central tenet of this research is based around the hypothesis that the 
development of social control in the contemporary city cannot be understood 
outside of the political and economic processes that affect the social form of the 
city centre, its conterminal state form and the consequent nonnative 
reconstruction of the legitimate uses of city space. What follows will provide the 
context within which concerns of crime, order and social control have been 
refonnulated in the entrepreneurial city. 
The post-war reconstruction of Britain's towns and cities heralded a period of 
optimism for 'the city' within the ideals of collective welfare state provision, full 
employment and a rationalised central planning of the urban form. Urban policy 
was linked to the power and progressivism identified with municipal politics that 
seemed to promise a "once-and-for-all reconstruction process" (Atkinson and 
Moon, 1994: 22). However, into the 1960s and 1970s these developments 
became questioned across a number of fronts that included the 'rediscovery of 
poverty' and pockets of 'social pathology', the disaffection with new public 
housing estates (Ibid), and the increasing salience of contentious debates around 
race and youth that heightened perceptions of insecurity on city streets (Hall et al 
1978; Solomos, 1989). Friend and Metcalf (198 1) argued that Britain 7s cities into 
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the 1980s had witnessed an intensification of political and economic divisions in 
containing significant pockets of those at the margins of society - unemployed 
youth, the unskilled, single parents and sections of the black community. 
The rise of the 'service city' underpinned by the flight and decline of large scale 
manufacturing lead to the growth in the 'surplus population' whose perceived 
unruly presence in the 'inner-city' spurred the development of authoritarian state 
responses (lbid: 146-174). The 'urban crisis' of the 1980s, manifest in severe 
economic decline and a fiscal and political crisis of urban governance, set the 
scene for attempts to change the nature of urban political management against a 
backdrop of global economic restructuring. Since the late 1980s, social scientists 
and urban scholars have been concerned to document and understand the apparent 
transformations that have affected western cities often characterised as 'post- 
industrial', 'post-fordist' or 'post-modem'. The 1980s heralded the rise of neo- 
liberal and market approaches to urban government which in Britain developed 
around a sustained attack on local government by the Thatcher administration 
underpinned by the crisis of the Keynsian welfare state and Britain's declining 
position in the global economic order (Cochrane, 1993; Pacione, 1997). Global 
economic restructuring was thought to be having a profound impact on social and 
geographic polarisation in the cities of the west (Graham and Marvin, 1996; 
Lovering, 1997). The increased recognition that cities in the late twentieth century 
were globally constituted has been based on the acknowledgement that cities do 
not operate as isolated localised economics but within global economic trends 
affecting urban fortunes, futures and lifestyle (Clark, 1996). This process of 
globalisation has been identified as facilitating new information and 
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communication technologies coupled with the global mobility of capital, 
including the growth of multi-national corporations, which have accelerated 
investment decisions and intensified the movement of capital to more productive 
and profitable locations (Harvey, 1989). The need for cities to compete in a global 
market has increased the operation of global economic forces at the local urban 
level particularly through the property markets. This has involved the 
transformation of some cities into 'world cities' operating core financial markets 
and specialising in service-based and information technology provision (Fainstein 
and Harloe, 1992), but has also accentuated volatility and insecurity as inter-urban 
competition has increased (Harvey, 1989). In this context, 'new' modes of urban 
political rule have emerged to promote local economic development in co- 
operation with private capital. 
Partnership, power and the neo-liberal stateform 
In the UK throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the 'partnership' approach to 
urban governance and economic management became consolidated through the 
impact of global economic restructuring and the political and ideological 
strategies of the 'new right'. Within the context of national and international 
competition for investment, the governance of cities has included the forging of 
new alliances and collaborative arrangements between public and private 
agencies. In their analysis of American cities Logan and Molotch (1987) depicted 
the city as a "growth machine" which has re-ordered inequalities between and 
within cities. Within such a growth machine: 
... local actors 
link parochial settings with cosmopolitan interests, 
making places safe for development ... The growth ethic pervades 
virtually all aspects of local life, including the political system, the 
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agenda for economic development, and even cultural organisations 
... 
(Ibid : 13). 
The local politics of growth has, therefore, led to a blurring of the boundaries 
between public and private interests with the consequence of consolidating novel 
alliances between locally powerful interests that have taken an increasingly 
important role in urban governance and undermined older, post war alliances and 
constituencies at the local level: 
This convergence of private sector (typically business and 
property) interests and the public sector has inevitably undermined 
working class constituencies, and resulted in a heightened control 
of the polity by new bourgeoisie and property interests, almost 
exclusively consisting of businessmen (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 
155). 
Therefore, in response to the increased potential for global market flows 
(Picciotto, 1996) there has "been a mushroom growth of local state institutions 
which are not part of (or only loosely related to) elected local governments" 
(Cochrane, 1993: 12 1). Such developments have involved the application of 
management techniques that appear to offer developmental growth as a 'value- 
free' and technical solution to urban problems claimed in the interests of all (Hall 
and Hubbard, op. cit: 156). In fact, the 'new' governance has served to "reflect 
(and reinforce) new sets of power relations" (Cochrane, op. cit: 108). 
The growth of city management coalitions has been shaped by central government 
policy in Britain, which constrained local government spending during the 1980s 
and urged urban regeneration along lines which suited the emergent centerprise 
culture' (Deakin and Edwards, 1993). Increasingly through the 1980s it was 
assumed that lasting economic, social and environmental regeneration could best 
be achieved by the involvement of the private sector in making city regions more 
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attractive to business investors (Harding and Garside, 1995: 167). These shifts 
have been encouraged by central government and European funding regimes (the 
Single Regeneration Budget, City Challenge, European Objective One Funding) 
which have encouraged competition between urban areas underpinned by 
fragmented policy networks and specificity in service provision (Rhodes, 1997; 
Newman and Thornley, 1997). As one writer argued: 
This implies a significant change at the local level, since it is 
competition between places intra-and internationally which 
provides the driving force for the new arrangements rather than the 
delivery of a centrally agreed package of more or less universal 
services (Cochrane, 1993: 95). 
Local level recognition of competition for grant funding and national and 
international investment has lead some to characterise changes in the local state as 
'post-Fordist' (Stewart and Mossberger, 1995: Jessop, 1994). Savage and Warde 
(1993: 172) argued that these processes point to "a plethora of state institutions 
with different spatial scopes" whose primary interests lie in the politics of 
investment. 
The increased role of the private sector in urban decision making and economic 
growth should not be exaggerated (Harvey, 1985), but has been influential in the 
'7A 
1, 
bility of city government not merely to respond to market forces but to act as 
46 vary much a part of global restructuring, and a pernicious part" (Lovering, 1997: 
79). The ability for locally powerful coalitions to 'act' in this context has been 
through the development of officially designated partnerships. This in turn has 
raised questions regarding the changing role between central and local state and 
between business interests and political parties and leaders, the allocation and 
uses of funding, and the role of a professionalised and technical elite in local 
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governance processes (Newman and Thomley, 1997: 969). Urban government 
characterised through partnerships - initially orchestrated through ad-hoc 
alliances between local/city government, property and business groups, utility 
groups, Universities and local media - has thrown up new problems of urban 
leadership and consent in relation to local populations (Judd and Parkinson, 
1990). The power of partnerships to act is not of necessity dependent on the 
electoral process but through strategic alliance, informal decision-making and 
proximity to legal and statutory authority as well as the ability to engage with 
criteria laid down in funding regimes. Partnerships have become the means by 
which local government has become 'fragmented' and at the same time centrally 
co-ordinated (Rhodes, 1997) in constituting a process that is deemed essential in 
promoting successful urban regeneration: 
Partnerships (or expedient alliances) between public-private-and 
voluntary-sector agencies with varying interests and expectations 
have become a de facto necessity in urban policy for the simple 
reason that government has written the rules so that you cannot get 
funding unless you participate in one (Edwards, 1997: 829). 
Consequently, the 'democratic deficit' in many partnership activities may 
arguably be consolidating a new authoritarian state form. A danger in the 
concentration of public funds, state capital and social capital within a small 
locally powerful network, who have shaped the urban fabric on their own image, 
has been identified by Swyngedouw: 
The 'hollowed out' state is characterised ... with a 
decidedly 
undemocratic and double authoritarian touch, both at the supra- 
national and local (urban/regional) level. In short, the production 
of post-Fordist spaces is paralleled by disturbing political 
transformations and a redefined citizenship (1996: 1503). 
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The work of partnerships towards local economic development has intensified the 
commodification of the city and its reinvention that hegemonically attempts to 
construct the meaning of 'place' and local identity. As Harvey argued: 
The active production of places with special qualities becomes an 
important stake in spatial competitions between localities, cities, 
regions, nations. Corporatist forms of governance can flourish in 
such spaces, and themselves take on entrepreneurial roles in the 
production of favourable business climates and other special 
qualities (Harvey, 1990: 295). 
Further to this process, cities "forge a distinctive image ... to create an atmosphere 
of place and tradition that will act as a lure to both capital and people 'of the right 
sort"' (ibid). The marketing of place has thus intensified processes bound up with 
attempts to lever investment and provide the basis for positive re-imaging through 
the selling of an area's economic 'benefits' in terms of infrastructure and labour 
force, the selling of cultural products, tourist attractions, the general quality of life 
(including crime and safety) and a range of consumption and leisure facilities 
(Madsen, 1992). These marketing discourses will be discussed in relation to 
Liverpool in Chapter Seven. As well as attempting to make the city more 
attractive to potential investors, this 'manipulation of image' has played "a role in 
6social control' logic, convincing local peoples as to the benevolence of 
entrepreneurial strategies" and in providing a framework for the construction and 
maintenance of partnerships (Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 162). Consensus building 
is also important in the internal cohesion between members of partnerships in that 
"the professions become institutionalised in policy networks and their unified 
view of the world - based on common ideas, values and knowledge - sets the 
parameters to local decision-making" (Rhodes, 1986 in Cochrane, 1993: 122). 
Drawing upon 'regime theory', Stoker (1995) has argued that local urban 
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coalitions formed between public and private interests may develop the capacity 
to act and lead depending upon the relationships with broader political and 
economic processes. Emerging regimes are characterised by a three-stage struggle 
that begins with uncertainty as to a regime's goals, its ascendancy in gaining 
support and lastly its ideological and material institutionalisation. The work of 
partnerships has been to build symbolic support and appropriate material 
resources to pursue selective aims. 6 
For Cochrane (1993: 124), understanding the politics of local government can 
only be possible within a wider framework of local politics and the local state. He 
also argued that whatever the terminology applied - 'partnership' or 'corporatism' 
- the structures of local government will vary between localities and display 
differences in the strategic balance of power among elected bodies, business 
interests and professions. Thus tensions between agencies in the local state form 
can arise. Such tensions will be discussed in Chapter Eight as they arose around 
the means to 'secure' Liverpool city centre. In thinking about this state form, as 
Chapter Three illustrated, it would be wrong to conceive of these developments as 
the wholesale replacement of the 'State' by the 'Market'. For Savage and Warde 
(1993: 187), the state has remained central in local regeneration strategies "as 
organiser of new forms of investment, market regulation, new forms of control 
and policing and as disorganiser of old forms of welfare and social collectivity" 
(emphasis in original). Urban geographers and political scientists, then, have 
6 These developments in governing the city have been criticised for prioritising a market and property 
led agenda and for the exclusion of other interests and in failing to empower the poorer members of 
the community (Bassett, 1996). Edwards (1997) questioned whether partnerships with their 
discursive armoury of 'community empowen-nent' and 'trickle-down' wealth creation would offer any 
solution at all for urban regeneration in terms of addressing poverty and job creation. 
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been engaged in understanding these developments in urban governance, the 
impact of which appears multi-faceted. As Hall and Hubbard (1996: 169) have 
stated, 
... urban entrepreneurialism has ushered in a whole range of 
changes in the way the city operates at all levels, changes that can 
only be comprehended with reference to the changing nature of the 
social, economic and political processes which are operating at the 
global and local level. These changes are being felt at the level of 
experience, as the new urban politics forge a new cultural politics 
of identity at the urban level, changing the ways in which the 
peoples of the city see themselves and others. New group factions 
and interests are being thrown up as entrepreneurial policies 
exacerbate existing social divisions in the interests of the minority. 
Furthermore, the social inequality resulting from 
entrepreneurialism is mirrored in territorial inequalities as all sorts 
of urban spaces are opened up to new types of development. 
What may also be included here is how these changes are also making their mark 
on the 'urban experience' in terms of the drive to make cities 'secure' and 'safe' 
places. Thus the contemporary meaning and trajectory of social control can be 
understood through exploring the alliances bringing together factional interests 
towards the construction and procedural maintenance of social order within the 
&entrepreneurial city'. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, central to the 
regeneration process in Liverpool has been the attempt to re-define and regulate a 
series of negative images of the city, which have emanated from outside and 
within the locality. Essentially the problem of place management (the selection of 
'desirable' images and the dissemination of information about 'place') has been at 
the same time the problem of representing and maintaining order within the 
locality. The problem of defining an orderly regeneration, in a broad sense, and 
instigating management strategies for its maintenance, will be discussed in 
Chapter's Eight and Nine respectively. Thus far this chapter has discussed how 
the work of urban regeneration partnerships has reflected an agenda driven by 
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economic growth in terms of levering investment and business into the locality. in 
promoting the economic growth of the city, 'place entrepreneurs' - often 
represented in provincial media as "local heroes" (Lowe, 1993 cited in Short and 
Kim, 1999: 120) - have contributed to long term shifts in urban governance, 
namely around the marginalisation of welfarist objectives in favour of 
competitiveness and growth, the speeding up of placed-based competition for 
public and private investment, and the development at the local level of a 
business-political bloc increasingly visible and proactive in the process of 
strategic urban management. The promotional strategies of local state managers 
have set in train and entrenched a series of taken-for-granted assumptions as to the 
6proper' rationale and procedures for urban governance. These have attempted to 
appeal to affluent, professional and white-collar sectors whilst marginalising 
'older' (and by definition less relevant) constituencies within the poorer blue- 
collar sectors. The marketing of cities has been targeted at business firms, 
corporate and divisional headquarters, investment capital, tourists, cultural 
establishments, and established and potential residents in order "to replace either 
vague or negative images" previously held by the various targets of city marketers 
(Holcomb, 1993: 133). These general observations, however, have glossed over 
the peculiarities and contingencies involved in marketing particular places with 
their distinct socio-economic contexts, political complexions, cultural forms and 
other issues that fall under the broad category of 'quality of life'. Although the 
composition of state managers has shifted under 'entrepreneurial' conditions of 
urban rule, those groups and individuals targeted as problematic for that rule have 
remained broadly the same. This point will be explored fully in Chapter Eight, 
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and has underpinned the lack of a deeper historical narrative Of social control 
within theorisations of risk discussed in Chapter Two. 
The tra ectory of the neo-liberal state fonn described above will provide the i 
material and ideological grounding from which contemporary social control in the 
city will be understood. Many writers have, in divergent ways, identified broad 
trends in social control within cities of the late twentieth century. The next section 
will explore the broad themes to emerge from this work. 
Social Control and the 'new' urban order 
Amidst its multiplicity of expressions, every city is to some degree 
a panoptican, a collection of surveillance modes designed to 
impose and maintain a particular model of conduct and disciplined 
adherence on its inhabitants. Those who do not, or actively 
threaten not to, adhere are in one way or another incarcerated in 
specialised enclosures, be they asylums and prisons or ghettos and 
skid rows ... The spatial concentration of power for social 
production and reproduction was what the first cities were 
primarily for. It has remained central to urban life ever since, even 
as new functions were added. Such commanding geographical 
presence differentiates the urban from the rural, adherents from the 
not yet adherent, polites (citizens) from idiots (hicks, rubes, the 
uncivilised) ... the major transformations of modem society, 
especially the growing role of the centralised state in maintaining 
surveillance and adherence via national citizenship and 
institutionalised identity politics, should not obscure the 
continuing power at the city and the citadel (Soja, 1996: 235). 
Soja sought to avoid historical generalisations concerning the 'panoptic city' and 
instead pointed to continuities regarding the spatialization of power; those 
"invisible processes of normalisation" that involve city and state in the attempt to 
maintain contemporary forms of representative democracy (Ibid). Soja (1995) 
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utilised the notion of the 'post-modem city' 7 to interlink several processes of 
change and continuity affecting the urban form as identified by urban researchers. 
The first process of restructuring he identified was the shift from a Fordist to a 
post-Fordist urban economy based on flexible production and accumulation 
strategies. The impact of this restructuring has not been uniform between cities. 
Secondly, the restructuring of an expanded global and highly mobile capital has 
contributed towards the formation of 'world cities'. The same processes have 
fundamentally disordered the concentric zonal models of the city associated with 
the Chicago School discussed above, and are characterised by the third 
restructuring process, captured by terms such as "megacities, outer cities, edge 
cities, metrocomplex, technoburbs" (Ibid: 13 1). The fourth geography of 
restructuring has condensed the above processes in developing new forms of 
social fragmentation, segregation and inequality. For Soja this has had both 
positive and negative impacts in that new alliances across class, cultural and 
political domains have emerged along with "new landscapes of despair, 
interethnic conflict, crime and violence" (Ibid: 133). Furthermore Soja argued: 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the post-modem city is how 
to build on the former while keeping the latter under control 
(1995: 133). 
The fifth process of urban restructuring has resulted from the above 
"Kaleidoscopic complexities" of the postmodem city which has made it 
7 These broad observations have echoed a concern with security and social control identified by a 
range of writers within the contemporary 'post-modem' metropolis. The category of the 'post- 
modem' used variously by many writers has been applied to capture some of the developments 
affecting the city and the urban experience. Although, "no clear understanding separates modem from 
post-modern cities", Zukin argued that through the lens of postmodernism, "we sense a difference in 
how we organise what we see; how the visual consumption of space and time is both speeded up and 
abstracted from the logic of industrial production, forcing a dissolution of traditional spatial identities r) 
and their reconstitution along new lines (Zukin, 1992: 221) 
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"increasingly ungovernable" under the fragmenting rubric of traditional local 
government. The result, following Davis (1990), has been the coming to 
prominence of the 'carceral city' - heavily enclaved and policed using spatial 
surveillance and military technologies (Soja: 133-134). The sixth, last and 
possibly "most postmodern" urban restructuring: 
... involves the intrusion and growing power of an urban 
hyperreality, of simulations and simulacra (defined as exact copies 
of originals that do not exist), into the material reality and 
ideological imagery of urban life Jbid: 135). 
For Soja this development represents a form of behavioural, cultural and 
ideological restructuring that affects urbanism as a way of life and is becoming 
part of a developing system of social control (Ibid: 134). 
In a very generalised sense many writers have highlighted an increasing concern 
with security, order and policing in the spaces of 'the new city'. Sorkin (1992) 
offered a dystopian description of the "the new American city" and put forward 
three characteristics that distinguish this emergent city that form the basis for 
"models for urban development throughout the world" (Ibid, xv). The first 
characteristic driven by globalised capital, electronic production techniques and 
mass culture, is repetitively universalising city spaces into the predictable and 
'known'. Secondly, the new city can be characterised as increasingly concerned 
with security, both technological and physical, leading to new forms of urban 
segregation and distinction amongst city inhabitants. Thirdly, the new city has 
increasingly assumed the character of a 'theme park' as reflected in its 
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architecture and imaging which in turn reflects "a spuriously appropriated past 
that substitutes for a more exigent and examined present" (Ibid: XiV). 
8 
The material and symbolic reinvention of the contemporary city has introduced 
new urban forms into the built environment. These forms have been characterised 
as representing a shift from the modernist city of industrial production to the 
postmodernist city of a new consumerism (Zukin, 1992). The enclosed spaces of 
the shopping malls, heritage and cultural centres, science parks and conference 
centres are concentrating the spatial practices of consumption, leisure and 
entertainment for local inhabitants, tourists and business. These 'new' urban 
forms including 'flagship' developments, such as the Albert Dock in Liverpool 
and London's Docklands, have often been cited as evidence of a shift towards the 
privatisation of public space, which is thought to be having an impact on how 
these spaces are regulated, ordered and policed (Bianchini, 1990; Davis, 1990; 
Sorkin, 1992). For Lovkaitov - Sideris (1993), the 'privatisation of the public 
open space' has been encouraged by economic stagnation, constraints on local 
government expenditure, the growth of partnerships and the long-standing 
perception that public space is 'pathological' and disorderly. The new spaces 
represented by urban plazas have been a site in which American downtowns have 
been privately developed, funded and policed toward the creation of 'exclusionary 
environments' providing protected and comfortable spaces for the target group 
pursued by developers (Ibid). 
8 For Sorkin, these developments have begun to undemine traditional notions of public space as 
represented for him through freedom of human interaction and political debate. Sorkin called for a z: 1 
more "authentic urbanity" and claimed that "the effort to reclaim the city is the struggle for 
democracy Itself' (Ibid: xv). 
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In thinking about the development of these consumerist spaces Goss, (1993) has 
argued that partnerships between designers, planners and developers have been 
energised in constructing total consumption environments that have their roots in 
shopping malls but are also increasingly important in the architectural landscaping 
of city centres. He argued that a complex control logic has underpinned the 
reconstruction process: 
... developers have sought to assuage the collective guilt over 
conspicuous consumption by designing into the retail built 
environment the means for the fantasised dissociation from the act 
of shopping. [ ... I ... designers manufacture the illusion that 
something else other than mere shopping is going on, while also 
mediating the materialist relations of mass consumption and 
disguises the identity and rootedness of the shopping center in the 
contemporary capitalist social order. The product is effectively a 
psuedoplace which works through spatial strategies of 
dissemblance and duplicity (Goss, 1993: 19). 
These spaces work toward social differentiation through the use of "class based 
cues" (Ibid). Applying this analysis in Liverpool, for example, the construction of 
heritage sites, 'high art' and public sculpture are placed alongside, and within, 
6normal' consumption spaces in the attempt to collapse any distinction between 
art, history and commodities. The contemporary built environment can be 
understood as "as a system of signification that gives symbolic expression to the 
cultural values of consumer capitalism" (Ibid). The creation of idealised 
environments - 'spontaneous', 'spectacular', and naturalised - are themselves 
ideological representations of 'the city' that underpin contemporary urban 
management strategies that attempt to foster a particular experiential mode or 
urban ambience. These broad strategies of urban rule through ideological and 
idealised representations of the city, its design and image management will be 
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illuminated in Chapter Seven. Such ideological representations as articulated by 
the locally powerful emerge from and reinforce a particular set of social relations 
within which can be placed specific practices of social control that have 
developed around camera surveillance networks. 
For Goss, the perception of these spaces as orderly and secure is integral to the 
realisation of profits. Thus these strategic spaces strictly curtail and police 
demonstrations, leafleting and picketing which threatens the contrived retail 
carnival atmosphere (lbid: 28). Furthermore, "those without shopping bags and 
other suspicious individuals (teenagers, single men and the unkempt, and social 
science researchers) will draw the attention of security, who use the charge of 
loitering as grounds for eviction" (Ibid: 35). 
In a broader commentary on the economic, political and social changes affecting 
the late modem city, Bottoms and Wiles (1994) argued that increased social 
differentiation is leading to the growth of 'defended locales' whether situated 
within individual retail houses, malls or "tourist bubbles" (lbid: 48-49). The rise 
of predictable, sanitised and secured urban environments has, for one writer, been 
bound up with the process of 'boundary erection', constructed through individual 
and institutional conceptions of abjection and hostility towards difference (Sibley, 
1995). Reflected within the built environment such boundaries of separation are in 
part moral boundaries (Ibid: 39-43) underpinned by a fear of the 'other' and 
constructed along class, gender, ethnic, sexual, age and disability lines. The urge 
to purify and dominate space may be a relatively "unnoticed" feature within "the 
spatial separations of city centre development" (Ibid: xiv). Although, for Sibley: 
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It appears that the boundaries between the consuming and non- 
consuming public are strengthening, with non-consumption being 
constructed as a form of deviance at the same time as spaces of 
consumption eliminate public spaces in city centres (lbid : xii). 
Christopherson (1994) explored urban security within the relationship between 
material conditions and changes in values and meanings that have re-worked the 
(. urban experience'. The rise of the "post-Fordist fortress city", at least in the 
American context, has displayed continuity and innovation in intensifying the 
administration of urban space. The meaning and practices of security are being 
propelled by an increasing commodification along with the need to maintain 
property values and extract profits in the contemporary city (Ibid: 419). The 
possibilities for an increasingly privatised and segregated city have been 
underpinned by changes in the meaning of citizenship that have privileged 
individual consumer values and consumption activity (Ibid: 416). In the 
contemporary city the security of property has presided over the security of people 
(Ibid: 420) and the city streets have become abandoned to the unhoused, the poor, 
the undesirable and the unprofitable (Ibid: 42 1). On the one hand "the street has 
become a gauntlet to run between safe places", but the city has also become 
dominated by "security cages" within which whole areas are protected using 
video surveillance (Ibid: 421). 
Mike Davis (1990) offered a possible future scenario of cities in his analysis of 
Los Angeles as 'the bad edge of postmodernity'. It is here that one can find 
"fortress cities, brutally divided between fortified cells of affluent society and 
places of terror where the police battle the criminalized poor" and where "the 
market provision of security generates its own paranoid demand" Jbid: 224). 
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Davis depicted the convergence of public and private police, property developers, 
planners and politicians in the creation of 'fortress cities', complete with 'pseudo 
public space' and a refinement in the processes of security, segregation and 
ghettoisation. 
The above writers have highlighted an increase in concerns with social control 
and order in the contemporary city that are part of a reworking of the boundaries 
between public and private space and a re-ordering of the uses of that space. Goss 
(1996) has issued caution in analysing these 'new' city spaces as being recent 
advances in privatisation and over-determined by capitalist economics that 
66collapses the dialectic of social control into a totalizing mechanism" (Ibid: 240). 
For him these spaces are "contradictory" and "organised by capital and state in 
public-private partnerships for instrumental effect" (Ibid). 
This section has discussed, in very broad terms, social control practices within the 
broader economic, political and social changes in the contemporary city. The 
broad, even 'global', trends outlined above may not apply uniformly in particular 
localities and social contexts. This point will be carried forward more fully in 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight, which detail the case study of social control in 
Liverpool city centre. For now the chapter turns to a general contextual discussion 
of the contemporary British city in terms of the debates that have informed a 
restructuring of social control in the British urban setting. 
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The search for order in the contemporary British city 
in City of Quartz, Davis (1990) captured the shift from social welfare to social 
warfare in post-liberal Los Angeles where "one observes an unprecedented 
tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a 
single comprehensive security effort" (Ibid: 224). His work has pointed to a 
dystopian - albeit critical - vision of the contemporary city where urban 
renaissance continues to go hand in hand with the reconstruction of policing and 
security towards the maintenance of brutal and unequal social boundaries. Davis 
cogently highlighted the interconnections between agencies involved in social 
control in the city. However, the extent to which it is possible to generalise from 
such an analysis has remained open to empirical and theoretical debate. 'Fortress 
LA', like Cohen's (1979) 'punitive city' or the pathological zones of the Chicago 
School, cannot be read as representative of urban policing, strategies of social 
control or patterns of urban crime respectively. As Taylor (1997: 59) argued, 
global prescriptions of change, whether formulated in terms of a 'risk society' or 
4 post-modemism', have failed to connect "global change to local expressions" 
regarding the emergence of local partnerships that have placed 4crime prevention' 
as a core concern. Within Britain during the 1990s at both national and local 
government levels it has become a matter of official recognition that problems of 
local crime are increasingly infringing on the efforts made at the local level to 
provide sustained social and economic regeneration. This recognition came at a 
time when public anxiety about crime was heightened, not least through debates 
around the effectiveness of the criminal justice system to deal adequately with the 
crime problem. 
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The application of CCTV in the cities of the United Kingdom intensified during 
the mid-1990s at a time when recorded crime continued to rise from the post-war 
period, with notifiable offences up from 2.4 million in 1979 to 5.5 million in 
1992. By 1995,5.1 million crimes were recorded by the police (a fall of 2.4% on 
the previous year), though crimes of violence increased by 5% on 1994 and 
robbery by 14%. Police clear up rates have declined from 41% in 1979 to 26% in 
1995. Furthermore, there has been increasingly intensive public and official 
scrutiny of police effectiveness. In 1996 an Audit Commission report indicated 
that 80% of the public were unhappy with the level of foot patrols (The Times, 29 
February 1996). In their defence the Association of Chief Police Officers argued 
that although crime had doubled since 1980 and 999 calls had risen by 133%, 
police manpower had only increased by 8% (Ibid). This led to an 
acknowledgement that policing and criminal justice agencies alone are limited in 
terms of combating crime with a consequent expansion in expectations in what 
the public and other agencies can contribute in this area. The growth of the 
private security industry has been particularly evident. Figures show that from 
1970 its turnover had grown from f55 million to fl. 2 billion in 1990. During the 
1990s, estimates of the numbers of private security personnel began to show that 
they out-numbered the police by as much as 12,000 employees (The Independent 
on Sunday, II June, 1995). 9 The increasing politicisation of law and order since 
1979 can be placed alongside a rise in public concern around safety and security 
9 The Association of Chief Police Officers in Britain was eager to point out that this rise in private 
and unregulated security provision was set to continue if cuts in Police manpower budgets were not 
reversed (The Guardian, 25 January, 1995). By 2000 the private security industry had grown to be 
worth E4 billion (The Observer, 2000,23 April) . At the same time, police 
detection rates have 
continued to fall to an all time low of 24% (The Guardian, 2002,12 July). 
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that, according to the 1994 British Crime Survey, is manifest in public anxiety 
about becoming victims of crime over and above worries to do with job insecurity 
and illness. Alongside this the 1995 British Social Attitudes Survey reported that 
the majority of those surveyed believed that the court system was too lenient on 
criminals, that increased public support existed for police surveillance measures, 
that concern for civil liberties was declining and that the fear of crime was rising, 
particularly amongst the young and women (The Guardian, 22 November, 1995). 
Interpreting any rise in crime from official criminal statistics is widely accepted as 
problematic in that they offer more an index of police practice and citizen 
reporting behaviour than any objective long term measurement (Lea and Young, 
1984). Neither have such figures been collated in such a way as to comparatively 
study 'urban' and 'rural' trends (Smith, 1989: 273). The wider concerns of crime 
surveys are also limited in their failure to pick up 'invisible' crimes whether 
corporate, domestic, sexual or racial in origin. With these and other drawbacks in 
mind Smith has commented that: 
No amount of political rhetoric or elaborate policy-making can 
overcome the fact that, empirically, there are major gaps in our 
knowledge of just what the problem of urban crime is (1989: 274, 
emphasis in originao. 
However, statistical measures, along with criminological research both past and 
present, have helped reinforce a common sense perception that crime is a city 
problem (Taylor, 1999: 91). More particularly it is a problem for "the policing of 
the working class city than the policing of the City" (Levi, 1987: 137). Statistical 
measures have served to 'mystify' the crime problem and reinforce popular and 
official perceptions of visible danger and risk in the public sphere that in turn 
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provide a legitimacy for legal, punitive and policing strategies aimed at securing 
public order (Box, 1983). Nevertheless, during the last twenty years of the 
twentieth century official statistics in particular have fuelled both 'Left' and 
'Right' political agendas in their attempts to monopolise the law and order mantle 
within a broader concern to deregulate the market economy whilst increasing 
regulation and control of the social sphere. The politicisation of crime is therefore 
not a straightforward matter singularly related to empirical measurement, but a 
selective and partial process in the designation of risks and victims. It is within 
this context of academic and political concerns around increases in recorded 
crime, police ineffectiveness and heightened public anxiety that: 
The material and symbolic significance of 'crime' and 'fear of 
crime' in different conurbations is increasingly linked with other 
issues to do with 'urban fortunes', as understood locally in past, 
present and future tenns (Taylor, 1996: 332). 
Crime, Social Control And The Regenerated City: The Governmental Response 
'Urban fortunes' in a deregulated economic climate have become increasingly 
linked and 'thought out' in relation to 'the problem of crime' as it arises in 
particular local contexts. These concerns have fuelled a renewed perception that 
the city centre is an increasingly insecure place both econon-kally and socially, 
for business and consumers alike, and have been acknowledged within central 
government which has sought to target potential victims, vulnerable environments 
and all those who are capable of exercising responsibility for reducing criminal 
opportunity (Hough et al, 1980). Under the Action for Cities initiative launched in 
1988 a range of problems were identified in Britain's cities and targeted under this 
new initiative which sought to: improve investment and enterprise; tackle 
dereliction and improve development; improve transport; development of the arts; 
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and make city areas safe and attractive places to live and work in. From this 
initiative the Safer Cities Projects emerged, which by 1998 operated in 55 cities 
and towns. This programme represented the Home Office's centrepiece crime 
prevention initiative and has had three main aims - "to reduce crime", "to lessen 
the fear of crime", and "to create safer cities where economic enterprise and 
community life can flourish" (Safer Cities, 1991: 2). The programme provided 
Home Office support through central coordination, advice, expertise and the 
funding of partnerships at the local level. The funds made available are also used 
as a levering device to attract other local funds, particularly from the business 
community, for the purposes of crime prevention. Though control over the 
process is firn-ily located within the central government domain, it is managed 
locally by non-profit making organisations such as the National Association for 
the Care and Resettlement of Offenders and Crime Concern. The latter body was 
established in 1988 by central government to encourage private sector funding 
and involvement in crime prevention through acting as an 'independent' 
consultant to local partnerships and encouraging 'good practice'. Central 
government also established the Crime Prevention Agency in 1995 to co-ordinate 
national objectives by bringing together the Home Office, police, business leaders, 
Crime Concern and academics (The Guardian, 23 November, 1995). '0 
Alongside these developments has been the increasing deployment of surveillance 
cameras in non-residential environments as a central component of current 'crime 
prevention' thinking and practice. In Britain during the 1990s, the drive to secure 
10 The work of this agency was maintained under New Labour's Crime Reduction Programme in 
1998. 
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urban space became big business with the market for closed circuit television 
(CCTV) doubling since 1989 to an annual spending of 000 million. The British 
Security Industry Association (BSIA) trumpeted an observation that CCTV was 
becoming an acceptable and "permanent fixture" on the streets of Britain and that 
on a "typical day" each one of us is viewed by 8 different surveillance cameras 
(BSIA, 1997: 23). Under John Major's Conservative administration, CCTV took 
a central role in government thinking around crime prevention and, as the 
Introduction to the thesis observed, this thinking was maintained and intensified 
under New Labour. In encouraging this growth the Conservatives removed the 
need for planning permission to install CCTV systems (Home Office, 1994: 17- 
18). Furthermore, as the Home Office publication 'Crime Prevention News' 
(April-June, 1996) made clear, CCTV was to be placed as a central component of 
the Conservative law and order strategy. John Major's desire "to make every 
street safe" underpinned the intention to generate 10,000 extra cameras by making 
f 15 million available in a CCTV Challenge Competition (Home Office, 1995). 
The bidding document made funding available only to those schemes that: could 
demonstrate a 'partnership' approach; were "broadly representative of the 
community"; have the support of local police; could clearly identify a 'crime 
problem'; and could secure private sector funding to maintain a CCTV scheme 
(Ibid: 1-2). " 
"The criteria to receive funding laid down in this document have remained unchanged under 
New 
Labour's funding arrangements for CCTV through the Crime Reduction Programme. 
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These developments within the city and town centre have emerged at a time when 
retail crime is reported to be on the increase with retailers' costs soaring to f2.15 
billion per annum. The 1996 British Retail Consortium estimated that f580 
million was spent on retail crime prevention -a 40% increase on the previous 
year. This is reported to be adding an extra f 140 per annum, per household, on 
shopping bills to cover the costs of crime while denting overall retail profits by 
23%. Crimes included here are burglary, robbery, vandalism, attacks on staff and 
terrorism. Overall, as little as 2% of retail crime finds its way into police statistics. 
In Britain, the police and the Home Office are actively encouraging private 
industry to invest millions in crime prevention including the sponsoring of police 
cars and the establishment of surveillance cameras. This has been necessary, 
argued the Police Federation, in a climate where crime costs f 1000 a second and 
f3l billion a year (The Guardian, 19 May, 1997). 
Thus a political shift has occurred towards 'partnerships' that emphasise the 
shared responsibility for crime prevention and have provided evidence for 
Garland's (1997) observation, discussed in Chapter Three, that what is occurring 
are centrally coordinated 'responsibilisation strategies) - These strategies 
have 
been exemplified under the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) (1998) that was 
aimed at public concern with issues of crime, disorder and nuisance that the police 
cannot deal with alone. The Act aimed to formalise and coordinate, with central 
government guidance, the work of local crime prevention partnerships. The Act 
depicts local crime prevention through the language of 'community safety' and 
can be seen as an attempt "to solve the problem of 'who owns the community 
safety problem? "' (Audit Commission, 1999: 20). The CDA 
has allowed a certain 
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level of continuity regarding local discretion for the identification and solution of 
local problems. Home Office Guidance has stressed "Maximum flexibility for 
local freedom": 
.. the 
Act does not prescribe in any detail what the agenda for the 
local partnership should be, nor what structures will be needed to 
deliver the agenda (Home Office, 1998: Forward). 
However, the Act imposed a legal duty on police and Local Authorities to work 
with other 'responsible authorities' in order to conduct three yearly crime and 
disorder audits as a means for setting strategic priorities. In line with this, 
computer technology known as Geographical Information Systems (GIS) have 
been developed in order to map high-risk areas or crime 'hot-spots'. The 
formalisation of business involvement in strategic partnerships was pushed by the 
Act. Local Chambers of Commerce and privately sponsored Town Centre 
Management consortia should be incorporated into local strategic partnerships, 
not merely as "a source of funds" but as educators in the skills of "project 
management and technical know-how". Local crime and disorder strategies must 
therefore seek the active participation of the business sector that has "a legitimate 
expectation that the strategy will address issues of concern to them" (Home 
Office, Ibid: Sec. 2.33). In allowing for local discretion, the CDA has been 
criticised for its lack of clarity and coordination, and insensitivity to public needs 
(Audit Commission, 1999). The Audit Commission National Report for 1999 
noted that "community safety" -a buzzword underpinning the CDA - had no 
agreed definition other than, as the Report defined it, "an issue of major public 
concern",, which is central "to people's quality of life and can make the difference 
between people wanting to live and work and stay in area or not" Jbid: 6). 
'Community safety' can mean more than 'crime' and contains those things "most 
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disruptive to people's quality of life" (Ibid). It is important to note here that 
6 quality of life' has been central to regeneration vernacular and played an 
ideological role in cementing relations between authorities within the neo-liberal 
state. Issues concerning locally powerful definitions of 'quality of life, will be 
explored in Chapter Seven. 
Further criticism from the Audit Commission focused upon police dominance of 
local crime prevention (Ibid: 43). Also, the over reliance on situational measures 
such as CCTV was criticised because of central government pressure to adopt 
such measures through the allocation of funds, and they were seen as easier to sell 
to the pubic (Ibid: 36). Furthermore, 'partnership' suffered from the failure to 
understand different cultures and working practices of partner organisations 
coupled with a "lack of ability of those around the table to conu-nit their 
organisations" (Ibid: 45). These tensions highlighted in the Report are, for the 
purposes of this thesis, to be understood as tensions and contradictions of state 
restructuring which, when examined, will highlight the ideological work 
undertaken across the neo-liberal state to shape both the boundaries of the state 
form and its legitimation in Liverpool city centre. 
Interpreting these developments in the shift to 'community' based crime 
prevention has, left questions for scholars in the field. The reinvigoration of 
appeals to community has sat alongside the 'democratic deficit' following the 
curbing of local authority power by central government during the 1980s (Hughes, 
1998: 147). As Hughes has suggested, "the 'unfinished business' around appeals 
to the ideologically volatile vision of community" (Ibid: 129) has left the concept 
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more open and contestable than some have argued. Evoking 'Community' may 
serve "countervailing forces ... on the wider social fabric/body politic" in ten-ns of 
provoking "the possibility of 'unsettlements' of the state's dominant agenda on 
crime control" Jbid: 128). 'Unsettlements' of dominant crime control (and social 
control) agendas will come up against powerful official discourses proliferated by 
local elites towards setting the parameters around what is and what is not relevant 
to the strategy of 'partnership' (Atkinson, 1999). These discourses have shaped 
the meaning of regeneration and partnership strategy in Liverpool city centre and 
will be explored in Chapter Seven. 
Partners against crime and the impact on city centre space 
The 'partnership' approach characterised by the CDA has for a longer period been 
developed within and across a range of social sites including Neighbourhood 
Watch and city regeneration coalitions or growth machines that, for Taylor 
(1997), are indicative of defensive social movements. This point was underscored 
by van Swaaningen (1997: 175), who characterised contemporary risk orientated 
crime and safety initiatives as increasingly defined through the targeting of 
'nuisances' that have mirrored the urban social defence practices of the 1880's. 
Contemporary practices of securing urban space have been encouraged by studies 
that have pointed a decline in the use of public space, accompanied by negative 
perceptions of urban centres. Bianchini (1990) echoed these concerns when 
calling for a more holistic approach to urban planning that required investment 
from both public and private sector and should include economic revitalisation (to 
stimulate retailing and the night time economy): social strategies of 'natural 
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surveillance' aimed at encouraging a greater public mixing of diverse groups, and 
political initiatives that coordinate cultural policy with policies on transport, 
policing and environmental improvements. Bianchini noted that the fear of crime, 
along with the expansion of low income groups and cuts in welfare benefits, was 
leading to the decline of public social life in the city. However, Bianchini warned 
that the increase in the privatisation of public space through "malling" and the 
need to promote "safe shopping" may be leading to "the virtual 
disenfranchisernment from city life of young people with low spending power and 
of other - generally low income - residents, whose appearance and conduct did not 
conform to the moral codes of well-ordered consumption enforced by shopping 
centre managers" (Bianchini, 1990: 5). Beck and Willis's (1995) study reported 
that town and city centres are facing decline because consumers are increasingly 
expressing a preference for out-of-town shopping and enclosed malls which offer 
the reassuring presence of private security and surveillance cameras. The public 
survey conducted for their study identified a number of 'nuisances' that the public 
perceive as obstacles to consumption in the city centre: 
The term nuisance is widely used as convenient shorthand for 
members of the public being upset in any way whilst shopping. 
This may include shoppers being subject to behaviour which 
causes them distress, or it may involve the unwelcome or 
unwanted presence of certain persons in the shopping 
environment. It may be manifest through unpleasant or offensive 
gangs of threatening youths; children hanging around in town 
centres and shopping centres; people selling things on the street; 
and distress caused by prostitutes, vagrants, beggars, drunks or 
buskers (Beck and Willis, 1995: 3 1). 
Such a wide range of 'incivilities' were "seen in themselves, irrespective of their 
actions, as contaminating the environment" (Beck and Willis, 1995: Ibid). The 
survey advocated the greater use of surveillance cameras and uniformed security 
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that reassures the consuming public. The research concluded that retailers and 
town centre managers will have to be prepared to fund "safer shopping" strategies 
as part of the drive to maintain profitability in the city centre. The drift away from 
the city centre has concerned local authorities and local private interests since the 
late 1980s. A report found that noisy youth, fear of drunkenness and violence 
coupled with litter-strewn streets, toilets and car parks were driving people away 
from town centres at night. In order to combat these fears - particularly amongst 
women - the report advocates a range of cultural and leisure activities to attract 
people of all ages back into the city centre at night in order to "dilute" 
troublemakers (The Guardian, 16 May, 1991). 12 
The fusion of regeneration strategies with 'crime prevention' has been 
exemplified in the growth of city and town centre management techniques that 
have broadly aimed to promote an improvement in the quality of the environment 
of the city centre. Such management techniques are indicative of the 
entrepreneurial forms of rule discussed in the previous section. The concept of 
Town Centre Management (TCM) originates from the recognition by local 
authorities and business interests that the economic viability of a town centre is on 
the decline and draws upon the model of the commercial management of large 
out-of-town shopping complexes. The pooling of resources from both public and 
private sources has been used to establish the office of Town Centre Manager, a 
position usually filled by seconded business personnel from one of the major retail 
12 This resonated with what Jacobs (1961: 45) termed "natural surveillance" as a process to revitalise 
city space: "there must be eyes on the street, eyes belonging to those we rruight call the natural 
proprietors of the street". 
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chains. The impetus therefore has been towards the enhancement of the 
commercial viability, through publicity and partner mobilisation, of the city or 
town centre. Studies have indicated that in attracting investment and consumption 
to particular locations, TCM prioritises the targeting of non-consumptive 
activities through environmental improvements and CCTV that aims to 
discourage begging, roaming youths and unlicensed street vending (Reeve, 
1998). 13 The management of safer city centres has become a growing academic 
specialism that has broadly encouraged the implementation of a range of 
situational measures open to city centre managers as a means towards greater 
civility and a reduction in criminal opportunity (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997). The latter 
authors state that although opportunity reducing measures are crucial to safer city 
centres, they will not prevent crime and must be placed alongside measures to 
encourage moral responsibility: 
What is therefore also needed is the curbing of social incivilities 
by better personal behaviour and conduct within the space of the 
city centre. Rather than a culture of excuses for poor behaviour in 
public places, what is required is a culture of expectations for 
more civility (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997: 238). 
Discourses of civility and civic responsibility punctuated the views of urban 
managers in Liverpool and forrned part of their visions for an orderly city centre. 
These views will be discussed more fully in Chapter Seven. Critical writers 
have 
observed that strategies enacted under TCM schemes in city centres 
have 
highlighted an increasing divergence of control tasks between public and private 
sectors and opened up "the development of crime prevention projects which are 
13 The development of TCM has been a feature of Liverpool's regeneration. 
Personnel working 
within with such bodies were interviewed for this thesis, the 
data from which will be discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
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not necessarily directed at 'crime' in the legal sense of the word", thus instigating 
a process of bringing "people under penal control under whom no legal suspicion 
is established" (van Swaaningen, 1997: 196). The developments discussed here 
can be understood as a merging of 'crime control/prevention' with a broader 
notion of 'quality of life' that is reflective of a process to re-image and construct a 
particular city's 'place' in the regional, national and international urban hierarchy. 
At the local level, this has been accompanied by a move towards 'public order', 
4zero tolerance' or 'quality of life' policing that has been aimed at groups 
"perceived to degrade the urban aesthetic and make life difficult for the 'law 
abiding"' (Stenson, 2000: 216). It has been argued that targeting the homeless, 
drunks and vandals has been underpinned by a widespread tolerance of social 
exclusion: 
There is a widespread acceptance of harsh methods of controlling 
and disciplining the poor and the deviant. It reflects a sense of 
being 'fed up' with troublesome people - people who are just 
unsightly and irritating as well as those who actually pose some 
real danger to life and limb (Currie, 1997: 136). 
As noted earlier, 'quality of life' has formed a thread in regeneration discourse 
and has acted as a key discursive device utilised across partnerships in the 
fon-nation of place marketing initiatives for the purposes of attracting inward 
investment. The concern with 'quality of life' increasingly has incorporated local 
crime indexes and those local, national and international reputations and identities 
that particular places are perceived to engender. Thus partnerships 
between local 
business, police, local government, developers and local media are 
becoming 
increasingly geared towards the management of local problems and threats 
deemed to destabilise a local risk-calculus increasingly used as an 
important 
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source of infon-nation in investment decisions. 14 This 'recognition' of the salience 
of 'cnmeý amongst local elites and its importance in the competitive re- 
positioning of 'global cities' has been reflected in central government initiatives 
such as Safer Cities, which since its demise as a discretely funded programme has 
seen funds transferred to the Single Regeneration Budget (1994). This transfer has 
made 'the control of crime' a central component of urban regeneration policy, 
making crime prevention an element that must be competitively bid for alongside 
and as part of any 'successful' regeneration strategy. Thus the identification of a 
'crime problem' becomes a key strategy in gaining scarce central resources. This 
has been reinforced by legislative and official guidance documents that have 
stressed a linkage between crime and disorder and 'successful' regeneration. The 
CDA and Local Strategic Partnerships (2000) have provided examples of what 
officially has been recognised as moves towards 'joined up' government. 'Joined 
up' government has been taking shape under a neo-liberal ideology of 
managerialism and intensified a process towards the subordination of social 
policy to sustaining economic competitiveness and fighting 'crime and disorder' 
(Crowther, 2000: 15 1). 1 5 Managers and proponents of CCTV, in shaping how the 
technology is ideologically represented and targeted, have further reinforced the 
link between orderly urban space and urban revitalisation. This point will be 
explored more fully in Chapter Eight. For now it can be noted that in the attempts 
14 The processes involved in defining the police role and their positioning in local investment 
strategies will be highlighted in Chapter Seven with regard to Liverpool. 
15 , Joined up government' has been New Labour's attempt at coordinating the partners within a neo- 
liberal state. This has been enacted "through a combination of inducements ... and sanctions" under a 
mantra of "corporate populism" which has assumed and consolidated a 
key role for business, in 
coalition with other 'responsible' partners, in the provision of local 'services' 
(Fairclough, 2000: 
121). 
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to coordinate agents and agencies in the neo-liberal state, through initiatives 
described in this section, a 'third way, politics has been inaugurated: 
A running thread of these initiatives is to enable the police and 
other governmental agencies to regain control over the 
neighbourhoods of the so-called 'socially excluded', the problem 
housing estates and poor inner city areas. In this way the aim is to 
provide congenial conditions for social and economic regeneration 
(Stenson, 2000: 229). 
This thesis will examine the 'congenial conditions' and strategic visions 
propagated within a developing neo-liberal. state fonn in the city centre of 
Liverpool as a means of exploring social control practices within that setting. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the historical continuities and discontinuities 
that have existed around 'the city' as a problematic site in the negotiation and 
construction of social order. Since the development of the great industrial cities of 
the nineteenth century, the concern to reconstruct the social and spatial character 
of the urban form has involved debates around social order within which struggles 
over the definition of 'crime', 'risk' and 'dangerousness' have been central. The 
formal organisation of these concerns has changed with shifts in the management 
of the urban social form that have reflected wider economic restructuring and 
politico-ideological preferences of urban governance within the state fonn. The 
-11 above discussion indicated the links between 'crime' and social change that 
Gatrell (1990) identified as central to the interpretation and response to those 
turbulent urban transformations in the 1840s. The overlapping categories of 
'crime', 'disorder' and 'incivility' have again become central to contemporary 
urban discourses. Scholars have begun to explore these processes involved in the 
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construction and representation of social order and the consequences for social 
control strategies as cities have engaged in programmes to regenerate, re-invent, 
re-position and re-image themselves. The material and ideological conditions 
have shifted towards (neW entrepreneurial governance strategies alongside the 
development of particular technologies and rationales of control. It would be 
incorrect however to take the 'entrepreneurial state' and its 'responsibilised', 
efficient, risk avoidance strategy at face value. van Swaaningen (1997: 90) warned 
of the dangers in losing a normative framework that would help make sense of the 
contemporary 'politics of prevention': "It is crucial to reveal the gut reaction 
populism on which this politics is actually based, and to place criminal justice 
politics in a socio-economic framework". Furthermore, the pairing of 'risk 
avoidance' through 'partnership' in the contemporary urban setting forces a 
consideration of wider local material conditions. "The vast new industry around 
crime prevention" has been, 
... attempting to legitimize and manage the changes in the post- 
industrial form, and provide the conditions of existence for further 
capital accumulation and growth in a locality, in a display of 
apparently coordinated action against national and local crime 
problems (Taylor, 1997: 66). 
Taylor pointed to shifts in political rationale that have impacted on processes of 
rule at the local level. The coordination of this rule and its consequences for social 
control has for some, as Chapter Three illustrated, been interpreted via a rejection 
of 'state centred' analyses with a focus instead on a plurality of power manifest 
cross-institutional boundaries (via expert alliances and partnerships). As Chapter 
Three discussed more fully, this work has downplayed the consolidation of 
particular powerful interests within state organs and the salience of normative 
constructions that state actors and agencies are able to articulate and invoke in 
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their authoritative appeals to leadership in civil society. Gramsci made this point 
when arguing against 'organic' distinctions between state and civil society and for 
a view of the state that privileges particular political rationalities and programmes 
of rule. Any such distinctions between state and civil society are 'methodological ý 
and furthennore, 
... since 
in actual reality civil society and state are one and the 
same, it must be made clear that laissez-faire too is a form of state 
'regulation', introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive 
means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not 
the spontaneous, automatic expression of economic facts. 
Consequently, laissez-faire liberalism is a political programme, 
designed to change - in so far as it is victorious -a state's leading 
personnel, and to change the economic programme itself - in other 
words the distribution of the national income (Gramsci, 197 1: 
160). 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the growth of partnerships and expedient expert 
alliances at the local level needs to be placed within a broader understanding of 
political and economic change that does not take the authority of prevalent 
political programmes for granted. The ascendancy or 'victory' of particular 
programmes of rule should not be mistaken for a hegemony based on an 
unproblematically 'correct' analysis of problems that are troubling society at any 
one time. Indeed, the thesis will explore processes involved in re-shaping the 
urban form within which problems thought to hinder the emergence of a 'new' 
urbanity are identified, articulated and responded to. The focus will therefore be 
upon powerful neo-liberal political programmes, which have reconfigured the 
boundaries and scope of local state action. In turning the research process upwards 
towards a local state"s leading personnel, some of the themes identified by others 
in this chapter, regarding an analysis of the trajectory of 'partnership', can be 
explored more fully. In exploring these social relations in Chapter Seven, the 
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context will be set for investigating social control in Liverpool city centre in 
Chapter Eight. The thesis will now begin the case study in the next chapter with a 
focus upon the historical interrelationship between historically prevailing 
econornic, political and social relations in the city of Liverpool and the processes 
of social control. 
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Chapter Six 
Social Control in Liverpool: An Historical Overview 
Liverpool's trades union leaders of 1991 crowing atop piles of 
stinking rubbish like cockerels on dung heaps, its welfare 
mentality growing upon the destruction of wealth producing jobs 
... poverty and crime nourished on the thin gruel of welfare, the 
whole mess financed by borrowing whose costs choke any 
tentative industry or commerce, was the world's image and the 
terrible reality of Britain in the 1970s (Tebbit, 1991: 23). 
Morphocity is now undergoing a cultural and contextual 
revolution. The city is reinventing itself and tuning in with the 
requirements of modem learning curves. Morphocity is now 
informed by a new and different set of values: openness, 
meritocracy, social diversity, plurality of skills, youth culture, 
transparency, vision, change, experimentation and 
cosmopolitanism (Humphreys and MacDonald, 1995: 50). 
The two qualitatively different quotes above point to the historically nuanced 
representations of place - in this case Liverpool - and the positioning of a 
particular place within wider economic and political processes. The quote from 
Norman Tebbit encapsulated for many political and media commentators what 
appeared to be 'wrong' with Liverpool from the 1970s onwards: a political, 
economic and cultural backwater, a disorderly city at odds with the cutting edge 
of neo-liberal discourse and practice, and the maker of its own demise. Such 
representations of the city are not isolated and emerge out of popular myth as 
much as concrete political and economic struggle. In contrast the notion of 
'Morphocity' emerged from a document that spoke of the 'new' Liverpool; a 
city in renaissance, forward looking, replete with the latest technologies of 
urban management and reminiscent of one view of the urban form characterised 
as "playful space", full of spontaneity and creativity (Christopherson, 
1994: 
409). The contemporary regeneration of Liverpool encapsulates these two 
contrasting positions and will be illuminated more fully 
in Chapter Seven. 
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Suffice to note for now that the struggle to re-image the city for local state 
managers has thrown up a clear contrast (and indeed a contest) between 
dystopian and utopian discourses of 'place'. Such reimaging has sat along-side 
attempts to manage a range of locally identified problems that were perceived 
potentially to disqualify the city from the shares in a global market place. 
The previous chapter broadly considered the political and economic processes 
that have impacted upon the drive to regenerate city centres within which 
discourses and practices of social control have become a central strategic 
feature. Other writers have argued that the centrality of mechanisms geared 
towards effective social control in the reformation of the city have displayed 
both "global" and "local" characteristics in the marketisation of security 
provision (Sheptycki, 1997). In this sense, "the multiplicity of tactics for risk 
suppression" will display peculiarly local characteristics: 
Underlying these developments is the discourse of insecurity and 
the practices of risk suppression [ ... ]. The 
distribution of risks 
depends on the segregation of suspect populations (which will be 
differently defined in different locales but which will, in any 
case, be those without access to the economic and political levers 
of power) (Sheptycki, 1997: 312). 
Similarly, Taylor (1997) has pointed to the uneven local expression and 
constitution of crime and anxiety about crime that have informed the emergence 
of local elite partnerships concerned with the re-positioning of cities 
in the 
global market place. It is the local expression of social control 
in the city on 
which this chapter will focus with reference to historical 
developments in 
Liverpool city centre. What follows is an overview of social control and 
policing in Liverpool that takes into account historical themes and 
issues that 
broadly illuminate the rationale underpinning social control strategies, policing 
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and their targeting. In drawing attention to these historical processes the chapter 
will begin the case study of this thesis and facilitate an appreciation of 
continuities and discontinuities in the formulation and targeting of social 
control in the city so that more recent debates around the 'newness' and 
strategic novelty of contemporary social control can be assessed in later 
chapters. 
Political-economy in Liverpool from the early nineteenth century to the 
1980s: an overview 
There is no city in the world, not even London itself, in which so 
many foreign governments find it necessary to maintain consular 
for the safeguarding of the interests of their exiled subjects. It 
should, however, be noted that this amazingly polyglot and 
cosmopolitan population, consisting of races which are 
backward in many ways, and maintaining itself largely by 
unskilled labour, vastly increases the difficulty of securing and 
maintaining the decencies of life (Muir, 1907: 305-306). 
The political economy of Liverpool in the nineteenth century was established 
around the largest and most complex dock system in Western Europe that, 
along with the city's identification as a commerce centre, placed Liverpool as 
the second city of industrial Britain and of the Empire. It is not often recognised 
that the prosperity and growth of the city was built on slavery, with over 40% of 
all slaves traded from Africa by European countries transported using Liverpool 
based ships (Gifford et al, 1989: 25). Indeed, without the slave trade 
Liverpool's economic prosperity would not have been possible (Williams, 
1964: 63). The town contained around 1,000 inhabitants in 1670 and 7,000 in 
1710. Between 1811 and 1861 the population growth in the city multiplied five 
times with 22% of the local population in 1851 being migrants from Ireland 
(Morris and Rodger, 1993: 2-3). The population was largely transient. In 1872 
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the Chief Constable John Greig estimated that at any one time the city 
possessed a shifting population Of about 20,000 (Lane, 1987: 34). Local 
manufacturing had a minor role in economic development which relied on the 
Liverpool port, which by 1857 was responsible for approximately half of 
Britain's exports and one third of its imports (Merseyside Socialist Research 
Group (MSRG), 1980: 28). In the 1860s, the local Chamber of Commerce 
presented with pride an image of Liverpool that was based not on the industrial 
factory system but upon the 'gentlemanly' pursuit of commerce. The dominant 
mercantile class accrued its wealth and profits through overseas trade on the 
back of a vast, and significantly immigrant, casualised labour force divided by 
work opportunities, culture and race (Brogden, 1982: 46). Up until the mid- 
nineteenth century Liverpool was dominated politically, economically and 
culturally by 'the old families' who were organized through "three or four 
handed partnerships" that combined the business interests of merchanting, 
shipowning and insurance whose considerable influence in the governance of 
the city was maintained through involvement in sitting on various committees 
that promoted 'civic duty' and improvements in the local 'quality of life' (Lane, 
1987: 53-82). By the early twentieth century, family firms and partnerships had 
been absorbed into larger corporations that progressively became detached from 
Liverpool. Of necessity, these enterprises looked beyond the city for their 
continued prosperity though evidence of their economic and cultural hegemony 
can be seen in the spectacle of Georgian and Regency Architecture that remains 
in and around the city today. Liverpool produced more wealthy families in the 
nineteenth century than any other English city and this wealth became closely 
connected to local politics through the Liberal and Tory parties and various 
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philanthropic organizations which procured for the local elite 46some 
intelligence of the other Liverpool" (Lane, 1987: 13 1, emphasis added). Up 
until the mid-nineteenth century, Liverpool was a town "in which the public 
good was equated with commerce" and accordingly the water supply and refuge 
collection were left to private enterprise, while no responsibility for building 
regulation and sewerage was bestowed upon the Liverpool Corporation (Power, 
1992: 35). Merchants dominated the town council up until municipal reform 
around 1835 - "what it lacked in accountability Liverpool more than made up 
for in its single minded devotion to furthering commerce" (Ibid: 25). 
The 'second industrial revolution' by-passed Liverpool, whose economic 
structure drifted away from national trends and the majority of whose labour 
force stood outside permanent and stable work. By the 1920's, 37% of 
Liverpool workers were involved in production as compared to the national 
average of 67% (Belcham, 1992: 3). After the first world war, the docks had 
started to decline though over half of Liverpool's working population were 
involved in shipping, dock-work or in related transportation. For male workers 
in the city there had always been limited opportunities for employment outside 
of the port. Women's exclusion from this arena meant that they if they worked 
outside of the home they were mostly employed as domestic servants for the 
merchant and professional classes. Between 1921 and 193 1, around 30 women 
in every 100 was engaged in servant-based occupations at a time when such 
work was steadily in decline as the wealthy moved out of the city centre area 
(MSRG, 1980: 31). 
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in conjunction with these processes the trajectory of the political economy of 
Liverpool during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries "ensured a classic 
lumpen-proletariat, low skilled and outside the disciplines of industry and the 
predictable security of a weekly wage packet" (Brogden, 1991: 3). 
Casualisation and a low skill economic base underpinned this residuum. The 
composition of the working class in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
was divided organisationally and culturally on sectarian and racial grounds. The 
Tory Party controlled the city council and governed the city for most of the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century in a manner that 
reinforced these divisions through the appeal to "religious-curn-national 
stereotypes" (Waller, 1981: 18). Sectarianism divided the working class and 
helped ensure that radical alternative politics did not develop in the city during 
the period' (Taplin, 1994: 19). It was not until the Liverpool General Transport 
strike of 1911 that the waterfront unions grew in numbers and influence. 
However, before and after the First World War the contraction of British capital 
was increasingly evident in the decline of export based industries which had a 
particularly devastating impact on the docks and related industries in Liverpool. 
The shift to manufacturing and service based industries in the 1920s brought 
some growth in Liverpool's traditional commercial and financial sector along 
with increases in seasonal work through the employment of shop assistants 
(MSRG, 1980: 33). By 1929, a relative boom year, the number of Merseyside 
people living below the official poverty line stood at around 30% with another 
I The political hegemony of the city was thus assured through the dominance of the Tory Party 
that was able to gain substantial working class support by playing the Protestant card and 
appealing to the small numbers of skilled workingmen (Waller, 1981: 18). 
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14% just above this. During the 1920s and 1930s the male unemployment rate 
on Merseyside remained higher than the national average and stood above 20% 
(Ibid, 1980: 32). The over- reliance on the docks and the predominantly 
unskilled and casual workforce left Liverpool in a particularly vulnerable 
situation in the depression years, and this was recognised in the special powers 
granted through Parliament in the Liverpool Corporation Act (1936) and 
sustained in the Merseyside Plan (1944) which enabled the local authority to 
buy up land on the city's outskirts in order to build factories, relocate the 
population and offer incentives for inward investment (Meegan, 1989). It was 
not until the 1960s that large scale manufacturing moved to the region in the 
form of multinational ventures by the likes of Ford, General Motors and 
Standard Oil. The impact of this restructuring was negligible in that traditional 
industries continued to decline and unemployment remained higher than the 
national average. The 'growth years' only really served to stave off even greater 
catastrophe for the region as a whole and Liverpool in particular, as 
increasingly local economic fortunes relied upon decisions made outside of the 
area and on national and international market conditions. Between 1961 and 
1971, the Merseyside Region - dubbed "the Bermuda triangle of British 
capitalism" (MSRG, 1980: 9) - lost 76,000, jobs while a further 40,000 
manufacturing jobs were lost between 1979 and 1984. Employment in the 
docks fell from I in 5 of the workforce in the late 1940's to I in 3 in the 1970's. 
By the mid 1990's the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company employed just 900 
workers. 
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Policing and social control in Liverpool: late eighteenth century to the 
1930s 
No town ... contains so difficult a population as that of 
Liverpool (Chief Inspector of Reformatories, 1898 cited in 
Waller, 1981: 170). 
... the stress of sheer necessity bore hard on a crowded 
cosmopolitan port - Liverpool had to have a more effective 
police force than practically anywhere else (Midwinter, 1971: 
66). 
The local Liverpool Mercury newspaper in 1851 commented "that the centre of 
the town of Liverpool is becoming more and more a place of business only" (18 
July, 1851). This was in sharp contrast to the vast un-enfranchised groups who 
lived in cellars around the dock areas. The popular concerns of the masses did 
not effect the hegemony of the mercantile aristocracy. Indeed, they were usually 
ignored up until the mid-nineteenth century: 
The division between the political concerns of the Liverpool 
masses and the elite was never more evident than during the 
1840s. The social control of the elite, achieved by their 
monopoly of political and economic power, was seldom 
challenged. At one level the masses could be contained by 
coercion; the mobilisation of volunteers and militia was not 
uncommon in Liverpool but electorally the various mechanisms 
of patronage were generally sufficient to ensure order (Collins, 
1994: 67). 
Writing of the masses, in his early and influential 'A History of Liverpool', 
Ramsey Muir contrasted the great wealth of the city evident by the late 
eighteenth century with a distinctly 'uncivilised' drunken and riotous history 
swelled by Irish and Welsh immigration (Muir, 1907: 273). The population 
stood at 54,000 in 1790 (Marriner, 1982: 70) with 6,780 living four to a cellar 
room (Muir, 1907: 272). For Muir, the misery of this "wretched population" 
was increased by the "extraordinary number of licensed houses which the 
slackness of the magistrates had allowed to grow up" (Ibid: 273). He 
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characterised a sizeable proportion of the CAY's Population around the turn of 
the eighteenth century as: 
A population so degraded and so drunk sodden ... inevitably turbulent and unruly. The streets of Liverpool were constantly 
the scenes of riots and open fights, especially in the days of the 
press-gang; at night they were unsafe. For there was no adequate 
police (Ibid). 
In 1811, the Town Council reorganised the police in appointing 21 constables 
and 7 head constables to patrol the 7 boroughs of the city. The wealthy residents 
of Toxteth Park financed their own force to patrol the line between their estates 
and parks and the city centre (lbid: 274). By the 1840s, the 'other', poorer 
Liverpool consisted of a shifting mass of migrants, both under-and unemployed, 
who formed a casual residuum segregated from the respectable working class 
and artisans who had gained new housing which conformed to public health 
standards. This residuum came to occupy the living space in the waterfront. 
Although the old families had began to desert these areas they where still the 
space that the machinations of "commerce and industry ... occupied by day" 
(Lane, 1987: 87). The hovels and alleyways of the dockland area grew into "a 
city within a city" and contained a quarter of a million people by 1901 (Ibid). 
For the police this area was known as the 'Scotland Division' and contained in 
the words of one Chief Constable "the failures". He went on to state that this 
was a largely: 
... Irish population, with the reckless, violent 
disposition of that 
people, and with the unfortunate taste of preferring whiskey, 
which makes them dangerous, to beer, which would make them 
sleepy. There were many absolute ruffians amongst them, 
brought up in poverty, without education or religious influence, 
wearied with the struggle of life, with a hatred of society, and 
none of the surroundings which might wean them from drink, 
and vice, and violence. There were streets in the Scotland 
Division that were unsafe for respectable persons to enter, and 
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where even the Police could not carry out their duty without 
patrolling in couples ... (Nott-Bower, 1926: 148). 
Squalor and disease were endemic. The city was the first in Britain to appoint a 
Medical Officer under The Liverpool Sanitary Act in 1847, that also gave 
powers to the local Health Committee to evict around 30,000 people from 
illegally occupied street cellars. The removal of people onto the streets put 
greater strain on the poor at a time when alternative accommodation was 
extremely scarce (Midwinter, 1971: 97). Coupled with these concerns were the 
390,000 Irish who arrived in the city in 1846 and 1847 which led to "such 
turbulence that 20,000 townsmen had to be sworn in as special constables, and 
2,000 regular troops camped at Everton" (Muir, 1907: 305). Within this context 
one local historian has commented: 
After London, Liverpool was the saddest example of 
industrialism and urbanisation creating a choking, swirling 
maelstrom of humanity, with which came an intensification and 
a reorientation of crime. As dockland expanded, theft and 
prostitution tightened their grip, often with thief and whore 
working in evil concert ... Property was sacrosanct. 
It was the 
mundane, day-by-day theft that troubled shopkeepers, 
merchants, and owner-occupiers of Liverpool (Midwinter, 1971: 
56-57). 
Writers on this period refer to the alarm with which 'respectable' citizens 
viewed the streets of Liverpool that were perceived to be filled with a range of 
pathological pursuits and immoral activities the scale of which threatened to 
overwhelm the ideological construction of the city as a centre of civic and 
commercial propriety. it was widely perceived that the great commercial wealth 
"had not brought civilization in its train" and instead had let fester "a sordid and 
degrading misery, stunted and brutalised" (Muir, 1907: 270). The sheer scale of 
this growing problem of urban ungovernability meant that: 
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Reckless seafarers from all over the globe, together with 
thousands of thieves, prostitutes, vagabonds and juvenile 
delinquents crowded into the dockland areas and those insanitary 
parts of the town nearest them. Here, numerous receivers of 
stolen property, brothel keepers and managers of beer houses 
and beer taps earned a steady income. In 1836, for example, 
more than 1,000 known male thieves lived in the town, whilst 
500 others "stole at intervals". Some 600 more operated at the 
docks and upwards of 12,000 children, less than 15 years of age, 
worked as thieves for adults (Cockcroft, 1991: 4). 
In the light of these concerns "something drastic had to be done to protect 
Liverpool's law abiding citizens" (Ibid: 4) and so the Liverpool City Police 
force was established in 1836. For Brogden (1982), the formation of the modem 
police in the city has to be placed alongside the mode of production as it had 
developed up to this point. The volatility in the mode of production and the 
casualised labour process that flowed from it underpinned the growth of a huge 
'illegal' secondary economy that operated to serve the casual poor in the streets 
and included street traders, gaming houses, pubs and brothels. This created a 
"peculiar problem of control for the merchant class" (Ibid: 46). Thus what 
spurred the formation of the Liverpool City Police in 1836 was neither "mob 
eruption" as Midwinter (1971: 57) saw it, nor the desire "to suppress the 
manifestations of direct economic conflict" (Brogden, 1982: 52). For Brogden 
(1991: 87), the emergence of the new police extended and reformulated older 
practices established by the Corporation, Town and Dock Watches. The New 
Police gained a substantive legal remit and acted under a series of directions 
from a newly formed Watch Committee (that swayed between Liberal and Tory 
domination) that, taken together, granted the police considerable autonomy in 
enacting "social control of the streets" as "the major historically derived police 
function" in the city (Brogden, 1991: 88). Furthermore: 
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The New Police were used directly to demarcate the territories of 
the dominant classes in the city - the merchants, the shopkeepers, 
and the new professional and white-collar strata - from the territories of the poor. The preponderance of requests (some 
90%) and subsequent commands - were for the control of the 
streets, and associated recreational contexts (Brogden, 1982: 62). 
Between 1836 and 1910 the policing mandate was for the most part 
uncontroversial and the aim of police action remained fairly constant: "to divide 
off, to map out, the lower class areas" (Brogden, 1982: 52). Thus: 
The subjects of police work - 'disorderly boys', 'children 
trundling hoops', 'rough characters', 'prostitutes', 'hawkers', 
'Arab children', and adults playing 'pitch and toss' - were 
penalised as the source of mercantile discomfort (Ibid: 63). 
Communications from merchants, shopkeepers and other businesses to the 
Watch Committee between 1836 and 1872 show that demands for police 
deployment were targeted overwhelmingly at "disorderly street behaviour" 
followed by "sabbatical disorder", "traffic obstructions", "street traders", 
"thieving", "brothels and prostitutes", "gambling and street games", and "public 
houses" (Ibid: 65). Such police practices became routinised and amounted to 
4moving on' and street cleansing which meant that officers operated "as a kind 
of uniformed garbage-men" were "arrests, other than for minor misdemeanours 
were rare" (Brogden, 199 1: 1). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Liverpool Police's sense of moral purpose was strengthened due to its closer 
working contact with other public and private agencies in developing various 
local campaigns against beer-houses in the 1870s and vice in the early twentieth 
century. In particular, officers aligned with the courts and purist organizations 
(notably the National Vigilance Association) in working towards closing down 
brothels, prosecuting under obscenity laws and investigating abduction cases. 
In 
1874, the most popular meeting places of the lower orders - public 
houses, beer 
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houses and off-licences - outnumbered all grocery, chemist, furniture and 
stationery shops in Liverpool. This numerical imbalance outraged local 
temperance groups and members of the Vigilance Committee (Waller, 198 1: 
23). During the 1870s a number of partnerships emerged to promote moral 
hygiene in the form of temperance movements that underpinned social reform 
in the city and attempted to tackle the perceived relationship between drink and 
crime, and more particularly drink and prostitution. Such movements aimed to 
improve the condition of the poor in setting up sports clubs, domestic science 
classes and friendly societies. Exemplifying these trends, the Police Court and 
Prison Gate Mission was established in 1879 and was the first of its kind in the 
country to be followed by the establishment of the Women's Shelter in 1887. 
These early experiments in social control, which sought to remould working 
class morality, assumed "that poor people would cease to frequent public 
houses or join street comer gangs if they were provided with alternative 
recreational facilities or had contact with well intentioned middle class citizens" 
(Waller, 1981: 23). However, the predominant response on behalf of local elites 
remained one of brisk street cleaning carried out by the police. 
In 1890 the purists, who saw criminal law as a key tool for improving public 
morals, gained much political influence in siding with Liberals in Liverpool to 
successfully overturn the Tory administration who were deemed too 
2 The drive against drink and prostitution in 1876 resulted in rises 
in arrests for all crime to 27,529 
(20,551 for drunkenness alone), of which 12,156 were women (Waller, 
Ibid: 24 and 109). Over 
5,000 drunks who were convicted were aged between 12 and 
21. Stealing, violence, riots and 
drunkenness were often depicted within police, media and reforming circles as peculiarly 
Irish 
crimes (Waller, 1981: 25). This led a prominent local reformer to observe that 
"this human despot 
of vice and poverty is hereditary" and that assisted emigration should 
be encouraged forthwith 
(Samuel Smith cited in Waller, 1981: 24). 
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sympathetic to publicans and brewers (Mort, 1987: 135). The attempt to drive 
vice and prostitution off the streets also demonstrated conflict between local 
businesses and moral organisations. Thus cleaning the streets of such 
'unsavoury' and 'immoral' practices associated with vice was not supported by 
a consensus of opinion among local elites in that such practices sustained the 
secondary economy which was integral to the balance of class forces in the city. 
As Brogden (1982: 69) argued: 
The mode of production, especially the dependence of the 
merchants on seamen, created the demand for prostitution, and 
the profits from prostitution promoted the well-being of small- 
scale capitalists in the city .3 
The strategy described above regarding the policing towards Liverpool's 
poorest and most dispossessed communities had particular resonance with the 
city's black population who have been identified as constituting a particularly 
'dangerous' section of the population. Liverpool's black population, 
concentrated around the south docks and in Toxteth, has been continually 
discriminated against and subordinated by local government, police and media 
(Murphy, 1995; Gifford et al, 1988; Fryer, 1984). The endemic institutional 
racism in the city, fuelled by competition over increasingly scarce employment 
in the docks, spilled onto the streets - most notably in 1919 and 1948. The black 
population attempted to defend itself from organised racist violence which the 
police, at best, ignored but more usually aggravated by 'swamping' black areas 
and raiding meeting places and arresting suspects (Fryer, 1984: 298-303; 
Murphy, 1995: 60). During the 1920s, the police even became involved "in the 
3 However, the social control of the streets did have a significant impact on levels of incarceration 
in the city. By the end of the nineteenth century, the prisons in Liverpool held one-ninth of the 
total prison population of England, I in 7 of all those sentenced aged between 16 and 29,1 in 3 of 
all reformatory inmates and just under I in 3 of all reconvicted ex-reformatory inmates (Waller, 
1981: 170). 
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agitation for repatriation of 'undesirable' racial groups" in the city (Murphy, 
1995: 62). Institutional, organised and individual racism was downplayed by 
the media who instead 'explained' the disturbances by painting a threatening 
picture of 'animalistic' black men harassing respectable white women on the 
streets or, as the case in 1948, referring to black people as 'welfare scroungers' 
(Murphy, 1995: 43-52 and 126-127). 
During the inter-war period, the police in Liverpool underwent dramatic 
changes as a consequence of the police strike in 1919 over pay, promotional 
structures and the government's failure to recognise the National Union of 
Police Officers. Over half of the Liverpool and Birkenhead police and three 
quarters of those in Bootle went on strike and were subsequently dismissed to 
be replaced by a well paid 'scab' force constituted of ex-servicemen and a 
majority of new recruits brought in from the regions of Scotland (MSRG, 1992: 
92). Police violence against the organised working class during the Liverpool 
Transport Strike in 1911 and towards unemployed demonstrators in the city in 
1921 demonstrated the existence of more general fears on behalf of elites as to 
the rise in working class militancy. In the 1920s and 1930s, the police continued 
to play a key role in maintaining order in the city so that: 
Outside working class areas, in commercial or suburban districts, 
police powers could be used freely against those who obviously 
did not belong there, to impose a kind of unofficial curfew on the 
working class (MSRG, 1992: 93). 
The attempt to maintain orderly city space was carried out on a number of 
fronts. Firstly, a form of bourgeois morality was imposed upon women in 
public space, particularly those thought to be prostitutes (that is, women alone 
on the streets and without the company of men). Police harassment focused 
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particularly on the increasing number of women thought to be frequenting 
public houses and thus blurring the boundaries between 'respectable' and 
'tainted' womanhood. Flower sellers also became the target of police action and 
were sometimes prosecuted for prostitution rather than obstruction (MSRG, ) 
Ibid: 94-95). Secondly, other policing priorities gauged from Chief Constables 
reports of the time focused on raiding and harassing gay meeting places and the 
clubs frequented by black people. Again, fears of interracial sexual contact 
seemed to underpin police concerns here as the Chief Constable noted of one 
meeting place in 1935: 
The club was frequented by white, coloured and half-caste men 
and women. Nightly this place was the scene of excessive 
drinking, foul language, filthy conduct and dancing during which 
the greatest indecencies took place. Between and during the 
dancing indecent conduct between men and women was openly 
indulged in. The sanitary arrangements in this club were of the 
most primitive character (cited in MSRG, Ibid: 96). 
Thirdly, youth were targeted. During the 1930s there was an increase in 
charges being brought against young people, despite the 1933 Children and 
Young Persons Act (Pearson, 1983: 46-47). One magistrate in Liverpool in 
1935 pointed to a 'new' danger in the city when he complained of: 
The startling rise in the number of cases of hooliganism and 
assaults on the police in Liverpool Today the youth of the 
city is out of hand. Every night the police come into contact with 
lawless youth (cited in MSRG, 1992: 88). 
In Liverpool, during the 1930s, the 'problem' of youth on the streets and rises 
in recorded juvenile delinquency can be contextualised within the climate of 
casualism particularly affecting young people so that by 1934 there were 13,000 
unemployed 14 to 20 year olds in the city (MSRG, 1992: 24). 
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Finally, there was the targeting of those groups who posed a threat to public 
order. During the 1930s the police developed a number of novel tactics - such 
as the baton charge and driving sidecar motorcycles into crowds - for dealing 
with demonstrations, including the hunger marches and local strikes. The 
intensification of public order policing towards the social control of the streets 
in the inter-war years served to further demarcate and marginalise the poorest 
sections of the population from the city's commercial and political structures: 
In 1928 ... the police deprived over 3500 people of their liberty, 
albeit temporarily, for drunkenness; over 600 for 'street 
obstructions and nuisance'; almost 600 for offences concerned 
with prostitution and further criminalised over 700 people for 
gaming and betting and 400 for begging, both being crimes 
without victims (MSRG, 1992: 105). 
Policing and social control in Liverpool: 1945 to the 1980s 
So far the discussion has focused upon policing practices toward designating 
the proper objects of power upon which the battery of legal powers that the 
police possessed were brought to bear in regulating the economic, cultural and 
leisure pursuits of the lower orders. The old Watch Committees provided the 
vehicle by which the mercantile class could insure the containment and 
regulation of the 'criminalised poor' in and around the city with very little 
conflict recorded between Committee members and Chief Constables (Brogden, 
1982). 
With the slow decline in port trade, from the 1930s, came the decline of the 
political class in Liverpool. With the increasing importance of the 
multinationals to the British economy in the 1960s, both local and central state 
strategies increasingly embraced extra-national economic interests. At the local 
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level these changes in economic dependencies7 underpinned by a succession of 
fiscal crises, manifested themselves in the rise of corporate managerialism in an 
attempt to exercise greater control over council finance, local services and the 
local workforce (Cockburn, 1977). In terms of policing, the upshot of these 
broad developments in urban management was the enhanced autonomy of chief 
constables within the new arrangements for local police governance under the 
1964 Police Act. The authority and independence of the chief police officer was 
thus enhanced by "his corporate management status" and in his/her local 
"specialist knowledge of the threat to social order", thereby leaving the local 
Police Authority - now composed of the elevated ranks of small business 
owners and self-employed professionals - with control of policing resources for 
local strategies (Brogden, 1982: 91). 
According to one commentator the development of the Liverpool police in the 
post-war period marked a continuation of efficiency, despite insufficient 
manpower, towards curbing the established problems of crime and disorder in 
the city - juvenile delinquency, drunkenness, prostitution and maintaining the 
public peace (Cockcroft, 1991: 8-30). During the Second World War, indictable 
crimes committed by juveniles in the city increased by 25% and continued at a 
high level after the war. The police pioneered the Juvenile Liaison Scheme in 
1949 which, along with the established practice of cautioning youths in the city, 
was designed to work closely with welfare agencies in order to "learn of 
potential delinquents at an early stage and take immediate action to prevent 
them developing criminal tendencies" (Chief Constable, Charles Martin cited in 
Gordon, 1987: 124). After the establishment of the scheme it was perceived as a 
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success by the proprietors in the city, in Particular "managers of the larger city 
stores - formerly plagued by swarms of children seeking a chance to steal, 
reported a great drop in such incidents" (Cockcroft, 1991: 13). By 1965, almost 
half of the total recorded crime in Liverpool related to petty theft and in 1966 
the reported value of stolen property exceeded El million -a new 'record' in the 
city's history. In contrast, local press reports painted a picture of increasing 
violent crime and supported police led campaigns for a 'war on crime' (Ibid: 
8 1). In 1964, the Liverpool City Police were among the first to experiment with 
camera surveillance: under "Operation Commando", a mobile camera was 
active in the city centre (alongside fifty-four plain clothes officers) in order to 
halt "attacks on ... persons and property" 
(Liverpool Chief Constable, 1965 
cited in Williams, 2002: 3). 4 According to Brogden (1982), the Police Authority 
consistently bowed to police requests supported by crime statistics for 
increasing resources so that, by the middle of the 1970s, Merseyside police had 
the highest recorded crime rate, the greatest number of employees and highest 
costs per capita than any other force in Britain excluding Northern Ireland 
(Brogden, 1982: 88). Between 1974 and 198 1, Merseyside police had grown by 
27% (compared to a national average of 15%) and the yearly budget exceeded 
f8O million (Liverpool Echo, 1 April, 198 1). 
Legitimacy and Policing in Liverpool from the 1980s 
For Brogden (1982), the effects of the mercantile economy in the post-war 
period left a 'sizeable' proportion of the city's population excluded from the 
4 Some years later the police in Liverpool acknowledged that the camera experiment resulted in 
no arrests though "the effect was preventative but largely psychological and therefore the camera 
had to be moved around" (Home Office report of 1969, cited in Williams, 2002: 
3). 
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local economy and political structures so that -policing that residual strata, and 
opposition to that form of control had always been a major manifestation of that 
continuing exclusion" (1982: 241). Most notably - though not exclusively - the 
black community in Toxteth Liverpool 8 continued to be on the receiving end 
of particularly hard policing methods. As one community representative from 
Toxteth noted: 
The black community is fed up of being hounded. No-one is safe 
on the streets after lOpm. One gang we know has given the 
police an ultimatum to lay off within two weeks or they fight 
back. It could lead to civil war in the city (Simey, 1971 cited in 
Scraton, 1985: 72). 
Through subsequent Chief Constable's reports the police, on the other hand, 
referred to the increasing rates of violent crime and 'inter-gang' wars that posed 
difficulties in policing the area and which had led to a number of confrontations 
between police and residents (Report to the Merseyside Police Committee, 
Chief Constable Kenneth Oxford, 1981: 6). In July 198 1, Toxteth along with 19 
other areas in the Merseyside district witnessed several major confrontations 
between the public and police (Ibid). The confrontations in Toxteth were 
particularly ferocious and a total of 781 police officers were injured with 1070 
recorded crimes and 705 arrests (Kettle and Hodges, 1982: 162). 5 
Lord Scarman himself noted that relations between Merseyside police, the 
Police Authority and sections of the local population were in a state of crisis 
(Scraton, 1985: 80). In response, a special police unit known as the 'Toxteth 
5 The disturbances in Liverpool drew witness to the spectacle of the Liberal leader of the City 
Council unsuccessfully petitioning the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, to send troops to 
defend the city centre. During these events 59 CS gas projectiles were fired by police to disperse 
crowds - its first use against British civilians outside of Northern Ireland. 
Officers believed that 
the city centre was about to be taken over by rioters. Four people were seriously injured after 
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Section' was set up in 1982 to police the 11,000 people in Toxteth that 
amounted to a curious mix of hard and soft policing in the locality. Margaret 
Simey, Chair of the Police Committee, pointed to a continuation in hard line 
and racially abusive policing in the Toxteth area, adding that: 
We have this utter folly of an official policy of softly, softly 
backed up by a strong arm. The people do admire the local 
police for their courage ... we talk about 'our Don'. But the 
minute there is trouble they are sent out of the neighbourhood, 
and what we regard as trained thugs are brought in to impose 
control (cited in Gifford et al, 1989: 165). 
During the 1980s, the crisis of legitimacy in the force intensified through 
further disturbances in 1985 after which the Police Authority was accused of 
being "anti-police" for challenging police tactics in policing the streets (Daily 
Post, 16 October, 1985). Nearly 10 years after the initial 1981 disorders the 
Gifford Inquiry recommended the "eradication of racist policing on 
Merseyside" (Gifford et al, 1989: 190). 
If the police institution seemed to be fighting a losing battle - particularly after 
the mass street disorders in Toxteth in 1981 and 1985 - it could justify its 
policing practice by reference to the 'peculiar characteristics' of the policed in 
the city. Quoting from Ramsay Muir's A History of Liverpool, the then Chief 
Constable Kenneth Oxford stated that; "it is a matter of historical fact that 
Liverpool has been beset by problems of violence and disorder throughout the 
centuries" (Oxford, 1981: 3). Such representations formed part of Oxford's 
evidence to the Scarman Inquiry. In his evidence he referred to what he 
perceived to be the historical threads that formed the "aggressive nature" and 
inhaling gas along with one disabled man who was killed, with others injured as the police drove 
Land Rovers up onto pavements and into the crowds (Kettle and Hodges 1983: 173). 
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"belligerent attitude" of the "true Liverpudlian". Such criminogenic tendencies 
as constructed by the Chief Constable have always "found expression in violent 
disturbances similar to, though perhaps in minuscule, to recent outbreaks in 
Toxteth" (Oxford, 1981: 4). Oxford argued that waves of immigration into the 
city up to the mid-twentieth century had "brought with them associated 
problems, disputes and tensions" and that Liverpool "has for many years 
fulfilled her (sic) reputation as a tough, violent city, to the present day" 
(Oxford, 1981: 4-5). In his report Oxford (Ibid: 54-56) defended the "frequent 
use" of stop and search powers as "an essential operational requirement" to 
stem the rising tide of local violent crime variously referred to throughout the 
report. Constructing this negative stereotype of sections of the Liverpool 
population, with its undertones of genetic and cultural pathology, denied the 
legacy of casual labour, high rates of unemployment and a police force that was 
out of control (Simey, 1988), as well as the previously unacknowledged 
66 uniquely horrific" racism pervading every aspect of the city's life (Gifford et 
al, 1989: 82). The Gifford Inquiry reported that the geographical demarcation of 
Liverpool's black population was particularly "staggering". Formal and 
informal racism was combined with the established form of aggressive and 
hostile policing which further reinforced the exclusion of the black population: 
Even in the city centre, only a mile away from Liverpool 8, the 
absence of black people is strikingly noticeable to the visitor 
from any city with a substantial black population ... Black 
people are not even doing the low-level jobs like sweeping the 
streets Jbid: 71). 
During the 1980s the struggle for the control of the streets in Liverpool became 
subject to a series of debates that scrutinised the police role. In 1986, a local 
report recommended a variety of measures for police adoption to reduce further 
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damage to police/public relations that included: overhauling relations between 
police and other public agencies; disbanding the Operational Support Units; 
paying closer attention to community needs; improving relations with young 
people, blacks and women; and a general move to improving conduct in public 
order situations (Kinsey, 1985). These recommendations were made in the light 
of other findings suggesting Merseyside has one of the highest rates of 
victimisation, a high fear of crime and one of the least satisfactory rates of 
public co-operation with the police (Ibid). In the decade after 1974 recorded 
crime increased by 60%, compounded by a fall in detection rates which were 
down 23% between 1983 and 1985. The use of stop and search powers were 
seen to be particularly ineffective in and around Liverpool with only 4% 
resulting in arrest with a resultant increase in resentment towards the police 
(Kinsey, 1985: 52). Within this context of rising crime, falling detection rates 
and disaffection felt by significant sections of the local population a wider 
mistrust developed between police on the one hand and council officers and 
local media on the other. 
These developments took place within the continuing economic and political 
difficulties faced by the city - not least in terms of its reputation and image as a 
strike-ridden, bankrupt and derelict area. As the Daily Mirror reported in 1982: 
"They should build a fence around [Liverpool] and charge admission. For sadly 
it has become a 'show-case' for everything that has gone wrong in Britain's 
major cities" (cited in Lane, 1987: 12). During the 1980s the peculiarities of the 
local economy set in motion a cycle of decline which was manifested in the rise 
in vacant land and buildings, population loss (from 750,000 in 1961 to 490,000 
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in 1985), decreasing personal income and spending, local authority revenue 
loss, declining taxation, and increases in social security spending to meet the 
Liverpool unemployment rate of 26.1 % compared to the national average of 
14% (Parkinson, 1985: 14; Liverpool City Council, 1987). In this climate of 
economic instability the service sector dominated Liverpool's economy into the 
late 1970s and accounted for 70% of all occupations (half of these in the public 
sector with a third of this category employed by the City Council). Within this 
context Liverpool City Council challenged central government fiscal policy in 
the 1980s under the banner of defending local jobs and services. Between 1983 
and 1987 the city council was dominated by the Militant Tendency, which had 
gradually gained control of the local Labour Party through the 1970s. Their 
strategy was one of confrontation with central government through threatening 
to bankrupt the city if extra public funding was not forthcoming. During this 
period the council funded - from central grants and foreign bank loans -a 
"constrained" Urban Regeneration Strategy that focused on its working class 
heartland and paid little attention to the retail and tourist potential of the city 
centre. This created a marked gulf between the city's political and business 
elites (Parkinson, 1990: 250-251). By 1987, the 47 Militant labour councillors 
had been pushed from office and were replaced by a more moderate Labour 
group who sought to reverse the climate of hostility towards the private sector 
that had meant local 'regeneration' lagged behind national trends in developing 
the increasingly fashionable public and private partnerships. 
Against the backdrop of structural decline local and national commentators 
continued to reinforce commonsensical understandings of Liverpool's dernise 
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as a city without order and embroiled with violence, self-pity, militancy and 
communal self-destruction (Scraton et al, 1995: 270). Such negative images 
became a major obstacle for regenerative partnerships working towards 
promoting the city as a business and tourist destination (Madsen, 1992). Three 
particularly outstanding events, and the consequent media reporting of them, 
helped reinforce the image of a city beyond control. The 1985 Heysel Stadium 
Disaster resulting in the death of 39 Juventus football fans and the 1989 
Hillsborough Disaster resulting in the death of 96 Liverpool fans marked a 
watershed in the representation of Liverpool people as 'riotous', 'violent' and 
beyond redemption (Scraton et al, 1995: 226-292). After the events at Heysel 
Liverpool was held up by those on the political right as the model of an ill- 
disciplined society as Richard West argued in The Spectator: 
The collapse of teaching and discipline in our schools ... is 
nowhere more evident than in Liverpool ... (where) a whole 
generation of pampered, undisciplined children has grown up 
with the habit of petulance, envy, greed and wanton cruelty - as 
seen last week on the television screens of the world (cited in 
Edgar, 1985: 26). 
The third event - the abduction of two year old James Bulger 
from a local 
shopping precinct and his subsequent murder by two 10 year olds - became the 
pinnacle of the extensive media campaign that focused on Liverpool as the 
centre of Britain's perceived moral and social decline. The interweaving of the 
city's 'unique' Problems was encapsulated in headlines such as 'Heysel, 
Hillsborough and Now This ... ' (The 
Guardian, 20 February, 1993). 6 During 
1996, a spate of drug-related shootings in the city led to national headlines 
6 This kind reporting helped establish a negative national and international reputation 
for the city 
which allowed the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to comment that the unification of 
East and 
West Germany was "like inheriting twelve Liverpools" (cited in Scraton et al, 1995: 226). 
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reporting the 'mean streets of Liverpool' encapsulated in The Independent's (23 
August 1996) 'Greetings from Gun City, UK'. Again, the article linked a 
number of themes in reinforcing the special 'nature' of the problems in the city 
that are depicted as representative of urban disorder generally: 
It seems to be Liverpool's destiny always to be setting new benchmarks for urban barbarity. The city that brought you the 
Toxteth riots, Heysel, the murder of James Bulger and, last 
spring, the rape of a five year old girl by a 14 year old boy, has 
in the past year staked a plausible claim to being the gun capital 
of the country (Ibid). 
Such representations have weaved a maze of 'problems' at all levels of 
Liverpool life that are perceived as uniquely 'self-inflicted' by the people and 
place. The construction of the city as a 'problem place' aided its positioning as 
an icon for national de-civilisation. One article, as part of a supplement on 
Liverpool, summarised the problems facing investment managers in the city 
during the 1990s: 
Merseyside has long suffered from an image problem, much of it 
self-inflicted from events in the past: the Toxteth riots of 198 1; 
the vicious political infighting between left-wing groups which 
all but wrecked the Labour party in the 1980s; the Militant 
Tendency's orchestrated confrontations with the second 
Thatcher government; the Liverpool city council workers strike 
of 1991; crime, gang warfare; and the apparent inability of a 
divided community to help itself (Financial Times, 3 April, 
1997). 
The impact of such high profile constructions upon strategies of local economic 
recovery became increasingly apparent in the 1990s. The label of 'problem city' 
became a problem in itself for city managers, marketing strategists and policing 
agencies concerned with restructuring the city's political economy under the 
auspices of regeneration. The perceptions of the locally powerful, working 
through Liverpool's partnerships, towards managing the city and striving for an 
orderly regeneration will be elaborated in Chapters Eight and Nine. Before that, 
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the next and final section introduces and outlines the contours of contemporary 
policing and social control in Liverpool city centre that were developed during 
1990S. 
Partnership and policing in Liverpool city centre: the 1990s 
Liverpool city centre has a lot going for it [ ... ]. There is a natural 
partnership of interests between the public sector, like Liverpool 
City Council, Merseyside Police and Merseytravel, and the 
private sector. Neither can succeed without the other ... overthe 
next year exiting new developments will come on stream. 
Alongside these we must see 'zero tolerance' within the city 
centre of anything but the highest standards. Promoting and 
planning special events and attractions is important. So too is the 
more mundane responsibility of keeping streets clean, policing 
unauthorised collectors and street sellers ... (Editorial, Liverpool Echo, 14 October, 1997). 
The establishment of the CCTV surveillance network in Liverpool will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight. This network developed at a time when other 
policing initiatives were being implemented under the broad political auspice of 
regeneration. The surveillance network developed at a time when Merseyside 
Police and other partners launched a series of initiatives under the umbrella of 
Cilysafe that organised and concentrated efforts toward order and control of the 
streets of Liverpool. Citysafe brought together a number of agencies including 
Merseyside Police, the City Council, Merseytravel, Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce and John Moores University. Launched in 1997, the initiative 
anticipated the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 and instigated a series of 
policing initiatives aimed to "improve quality of life" within Liverpool 
(Liverpool City Council, Press Release, 10 February, 1999). In order to tackle 
crime and disorder in Liverpool, partnerships were established between police 
and other agencies to implement what was identified as "neighbourhood 
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policing, which can encourage ownership, reduce the fear of crime and bring 
new investment to the city" (Merseyside Police, Press Release, 2 February, 
1999). In drawing up its Crime and Disorder Strategy for Liverpool, Citysafe 
produced an audit purporting to show an increase in disorder related calls to the 
police, from 51,390 in 1995 to 57,844 in 1997 (Citysafe, 1998: 2). The release 
of these figures forms the basis for understanding developments in policing the 
city centre during the 1990s. 
The changes in the local state that have impacted on the material form and 
management of the city centre will be discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Part of this process of change has been transformations in the organisation and 
rationale underpinning policing. Concerns expressed for social order in 
Liverpool city centre have to be placed alongside a number of region-wide 
initiatives that have included local police resourcing projects and wider 
partnership schemes that emerged in the 1990s. During this time, Merseyside 
Police began seconding senior police officers to engage in local partnerships 
including the Safer Merseyside Partnership and the Urban Regeneration section 
in the Government Office for Merseyside. Merseyside Safer Cities (with an 
annual budget of f-100,000) and the Safer Merseyside Partnership have worked 
at responsibili sing and encouraging cooperation between public and private 
agencies by targeting resources for crime prevention towards vulnerable 
individuals and communities. The latter partnership brought together 
Merseyside Police Authority, Merseyside Police, Merseyside District Council 
and a range of voluntary and statutory agencies to secure f 10 million between 
1994 and 1997 through local fund raising and successful bids from the Single 
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Regeneration Budget. During the 1990s, Merseyside Police engaged in a 
number of fund raising exercises that included encouraging local businesses to 
contribute to the under-funded Crimestoppers phone line and to take up seats on 
the Crimestoppers board (Liverpool Echo, 28 January, 1997). 
In 1997 Merseyside Police embarked on more fund raising and unveiled a 
"pioneering cash for constables scheme" for patrols to be made available to 
specific institutions and residential areas that would be prepared to pay for the 
service. 7 In 1998 a "unique" trust fund to raise fI million was established by 
the Chief Constable and the High Sheriff of Merseyside 8 to "enable businesses 
to make a contribution to community safety and crime prevention" (Liverpool 
Echo, 25 February, 1998). Such developments have to be seen in the light of 
dwindling local police resources compounded by a 1997 public perception 
survey undertaken by the police that purported to show the majority of those 
surveyed thought that Merseyside as a whole was 'unsafe', a significant 
proportion only felt safe at home, 72% wanted to see more officers on the beat 
and that the numbers of those dissatisfied with their dealings with the police had 
risen on 1995 figures (Liverpool Echo, 7 March, 1997). Furthermore, the cost 
per head of policing on Merseyside was the second highest in the country, at 
f 152 per person. In addition, throughout the 1990s, the council tax police 
precept for Merseyside remained at over f29 million. In terms of the levy 
imposed on residents, these policing costs were the fifth highest in the country 
7A local Chief Inspector justified the proposal In that it would be preferable "to have trained and 
accountable police officers patrolling the streets than private security officers" 
(Liverpool Echo, 
15 October, 1997). 
8 Since late in 1999 the office of High Sheriff has been filled by an ex-Vice Chancellor 
from John 
Moores University where my research was based. 
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(Charted Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 1999). In 1997, 
Merseyside Police came top of a national 'sickness league' that was reported to 
be costing the force f 12 million a year (Liverpool Echo, 27 August, 1997). 
Merseyside Police Authority (MPA) predicted a loss of 500 officers up to the 
year 1999. As a consequence the police would be denied f 19.5 million funding 
in real terms up to the year 2000 (MPA Annual Report, 1996). From 1995, and 
in response to this situation, the Police Authority, the Chief Constable, a group 
of local MPs and Liverpool Chamber of Commerce engaged in a campaign 
directed at central government "for a fair and reasonable distribution of 
resources for Merseyside" (Ibid: 1). In the light of fiscal constraint Merseyside 
Police continued to maintain high operating costs in more 'traditional' policing 
arenas and engaged in a number of high profile policing strategies. The police 
invested in hand-held video cameras to film "overtly in areas identified 
where there is a problem with youths misbehaving" on the principle "that there 
is a wealth of evidence to show that filming people has a strong deterrent 
effect" (Merseyside Police Inspector cited in Liverpool Echo, 10 April, 1996). 
Under 'Operation Tranquility' committed to "keeping unruly youngsters off the 
streets" the police targeted and filmed youthful disturbances associated with 
under age alcohol consumption and showed the film to parents. The Operation 
was thought to have been a success as police reported a drop in residents' 
complaints and "the number of gangs on the streets has fallen" (Liverpool Echo, 
17 October., 1997). As part of af 315,000 government and European funded 
scheme, the City Council and the police launched Liverpool's "biggest 
crackdown on school truants" that involved a massive advertising campaign 
aimed at young people and their parents. As part of the crackdown, the police 
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role was to "round up pupils in the city centre and major shopping areas" 
(Liverpool Echo, 19 April, 1998). The police helicopter played its part in 
looking "for pockets of school crime" in order to monitor "school vandals" and 
"teenage thugs" (Liverpool Echo, 27 July, 1998). During the 1990s, the police 
invested millions in pro-active policing that included af1.5 million surveillance 
helicopter, f600, OOO spent on bullet proof vests for 2,500 officers, and the 
piloting of CS gas (Liverpool Echo, 16 January, 1996). From 1996 Merseyside 
Police, under the flag of 'Operation Goldwing', deployed 11 armed response 
vehicles and 72 trained marksmen carrying semi-automatic weapons supported 
by riot vans from the Operation Support Division containing snatch squads and 
teams of special dog patrols. Such visible and paramilitary policing tactics 
caused tensions between the police and other partnership players (these tensions 
will be discussed in Chapter Eight). This show of force, focused on the city 
centre, was justified through local newspaper headlines such as: "Crackdown on 
armed raiders" (Liverpool Echo, 31 January, 1996), in combating "Gun law on 
the streets" (Liverpool Echo, 17 April, 1996), as a response to a "Christmas 
bombs offensive" by Irish Republican groups (Liverpool Echo, 4 December, 
1996), and as part of a general 'safety' initiative: 
This is not in response to any specific threat ... 
This is all part of 
our policy of a safer Merseyside. Crime has the potential to 
increase over the Christmas period but we want people to feel 
safe to come and shop and socialise in Liverpool city centre 
(Assistant Chief Constable cited in Liverpool Echo, 23 
December, 1996). 
In 1997, in Birkenhead, half a mile from the city centre, the police regularly 
deployed 100 officers on the streets in an f800, OOO 'Townsafe' initiative to 
target 'anti-social behaviour' that included rowdiness, truancy, prostitution, 
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shoplifting and drug selling. The 'experiment' in zero tolerance style policing 
was: 
... set against a 
back drop of massive investment in the town. 
But the regeneration was - and is - threatened by the perception 
of rising crime. So we had to confront this (Superintendent, 
Merseyside Police cited in Liverpool Echo, II March, 1998). 
At the same time, there were important parallel shifts in Liverpool city centre. 
The Stores' Committee, working with local police and the Association of Chief 
Police Officers, established a 'Town Watch' scheme comprised of up to 20 
uniformed guards recruited from the long-term unemployed. Town Watch was 
developed through the partnership between local police and businesses and was 
a key component in the CCTV network (see Chapter Eight for a fuller 
discussion of this point). In August 1995 the local press reported that the 'City 
Plans Clampdown on Beggars' in bringing together police and council to, as 
one Councillor put it, "improve the city's image". The City Centre Commander 
commented, "we would be happy to work with the city council to get rid of 
them" (Liverpool Echo, 11 September, 1995). The police also worked closely 
with Merseytravel to improve safety on public transport through schemes such 
as 'Travelsafe' and more pro-active initiatives like 'Operation Forensic Cult'. 
9 
These policing developments were consolidated and extended in 1999 by the 
launch in the city centre of the 'Citysafe War on Crime'. As well as unveiling a 
number of signs publicising the presence of CCTV, the launch set out an 
9 This involved a month long "purge" Involving police carrying out 911 station checks and 
2,322 
spot checks on buses resulting in 29 arrests for criminal damage or possession of 
drugs, 206 
passengers "thrown off' buses and trains and 1,011 fare increases made after ticket inspections. 
More operations were planned in conjunction with Merseyside Transport's Rapid 
Response Unit 
(Liverpool Echo, 19 February, 1997). 
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agenda to tackle "yobbish behaviour"10 in the city Centre which included 
truancy, street muggings, drunkenness and vandalism (Liverpool Echo, 10 May, 
1999). The initiative underpinned a move towards zero tolerance policing 
strategies in and around the city centre in an "all out war on street crime", 
financed by E30 million from the Home Office Crime Hotspot fund (Liverpool 
Echo, 13 November, 1998). This sat alongside a liaison scheme initiated in 
1998 between Senior Merseyside Police and Council Officials and the New 
York Police Department to learn lessons in New York style "quality of life" 
policing. As one senior police officer put it, the initiative was important because 
"from Liverpool's point of view we need to keep crime low to encourage 
tourists to keep on coming" (Liverpool Echo, 15 August, 2000). 
In summary, rationalisation for policing street order in Liverpool during the 
1990s has been informed by discourses of regeneration and urban revitalisation. 
As this chapter has charted, it has been the struggle for street order and control 
over unruly groups that has been a characteristic feature of the political and 
economic development of Liverpool city centre. The contemporary vernacular 
of regeneration has re-orientated concerns of 'safety', 'crime' and 'disorder' in 
the city centre and tied them in with a more all-encompassing notion of 'quality 
of life'. These discourses emerged out of the strategic thinking of state 
managers in Liverpool during the 1990s and will be explored the next chapter. 
10 Under the Crime and Disorder Act, partnerships in Liverpool have utilised sophisticated 
Geographical Information Systems used to create so-called "yob maps" that have detailed a "top 
130 yob zones" each with an estimated one youth disorder incident for every 40 people (Liverpool 
Echo, 16 March, 200 1). 
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Chapter Seven 
Partnership and Power: Neo-Liberal Rule in Liverpool City Centre 
We are talking about the drive toward a twenty-four hour city. 
What we mean by that is that people will come here for perhaps 
a day's business and then do some shopping and then go for a 
meal, go to a show, then go onto a night club and then to a hotel 
to stay overnight. That's what we are after - all of it generating 
wealth and prosperity in Liverpool and improving the quality of 
life here for people who live and work here (Superintendent 
Merseyside Police, Government Office for Merseyside [GOM]). 
Unless we constantly ask 'who builds, develops and governs; 
and whyT, we shall not understand the scope and limits of 
present institutions and programmes or appreciate why every 
definition of a social problem or its solution should trigger in our 
minds the further questions: 'A problem for whornT 'A solution 
for whornT 'Whose city is thisT (Donnison and Soto, 1980: 
185). 
Introduction 
The previous chapter began the case study of the thesis by providing an 
historical overview of social control practices in Liverpool city centre from the 
early nineteenth century up to the 1990s. The chapter explored the shifts in 
political economy alongside particular discursive representations of the city of 
Liverpool that have underpinned social control strategies. This chapter will 
focus on the strategies of rule that emerged in Liverpool during the 1990s. Such 
rule was indicative of the trajectory of the neo-liberal state discussed in Chapter 
Three. In charting these strategies the chapter will map out the institutional 
matrix of the state form in Liverpool and the underlying normative sense of 
order that the 'new primary definers' articulated to imbue this state fon-n with 
meaning and strategic direction. 
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it will be argued more fully in the next chapter that the camera surveillance 
network in Liverpool was central in the development of a social ordering 
strategy, the impetus of which emerged out of the locally powerful visions for 
order discussed in this chapter. These definitional processes may not have 
always been successful in terms of mobilising action against problematic 
categories but they did represent an attempt by the locally powerful to bring 
problematic activities and people under surveillance and control. Therefore it 
will be argued that the camera network can be understood as a social ordering 
practice. As discussed in the following chapter the agents involved in the 
network were engaged in a process of "interpretive construction" (Lacey, 1994: 
30) regarding the identification of suspiciousness, wrongdoing and illegality 
that involved information sharing and intervention. These latter activities were 
interpretive decisions understood within the broader social relations of urban 
rule that will be discussed in this chapter. They can be understood therefore, 
using Lacey's theoretical framework, as normative decisions "made in the 
context of underlying features of the social order" which also contain "locally 
dominant ideologies" pertaining to the nature of that order (Lacey, 1994: 30- 
3 1). The preferred meanings of an orderly city centre expressed by the locally 
powerful articulated problems for the 'rational' and 'proper' governance of the 
city. The representatives of the neo-liberal state not only indicated preferred 
techniques of control but their responses also denoted the persistence and 
reworking of long standing moralising discourses of censure aimed at 
problematic categories. As Chapter Six outlined, the streets of the city centre 
have historically provided the modus operandi of policing alongside discourses 
of censure and order. The contemporary attempts, therefore, to promote or er in 
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the city - illuminated by the material presented in this and the next chapter - 
demonstrate both continuities and discontinuities in who and what is to be 
targeted and the means by which targeting has taken place. 
Prior to detailing the developments in policing and social control in Liverpool 
city centre in the next chapter, this chapter will focus upon the linkages and 
interrelationships between local regeneration agencies, together with an 
understanding of the ideological frameworks underpinning the notion of 
regeneration. It is the local state framework that provided the context within 
which the locally powerful have sought to co-ordinate the various agencies 
brought together in partnership. More critically, it was the formal and informal 
normative orders constructed in the neo-liberal state ensemble that drove 
'regeneration' and 'partnership' and permeated them with meaning, a measure 
of coherence and direction. Thus these interpretive normative discourses played 
a role in the construction of social order and endeavoured to "command the 
support of a critical mass of citizens or officials who see the relevant norms as 
expressing quasi-moral judgements" Jbid: 3 1). The chapter will present a 
deconstruction of the interests and cultural sensibilities of locally powerful 
actors in order to reveal the dynamics of ideological unity and fracture across 
the neo-liberal sate form. In this sense the chapter will seek to provide a 
contextual understanding of the wider social processes out of which practices of 
social control were implemented, articulated and made meaningful in Liverpool 
city centre. 
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The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first sectIon outlines the 
development and relations between the formal and informal partnerships in the 
city centre. The focus here will be on how local ruling interests re-orientated 
themselves (institutionally and ideologically) in relation to each other, and in 
doing so constructed and fostered relations of power in the trajectory of city 
centre regeneration. The second section will explore the process of 
44spatialisation" (Ryan, 1994: 40) discussed in Chapter Four, which 
encapsulated the broad visions for order that were identified by locally 
powerful players and which were deemed to promote the objects of partnership 
and regeneration. 
Orchestrating partnership 
It is a common recognition that we have got to get a grip of the 
situation and do something about it. We can't all sit around 
saying 'its not my problem, I'll look after my little bit' 
(Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation). 
This section outlines the issues and problems around the development of 
partnerships for regeneration in Liverpool in terms of bringing agencies 
together as a forerunner to negotiating a strategy and constructing a vision for 
regeneration in the city centre. The section will examine the notion of 
4 partnership' in Liverpool and what this has meant in terms of tackling 
differences in local institutional political outlooks. The notion of 'orchestrating' 
partnership points to processes of inter-governmental order and strategic 
selectivity in establishing feasible, credible and authoritative working organs 
involved in the task of city centre regeneration. The social and political 
processes involved in the propagation of partnerships in Liverpool city centre 
took place in formal and informal settings. The establishment and strategic 
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direction of partnerships in Liverpool has been structured through avenues of 
central government funding, local funding initiatives, the outcomes of 
conferences on the future of the city, as well as local interagency connections 
formed via more established avenues. With the ending of the Development 
Corporations and City Challenge programmes in the middle of the 1990s, more 
localised solutions to the problem of city management and strategic growth had 
to be found. On the formal level, the Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP, 
changed to Liverpool Vision in 1999) and the Government Office for 
Merseyside (changed to the Regional Development Agency in 1998) have been 
central to the development of initiatives aimed at promoting coherence in 
regeneration generally and security in particular. The variety of initiatives, 
funding regimes and partnerships underpinning Liverpool's regeneration 
necessitated the formation of the Government Office for Merseyside. The 
Office was established to "provide a single point of contact" for partnerships 
and to "promote a coherent approach" to competitiveness, quality of life and 
regeneration (Government Office for Merseyside: A Brief Guide, 1995). More 
established bodies like the Stores' Committee and Merseyside Police have 
regular senior level contact through the Officer Partnership Group (established 
through the Government Office) which was responsible for finding out what 
bodies exist in the city centre and co-ordinating their efforts towards the 
marketing and promotion of a secure and orderly city centre. The Group's main 
partners in the city centre were Merseyside Police, Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce, Liverpool City Centre Partnership, the Stores' Committee, Mersey 
Partnership and Liverpool City Council. The Group aimed to co-ordinate the 
partners and identify problems for action within the regeneration agenda. 
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These networks of local governance have had as their strategic nodal point the 
Government Office which made decisions on funding local projects upon 
criteria laid down at both central and European government level. Another 
important point of contact was the Liverpool City Centre Partnership. This body 
marshalled public and private funding for city centre projects. During the 
interviews it became apparent that particular partnership agencies did not come 
together in an unproblematic manner. Interviewees highlighted negative and 
historically formed perceptions between agencies, perceived threats to 
institutional authority and issues of leadership. 
Policing and partnership 
A big factor with the cops now is their willingness to talk. It isn't 
generally known that they are now talking to people like us 
[Government Office] at a strategic level because they do 
influence the process of regeneration. If something is going to 
adversely impact on the image of Liverpool then we need to 
know, as do the city fathers (Home Office Advisor [GOMI). 
This part of the section examines how particular institutional hurdles were 
overcome within the process of establishing a partnership between agencies that 
had previously regarded each other with a measure of institutional closure, even 
mistrust. These hurdles were managed through the emergent discourses of city 
6 renaissance' and the promise from this of benefits accruing from resource 
allocation. The processes involved in the instigation of partnerships brought to 
the surface problems in the negotiation of roles and responsibilities between 
various agencies that at the same time involved the attempt to reconcile 
competing interests and perspectives. The partners, therefore, were engaged in 
constructing a form of official discourse through which a rationale and 
legitimacy of rule was forged along with the construction of the objects of 
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partnership power. Importantly, these discourses of partnership "are not 
neutral" in the sense "that they construct problems, solutions and actions in 
particular ways that are congruent with existing relations of power, domination 
and distribution of resources" (Atkinson, 1999: 70). Thus in Liverpool city 
centre a great deal of ideological work was undertaken by the new primary 
definers in building coalitions of interest in the name of the wider interest of 
what was deemed strategically necessary for the 'city as a whole'. The building 
of 'workable' partnerships in Liverpool needed to be co-ordinated and 
'policed'. Underlying interviewee vernacular of 'common goals' and 'getting a 
grip' were changes in the balance of power underpinning the strategic alliances 
involved in the political decision making process. ' It was the Government 
Office that provided a nodal point in the process of creating a perception, if not 
an actuality, of stability amongst the key players in the regeneration process: 
If the police are not talking to the city council and the council 
are not working with the private sector then we lack credibility 
in the eyes of everyone else. Regeneration has given this city the 
impetus to move forward, leave the past behind and challenge 
some pretty outmoded ways of thinking (Home Office Advisor, 
[GOM]). 
Writers have noted the labour and effort that needs to be carried out to 'make 
partnerships work' with regard to finding common ground and agreed goals 
(Crawford, 1997). The negotiation of trust and management of conflict between 
partners in Liverpool was manifest within the discourse of regeneration as 
I These processes, as Chapter Five discussed, have been characterised as 'decentred' in the sense 
that locally elected governmental structures are becoming but one of many governmental actors 
Involved in promoting a place marketing ethos which sits alongside the fragmentation of centrally 
funded and administered services. Thus funding regimes such as Objective One and the 
Single 
Regeneration Budget, which were ostensibly administered outside of established city politics, 
led 
to a shift in power to Government Offices and Regional Agencies. It is in such 
bodies that 
decisions are made about the funding of city centre projects and whether applications 
for funding 
cohere with strategic thinking about the regeneration of the 'city as a whole'. 
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signified through the network of interests most centrally involved in the city's 
renaissance. The struggle to make partnerships coherent and workable was 
routinely fought out at the highest strategic level in the attempt to reconcile 
organisational differences and establish common goals: 
Although partnership may be a fairly hackneyed expression, one 
thing that is coming out of it is a tremendous learning curve as 
far as partnerships are concerned. There are still people in many 
organisations who think that partnership means having your 
name on a list somewhere and saying 'that's a good idea, we 
support you'. It's not. It's actually about committing resources to 
the common goal of the partnership - to the agenda. Problems 
happen where the goals of the partnership are in tension with the 
objectives of your organisation. But it's about commitment; it is 
about honouring promises and delivering what you agreed to 
deliver. It is also about negotiating sensible terms of reference 
when you get involved in a partnership. But this is a growth area 
with much work to be done Jbid). 
The establishment of terms of reference, common goals and a sense of unity has 
been most actively fought out and negotiated at the local level. "Responding to 
the need of the partnership" (Chairman, Stores' Committee) in Liverpool 
involved processes that both realigned and reinforced existing local networks of 
power that impinged directly on the meaning of place and space in the city 
centre. However, through the discourse of partnership, the ascendancy of the 
city as a marketable place in tune with modem consumer patterns and 
investment trends was not a phenomenon orchestrated by the locally powerful 
alone, but was worked out in conjunction with centrally administered rules and 
procedures. As Chapter Five discussed, the shift to the so-called 
6 entrepreneurial city' has been encouraged through various central government 
initiatives around the formation of public and private partnerships and 
competitive, centrally coordinated bidding regimes. Moreover, the very 
vagueness with which central government has defined 'partnerships' concerned 
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with regeneration (Atkinson, 1999) has sidelined issues to do with broadening 
democratic local decision-making and allowed more established actors to set 
agendas. It is these agendas that formed the basis of feedback chains between 
local and central decision making agencies with respect to Liverpool. It was the 
Government Office that acted as a means of communication between local and 
central governmental actors. Thus, one interviewee described partnership in 
Liverpool city centre as: 
... a method 
for delivering on a local basis but the policies, the 
significant policies, are still set nationally by central government 
but it's left to local government and other organisations ... to 
actually deliver things on the ground and to feed back to the 
central policy making machinery about what works, what 
doesn't and why (Chairman, Merseyside Development 
Corporation). 
As a forerunner to practising and initiating regeneration projects, local 
regeneration and state managers organised conferences in an attempt to stabilise 
2 
and promote effectivity in the working relations between key players . It was 
felt that only with a measure of stability and coherence among the key players 
could regeneration take place. Outside perceptions of local political infighting 
and instability "do not bode well for building and sustaining the investment 
machinery Liverpool has in place" (Ibid). The process of developing new ways 
of thinking across various agencies was forged through appeals to both 
particular agencies and the benefits that would be gained in partnership as well 
as appeals to the 'city interest' as a whole. This was exemplified by the 
position of Merseyside police who re-orientated themselves in relation to other 
local agencies at a strategic level through the secondment of senior personnel to 
2 The researcher, as discussed in Chapter Four, attended two major local conferences indicative of 
these attempts to align local key players. 
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the Government Office. Alongside this, other initiatives were put into place that 
saw the police working more closely with other city centre regeneration 
agencies on both formal and informal levels. Firstly, Merseyside Police in the 
form of the Area Commander for the city centre sat on the monthly meetings of 
the Stores' Committee to keep senior store representatives up-to-date on 
policing in the city and to listen to the concerns of retailers regarding issues 
around crime and disorder. Secondly, Crime Prevention Officers and 
undercover police attend a subsidiary of the Stores' Committee - Crime Alert. 
These closer working relations at an operational level between police and 
business came about through pressure from local businesses for the police to 
take their concerns more seriously around crime and disorder in the city centre 
and a police recognition of the benefits of being involved in the move to 
paftnership: 3 
In the past the perception from the business side was 'what the 
hell has this got to do with you' [the police]? Now there is the 
sudden realisation that the police do have a real role to play. 
They can be instrumental in initiating the regeneration process 
and in maintaining it by policing effectively and by consent 
(Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
'Policing effectively and by consent' became a source of tension between key 
players regarding what this meant in terms of effective regeneration, and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. In Liverpool the police and businesses instituted 
closer working relations under the auspices of regeneration that required the 
passing of expert information deemed necessary for 'successful renaissance'. 
On this point, Ericson (1994: 168) argued that general changes in policing 
could be analysed under the advent of the 'risk society'. Here the police role 
3 Both the Stores' Committee and Crime Alert were central to the establishment of the camera 
network. This role, and their relationship to Merseyside Police, will be discussed In 
Chapter 
Eight. 
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takes on a "knowledge-risk-security" perspective in providing expertise to other 
governmental agencies concerned with aspects of "social development": 
I think the cops have become more receptive to the sharing 
aspect that they were not renowned for before. Since around the 
time of the Morgan Report in 1991 the perception among police 
officers was that it was probably within their interests to 
acknowledge that crime prevention can't just be left to the cops 
and by implication opinions spread wider and people wanted to 
know more. People are much more informed now than they were 
and the police are a lot more open about the recording of the 
reality. They recognise that perceptions of safety and un-safety 
(sic) are factors in the regeneration process Jbid). 
In this sense the police were able to "provide local intelligence and information 
crucial to the planning stage on all manner of funded projects" (City Centre 
Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police). In Liverpool, the notion of the 
police as information brokers extended to meetings of the Confederation of 
Trade and British Industry (CBI) in the city. It was in this forum that the 
Assistant Chief Constable addressed investors and potential investors on the 
merits of setting up commercial ventures in the city: 
Our Assistant Chief Constable now carries a stronger message to 
business. It is now a case of saying 'look - the CBI needs to 
know that things in Liverpool are not as bad as they are 
perceived to be. You need to take this message to your 
organisations and not miss out on this window of opportunity 
under Objective One simply because you think Liverpool is not a 
safe place' (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
Having the police involved at a strategic level in the regeneration process 
materialised as an outcome of pressure from local businesses and developers. 
From their perspective, the police needed to be seen as involved in the process 
to take it forward. In this way partnership with the police would hopefully 
redress the fallout between the police and the local council after the street 
disturbances of 1981 and the Militant politics of the 1980s: 
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In the Liverpool of the 1980s we had the problem of council 
officers criticising the police and the police refusing to talk to 
the council. What seems to have happened during the 1990s is 
that businesses and developers have gained a greater say. 
They've been able to bridge the impasse and point out the 
futility of wrangling when we should all be working for the 
renaissance in the city (Marketing Director, Mersey 
Partnership). 
Persuading the police of the benefits of being at the centre, of the regeneration 
process had a two-fold appeal. Firstly, it appealed to the local political position 
of the police regarding strengthening their involvement in local political 
decision-making. Secondly, and related to the above, the police's ideological 
hegemony on issues of local crime and disorder was also strengthened. In this 
sense the discourse of regeneration provided the cement with which to 
reconfigure locally powerful agencies and smooth over old enmities: 
The fact that we have senior police officers on board - most 
crucially in the Government Office - shows Merseyside Police as 
willing to take a gamble. But the way we sold it to them, and I 
have been at it for years, is by saying you really ought to be 
involved in the policy process because there will be policy 
dividends for you down the track. I mean if we are successful in 
delivering Objective One and the Single Regeneration Budget 
and attracting business and people there are operational 
implications for the police service. As they are involved in the 
planning stage they will have the edge over other organisations 
that are not (Home Office Advisor [GOM]). 
'Having the edge over other organisations' meant the police being involved in 
the bid approval process through the Govemment Office. The work of this body 
has concerned itself with the construction and propagation of a consensus 
among locally powerful agencies regarding the 'good governance' and strategic 
rule of a particular locality. For the police as well as other institutions this 
meant experimenting with new cross-agency roles and, at the highest level, 
engaging the police in constructing discourses and implementing management 
procedures around local social development strategies: 
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The police organisation wants to be involved in the regeneration 
process as partners and we want to see the place as a vibrant 
region, which is attractive to inward investors and supports a 
high quality of life for citizens and visitors. Having a police 
officer in here has been able to make a change in the bid 
approval process and helps deliver policy objectives around 
quality of life and freedom from crime. It is actually a good 
thing for the police as an organisation as well as a good thing for 
the people of Merseyside. It's an example of good practice 
(Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
Development and business managers were enthusiastic about senior police 
involvement in the regeneration process in that it helped smooth the process and 
enhance its credibility in the eyes of potential investors: 
To be effective, urban profiling has to have all the key players 
involved and at the highest levels and we are way ahead of other 
areas on this. It is not every investor that wants a low down on 
crime, but a major investor who does, wants to see the sheriff not 
the deputy. So yes, it's very good, very good that they [the 
police] are part of the whole partnership thing - they listen to us 
and they actually understand that their role is now Part of the 
investment machinery. The Chief Constable has actually been to 
business receptions with me and explained the picture - they 
have got totally into that (Chairman, Merseyside Development 
Corporation, emphasis in original). 
Within this process. police symbolic power was a central component in a wider 
corporate strategy to lever investment and sustain local economic growth. The 
cementing of local power relations through the discourse of regeneration 
opened up a space for the police in Merseyside to take forward their own 
agenda around the issue of police funding. In this sense police involvement in 
the process bolstered their position in terms of their "symbolic authority" to 
make "legitimate pronouncements" on crime and disorder (Loader, 1997: 2). 
Indeed such authority manifested itself in, and was processed through, the 
authoritative coalitions that have emerged around regeneration. Crime and 
disorder was articulated in terms of a wider notion of 'social development' and 
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the "quality of life we are trying to promote in this city" (Superintendent, 
Merseyside Police [GOM]): 
It seems to me an anathema that in a region in England and 
Wales that qualifies for Objective One status and where we are 
trying to do the socio-economic regeneration work with the 
police on board and through secondment, that the funding for the 
police is being cut - particularly when crime and safety are the 
big issues blocking inward investment. It is absolutely crackers 
and we will be saying so to the Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
Jbid) 
Responsible partners and the responsibilisation process 
David Garland's (1996) notion of a 'responsibilisation strategy' highlighted a 
series of political processes in which state agencies were divesting 
responsibility for crime control to other public and private agencies at a time 
when problems of management overload and legitimisation were particularly 
acute. Indeed, as Garland argued, the responsibilisation strategy has taken place 
across a range of social policy fields in an attempt to redraw and reconstitute 
the management of diverse social problems. In the context of regeneration in 
Liverpool and the reordering of local power relations, the notion of 
6 responsibility' took on a political and ideological significance. The meanings 
attributed to 'responsible partner' and the empowerment of such a partner - 
through funding and political recognition - pointed to broader processes 
concerned with the coordination of the local state ensemble in a manner that 
sought to expand its scope for action and influence. Police expertise was central 
in these definitional processes and provided leadership in this area. Having the 
police involved in the bid approval process, with the information and 
intelligence they can bring, was articulated as a means to enhance the 
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credibility of local partnerships with respect to those who manage urban 
funding regimes, such as the Single Regeneration Budget: 
All partnerships like to have the police involved - it lends legitimacy to what they do. There is an issue of trust here about 
who is actually going to be the banker, handle the money and, 
you know, is it going to get ripped off? This has happened in 
Liverpool in the past. Some of the government-funded 
organisations, for example, involved in the regeneration of 
Toxteth have ripped the government off and there have been a 
number of fraud investigations. So having the police involved is 
a step towards making that harder and making partnerships do 
the right thing rather than what suits their own agenda 
(Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOMI). 
The co-ordination of partnerships has involved 'policing' the discursive 
contours as to the meaning of 'reliable' and 'credible' partners. More 
particularly, this has involved the attempt to shape definitions of 
6 responsibility' and 'responsible partners' in the regeneration process. Thus 
partnerships in Liverpool city centre were engaged in a process of determining 
the ideological parameters of partnership power in terms of who is authorised to 
speak, on which issues, and at which time. This process can be seen as an 
attempt to define a localised 'collective will' and to promote strategies deemed 
to serve it. Partnership in Liverpool involved processes towards "the focusing 
of minds and the negotiation of sensible terms of reference" along with the 
"commitment of resources to agreed packages" (Home Office Advisor [GOMI) 
that, at the same time, redrew notions of the public and private interest. In this 
sense, regulating tensions and mistrust between local collectivities of interest 
set in motion managerial practices underpinned by ideological agendas around 
the notion of 'responsibilisation'. The responsibilisation of agents and agencies 
took place on a selective discursive terrain that was underpinned by the notion 
of 'empowerment'. Key players focused on who was 'empowered' to speak for 
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particular collective interests and, therefore, able to assume a measure of 
6 responsibility' to receive funding: 
We need to check with potential partners whether they are 
empowered to speak for a community. It operates like a 
checklist: Accountability - to whom? Responsibility - how much 
of it do you have? Information - how much information is 
available you and how much do you have to pass to other 
players? (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside 
Police). 
Accountability, responsibility and information set the discursive and 
institutional parameters for the process of partnership building and access to 
centres of power and decision-making. 'Useful' information, in particular, was 
defined within the context of regeneration and, as has been indicated, 
definitions of what were in the interests of 'the city as a whole'. Importantly, 
the building of partnership, therefore, did not represent an open 'free for all' 
that eschewed contemporary and more traditional networks of ideological and 
institutional power. As one interviewee candidly stated: 
One of the biggest problems has been around consultation in 
Liverpool and the transparency of the process itself. The 
temptation is when you are setting something up you go and talk 
to somebody who will respond to your need. You take the easy 
way round (Home Office Advisor [GOM]). 
Thus partnership in Liverpool has operated through a series of constraints to do 
with the identification and targeting of key players deemed appropriate and 
necessary for successful regeneration, tempered by definitions of who is 
responsible and who is not. In this sense, new sets of power relations were 
reinforced through the building of alliances that at the same time reconfigured 
the contours of locally powerful networks of rule. 
207 
Getting the message across: Re-imaging and the local press 
The notions of the 'entrepreneurial city, or the city as 6growth machine' 
discussed in Chapter Five each highlighted the development of locally powerful 
coalitions whose concern to 'talk up' a sense of place and instil a growth 
mentality has led to alliances with local press agencies. The local press "can 
play an invaluable role in coordinating strategy and selling growth to the 
public" (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 72). The strategic importance of such 
agencies in regeneration projects has been grounded in the dissemination of 
information and images that potentially construct a sense of place favourable to 
potential investors and geared towards cultivating 'local pride' amongst the 
local population. The construction of an urban aesthetic through local press 
organs has been an important component in regeneration for businesses, local 
developers and police. In Liverpool, the local presS4 (consisting of the 
Liverpool Echo and Daily Post) have been pressed by city centre partners to 
attune their role and become agents of regeneration. The position of the local 
press in representing 'quality of life' issues was deemed to have a major impact 
on smoothing the wheels of the investment machinery. This was born from a 
recognition that the local press can produce negative and positive images of the 
region and of particular institutions within it, images that will have a direct 
bearing upon regeneration. Those involved in city centre partnerships were 
particularly focused upon 'negative' reporting around both the City Council and 
Merseyside Police: 
4 It was the local press as opposed to other media that nterviewees highlighted as a concern In the 
process of building partnerships. In their study Logan and Molotch found that "because 
newspaper interests are tied to growth, media executives are sympathetic to business complaints 
that a particular Journalistic investigation or angle may be bad for the local business climate" 
(1987: 72). 
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We are not trying to have a go at investigative journalism but the 
presentation of a story does not have to be couched in negativity. 
Potential investors will want a flavour, a snap shot of things in 
the city and they will want to see the local press. Sometimes I 
cringe at some of the stories in there, which only reinforce 
images we need to overturn - 'Liverpool is politically unstable, 
the City Council is crap, that Liverpool people are bolshie and 
thieving'. Some sections of the press have done nothing for this 
city and Council Officers have a bad taste in their mouths from 
the past, they're terrified they might get a bad press and so won't 
talk (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership). 
This situation led local partners to form alliances with sympathetic national 
newspapers in order to promote the city through, for example, national 
conferences such as Merseyside: The Future, sponsored by The Guardian in 
1997. In other areas, agreements with the local press have been inaugurated in 
order to bridge perceived mistrust. This was exemplified by the negotiation of 
press-police relations regarding the reporting of policing and levels of crime in 
the city. One interviewee described these negotiations as "about building trust 
with the media" after a series of "damaging articles for Liverpool". These 
articles: 
... were basically along the lines of 'crime 
is out of hand and the 
police are unable to cope with it'. At the end of the day it is as 
much in the interest of the Echo's Editor as it is in the interest of 
Merseyside Police that we repopulate, have prosperity and 
vibrancy. I mean he'll sell more newspapers if there are more 
people living here, working and with money to spend 
(Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
The production of news around issues of local crime and disorder were 
reshaped, in this instance by the building of a collective will around 
regeneration that helped cement partnerships between key players within which 
issues of policing assumed paramount importance. Again this involved 
negotiation and co-operation between locally powerful players at a corporate 
level: 
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Now I would like to think we have got our act together here. If 
something is going to happen that we know about we brief the 
media first. If things happen that we don't know about and the 
media get a story we have negotiated protocols with them so that 
we can actually say when a story is published it must portray 
things fairly. We can actually go as far as to contact editors 
directly via the Chief Constable. 'This is the Chief Constable of 
Merseyside on the telephone - if you do not publish a retraction 
of what you have just said we will issue writs today'. We have 
done that and they have backed off Jbid). 
Alongside these coercive tactics was a move to cement a political image 
building process to help shape and reinforce powerful definitions of the 'public 
interest'. This kind of coalition building, involving the local press, increasingly 
endeavoured to link the notions of 'good business practice' with the proactive 
management of images of crime and its incidence: 
Merseyside is no worse than other cities - in fact our crime 
trends are probably better than most. But we seem stuck with an 
undeserved reputation as a hotbed of criminal activity ... To say Merseyside is a safe place to do business requires a sense of 
proportion. Perhaps nowhere is truly safe in the sense of being 
completely crime free, but Merseyside is certainly a sensible 
place to do business ... and I am delighted to have the chance to 
put the record straight (Editor of the Liverpool Echo cited in 
Merseyside Police Community Strategy Department, 1998: 4). 
This closer alignment of the local press to the regeneration process was also in 
evidence through headlines to do with 'talking up' Liverpool and the new 
entrepreneurial spirit that partnerships wanted to represent. Some examples of 
this appear in the next section of this chapter. The next part of this section will 
deal with partnership and the issue of leadership that interviewees identified. 
Trust and leadership 
The trick is; this is never going to be a properly democratic 
process. We use democratically elected representatives where 
appropriate and where possible, but there has to be a point where 
you say, 'we've done as much as we can' (Marketing Director, 
Mersey Partnership). 
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The shift to a more 'business like' approach to urban rule and the establishment 
and inter-linkage of bodies such as the Government Office, LCCP and Mersey 
Partnership generated initial mistrust between these "catalysts for change" (The 
City Centre Manager, LCCP) and other local actors, particularly the City 
Council and Merseyside Police. Initially the latter agencies viewed the former 
as political outsiders - "parachutists" or "prefects" (Home Office Advisor 
[GOM]) - who were appropriating and reordering, both discursively and 
materially, the mechanisms and rationality for urban rule from outside older, 
established local political frameworks. Mistrust was tempered by the feeling 
that power was sliding away to other bodies, a perception recognised by the 
Govemment Office: 
The Government view of regeneration and the Government 
Office's view is that it is about arresting the demographic slide, 
improving infrastructure, improving the quality of life and 
improving the ability of the local authorities to deliver their 
services more effectively. The subtext... is about politics and 
the view rightly or wrongly that central government have an 
almost pathological dislike of local government - that it wasn't 
going anywhere. The Government Office is about striking a 
balance between local and central. We are here to make the 
process of change easier (Ibid). 
For the Government Office and the LCCP things became easier with changes to 
Liverpool's ruling Labour Group in the run up to and after the 1997 General 
Election. The Group adopted a more cooperative approach to the private sector 
under the influence of 'New Labour'. Through this co-operative approach the 
6 spirit of regeneration' became more tangible. These processes of bringing 
agencies into the 'spirit' of the regeneration agenda were at the same time 
attempting to facilitate trust between agencies. The perceived failure of past 
forms of urban management under the auspices of an urban welfare strategy 
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was sharpened for new governmental actors in Liverpool by the spectre of 'hard 
left' council politics in the shape of Militant in the 1980s: 
Something that we are working for and is coming over the 
horizon is trust, which is growing between organisations like the 
City Council and the police. You must realise that in Liverpool it 
was not that long ago since the Fraud Squad were arresting the 
Deputy Leader, Derek Hatton. Time is a great healer but you 
need more than time. It's about building bridges at the highest 
level in both organisations where you can have a strategic impact 
in trusting each other with knowledge about each other's 
organisations and priorities (Superintendent, Merseyside Police 
[GOMI). 
The prospect of gaining funds through competitive bidding and the arrival of 
Objective One funding "has provided the glue where we have had to sit round 
the table and thrash out strategies - but it has not in itself solved the leadership 
issue" (Chairman, Stores Committee). Leadership issues went hand in hand 
with trust and raised questions for urban managers about who was capable, 
responsible and 'charismatic' to fill the role: 
One of the themes that came through is that leadership is 
required and leadership is something that has been lacking. This 
lacking is not a reflection of the individuals involved but it 
points to the problem of Council Officers having to serve the 
needs of politicians and the politicians in Liverpool, dare I say, 
are of a widely varied calibre. Some of the more charismatic, 
who possess qualities of leadership, have actually shot Liverpool 
in the foot with the rise of Militant and so on. As I've indicated 
this is one of the things in the minds of potential investors 
(Private Developer [I], affiliated to LCCP). 
The perception was that 'old ways' of working within established political 
arenas were at odds with what was deemed necessary for effective regeneration: 
Party politics whether left or right is a Stalinist type of approach 
and can get in the way of real politics. The only thing that gets in 
the way in Liverpool as in other cities is party politics - that is, 
who has the right to decide. Until a system is in place that people 
see as being the right system, not all the people but the few that 
count, you are always going to have that party politics 
(Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership). 
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'Educating' elected local representatives to new learning curves regarding the 
nature of local economic and social development involved moving beyond what 
was characterised as 'political infighting' or 'turf politics'. In establishing an 
authoritative context within which partnership for regeneration could operate, a 
carrot and stick approach was developed as a means to bring agencies into line. 
Merseyside Police and the Government Office played a key role here: 
Building trust is very, very important. It's about having the 
police actually saying to Liverpool City Council here is access to 
our information, our database that you can use for deciding what 
you need to do to engineer out crime when rebuilding parts of 
the city. It's about focusing minds and getting local politicians to 
think across the city and not just their own wards and that they 
might get some of the cake next time (Superintendent, 
Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
Thus building strategic ways of thinking in the governance of the city went 
hand in hand with the allocation of resources through Objective One and the 
Single Regeneration Budget: 
What is bringing people together is the prospect of having some 
money to spend on what they want to see done. Realistically that 
is quite fair and legitimate because if you live in a crappy 
environment you want to do something about it. If something 
like the Single Regeneration Budget or Objective One is in 
operation you are told that if you want to spend X million 
pounds on something, you get yourselves into a partnership, 
show us that you mean it and have some strategic thought behind 
it (Home Office Advisor [GOM]). 
Within the processes of defining and refining (strategic thought' has been a 
related process to do with getting agencies to think within an ideological 
framework that prioritised what was in the interests of 'the city as a whole'. 
This incorporated the idea of 'sustainable projects': 
Partnerships will get the money and continue to get it providing 
they deliver what they said they would deliver. But all of these 
projects have to identify succession strategies - what are they 
going to do when the money runs out? Have they thought about 
budgeting in the future? (Ibid). 
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in establishing a framework of governance that moved beyond "parochialism" 
jbid), a series of regeneration strategies were initiated to re-orientate the 
meaning of urban renewal in terms of who would be responsibilised, what kinds 
of projects took precedence, and where, in geographical terms, funded projects 
would occur: 
People are beginning to get a much better idea about seeing how 
things can work in strategic blocks. So rather than saying 'I want 
this in my area', they can actually see that there are over-spill 
benefits from one area to another. In Merseyside there has 
always been those who get and those who don't and there is a 
perception among residents that the city centre and south 
Liverpool are getting all the money and the north of the city is 
not (Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation ). 
It was the city centre that provided the hub of regeneration. The assumption was 
that what would be good for the region of Merseyside would be provided for in 
promoting the city centre, re-scaling it and re-ordering it within a framework of 
'sensible governance'. 
The emphasis, therefore, on partnership between public and private sectors and 
the shift away from traditional post-war models of urban government threw into 
sharp focus the issue of leadership. This issue percolated through the local press 
which provided a forum for local elites to air their views on the subject. For 
example, in an article entitled 'Who Runs The City CentreT (Liverpool Echo, 
15 August, 1997) a series of "key players" expressed the need for leadership 
that encompassed a range of related issues - including external image, city 
marketing and street cleanliness. 'Our City's Heart: Clean Sweep for the Streets 
of Shame' was the title for another article which identified a 'new confidence' 
expressed by city managers in tackling anti-social activities in the city centre 
214 
including litter, graffiti and fly-posting. In the article the City Centre Manager 
expressed the new confidence thus: 
.. 
if we want to attract the big players to the city then we have to 
clean up the environment .. I think pride in the city is what we 
need to have, unless we instil that pride, unless people take 
ownership of their own city, we are not going to make much of 
an impact (Liverpool Echo, 9 October, 1998) 
The article trumpeted the collaborative efforts towards 'street cleansing' 
between the City Council, City Centre Manager and the Stores' Committee and 
mirrored other well received collaborations in the press that sought to manage 
order in the city centre. Indeed, it was within this context of reordering, re- 
imaging and establishing responsibility and leadership in the city centre that 
Liverpool's CCTV scheme emerged. The scheme was positioned as a flagship 
development in the regeneration process and was born of similar coalitions of 
interest. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. Before that, the next 
section of this chapter discusses the emergence and consolidation of the neo- 
liberal state form and the city centre regenerative visions that emerged within it 
as expressed by interviewees. It is to these 'new primary definers' that the 
chapter will now turn. 
An orderly regeneration: 'attracting capital and people of the right sort' 
Liverpool in the 1990s: Towards the commercially viable city 
'The Perception of Merseyside and the Client Problem' -a local 
survey that shows an all too familiar problem. Those surveyed 
listed crime, poor industrial relations and political unrest as the 
key major factors in decisions to invest. This is the client pool of 
our potential inward investment. Those are the perceptions of 
outside of what's inside (Marketing Director, Mersey 
Partnership). 
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Liverpool and Merseyside are unlikely to succeed if the city 
centre fails (Ambitions for the City Centre, Liverpool City 
Council, 1996: 11). 
As discussed in Chapter Six, the political, ideological and econon-tic climate of 
Liverpool in the 1980s meant that the city's regeneration lagged behind 
developments that were underway in other cities throughout the United 
Kingdom. However, the trajectory of the regeneration strategy followed the 
substantive contours concerning the shifts in urban governance identified in 
Chapter Five. This section will discuss the key agencies and related strategies 
underpinning Liverpool's regeneration in the 1990s as a means of introducing 
and contextualising the emergent strategies for order in the city that have 
witnessed shifts in the institutional configuration and responsibility for enacting 
social control. The creation of an urban aesthetic landscape took both a 
discursive and material form underpinned by orderly visions for the city centre 
and, running alongside, perceptions of threats to that aesthetic order. In sharp 
contrast to the 1980s, and moving more in line with national trends, the 
contemporary restructuring of Liverpool has focused on the city centre and 
designated key regeneration sites around retailing and consumption, commerce, 
leisure and tourism, culture and the arts. 
As in other cities., the regeneration of Liverpool was underpinned by a more 
business like approach to urban management that incorporated City Challenge 
and the Merseyside Development Corporation. The latter body, established in 
Liverpool since 198 1, was responsible for a series of initiatives (costing f400 
million up to 1997) to regenerate the city's docklands. Stressing a more 
business like approach to urban governance involved marketing localities 
in 
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order to construct a distinctive city image to lure inward investment. The 
Mersey Partnership has brought together over 300 local partners to invest 
millions in marketing campaigns through a proliferation of brochures, seminars 
and conferences and a series of targeted initiatives aimed at national and 
international media and at potential investors. The work here hinged around 
promotional strategies towards constructing a local 'quality of life' that 
publicised information on business services, local infrastructure, labour costs - 
sold as "lower than the national average for virtually all grades" (The Mersey 
Partnership, 1997) - culture, arts, education, housing and architecture and 
scenery. In a climate of global competition, local marketing strategies have 
attempted to promote a distinctive city image: 'Liverpool -A Maritime City', 
'A Pool of Talent' and 'Local and Proud' have been examples. In 1998, a 
marketing campaign to reverse the negative undertones associated with the 
regional name 'Merseyside', and to change it to 'Liverpool Bay', was launched 
with the support of local business with the aim of selling the region to the USA, 
Canada and Japan where 'Liverpool' was thought to be a "recognised brand 
name" (Liverpool Echo, 2 July, 1998). In addition, tourism has formed a major 
plank of the local economy and was estimated to be worth f480 million a year 
(Ibid). The Merseyside Development Corporation's crowning glory, the Albert 
Dock shopping, arts and museum complex, received 5 million visitors a year 
and houses Liverpool's bid at cultural differentiation in the form of the Tate 
Gallery. In attracting capital and investors local partnerships have been 
planning and funding improved telecommunications, infrastructural support, 
tourist attractions and leisure services (notably around the Beatles mythology 
reported to be worth f 50 million in spending alone), caf6-bar culture and sport. 
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One of Europe's biggest city centre developments at Queen's Square 
exemplified future visions for the city in incorporating an international hotel 
within a retail and leisure complex costing over f90 million. Further evidence 
of private development and investment in the city was evidenced in the creation 
of af 125 million National Discovery Park incorporating a high-tech media 
factory linking the waterfront with the retail centre, thus further expanding the 
city centre in reclaiming derelict buildings and land. The mushrooming of 
private developments in the city was underpinned by Merseyside's Objective 
One funding status whereby E630 million was claimed from the European 
Union to encourage private investments in technology, exports, marketing and 
small business (The Times, 5 March 1995). 5 
The attempt to expand the service-based economy through such partnership 
initiatives was hailed as a success for Liverpool and its people. As noted above, 
the local press were targeted as key players in getting a positive message about 
regeneration to the wider public: 'Partners doing the business' (Liverpool Echo, 
20 May, 1998); 'Mersey fortunes in hands of experts' (Liverpool Echo, 12 
September, 1996); 'Progress - here and now' (Liverpool Echo, II September, 
1995); '2 1 st Century City' (Liverpool Echo, 17 September, 1997) and 'Mersey 
is Leading the way'l (Liverpool Echo, I November, 1996) were examples of 
positive local coverage. 
Objective One funding was granted to Europe's poorest regions - those whose per capita Gross 
Domestic Product is less than 75% of the European Union average - and has been instrumental in 
encouraging partnerships as a prerequisite for funding. 
218 
These developments towards instituting sets Of Power relations in urban 
governance and regeneration impacted on the city centre as "the driving engine 
for the whole region" (City Centre Manager, Liverpool Echo, 20 May 1998). 
Drawn up in 1997, The 'Ambitions for the City Centre' document, involved 
public and private agencies that included the City Council, the Police, the 
Development Corporation and the Tourism Bureau. The document took a "hard 
headed" view of the city's potential in utilising Objective One funds to become 
a world class player in insurance, tourism and media, arts and culture 
(Liverpool City Council, 1997a: 9). The creation of a "safe and secure" 24- 
hour, 'European city' is a central theme in the document. Furthermore, the 
Council "cannot and should not itself lead in all courses of action" (Ibid: 3). 
The "success" of the strategy was to be "measured by indicators such as the 
level of private sector investment, improvements in the appearance of the city 
centre ... but most importantly by the city centre's 
image and level of 
confidence in its future" (Ibid: 7). Thus the strategic revitalisation of the city 
centre was prioritised in the drive to economically, socially and culturally 
regenerate the region as awoe. 6 
In 1987 the reformed Labour majority on the city council published a major 
LI - Economic Review that highlighted "the need for a strategy" regarding the city 
centre that would promote its centrality as the hub for regional regeneration. 
6 Indeed during Liverpool's post war decline, discussed In the previous chapter, the city centre 
remained the hub of the area's economic activity. The slow decline of the economic and political 
power of the merchant class became gradually replaced by the city's always-strong retail sector 
(Midwinter, 197 1). Out of the 240,000 jobs located in Liverpool in 198 1,10 1,000 (or 
42%) were 
in the city centre, notably in the commercial, retail and local government service sectors. 
Despite 
decline elsewhere in the local economy the city centre during the early 1970s 
had the highest 
retail turnover of any shopping centre in England and Wales outside of London 
(Liverpool City 
Council, 1987: 3-6). 
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The Review flagged up a number of "only too well publicised problems" that 
included the environment, security and pedestrianisation that would need to be 
tackled if the city centre was to stave off competition and build a "total 
package" that accommodated shopper's preferences for "an overall leisure 
experience - the day out in Liverpool" (Liverpool City Council, 1987: 4). The 
Liverpool City Centre Plan (1993) extended these observations in noting that 
"competition is intense" and that public and private sectors must work to a 
common purpose in establishing the "strategies, policies and proposals needed 
to help create Liverpool as an international city". The instigation of "proper 
management" through harnessing public and private interests was the 
prescribed role of the Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP), which was 
established in 1992 Jbid: 30). It was part of a patchwork of local bodies loosely 
connected to elected local government concerned with the promotion and 
regeneration of Liverpool city centre. The Partnership operated with an annual 
administration budget of 02,000 to help implement various schemes "working 
towards maximizing the city centre's potential as a regional centre, and 
enhancing its attractiveness to all those who use it" (Liverpool City Centre 
Partnership, 1995: 1). This body acted as a catalyst for public and private 
partnerships to both fund, and become responsible players, in city centre 
projects that included transport facilities, area ownership schemes, re- 
development projects, anti-litter campaigns and, as a central focus, street 
security. Much of this work took place through an Action Group which 
comprised of local corporate interests such as Merseytravel, the city's two 
universities, Liverpool Stores' Committee and the local Chamber of Commerce. 
From this platform, local and outside interests were to be targeted for potential 
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investment in local projects that included the provision of security initiatives 
such as CCTV, discussed fully in the next chapter. The growth of such city 
centre management agencies extended the neo-liberal drive of the 1980s that 
implied that lasting economic, social and environmental regeneration could be 
best secured through giving a key role to the private sector and in making urban 
places more attractive to business. Hence the LCCP was established as a local 
initiative comprising of a small administrative team and the (unelected) office 
of City Centre Manager, which has been filled by seconded senior retail 
businessmen. This 'flexible' and more 'efficient' approach to urban 
management has been described in the following terms: 
The City Centre Partnership exists at the behest of the city 
council but it is not another layer of bureaucracy. It is an open 
channel of communication, a catalyst and a means of getting 
things done that need to be done (The City Centre Manager, 
LCCP). 
The impetus behind post of City Centre Manager came from the Stores' 
Committee in Liverpool, who saw in the LCCP an opportunity to voice their 
interests in managing the city centre. 7 The Area Commander from Merseyside 
Police attended Committee meetings to listen to requests for police action on 
behalf of the stores and to brief store managers on relevant aspects of policing 
and criminal activity. Its members accounted for nearly 80% of city centre 
turnover and its aims were "to assist in provision of a clean, safe city centre 
environment", and "to further the interests of all its members who trade 
in 
Liverpool city centre" (Liverpool Stores' Committee, 1992: 1). 
7 The Stores' Committee in the city has been In existence since the Second 
World War and holds 
monthly meetings for its 40 members who pay an annual subscription of 
f 1200. 
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The Committee has a press officer and formed a sub-group, 'Crime Alert', in 
the early 1980s as a forum for store detectives, private security and police. 
Indicative of building partnerships towards regeneration, the Stores' Committee 
has become a more active player in the city centre: 
The Committee was originally formed to look after the interests 
of retailers, but more recently it has become a body concerned 
with general issues in the city centre. We see ourselves, because 
of our voluntary status, as facilitators and a body tuning in to the 
groups of people who run the city and lobbying them, cajoling 
them and advising them on what direction the city should take. 
We now have a strong power base, in that we represent a large 
number of staff and a large turnover and large purpose for 
visiting the city centre - but we feel frustrated because the city 
does not share our vision (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
With these concerns in mind, the Stores' Committee actively pushed for the 
establishment of the LCCP as a more 'representative' body of city centre 
interests that would be able to draw upon the expertise and knowledge of the 
private sector: 
Yes ... we were the founding members ... because our frustration had always been that we have this untapped resource 
of ideas. We were working on shop floors ... we know what is 
going on in the city and we know what the demands of the 
public are as well. We continue to have strong feelings on issues 
in the city such as street cleansing, security, street trading 
through to the management of the city centre. There was no 
representative body to channel this through; it was just a 
slanging match between the city council and the stores on a 
regular basis (Ibid). 
In general terms, these shifts in the rule of the city centre established new 
networks and alliances within which the objects of that rule were defined. As 
part of these developments in the realignment of governance in the city centre, 
more sophisticated forms of social control evolved through the establishment of 
partnerships and strategic alliances that precipitated a greater role for the above 
agencies in the task of securing order in the city through camera surveillance. 
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The next section will consider, in broad terms, the visions for the city expressed 
by the new primary definers. 
Consolidation and marketing: Visionsfor the city 
Toxteth is not Liverpool; it is not the city centre just like Brixton 
is not London. The urban problems of the twenty first century 
are going to the suburban areas. They are moving to the outer 
city and this brings us back to the necessity of success for the 
renaissance of the city centre (Chairman, Merseyside 
Development Corporation ). 
David Harvey's notion of "attracting capital and people of the right sort" (1990: 
295) has been particularly apposite in Liverpool's regeneration strategy. This 
part of the chapter will overview what can be called the 'politics of attraction' 
in Liverpool and the general meanings attributed to regeneration in terms of a 
6 city centre ambience' that key partnership players sought to promote. This will 
provide a prelude to an exploration of the processes involved in the social 
control network that defined the 'proper objects of power' within the city 
centre. The impact of business and development agencies in the local decision 
making process opened up forms of dialogue around the nature of order in the 
city centre, and reconfigured locally powerful agencies in realising that order 
within public space. 8 The regeneration process set in train a series of initiatives 
in the form of partnerships and local annual conferences bringing together 
elected representatives, developers, local businesses, churches, educational 
8 This is not to argue that because 'private' interests and fractions of capital are 
increasingly 
involved in these processes that a 'new' shift towards privatism has occurred (Goss, 
1996; 
Johnson, 1992). As Chapter Three illustrated, the scale of corporate involvement and capacity 
for 
influence has fluctuated historically. Thus nostalgia among some critical commentators for a lost, 
more authentic, 'public' space has forgotten, as Goss argued and the historical material 
in Chapter 
Six highlighted; "... the modern bourgeois revolution and its conception of the public sphere was 
built on private property and commerce" (1996: 240). It is the management and ordering of these 
social relations around which the state has scaled its interventions and in doing so sought to 
build 
Powerful coalitions for its actions. 
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establishments and police. The purposes of such conferences was to create and 
galvanise a sense of coherence to the work of the various partnerships across 
the city and to produce progress reports for developers, investors, businesses, 
elected representatives and "other agencies and groups who contribute to the 
future of the city centre" (Liverpool City Council, 1997a: 4). Two of the most 
high profile conferences - Ambitions for the City Centre and Merseyside: The 
Future - set themselves the task of identifying a number of themes "as a means 
of guiding and focusing action" (Liverpool City Council, 1997a: 4). These 
themes were laid down in the City Centre Strategy up to 2002 and included: 
building upon retailing, cultural design and media industries; enabling private 
sector development by improving transport links and providing new buildings, 
repair and refurbishment; creating a quality environment by improving 
maintenance and design and security; developing as a leading cultural and 
tourist centre with an emphasis on business, tourist and short stay products; 
communicating a positive image to build the confidence of operators, investors, 
developers and visitors; and, lastly, linking opportunity with need by giving the 
most needy better access to employment (Ibid: 4). 
As part of these strategies for regenerating the city centre, a new ideological 
terrain was in the process of being constructed which emphasised a re-imaging 
and marketisation of the urban landscape. Agencies charged with this function 
can be understood as belonging to what Thrift (2000: 252-253) termed the 
44 capitalist circuit of cultural capital", the use of which has been to accrue and 
disseminate knowledge used in the construction of place identity. The form of 
discourse invoked in this task played a role in cultivating belief amongst the 
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locally powerful regarding the reshaping of place identity. In some respects --it 
is belief itself, rather than what is believed, that counts as important" (Ibid: 254, 
emphasis in original). References made by urban managers in 'talking up' 
Liverpool, 'making the place look better' along with the construction of 
4spectacular' urban landscapes through design, played an important 
governmental role in "lubricating the transition ... to urban entrepreneurialism" 
(Hubbard, 1996: 1442). This was done, for example, through attempting to 
foster civic pride and make the city more attractive to external investors. Belief 
in the regeneration programme for Liverpool was orchestrated through a 
commercial vernacular that attempted to promote 'confidence in the city', 
whilst, at the same time, trumpeting a form of locally powerful self promotion, 
in addressing local and external audiences. General references to the urban 
landscape with an emphasis on existing and new architecture, as well as the 
'look of the place', form an important starting point for understanding the 
articulation of social order within the city centre. As many writers have 
recognised, and as the literature produced by regeneration agencies has 
indicated, there is an increasing emphasis across a range of agencies upon the 
catch-all category of 'quality of life', within which a number of interlinked 
programmes for action have arisen for urban managers. Some cities, however, 
have found it more difficult than others to 'successfully' market a sense of 
4 place'. Those who took part in the interview process spoke of the difficulty 
identified in redressing negative perceptions of 'place' regarding Liverpool city 
centre: 
In Liverpool you have got the problem of perception and the 
actuality - there is a big gap here. If somebody 
is looking for a 
place to set up business, which will mean employing people and 
paying taxes, they will look at it objectively and subjectively. 
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Objectively - and we are doing very well on this - they ask 4where will we be in commercial terms if we move here'? Subjectively they ask, 'do I really want to be in this place'? Here 
we are losing at the moment. It is part of the image problem of 
the city (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM], emphasis in 
original). 
The problem of image set in train a series of objects for action that included: 
perceptions of political instability; poor labour relations; inadequate leisure, 
cultural facilities and consumption facilities; a problem of street trading; land 
litter, crime and disorder. Each issue was seen to contribute to negative 
perceptions of place. Although these issues were qualitatively quite distinct, 
they all fell under the remit of The Mersey Partnership as issues to be marketed. 
As noted above, the Partnership was established in 1993 and has over 300 
members consisting of local businesses, developers, police, tourist agencies, 
local councils and education establishments all of whom contribute funding to 
the Partnership. The Partnership evolved from the late 1980s through the efforts 
of Liverpool Chamber of Commerce and the Stores' Committee who felt 
frustrated at the City Council in its refusal to give voice to, or work with, the 
private sector: 
The history of The Mersey Partnership starts at the back end of 
the 1980s. There was a lot of disquiet amongst local companies 
around the question of who speaks up for Merseyside. Some 
worthwhile work was being done but not in a co-ordinated 
manner. It started with the problem of perceptions, out of which 
stems the problem of inward investment. All city regions in the 
UK have had to develop new mechanisms, new vehicles to 
promote and attract investment for all sorts of reasons. More 
importantly, it is a realisation that this is not just a public sector 
job, the private sector can probably do it better and can actually 
physically create and fund an organisation and, critically, use 
their network to actually make things happen. I think there is 
always going to be a role for the City Centre Partnership and the 
Mersey Partnership. They can do publicly what businesses have 
always done privately - and give people a 
kick up the backside. 
So there is always going to be a role for that kind of lobby and 
if 
we are going to be an efficient smooth running machine as a 
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region, the key elements, including the City council will have to be able to run at what ever speed the market wants it to run at (Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership). 
The Mersey Partnership orientated its campaigns both at intra-region and inter- 
region levels and defined 'hard' and 'soft' marketing issues. The 'hard' issues 
included strikes, productivity and political stability, and campaigns aimed to 
redress "misconceptions that this is not a sensible place to do business" 
(Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership). 'Soft' issues: 
.. are beginning to become more important as regeneration takes hold. Softer issues include crime - that's the top issue - crime 
and its perception. Second is the issue of 'am I going to live 
here'? That's the social stuff around education, housing and 
leisure. These soft issues are about quality of life, which in turn 
are about security. Security runs like a vein through both hard 
and soft issues. For our potential inward investors security has 
political and social dimensions -a secure environment means 
looking at the political regime, the culture of the workforce and 
then it runs through into issues of social security and personal 
safety. We try and deal with all of these things, though different 
clientele seek information on different aspects of the equation. 
What we are marketing here, across the board, is stability (Ibid). 
Addressing the problem of image provided a focal point for partners in 
initiating and channelling the regeneration process in the city centre that 
initially focused upon a generalised 'look' and 'feel' of the urban fabric: 
The regeneration is wonderful because the place was looking 
very sad and sorry for itself and it has a reputation it doesn't 
deserve. We need the place to look significantly better and the 
city has a lot to offer - there are some beautiful buildings 
here, 
the museums and theatres. We need to get people to realise that 
this is a beautiful city (Superintendent, Merseyside Police 
[GOM]). 
The focus on the condition of the urban fabric pulled together themes around 
4 pride of place' and the potential for economic development within a 
recognition of competition between cities at the national level. The 
Officer 
Partnership Group provided a forum where issues under this general theme 
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could be aired. The articulation of 'place attractiveness' in this forum allowed 
the new primary definers to make an impact in the re-configuration of rule in 
the city: 
One mechanism that is most likely to achieve success is the Officer Partnership Group. These officials provide an important 
guide to policy. But the Group has gained a very powerful 
argument to take to the politicians whom it has been left to grasp 
the nettle (Chairman, Stores Committee). 
The hegemony of 'image' and 'attractiveness' provided a means for focusing 
minds across partnerships and played a cementing role in directing urban 
governance. As one interviewee stated: 
Indeed, if they [local politicians] fail to grasp these arguments 
and begin to think holistically they may well lose their seats 
because our consultation process has been very wide indeed. For 
example, the Stores' Committee, Marks and Spencer, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Mersey Partnership and the 
Community Safety Officer in the Council itself, have contributed 
to the agenda. The Council are beginning to recognise that, on a 
par with unemployment and education, perceptions of un-safety 
(sic) are important (Ibid). 
In its Action Plan, the Officer Partnership Group related 'image' to "the 
development of a safer city" and partners were encouraged to market 
proactively Liverpool in a positive light: 
The strategic importance of the image of Liverpool cannot be 
over-emphasised. The whole regeneration opportunity and 
process could be thwarted if people from within and outside 
Merseyside do not perceive Liverpool as a safe place and market 
its many qualities actively (Liverpool City Council, 1997b: 6). 
This marketing must go hand in hand with "situational measures" directed at 
the look of the urban fabric such as the "disguise and screening of derelict sites" 
and "improving the appearance of the gateways to Liverpool". These measures 
were important "to improving the image of Liverpool, not just in terms of 
safety, but to stimulate wider regeneration in the city", as "first 
impressions are 
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very important" (Ibid: 3). For the locally powerful, the focus on the urban fabric 
occupied an initial stage on a continuum that sought to re-image and re-order 
the city centre under a ubiquitous discourse of 'safety' within which CCTV was 
to play a central role. 
In broad terms, those at the centre of regeneration in the city centre expressed 
their enthusiasm for 'talking up' Liverpool in terms of its architectural and 
cultural heritage and as a 'European city': 
I recently hosted a visit from the Chief Executive of Paramount 
Parks in the USA. They run theme parks, well controlled and 
organised, sanitised Disney-like spaces, which are state of the art 
in terms of security and hospitality. They are a top ten world 
company and I showed them the Pier Head and walked them 
through the Albert Dock. They thought it was awesome as it is 
older than anything they have. They thought it was a fix, you 
know - like Disneyland done for real. What struck me is that 
they thought we had it made and that we do not realise what we 
have got here. Put simply, our job of reclaiming the city centre 
as an economically viable place will be a lot easier than the 
American approach, which starts from scratch (Chairman, 
Merseyside Development Corporation). 
The notion of 'reclaiming' the city centre as a viable commercial entity was 
expressed through a variety of strategies aimed at tourists, shoppers and 
investors. Reclamation underpinned a strategy of re-imaging the city centre that 
targeted specific audiences. These attempts to revert negative images of the past 
operated in a manner that played upon and reworked 'older' discourses of class 
and attempted to appeal to a potentially new constituency in Liverpool: an 
upwardly mobile, prosperous and entrepreneurial citizenry. 
Reworking images 
of Liverpool from a 'working class city' into a representative 
'European city' 
focused not only on how city streets look but also what activities 
take place in 
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them. For example, the drive to instigate a caf6 society in the city centre took 
place alongside campaigns aimed at cultivating a caf6 culture clientele: 
Our image campaigns are aimed at addressing local audiences as 
much as outsiders. The self-perception of Liverpudlians is 
negative even when they are being funny. The best burglar jokes 
are about Liverpudlians, but Liverpudlians tell them best! So that 
is why there are Mersey Partnership campaigns aimed inwardly 
to address Liverpool people and their relationship to the city. We 
are saying to Merseysiders - 'you are not just poor or self 
pitying'. We have to get across that Liverpool people are not all 
scallies, they have flash and well dressed young people who 
drink cappuccinos (Ibid). 
In this sense, the local population as a whole became a category to be educated 
in line with 'quality of life' and 'life style' issues as defined within central 
regeneration vernacular. These themes ran coterminous with a desire to evoke a 
notion of self-governing subjects, autonomously choosing aspects of 'life style' 
offered by the regenerated city. Furthermore, and contrasted to these new urban 
desires, other aspects of city centre business which attracted a rather different 
citizenry within the network of market stalls, street traders and the "bargain 
basement sector", were deemed out of step with the new urban faqade and 
pointed to a perception of a "downgraded economy" (Marketing Director, 
Mersey Partnership), thereby attracting people of the 'wrong sort'. As part of 
this process of re-articulating the urban order, a range of issues were targeted 
within strategies for responsibilised self-governance. These strategies initiated 
the instigation of a zero tolerance culture of civility. Intolerance of litter, 
vandalism and damage to the physical environment, along with "courteous, 
knowledgeable advice to customers and visitors", were the desirable qualities of 
it a town-watch culture where people advocate their own responsibility" 
(Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation). North American theme 
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parks and European cities such as Amsterdam were held as exemplars in this 
respect: 
North American hospitality industries have developed a whole 
level of management expertise and training -a philosophy of 
customer relations, which is still to reach our service industries. I 
mean they are selling a themed product - it's not just about what 
is sold but how it is sold. But it does not stop there. If you go to 
the Magic Kingdom in Orlando you cannot put a fag end out on 
the ground -a park employee would have picked it up in ten 
seconds and binned it. It is that kind of quick response we are 
working towards here. So people won't stub out a fag or drop a 
crisp packet because they are totally intimidated by doing it. I 
ran a similar scheme in London Docklands - if something 
happens you hit it instantly. I would like to think we did it here 
as well Jbid). 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, and in recognition of these and 
other issues, Town Watch was established in Liverpool in 1998. Initiatives such 
as this have underpinned the material drive towards a service based economy 
and have taken place alongside a recognition amongst locally powerful partners 
of the particular need to train the local service based workforce in 'customer 
care': 
We want to make people feel inclusive when they come to 
Liverpool. So what we are doing is about creating jobs within 
the services but also it's about creating a town centre culture of 
responsibility on behalf of those who work here, day to day. It is 
a way of getting everyone who is working in shops, cafes and 
bars to know what they are part of - that they get the bigger 
picture and appreciate what is going on around them (Chairman, 
Stores Committee). 
The LCCP has been at the forefront of a campaign running from July 1997 to 
establish an Academy (dubbed the "charm school") to educate service staff in 
the treatment of customers and visitors to the city (Liverpool Echo, 25 April, 
2000). Instilling a culture of civility amongst front line business personnel was 
recognised as a necessary step in the move to a service economy and as a 
response to competition in this area from other cities. For example, a more 
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business like approach in managing the city centre allowed the Government 
Office and the Stores' Committee to challenge the City Council to take a more 
proactive stance over its workforce regarding street sweeping. The perception 
of an 'unclean' urban fabric for these new urban managers was critical to the 
process of attracting investment, and used as a means to bargain with council 
officials and change council employment practices that were often described in 
Liverpool as based on a 'jobs for the boys' agenda: 
If we want people to come and shop, go for a meal and to a 
show, we don't want them to have McDonald's wrappers 
blowing round their ankles at 7.00pm in the evening - but that's 
what happens. At a much more cynical level if the City Council 
adopts and signs up to the regeneration agenda it will give them 
the leverage they need to challenge some of the inertia and worst 
customer practice in the Council workforce. This is the case with 
the street sweepers, who finish at 2.00pm. They should be 
working shifts. If we are to get a 24 hour city they are going to 
have to re-negotiate a deal with sweepers so they are cleaning up 
24 hours a day (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
The process of regeneration opened up spaces of manoeuvrability for key 
players in order to articulate interests, roles and responsibilities both within and 
between agencies. The cultivation of a 'growth mentality' had at its kernel a 
drive towards civic pride coupled with educative discourses directed at 
particular agencies and the population as a whole. These educational aspect of 
local state rule, along with marketing campaigns, formed the basis of a 
responsibilisation strategy legitimated though an official discourse that has both 
constructed and addressed 'self governing subjects'. Campaigns such as 'Your 
City, Your Choice', launched in October 1998 through the LCCP, was directed 
at both businesses and individual citizens as responsible categories to be made 
aware of the benefits of a clean city centre environment and the impact this has 
on tourism and investment (Liverpool Echo, 9 October, 1998). These discourses 
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of empowerment were central to strategies Of city centre rule and represented 
techniques that attempted to promote the interests of the new primary definers 
and the social reproduction of their power to rule. In sum, this discussion has 
sought to illuminate how the discourses of responsibilisation prioritised a 
commercialisation of city centre space and the activities within it. In promoting 
a particular spatialisation strategy, a construction of civility, underpinned by a 
moral set of meanings, was constructed in a drive to order city centre space. 
Conclusion 
In light of the theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter Three, it can be argued 
that the governmental logic that permeated the neo-liberal state in Liverpool 
hinged around what Zukin (1996a: 45-46) called "a collective belief in the 
growth of the symbolic economy", images from and about which circulate 
through to the wider public and underpin "both a landscape of power and a 
vernacular". As representatives of a contradictory and discordant particular 
social bloc, the agents of the rescaled state have been engaged in local political 
struggles to forge a "hegemonic project" (Jessop, 1990: 260) across institutional 
boundaries that has, as discussed in this and the next chapter, thrown up 
contradictions and tensions between powerful interests. However, ideas of what 
were deemed to be in the interests of 'the city as a whole' were married with a 
particular meaning of regeneration in order to forge a consensus and legitimacy 
within and for the mechanisms of rescaling. The meanings and visions outlined 
in this chapter were central to a hegemonic project that was constructed 
"through particular spacialized discourses and practices" in a series of attempts 
to resolve "(albeit temporarily and unevenly) the conflicts between particular 
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interests within a particular spatially imagined and demarcated space" 
(MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999b: 720). The development of the closed circuit 
television network in Liverpool, discussed in the next chapter, rendered a 
visionary and demarcated space both thinkable and practicable for the locally 
powerful. 
Moreover, within these 'new' urban spaces, Parenti (1999: 95) argued that, 
"while the popular press has focused on the economy of play ... few writers 
have examined the security imperative that lurks on the dark side of 'culture' 
based regeneration strategies", what he called "policing the theme park city". 
The general themes and organising principles discussed above, that brought 
agencies together, constituted processes toward the creation of nonnative 
orders. These orders have permeated the institutions of rule in Liverpool and 
helped establish inter agency cooperation, but also have been instrumental in 
setting the parameters of 'proper' and 'orderly' regeneration. The discourses of 
empowerment that have addressed the 'active subject' are important to 
recognise and crucial in understanding the establishment of 'theme park 
policing' initiatives. Within the promotional ideologies engaged in the 
construction of an orderly urban fabric, the context can be identified for 
understanding the articulation of problems for such orderly regeneration and, in 
particular, how the objects of power have emerged thematically within the 
network of city centre rule. The development and promotion of an effective 
network of surveillance and social control in the city centre emerged out of the 
procedural alliances and broad city visions discussed in this chapter. An 
exploration of the development of techniques of control, of which the 
CCTV 
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scheme provided a nodal point, will further illuminate an understanding of the 
processes involved in constructing the normative sense of city centre space 
articulated by the locally powerful towards the legitimate uses and ordering of 
that space. The next chapter will examine the particular alliances, techniques 
and normative frameworks that underpinned the development of the social 
control network in Liverpool city centre through an exploration of the camera 
surveillance network. 
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Chapter Eight 
Interpreting the CCTV Network: The Techniques and Norms of Social Control 
If Merseyside is to become a hotbed of industrial activity it is 
essential that we can effectively attract new businesses here. All 
forms of grant assistance to Merseyside are allowing companies 
to make considerable improvements to their premises, not only 
to make them more appealing but much more secure against 
crime. Most of our major town centres now have comprehensive 
CCTV systems and many businesses are participating in various 
schemes that upgrade their security (Community Strategy 
Department, Merseyside Police, 1998: 1). 
Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with the building of coalitions of interests through 
the discourses of 'partnership' and 'regeneration' in Liverpool. In particular the 
focus was on how these interests marshalled support for strategies aimed 
towards a re-imaging of the city, whilst at the same time establishing broad 
visions for a 'renaissance' in the city centre. This chapter will turn more 
specifically to the agencies and coalitions that constituted the closed circuit 
television (CCTV) network, as it emerged conterminous with the political and 
ideological processes outlined in the previous chapter. The self-styled role of 
the new primary definers found expression in the development and targeting of 
the CCTV network, discussed below. Their political and ideological position in 
the regeneration process provided both an increasingly powerful position for the 
articulation of problems of crime, deviance and social order, and a focal point 
for the instigation of social control practices. Therefore, within the context of 
definitional struggles over the meaning of partnership and regeneration, the 
46 proper objects of Power" (Fiske, 1993: 235) emerged as a salient component 
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of the visions articulated for the city which formed the basis for the engineering 
of a social ordering strategy. 
Following the previous chapter, and the research aims of the thesis laid out in 
Chapters Three and Four, the development of the local CCTV network will be 
situated within the political, ideological and material imperatives that informed 
the strategies of powerful coalitions and partnerships involved in the 
regeneration of the city centre. In this sense, the thesis extends and challenges 
previous research around CCTV. This chapter will, firstly, overview the 
previous research in order to outline the issues it has raised and its limitations. 
Secondly, and in contrast to many of the previous studies, this chapter will 
examine more closely the ideological underpinnings of the techniques of social 
control in Liverpool city centre. In particular, the focus will be on the role of 
CCTV in the promotion of a social ordering strategy that was filtered and 
organised through the regeneration process. This will illuminate the cross- 
agency alliances involved in the management and targeting of the CCTV 
network, and indicate how that targeting was rationalised and refined through 
the normative orders of power (introduced in the previous chapter). The role of 
CCTV in Liverpool was pivotal in that it was identified as a 'flagship' 
development in the promotion and maintenance of an orderly city, though, as 
this chapter will explore, this development sat alongside and linked in with 
other policing initiatives in the city centre. Lastly, the chapter identifies and 
explores the tensions and contradictions within the networks of the locally 
powerful as the social ordering strategy unfolded. 
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The research process and CCTV 
In Chapter Four a number of issues were raised regarding the relationship 
between powerful interests in the state and private sector, and the research 
process in and around contemporary crime prevention. This relationship helped 
marginalise political questions and processes that could be included in a 
research agenda and placed theoretical and methodological limits on 
understanding contemporary crime prevention practices such as CCTV. What 
follows in this section is a discussion of previous research around CCTV before 
presenting further research findings that develop the arguments in this thesis. 
The centrality of surveillance camera technology in the field of crime 
prevention is bome out by the existence of its own research and practitioner 
journal, CCTV Today. Like all criminological research, the research process 
around CCTV has taken place within a politicised environment. Encouraged 
through a cocktail of government grants, private funding and superlative 
rhetoric, CCTV has been eagerly taken up by public and private partnerships at 
the local level. I Through the early 1990s, in a context of rising crime and public 
fear about crime, the rapid proliferation of CCTV was described by several 
commentators as an expedient, 'technical-fix' solution to a range of crime 
related urban problems (Groombridge and Murii, 1994; Graham et al, 1996). 
According to Groombridge and Murii (1996: 283), CCTV is viewed in 
government circles as unproblematic and has also become big business so that it 
64 now seems set to achieve the status of an article of faith in popular crime 
I These developments have been discussed in the Introduction and will be highlighted again in 
Chapter Five. Chapter Eight will discuss extensively the establishment of partnership approached 
to CCTV in Liverpool. 
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prevention discourse". At times the debate around CCTV has been sharply 
polarised among researchers and practitioners. Some writers have argued for' 
CCTV as a necessary and straightforward policy response to increasing crime 
and incivilities (Home, 1996), whilst others have noted the problematic nature 
of research in this area in that "critics of CCTV are often portrayed as enemies 
of the public interest" (Davies, 1996a: 328). 
The next section will examine the research carried out on CCTV. The research 
will be broadly grouped under the two headings of evaluative and nonnative 
research. Following a discussion of the literature in this area, it will be possible 
to locate and elaborate upon the research questions and methodology of this 
thesis. 
i. Evaluation of CCTV 
Evaluative research into CCTV has exemplified many of the limitations 
discussed in the previous section regarding the narrow parameters of 
investigative questions posed and methodological approaches adopted. The 
proliferation of CCTV through Home Office and private sector funding has 
brought with it various attempts within and outside criminology to evaluate its 
effectiveness as a crime prevention tool. According to Tilley (1998: 145), "we 
have probably reached the point where the potential for CCTV to reduce crime 
has been established". However, Tilley also pointed to a number of problems 
that can be identified for evaluative researchers in investigating CCTV- In 
particular he pointed to the relationship 
commissioners of research: 
between the researcher and 
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It is not always clear exactly what is wanted from an evaluation 
of a CCTV system. Whether an evaluation is worth undertaking 
at all and what needs to be done in any study depends on the 
purpose of the work. The evaluator and the commissioner of the 
evaluation need, thus, to agree reasonable purposes, and the 
research design of the study must be devised to achieve them. 
Evaluators should not underestimate the need and opportunity 
they have to educate those asking for evaluations as to questions 
it is possible to answer and desirable to answer. Similarly, those 
orchestrating evaluations should not underestimate their need to 
spell out, negotiate and oversee the evaluations undertaken on 
their behalf to generate credible and useful findings (Tilley, 
1998: 139-140; emphasis added). 
Tilley highlighted a variety of purposes that may exist for evaluating CCTV 
schemes, and that these purposes vary widely in their ability to generate 
credible findings and practical applications. He implied that the search for 
'credible' and 'useful' findings continues to be a source of heated debate 
amongst evaluators. Thus, the first and most common kind of evaluation has 
asked 'Does CCTV work? ' This approach has variously focused upon the 
impact of CCTV on levels of recorded and reported crime. Such statistical 
indices have been most commonly used as evidence for the 'success' or 
'failure' of CCTV. However, as Tilley (Ibid: 141) observed, such research has 
produced "mixed and arbitrary findings". This approach has most often been 
constructed and applied by the proponents of CCTV that include policing 
agencies, local managers and developers. Short and Ditton (1995: 10), in their 
review of this work, noted that research with claims for 'success' in cutting 
crime, improving detection rates or in being unanimously popular amongst 'the 
public' has generated "post hoc shoestring efforts by the untrained and self- 
interested practitioner". From this observation, the authors challenged the lack 
of 'professionalism' within this type of evaluation study: 
This is not to claim that the evaluations are intentionally 
deceitful (or that CCTV doesn't work): just that the evaluations 
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haven't been conducted by independent professional analysts, 
and thus, in no case that we are aware of, do they satisfy the 
standard criteria of a credible evaluation (Short and Ditton, 
1995: 10). 
In view of these problems a more 'robust' evaluation procedure has been 
developed that asks 'Can CCTV work? ' This has been tied to, though not 
exclusively, the so-called "realistic evaluation" approach (Tilley, 1998: 145). 
Such work has stressed the need to address a wider and more complex set of 
questions pertaining to the effectiveness of CCTV that are sensitive to 6context, 
'mechanisms' and "outcome patterns' (Ibid). According to Tilley, three related 
questions "have always to be asked" in order to produce realistic and credible 
results: 
Mechanism - What is it about CCTV which may lead it to have a 
particular outcome pattern in a particular context? 
Context - What conditions are needed for CCTV to trigger 
mechanisms to produce particular outcome patterns? 
Outcome pattem - What are the practical effects produced by 
causal mechanisms being triggered by CCTV in a given context? 
(Tilley, 1998: 145-146). 
This approach recognised that CCTV can produce a number of effects (both 
positive and negative), for example, reductions in particular offences, 
displacement of particular offences, and impacts on the use of public space by 
women and young people. Realistic research has sought to evaluate CCTV 
alongside other crime prevention measures operating within a locality. From 
this angle, CCTV may reduce some crimes while others remain fairly constant 
(Brown, 1995). In his findings from a research evaluation in three town centres 
Brown noted the complexity of factors that have to be taken into account to 
make a CCTV scheme more effective: 
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The implications of these findings are that in order for a camera 
system to be effective within a town centre, there needs to be a 
high degree of coverage ... If a town centre area has many side 
streets and other premises such as car parks, it will require many 
cameras and several operators to make such a system effective 
... CCTV seems to work best when it is part of a package of 
measures ... What is important is the way CCTV is used as part 
of an overall strategy for policing town centres. In order to 
sustain an effect, the cameras must also play a part in the 
apprehension of offenders ... Camera successes can then be 
published, reinforcing the message for offenders that there is an 
increased risk of being caught (Brown, 1995: 65). 
Other studies in this vein have attempted to assess what the managers of CCTV 
schemes profess as the aims of a system (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) and the 
impact of CCTV upon the behavioural patterns of criminals in a given locality 
(Short and Ditton, 1998). Short and Ditton's research evaluated the sharply 
debated issue of whether CCTV led to reductions in crime: 
There are two key concerns relating to the effectiveness of open 
street surveillance CCTV schemes as crime prevention 
measures. One, do they reduce crime? Two, if so, is this at the 
cost of displacing it elsewhere? (Ibid: 404). 
The research challenged previous findings that used police-recorded crime data 
as the sole reliable indicator to test for significant falls in crime after the 
introduction of CCTV. 2 In their pilot study, thirty offenders were interviewed to 
ascertain their attitudes to CCTV and whether they considered re-offending in 
an area with camera coverage. Using a qualitative approach to evaluating 
CCTV, they found that camera surveillance impacted differently upon different 
types of offence - some criminal behaviours being displaced others remaining 
fairly constant (Ibid: 426-427). Thus within evaluation research the issue of 
displacement has been crucial: 
2 For these researchers, CCTV "cannot be counted as a success until it has been demonstrated that 
these apparently saved crimes have not simply been displaced elsewhere". Furthermore, earlier 
statistical based studies "did not permit a check for temporal, tactical or target displacement" 
(Short and Ditton, 1998: 405). 
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... because the simplistic 
demonstrations of crime rate decreases 
that typically accompany the installation of open street CCTV 
systems are usually used to justify the ongoing system 
expenditure. If offending can be shown to be merely displaced 
elsewhere, then these demonstrations of apparent effectiveness 
would be revealed as worthless (Short and Ditton, 1998: 426). 
Following Tilley's 'realistic' agenda this kind of research has stressed that 
CCTV may produce specific and beneficial outcomes in particular contexts that 
depend upon a range of factors including offence type, offender behaviour, 
camera location and the stated aims of a CCTV scheme. For Tilley this kind of 
evaluative research has a clear role in the policy process: 
This type of approach is also needed to develop individual 
schemes ... Those commissioning and conducting evaluations have an important role to play in arranging, undertaking, writing 
up and disseminating CCTV evaluation findings in a responsible 
way likely to help us achieving objectives cost-effectively whilst 
being aware of, taking account of, and where possible avoiding 
unwanted side-effects (Tilley, 1998: 15 1). 
In moving away from findings that report an unqualified 'success' for CCTV 
such research - at least potentially - has applications in the policy arena of crime 
prevention, for example: in reminding practitioners of the dangers in assuming 
high levels of public support for CCTV (Honess and Charman, 1992; Ditton, 
1998); in the need to carefully plan a camera network suited for specific 
localities and to place CCTV alongside other crime prevention and policing 
initiatives (Squires and Measor, 1996); and in moves to develop a CCTV 
scheme in such a way that recognises the perceptions and behaviour patterns of 
actual and potential offenders. In broad terms this research has remained 
supportive of CCTV as a potential crime and disorder reducing technology - 
albeit one that needs considerable fine-tuning and constant monitoring. In 
confining itself to the pragmatic, this research has not concerned itself with 
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problematising or questioning those definitions of crime and criminality that 
have underpinned the development of CCTV networks. 
ii. Investigating the normative: questions of power and CCTV 
Technical questions have set the evaluation research agenda on CCTV and, in 
doing so, not allowed for theoretical and normative questions that concern the 
conditions of its emergence, consolidation and uses of CCTV that take that 
agenda outside of a narrow crime prevention discourse. Graham et al (1996: 25) 
called for "a more critical debate about CCTV" among researchers and policy 
makers, arguing that research in this area needs to be broadened. They argued 
that what is "urgently required" are investigations into the effects of CCTV on 
the perceptions of diverse socio-economic groups and the development of 
CCTV within processes towards the "commercialisation" of urban centres. In 
their theorisation of CCTV, Norris and Armstrong (1998a: 8) noted that 
surveillance could be seen as "a form of power with a number of dimensions 
which all raise important questions which move beyond the narrow confines of 
criminological concerns with effectiveness". In making this observation, the 
authors introduce broader theoretical concerns within which to flag up a 
number of research questions that move beyond evaluative methodological 
frameworks. In order "to develop a sociologically informed analysis and 
critique of the exponential growth of CCTV surveillance" (Ibid: 10), they 
encourage research into the relationship between CCTV and power. This would 
allow a broader range of questions to be asked such as: who is targeted by 
surveillance cameras and why? They raised further questions such as whose 
interests underpin CCTV schemes; how public support for CCTV has served 
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particular political interests; how do those targeted by CCTV experience and 
resist surveillance; and, what of the relationship between CCTV and structures 
of accountability and the impact of advanced surveillance systems "in 
increasing the scope of power? " (Ibid: 10). A number of researchers have 
developed research agendas that have built upon these broad questions. As will 
be shown, these agendas vary in the level and focus of analysis. Nevertheless, 
normative research is less preoccupied with whether CCTV 'works' and, 
instead, is expressive of a wider set of concerns that converge around the 
question of whose interests CCTV benefits and its relationship to social order. 
Those working within a normative framework have critically investigated, 
firstly, the targeting of CCTV and, secondly, the relationship between CCTV 
and the reconstitution of contemporary urban space. 
Questions ofpower]: targeting, CCTV and civil liberties 
The growth of CCTV has not gone completely unchallenged, as research asking 
questions into the civil liberty implications and regulation of this growth has 
demonstrated (Davies, 1996b; Fyfe, 1995; Kitchen; 1996; Bulos, 1997; Fay, 
1998). The lack of statutory regulation pertaining to the uses and operational 
procedures regarding CCTV schemes - what Fyfe and Bannister (1996: 44) 
termed the 'democratic deficit' - has led some researchers to examine the 
discretionary perceptions of operators and managers of CCTV in order to 
ascertain who and what is targeted using camera systems. In this vein Bulos 
(1995: 5) asked a series of research questions omitted from previous research in 
this area. These questions included: the impact of the cameras on non-criminal 
patterns of behaviour; the nature of the criteria of selectivity used by operators; 
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and the processes of resisting the gaze of CCTV. Bulos interviewed the 
operators of one CCTV scheme and concluded that young men in relation to 
other social groups "were regarded with greater suspicion". Her findings raised 
issues to do with the 'enclosure' of public space, whose interests this serves and 
the impact of this upon uses of public space by young people. In noting the 
expansive body of research on the effectiveness of CCTV in reducing crime, 
Norris and Armstrong (1998b: 10) pointed out that very little attention has been 
paid to the "working rules" of CCTV operators and how the investigation of 
these rules may help us understand "the social construction of suspicion". In 
their extensive observational study covering the operation of three CCTV 
control rooms which generated 600 hours of data, the authors identified eight 
working rules that guided the targeting of surveillance. These rules included a 
prior knowledge of a person's criminal record, stereotypical assumptions 
regarding the distribution of criminality (particularly towards young black 
men), and normative conceptions of time and place. This research strongly 
challenged assumptions that a straightforward relationship between CCTV and 
4crime prevention' exists: 
Although these working rules produced nearly nine hundred 
targeted surveillances, they only led to forty five deployments, 
predominantly for crime and order related incidents. The 
deployments produced an arrest for one or more persons in 
twelve incidents Jbid: 11). 
For these authors the findings pointed to a systematic discriminatory use of 
CCTV against particular categories, which for them raised further questions 
relating to the possibilities for the emergence of a collective culture of 
resistance on behalf of those under systematic and targeted surveillance. 
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CCTV has often been legitimated on the basis of women's safety and studies 
are divided in suggesting, on the one hand, that women are more likely to 
support camera schemes than men (Squires and Mearor, 1996: 38) and, on the 
other hand, that although women express support they do not necessarily 
believe CCTV will greatly impact upon crimes of sexual assault and physical 
attack (Honess and Charman, 1992: 11). More broadly, Brown (1998: 218) 
observed "the gendering of subjectivities of security and insecurity is hardly 
considered within debates over electronic surveillance". Using observation and 
interview data gathered from a cross section of women and men who use the 
CCTV monitored town centre under study, Brown concluded that CCTV only 
bolsters an already masculine regulation of public space and women within it. 3 
In terms of the policy implications of these findings Brown argued that research 
findings that stress gender differentiation regarding safety have not been given 
priority in policy formation around CCTV. 
Questions of power 2: CCTV, private interests and the constitution of urban 
space 
As will be highlighted in more detail in Chapter Five, a discerning feature of 
contemporary developments in the organisation of crime prevention strategies 
has been the role of the private sector in initiating and managing such strategies 
(Bottoms and Wiles, 1996: 5). This is certainly the case with CCTV schemes 
whose capital and maintenance funding has in part come from the private sector 
3 Brown pointed to the differential meaning and experience of social control that feminist writers 
highlighted in Chapter Two. She stated, "CCTV, which is essentially a tool of surveillance, is Cý Ii likely to be of limited benefit to women. They are already subjected to po icing 
by attitudes and 
behaviour; they already police themselves by avoidance behaviour ... It is not so much a question 
of whether CCTV can improve women's safety, as one of whether CCTV relates to the ways in 
which women are made to feel insecure" (Brown, 1998: 217). 
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(Home Office, 1995 ). 4 Investigating private involvement in the initiation of 
CCTV schemes and the consequences this has for the uses of surveillance and 
its impact upon the ordering of public space has been highlighted by a number 
of researchers in the field (Bulos, 1995; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Reeve, 1998; 
Coleman and Sim, 1998). 
Research conducted by Reeve (1998: 70) aimed to place CCTV "vis a vis other 
elements in the stage set of consumption". For him, CCTV could be understood 
along with those processes that seek to create "predictable environments"; that 
cohere with attempts to enhance the economic viability of urban centres (Ibid). 
Within these broader shifts in urban management Reeve argued that questions 
around CCTV and its impact on crime and criminal activity was "a side issue" 
(Ibid: 70). Central to this process of urban economic enhancement has been the 
role of privately sponsored Town Centre Management (TCM) from where 
Reeve gathered data using questionnaires. TCM5 has been essentially 
"commercially driven" (Ibid: 76) and CCTV has been pivotal in consolidating 
64 a particular view of a town centre as a safe environment for those staying 
within the standards determined by the agencies controlling its use" (lbid: 8 1). 
The research by Reeve raised questions about the proliferation and use of 
CCTV as an element within the broader strategy of urban "commercialisation" 
4 The increasingly active involvement of the private sector in the Implementation of social control 
has, as Chapter Two discussed, been documented and theorised by several writers concerned to 
theorise changes in contemporary control strategies (Cohen, 1985; Shearing and 
Stenning, 1985; 
Fyfe, 1995; Garland, 1996). 
5 TCM will be discussed in Chapter Five as It has emerged within the so-called 
'entrepreneurial 
city' and in Chapter Seven as it has related to developments in Liverpool's regeneration 
Partnerships. In Liverpool TCM will be understood as one component in a patchwork of neo- 
liberal institutions that constitute the contemporary local state. 
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and the private interests this has promoted. For Reeve, these processes have 
denied "the traditional view of the town centre as a democratic space, capable 
of being appropriated by different groups for autonomous ends" (Ibid: 84). 
Taking a similar line of enquiry, Fyfe and Bannister (1996: 44-45) argued that 
the diffusion of CCTV needs to be understood not through "operational 
questions about effectiveness" but in situating CCTV "in its political context". 
The authors placed their research into CCTV within an historical and 
theoretical context within which a number of research questions were 
generated. In applying Foucault's panoptic schema they argued that CCTV can 
be seen as "a general expansion of power" and as a "political technology for 
producing obedient individuals in public spaces" (Ibid: 39). These power 
relations have to be researched in recognition of the alliances between the local 
state and local private capital (Ibid: 40). Importantly, "city centre CCTV 
systems are not simply a piece of crime prevention technology" (Fyfe and 
Bannister, 1996: 40). In making such observations, a wider set of research 
questions have been generated that place CCTV within the economic, political 
and ideological processes that constitute urban governance. Bannister, Fyfe and 
Kearns (1998: 22) argued that research into urban CCTV systems must be 
informed by broader theoretical frameworks that forge an understanding of "the 
nature of contemporary urbanism" and the "economic and political 
imperatives" that shape the urban form, its differentiated uses and identity (Ibid: 
35). For these authors therefore, research into CCTV should be approached less 
for its crime reducing potential but "rather as a symbol, of the current urban 
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malaise" and the attempts to manage and regulate the impact of this malaise 
(Ibid: 22). 
Assessment and further questions 
For the purposes of cogency and organisation, the above section reviewed 
CCTV research and categorised this work into evaluative and normative 
research. The section sought not to present an exhaustive review of research 
findings around CCTV but to establish and highlight the sorts of questions that 
have been asked in approaching the phenomenon and the relationship between 
research findings and policy. Evaluative research has been concerned to 
investigate, through the refinement of methodological approaches, the 
effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention tool and to address its impact 
upon categories of 'crime'. However, this type of research has promoted a 
narrow focus of investigation. Important as this latter work is - for it may 
indeed challenge the legitimating discourses of CCTV managers and 
practitioners - it needs to be placed alongside critical qualitative investigations 
concerned with deconstructing prevailing definitions of risk within the 
public/private CCTV networks. 
Research concerned with normative questions has begun to raise more critical 
questions arising from both theoretical and empirical work focused on the uses 
of CCTV and the interests and forces that shape such uses. Thus a number of 
researchers have raised issues connecting CCTV to processes related to an 
intensification in the exclusionary potential of contemporary social control 
(Norris, Moran and Armstrong, 1998), the privatisation of public space (Fyfe 
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and Bannister, 1996), and as indicative of an emerging 'new penology' 
(McCahill, 1998). From this literature a number of research questions can be 
developed and new questions introduced into an analysis of the camera network 
in Liverpool, which sustain a critical focus upon political economy in 
understanding the techniques and social meanings of social control. Thus, 
following the methodological discussion presented in Chapter Four, the 
remainder of this chapter will develop the arguments central to this thesis, 
namely; that the rationale for CCTV can be understood as part of a locally 
powerful social ordering strategy within a neo-liberal state form. 
Liverpool, CCTV and 'renaissance' 
During the 1990s, what was conspicuous about public and private policing 
initiatives in the city centre was the development of an underlying 
rationalisation for such initiatives that mobilised around the notions of 
'regeneration' and 'quality of life'. As discussed in Chapter Six, public order 
policing in and around the city centre was, throughout the 1990s, increasingly 
articulated through a discourse of urban 'renewal' and 'regeneration'. These 
discursive themes played a significant role for the new primary definers in 
rationalising the policing initiatives discussed in this chapter. The discourse of 
regeneration provided a platform for the locally powerful to promote their 
visions for the city out of which a variety of strategies for rule in the city centre 
were articulated. For example, the establishment of CCTV in the city 
symbolised a new-found confidence for the new urban managers central to the 
regeneration process, and consolidated their belief in the process. As one 
interviewee stated: 
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CCTV is a fantastic thing. Liverpool was one of the first major 
cities to establish a comprehensive surveillance system and it has 
helped produce dividends across the board. We had been arguing 
for it for years, and finally we pulled it off. It is marketed here 
so people know it is there. We had one of the biggest launches in 
the UK and as the Home Office minister said at the time people 
have nothing to fear from this technology and it will prove a 
tremendous asset to the city of Liverpool. Why? Because it can 
help induce confidence; a confidence in this city for all manner 
of people. And confidence in this city is something that has been 
lacking (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
The expression of 'confidence' through CCTV pointed particularly to the 
increased power and influence of the private sector in local decision-making 
and the process of urban management generally. It was these new primary 
definers who, as will become clear, provided a central ideological and material 
base for the introduction of CCTV in the city. The development of CCTV in the 
city centre took place within a wider set of debates concerning the city's 
regeneration, outlined in Chapter Seven, and therefore can be situated 
materially within the network of alliances and strategies of rule that have 
shaped the meaning and direction of regeneration. Within these processes the 
surveillance system was developed and managed in order to appeal to a range 
of audiences - namely, consumers, local businesses and potential 
investors. In 
this sense, CCTV provided a focal point for the Liverpool City Centre 
Partnership and its members to carefully re-image the negative reputation of the 
city: 
We can reassure already existing businesses, which may have 
felt isolated - let down even by crime being unchecked 
in the 
city centre - that we are keeping an eye on their 
frontage day and 
night. We can also reassure the consumer, and tourists, that this 
is a safe place to enjoy and spend some time. And of course, we 
can show potential investors into the city that we have our act 
together with efficient and open partnership forums, which care 
about business in this city and are prepared to provide the 
necessary safeguards (The City Centre Manager, LCCP)- 
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It is important, then, initially to contextualise city centre CCTV as a key 
policing development implicated in a series of regeneration strategies on a 
number of fronts. Following on from this, the next section examines the 
establishment of CCTV through the various networks of partners that were 
introduced in the previous chapter and will illustrate how these partners 
cultivated a rationale and management structure for the surveillance network. 
Establishing the camera network in Liverpool 
Roots and consolidation 
CCTV has been the flagship in promoting a secure city centre in Liverpool and 
has provided the vehicle for initiating partnership policing in the city. Thus, 
tracing the trajectory of Liverpool's CCTV scheme can further illuminate the 
shifts in urban rule together with changes in responsibility for the provision of 
social control in the city. 
In 1989, a report drawn up by the Liverpool City Centre Crime Prevention 
Panel looked into the feasibility of establishing a CCTV system in the city 
centre in terms of mobilising cross-agency support and securing funding. The 
report signalled the start of a responsibilisation strategy, discussed in Chapter 
Three and the previous chapter, concerned with the governance of crime and 
disorder in the city centre. Early in the report it was stated that: 
It is recognised that the prevention of crime is not just a matter 
for the police. If we are to succeed we must all accept 
responsibility. The support and co-operation of all in the 
community is essential. Local authority departments, business 
and commercial interests and the individual citizen all have a 
part to play. It is equally recognised that solutions to crime need 
to be based on sound knowledge of local problems and needs. To 
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this end the Crime Prevention Panel is a non-political 
organisation representing the public (Crime Concern, 1989: 2). 
"All sectors of the city community" were represented on the Panel that 
consisted of the City Council, Crime Concern, Merseyside Tourism Board, the 
Stores' ' Committee and Merseyside Police. In creating a 66 safer city for allI9, 
the Report contextualised the need for CCTV within: 
The changing face of the city centre [which] has received wide 
media coverage following press releases from the Leader of the 
City Council. Private sector investment in the city has also 
gathered momentum through the development of new shopping 
precincts and large scale refurbishment. Installing CCTV as an 
initiative for crime prevention will register support for all. It will 
prevent and reduce crime and disorder. It will reduce the 'fear of 
crime', restore confidence and encourage greater city centre use. 
It will be helpful to business in that they would not have to 
present a siege image Jbid: 9). 
Initially, the Report proposed an initial six camera network to be located in the 
main retail area and hoped that funding would be shared across a range of 
agencies, notably central government, the City Council, Merseyside 
Development Corporation, the police and large corporate bodies. It was 
proposed that the system would be maintained by yearly subscriptions from 
commercial and business enterprises and that it would act "as an additional aid 
to the police": 
At the end of the day it was concluded that to obtain the most 
effective and beneficial use of the system, the only body capable 
of monitoring is the police. The value to be gained, it was felt, 
would be derived from the speed of communication with, and 
operational response from, police officers on the ground. The 
police have the training, skill and experience unique in this field 
and the statutory power to take the necessary action. We are 
cognisant to the fact that we would be adding to the burden 
already carried by the police, but feel that the benefit to be 
derived would outweigh the costs and resource implications 
(Ibid: 7). 
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As noted above, the original intention was to seek funding from the City 
Council, Merseyside Police, central government and large corporate bodies. In 
effect no money was forthcoming from the Council (whose budget deficit was 
the largest in the country throughout the 1990s), nor Merseyside Police. 
Insurmountable problems around funding and responsibility for the system 
meant that CCTV in the city as envisaged by the Liverpool City Centre Crime 
Prevention Panel was abandoned. As one of those involved in the process 
explained: 
Part of the debate we were having at the time was setting up 
CCTV which many of the people felt was an essential element in 
trying to improve the product of Liverpool city centre - primarily 
as a shopping base but also as a safer place for people to walk 
around ... [and] drawing upon the experience of other cities who have pushed ahead - particularly Newcastle. We put forward this 
proposal for CCTV through the Urban Crime Fund but we could 
not sort out the management of it and it was eventually 
abandoned at that stage. One of the reasons I was unwilling to 
push forward with it was I and others felt very strongly that 
Merseyside Police should have accepted long term liabilities for 
the maintenance and management of the system. Okay, it's an 
expensive system - high quality fibre optics - but unless someone 
took ownership of it, whether it be the City Council or 
Merseyside Police - who did not have much money, but 
realistically it was a policing tool ... (Private 
Developer [2], 
affiliated to LCCP). 
CCTV did not arrive in the city for another five years, with the configuration of 
relations and responsibilities between key partners considerably changed from 
the initial plan. The conflict between the partners flagged up the difficulties 
over responsibilities for the funding, monitoring and location of the system. It 
was not until July 1994 that Liverpool's camera network was established with a 
total capital funding of 096,000. Central government, through the Urban 
Programme, provided E100,000, the European Regional Development Fund 
contributed f 158,000 with the private sector inputting f 138,000. Initially, 
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high-resolution pan, tilt and zoom cameras with full night-time capability were 
installed within a two-square mile area, covering the central shopping and 
office districts. The system was monitored by a private security company in a 
secretly located control room in one of Liverpool's shopping malls. Monitor 
and audio links were installed in Merseyside Police Headquarters and in the 
Police Shop on Church Street (the city's central shopping street). The system 
formed part of an extensive surveillance network which linked the police, 
private security and in-house store security via a radio link "early warning" 
system which made possible the monitoring of persons through both open 
public space and private shop space. The cameras were located on police advice 
in "recognised trouble spots and escape routes" (LCCP, 1994: 3). 
Rationalising CCTV in Liverpool 
CCTV did not come about just because retailers were bleating. 
But it is a fact that they were in the best position to bring all of 
this about (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
At the high profile launch of the system, David MacLean, the then Home Office 
Minister for Crime Prevention, invoked the infamous murder of local two year 
old James Bulger to illustrate the need for, and advantages of, CCTV. His 
rationale for the system was picked up in the national press. 6 National coverage 
of the launch was also underpinned by assumptions about the preventative 
capacity of the cameras regarding the safety of women and children in public 
spaces (LCCP, op. cit: 1), along with the much-publicised claim that the 
6 Such coverage included: 'Liverpool's bid to prevent new James Bulger horror' (Today, 7 July, 
1994); 'Jamie Bulger city unveils spy cameras' (Daily Express, 6 July, 1994). As The Guardian 
reported "the system is also expected to cut the risk of toddlers being lost, or abducted like James 
Bulger, led away to his death 18 months ago by two boys at a shopping centre in Bootle, three 
miles north of the of the area covered by the Liverpool scheme" (The Guardian, 6 July, 1994). 
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cameras would reduce crime in the city centre by 20% (Daily Post, 7 July, 
1994). A 64 more secure environmentI9 was thus promised, 46 particularly in a city 
like Liverpool where the fear of crime is not bome out by the statistics" (city 
Centre Manager, Liverpool Echo, 6 July, 1994). At the launch, MacLean 
praised the "excellent common sense" of the people of Liverpool in positively 
responding to the system, adding that formal regulation of CCTV was 
unnecessary: 
The controls are that if people are behaving themselves, not 
committing crime on the streets, then nothing actually happens. 
It is rather fanciful to suggest that we need special controls just 
because we are using the latest high technology which actually 
stops crime ... and that's what the public want (Liverpool Echo, 5 July, 1994). 
The various strands of official rhetoric around the launch of CCTV belied 
deeper motivations for the introduction of the system that were identified 
during the interview process. The impetus behind the establishment of the 
network involved a series of complex inter-related processes including: the 
desire to reconstruct the city's deviant image; the bolstering of consumer and 
business confidence; the counteracting of certain forms of crime; and the 
perception - particularly on behalf of the business community - that the police 
could not or would not police the city centre 'effectively'. As one urban 
manager put it: 
The Bulger case served to focus attention but was not the prime 
cause in establishing CCTV - it's a much longer-term thing than 
that (Research Interview, 8). 
For this interviewee, involved in the management of CCTV, the system 
emerged to tackle the city's negative image and its perceived impact on city 
centre business: 
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Perception is the biggest single burden Liverpool has got in 
terms of regeneration. There is a lot of information and disinformation, which can feed back in locally. The core trading 
area can be seen by some as a dangerous place (Ibid). 7 
According to one key player, the network had: 
... 
been evolving for the last 10 years. My experience of towns 
and cities is that it [CCTV] came out of horrendous store losses 
... up to 3% straight loss. We have long been particularly 
concerned about security with regard to stores but also external 
security of the environment in which we operate (Chairman, 
Stores' Committee). 
As active lobbyists in establishing the Liverpool City Centre Partnership 
(LCCP), the Stores' Committee was able to articulate more powerfully the need 
for a CCTV scheme: 
We were the leading advocates of CCTV- We had been pursuing 
the issue for 4 or 5 years before the establishment of the LCCP 
in 1992, but when the Partnership was formed the number one 
priority of the City Centre Manager was to establish a CCTV 
system, which he did successfully ... housed in the city centre 
and run predominantly by the private sector (Ibid). 
The major retailers in the city felt that the policing and prosecution of offenders 
in the city centre had become ineffective. The main problems they identified 
were surnmarised by one interviewee as the "lack of resources to patrol the 
streets; the lack of communication on criminal movement from one area to 
another and the lack of the courts to give meaningful sentences given to the 
convicted offender, which can have a knock-on effect on the morale of the 
police and Crime Alert members" (Private Communication from the Stores' 
Committee, August 1996). The Stores' Committee were concemed about cut- 
7 The notion of 'dangerous place' was not constructed on the basis of local crime statistics alone. 
On the basis of crime statistics Liverpool city centre would have to be seen as 'less dangerous' 
than the immediately surrounding areas during this period. A total of 5,954 criminal offences 
were reported in the first 5 months of 1994 in the police division which includes the city centre 
compared with 7,131 in the division covering north Liverpool. Within this period the city centre 
showed a higher crime rate than north Liverpool in the categories of street muggings and other 
thefts from the person, but these only accounted for 2.9% of all city centre crime. The statistics 
show that shoplifting accounted for 13% of all city centre crime (The Independent, 6 July, 1994). 
258 
backs in police foot patrols in the city centre from two sergeants and fifteen 
officers from the Shop Theft Squad to one sergeant and six officers based at the 
Police Shop on Church Street. This lengthened the police's back-up response 
time from 90 seconds to 5 minutes. Within the context of dwindling public 
resources for the police, the pressure on the private sector to carve out a 
political space to responsibilise themselves in matters of managing local crime 
became acute: 
My biggest concern for the police is that their power base has 
been undermined, their authority undermined, the conviction rate 
has fallen. The simple fact is that the criminal seems to be 
winning the war (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
Within this context a "siege mentality" (Ibid) emerged within the Stores' 
Committee who felt, at best, let down by public authorities in the city: 
Our organisation has security bills of E270,000. That suddenly 
becomes an acceptable cost and do I feel comfortable with that? 
Well I can control it and become master of my own territory 
instead of relying on a public service body. This came about 
because of a deterioration in the quality of the police force - 
under-resourcing and motivational problems. We decided to take 
control of our own situation and because our insurance 
companies demand it - you don't get cover unless security is 
sorted out (Ibid). 
Funding the CCTV Network 
Funds to establish the CCTV network from central government and European 
sources were made available on the proviso that private sector funding would 
also be forthcoming. Thus the role of the LCCP from 1992 was to lobby various 
businesses in the city to generate capital funding. This was done without any 
long term planning regarding the maintenance of the system: 
At the beginning the primary goal was to get the system up and 
running while the capital funds were available through European 
and government money, with no plan for operating costs. The 
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initial funding was capital not revenue (The City Centre 
Manager, LCCP). 
Lack of planning regarding future funding towards maintenance costs 
contributed to tensions within the security network; these are discussed in the 
final section of this chapter. For one CCTV manager, the rise of CCTV in 
Liverpool was a process of "metamorphosis" and the raising of private capital 
involved targeting the larger traders in the city: 
All the people that were approached were pretty sold on the idea. 
I'm not saying they parted with cash easily but the issues were 
well known. They all had the same problems as previously 
outlined and there was a general move towards this Jbid). 8 
The ongoing maintenance costs of the system were secured through lobbying 
activities directed by the LCCP and aimed at local businesses. As pointed out 
earlier, the surveillance system in Liverpool linked the control room with 
private security via a radio link, which was monitored by police along with 
camera pictures. The combat radios - of which there were 60 on the network - 
cost f 350 each and were acquired through the Urban Crime Fund and owned by 
the Stores' Committee who issued them to members on payment of an annual 
subscription. 
The Management of CCTV 
Management of the system involved the City Centre Manager at the LCCP, the 
managers of a major shopping mall (where the system is housed) and 
Merseyside Police. The police controlled access to taped information for 
reviewing, evidential and publicity purposes as laid down in the local Codes of 
8 In Liverpool, businesses that operated within the CCTV coverage area received insurance 
discounts of up to 40% through a scheme entitled 'Watchguard' brokered between the LCCP and 
a local firm of major insurers. 
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Practice (Liverpool City Council, 1994). The handbook also stated that the 
police may request cameras to be directed to specific locations and that such 
requests must be complied with unless the operator deems otherwise, in which 
case the police must be given an explanation (Ibid: para. 6.9). 9 The objectives 
of the system included: deterring crime; enhancing detection; reducing the fear 
of crime; making the city centre more attractive to business, shoppers and 
tourists; improving communication and response times of police patrols; and 
creating a safer city for all (Ibid: para. 1.3). Para. 1.5 of the Codes of Practice 
stated that private operators of the system must discharge their duties in line 
with the objectives "to keep wrong-doers off the streets". Thus the local 
controls surrounding the system cohered around an informal triangle or chain 
involving the City Centre Manager, security management of the shopping mall 
and the City Centre Commander for Merseyside Police: 
Although everything we do has to be closely worked out with 
the police - they don't control it, only over evidence. This is all 
part of maintaining the system's integrity and confidence with 
the public. So there is not a lot of need for detailed control ... I'm not saying it's not there because there is a management 
chain (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
The day-to-day operation of the system was directed through Crime Alert, the 
sub-group of the Liverpool Stores' Committee. This group performed functions 
in the front line of targeting surveillance in the city centre and will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
The 'effectiveness" of CCTV as a finely targeted mechanism of public 
surveillance needed to be communicated to the wider public. Home Office 
9 Codes of Practice for CCTV schemes were drawn up on a local discretionary basis amongst the 
immediate interested parties (The Observer, 10 March, 1995). 
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Guidelines urged scheme managers "to get the local press on your side from the 
start" to "ensure they realise what your objectives are" in focusing "them on the 
safer shopping/walking element" (Home Office, 1994: 32). Thus, from the 
outset, a key component in the management of CCTV in Liverpool was its 
reception in the local media and therefore its credibility and legitimacy among 
the wider populace. As one CCTV manager stressed; "there is no need for 
detailed controls; as long as we've got Mr and Mrs Bloggs on board - great" 
(The City Centre Manager, LCCP). Another interviewee stressed the need to 
"constantly sell the benefits of CCTV; though this must be done carefully" 
(Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP). These issues will be returned in the 
final section of the chapter. 
The location of the cameras in Liverpool was decided on the basis of "police 
crime patterns and knowledge of incidents" along with the "hands on 
experience" of store security so that "escape routes and access points" would be 
covered (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). Crime Alert, along with the City 
Centre Manager, defined the role and use of CCTV in the city: 
That is what is most effective about CCTV ... It 
is effective 
when you know who you are looking for (Chairman, Stores' 
Committee, emphasis in original) 
Furthermore: 
You need somebody to monitor the system, somebody available 
to react and to be seen to react - then it has got credibility (Ibid). 
This involved triggering an "appropriate police response" using picture relays 
and the two-way radio. This acted as an "early warning deterrence": 
The criminal element is not stupid. They have a pretty good idea 
about what's covered, where and how ... and they can tell 
that 
by testing it ... 
but once they've been picked up on the radio and 
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then on camera - it cramps their style - there is virtually no 
escape (Ibid). 
Importantly, a message "Must go out" to those targeted by the system so that 
"known shoplifters and people who are banned cannot walk around the city 
centre with impunity" (Ibid). This message was also relayed replete with video 
stills through local and national media to promote claims of the system's 
success in deterring and apprehending potential and actual offenders. 'O The 
police Area Commander, in a much publicised comment, maintained that: 
The system is like having 20 more officers on duty 24 hours a 
day who make a note of everything, never take a holiday and are 
very rarely off sick (The Times, 6 July, 1994). 
The police position on CCTV in Liverpool will be returned to below, as it took 
a more ambiguous line than such official pronouncements suggested. In 
summary, for the City Centre Manager CCTV provided a broader vehicle for 
social ordering in the city centre: "Hopefully the cameras will deter criminals. 
But we also hope the cameras will reassure potential investors" (Liverpool 
Echo, 13 June, 1996). 
After the launch and establishment of the CCTV system it was integrated along 
with two other initiatives in the city centre with a security function. Firstly, 
Crime Alert had been in operation some years before the CCTV scheme came 
on line and, as noted above, took a key role in targeting the system. Secondly, 
the Town Watch initiative arrived after the CCTV scheme became operational 
and was envisaged as a visible street level accompaniment to the effectiveness 
10 One urban manager passed on examples to the researcher of fisuccessful' media coverage: 
'Tapped by CCTV' (Liverpool Echo, 10 November, 1995); 'This man has just knifed a stranger to 
death' (Daily Mirror, 2 December, 1995); 'Camera Trap' (Liverpool Echo, 5 February, 1996). 
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of public camera surveillance. It is to a consideration of the development and 
role of these organisations that the chapter will now turn. 
The Role of Crime Alert 
The work of Crime Alert has been briefly alluded to, above, in this chapter. 
What follows will detail the work of the organisation, its rationale and position 
within the overall security network. As Chapter Four noted, eight meetings of 
the group were attended during the course of the research within a year long 
period. This section will utilise field notes and interview material accrued from 
the group. The group initially used to consist of store detectives only, but with 
the proliferation of in-house security guards, security managers and in-store 
CCTV the meetings of the group became operationalised on a monthly basis 
with 30 to 40 attendees. These meetings provided a central focus for local 
businesses, police and private security in defining risks and gaps in the network 
as well as prioritising policing objectives for the city centre. In bringing 
together private and public interests this closed forum represented, to borrow 
Brogden and Shearing's (1993) term, the development of a local 'security 
network'. In Liverpool, the network consisted of initiatives spearheaded 
through the Stores' Committee and its larger offshoot, the Liverpool City 
Centre Partnership. From these bodies was developed the city centre CCTV 
system, Crime Alert and Town Watch that collectively formed the pillars of the 
network. The work of Crime Alert was described as "letting the criminal 
element know that we know they are there ... 
it is about making it harder for 
them". This body acted as a catalyst for store security and attempted to 
"get 
people into the spirit" (Chairman, Crime Alert). The Chair of 
Crime Alert 
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reported back to the Stores' Committee, which, as mentioned earlier, the Area 
Commander from Merseyside Police attended. Crime Alert existed as part of 
the Stores' Committee and is one of several inter-related subgroups with 
responsibility for promoting retail interests and working with interested parties 
in the city centre: 
The Stores' Committee is like a brotherhood organisation and 
from that we have set up Crime Alert. There are groups 
responsible for tourism, street lighting and street cleansing. But 
we all work as a team and each cultivate working relations with 
the likes of the City Council and Merseyside Police (Ibid). 
Within Crime Alert, Merseyside Police Crime Prevention Officers and 
operational support, private security and store security met to discuss 
intelligence and the targeting of activities in the city centre. 
Crime Alert had its roots in the early 1980s and was launched as 'Commercial 
Crime Watch' at the behest of Liverpool Stores' Committee. To be a member of 
the group the annual fee of f-1200 had to be paid to the Stores' Committee 
whereby access to the radio link and monthly meetings was granted: 
Crime Alert, in conjunction with the Liverpool Stores' 
Committee, has an aim to make Liverpool a safe and clean city 
for visitors and shoppers alike and to this end works closely with 
many organisations, including the city council, Liverpool City 
Centre Partnership and the Chamber of Commerce (Private 
Communication from the Stores' Committee, II August, 1996). 
Crime Alert identified problems in the city centre very broadly, but these 
problems were subsumed under a key concern with that which was detrimental 
to trade. The main problems were defined in the following manner: 
We have problems with terrorist threats - the Animal Liberation 
people for example. Of course we have shoplifting, damage to 
property day and night. From a personal point of view and from 
the Stores' Committee point of view we also believe the street 
traders do not enhance the city centre. They force people in 
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certain directions so you have not got any freedom to move 
through Church Street at will. Street beggars, street musicians 
and collectors give the same problems. We seem to have people 
collecting for all sorts all the time. We don't believe there should 
be so many and that licensing should be tightened up and 
inspected (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
Initially the group was organised through the larger stores "to get information 
passed amongst retailers of who was operating in the city centre to the 
detriment of trade and with a view to working with police to curtail the 
problem" (Chairman, Crime Alert). From this fairly ad hoc and informal 
communication channel, "the idea progressed to an organised monthly meeting 
with a full sixty radio communication system connected to the city camera 
room and 'Cop Shop' along with meetings with the Police Intelligence Unit, 
Crime Prevention, Shop Lifting Squad with regular attendance of the Crime 
Prosecution Service" (Ibid). The larger numbers of attendees at Crime Alert 
were private security. Most of the security staff was hired on an individual basis 
by particular stores, while others belonged to national security firms contracted 
to particular retailers (Ibid). 
The aim of working more closely with the police was initiated by the larger 
retailers who had been advocating such a move on a national scale. In this 
sense, the cultivation of both formal and informal national feedback chains 
helped to plan and initiate action at the local level. For example, in Liverpool, 
Marks and Spencer, who spearheaded the move to install a City Centre 
Manager and who took a leading role in the Stores' Committee, developed 
senior and Board level links with Home Office Ministers concerned with crime 
prevention. In this context, meetings occurred around issues to do with the role 
of retailers in "contributing to the local environment in which we operate- 
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(Represenative of Stores' Committee). The aim of such contacts was to 
encourage and galvanise local co-operation between business, local government 
and police on matters of crime prevention and to "improve the environmental 
quality of life within which business operatives work" (Ibid). In forging these 
links, Marks and Spencer were central in that they had been able to utilise their 
national security provision which consisted of six Divisional Security Co- 
ordinators and extensive data bases of known and potential shop lifters 
including a regularly updated and distributed "national top ten". The utilisation 
of this provision to aid local policing was encouraged by the Home Office and 
supported by major retailers themselves who, in Liverpool, wanted to see more 
done in terms of policing crime as perceived from the retail perspective: 
Other stores are very interested in what we are doing because we 
tend to be the high street leaders in these things - probably 
because of the size of our operation and the high levels of loss 
we incur, we have invested a lot in security. So we tend to know 
if and when there is something going down somewhere. So if we 
have got a pattern of something happening we can get the 
Regional Crime Squads involved (Ibid). 
From the perspective of Merseyside Police the pressure to become involved 
with local retailers took place in a context of criticism from the latter over the 
perceived decline in police presence in the city centre and lack of understanding 
regarding retail issues. For the police, the more effective targeting of their 
resources provided a rationale for the existence of Crime Alert and their 
working with them. However, Crime Prevention Officers initially expressed 
their concern about engaging with such bodies in that 'normal' policing issues, 
resources and time may be diluted in having to engage with the business 
community. These tensions between players will be introduced at this point in 
267 
the chapter but will be returned to in more detail below. One Crime Prevention 
Officer stated: 
Some years ago when the police were invited to attend local 
traders' meetings I would sit for hours listening to people talk 
about the state of the pound and what a Labour Government 
would or would not do for the local economy. This can't be 
justified - it is a waste of police time and so, yes, we encourage 
sub-groups that focus on the issues the police can be useful in. 
These partnerships with local traders come out of the fact that 
the police cannot do it on their own. So we, and others had to get 
on board with this. Crime Alert is a classic example of how we 
cannot police the city centre as we once did - because of 
resource issues and the like. So we rely on those others to be our 
eyes and ears and bring things to our attention, so if we do have 
an incident we can allocate resources accordingly (City Centre 
Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police ). 
The police role in the city centre, as discussed in the previous chapter, changed 
from a situation of relative isolation from other agencies to one of closer co- 
operation and liaison. In this context, information became a prime commodity 
and negotiating tool in inter-partner relations: 
Fifteen or twenty years ago we would not have even entertained 
the idea of engaging with the likes of the Stores' Committee. I 
mean, two separate organisations, right? The level of 
information exchange and formalised meetings that we have 
today was unimaginable then. For example, as a Crime 
Prevention Officer I would have to seek higher approval for 
releasing crime figures and even if they were released there was 
the worry of how they would be used - how would they reflect 
on the police? With the arrangements we have now this is not 
necessary and we can be a bit more honest. We have nothing to 
hide and if people say those figures are terrible, we say yes they 
are, and that is why we are doing this-and-that to rectify the 
situation. The more information we release the more we can 
explain ourselves and influence people (Ibid). 
Information gathering and sharing was also a key function of Crime Alert. The 
information gathered through CCTV footage and intelligence from the radio 
link was channelled through the Chair of Crime Alert to be used in helping to 
guide police action. This information channelling through the private sector was 
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necessary in order to get the police to act - "they'll only proceed if there's 
intelligence, not because we want them to" (Chairman, Crime Alert). From the 
police point of view, this was crucial for them to get involved in criminal or 
potentially criminal activities and to target resources accordingly. For Crime 
Alert, a process of learning to gather information and collate it in accordance 
with police criteria of 'usefulness' was set in motion: 
We have day-to-day contact and monitoring procedures aimed at 
street beggars, Big Issue vendors, acts of criminal damage, fly 
posting - anything of that nature. We know when it has become a 
problem. The more information they [the police] get, the more 
that is fed to them, the more they can decide upon what 
resources they need to put in. If we can get our act together 
information wise, they are quite willing to receive the 
information, estimate it and act upon it (Ibid). 
Within Crime Alert all security managers were regularly encouraged to write to 
the Area Commander within Merseyside Police informing him of all incidents 
in order to "keep piling on the pressure for increased police manpower in the 
city centre" (Field Notes). Again, lower level Crime Prevention Officers were 
initially reluctant to become involved with Crime Alert in that a sense of an 
I independent' policing rationale for particular policing operations was being 
taken away: 
As the business partners became more organised through things 
like Crime Alert and CCTV they were obviously able to 
command a certain amount of information about crime in the 
city - at least crime in the way they see 
it. These associations 
tend to evolve with a crime component in their day-to-day 
activities and there are always victims amongst them and so we 
get dragged in. Dragged sounds terrible, but you know we tend 
to get pulled in their direction (City Centre Crime Prevention 
Officer, Merseyside Police, emphasis in original). 
The police response at a more senior level was to establish specialist units 
to 
work more closely with local businesses in the city centre. 
Thus the Police 
Intelligence Unit, a Crime Prevention Officer for the city centre and 
the Shop 
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Lifting Squad regularly attended Crime Alert and supplied information and 
operational support when appropriate. 
Although tensions arose on technical matters between police and private 
security (these will be discussed in more detail below), members of Crime Alert 
developed an organisational bonding through the cultivation of a normative 
sense of purpose that engendered loyalty and cohesion around the aims of the 
group. This normative underpinning aided the various agents within Crime 
Alert to define their work as well as cement relations between agency 
representatives. These normative processes were manifest in the discursive 
exchanges between group members and represented an integral part of the low 
level social ordering activities the group were engaged in. Such exchanges 
constructed and demarcated the users of city centre space: the 'respectable' and 
'non-respectable'. Members of Crime Alert characterised the objects of their 
power as "dross", "scallies", "knobs", "hawkers" and "fake homeless" (Field 
Notes). These constructions complimented and reinforced, albeit in less 
sophisticated tones, the broader visions for order in the city centre discussed 
earlier in the chapter and in the last chapter. 
In the process of constructing the proper of objects of power, the members of 
Crime Alert collectively compounded a process of negation and othering 
directed at known and potential shop lifters, street traders, homeless people and 
young people who were regularly the subject of ridicule, contempt and objects 
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of fascination and frustration. " These aspects of Crime Alert will be discussed 
more fully below. 
The Role of Town Watch 
Alongside the city centre CCTV initiative and Crime Alert, another inter- 
related scheme was developed. Town Watch (also known as the City 
Representatives) stemmed from discussions between the Government Office 
and the Stores' Conu-nittee and was described as "a reassuring, visible presence 
that is uniformed but recognisable... to stand in public places with no special 
powers" (Home Office Advisor, [GOM] ). Town Watch became operational in 
January 1998 and recruited 20 persons from the long term unemployed. The 
problems in establishing Town Watch were considerable and involved 
negotiating relations with the police and city centre funding regimes. The issues 
with the police were down to operational matters: 
The possibility was they [the City Rep's] would be perceived by 
the regular police as the thin end of the wedge to a two tier 
police service .. They [the police] told us what they would not 
be 
prepared to tolerate that and we had to construct a path through 
it. So we had to avoid things like using the word 'security' and 
the word 'control'. You have to avoid words like 'residential 
areas' (Ibid) 
The Government Office took on the role of selling the idea to the Association of 
Chief Police Officers through Merseyside's Chief Constable. For the police, the 
idea became realistic when it became clear that Town Watch personnel would 
not be a policing substitute. Furthermore, from the police point of view, Town 
11 At one meeting of Crime Alert the group spent fifteen minutes watching CCTV 
footage of a 
woman pushing a wheelchair with three small chl*ldren In tow. The woman appeared to 
be 
pregnant. The group were keen to identify her because she was "too dirty to 
be your ma". Several 
minutes were taken up with the question of whether she was "really pregnant" and whether 
the 
children belonged to her. She had been "seen around town" and several group members and the 
chair requested information on the woman (Field Notes). 
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Watch would be an independent policing aid, with specified links with the 
policing apparatus and untainted by links with the private security industry: 
They would have to be employed through or by the Local 
Authority and would have a communication network that was 
independent of the police. We [the police] might help in their 
training and so on. The deal is that they [Town Watch] will have 
service level agreements with a broad spectrum of agencies. So 
for example, if they found uneven paving stones and asked the 
Highways Department to come and sort them, they would sort 
them in an agreed number of days. If they find crime, vandalism 
or anti-social behaviour and they report them to the police, the 
police will respond within agreed time periods. The key thing is 
they would have no special powers. They would not be expected 
to use their civil powers of arrest unless it was in circumstances 
were they would do it anyway as citizens. On that basis we are 
happy to go with it because it is very much not-for-profit like the 
private security industry and will employ people responsibly 
(City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police ). 
The role of Town Watch emanated from concerns within the Stores' Committee 
regarding the declining police presence in the city centre, alongside the separate 
issue of the competition wrought by the rise of 'out of town shopping' areas. 
These latter domains were seen to be one step ahead of the city centre regarding 
street security and cleanliness. Town Watch was envisaged as a response to 
these issues as well as a facilitator to the tourist industry: 
Town Watch is a group of people from the long term 
unemployed who are trained in knowledge of the city. They have 
maps and car park information. They are also trained in non- 
aggressive communication skills with the general public. The 
training is extensive in making sure Town Watch is non- 
confrontational. They can move on street traders unlawfully 
trading and move on beggars. They can check the validity of Big 
Issue sellers and they can even challenge people who drop litter 
on the streets. They are radio linked to the CCTV control room 
so that if they see something untoward they would be able to call 
the police very quickly. They are literally a presence; they are 
not another police force. They are not vigilantes (Represenative 
of Stores' Committee). 
Town Watch emerged from negotiations between key players at local and 
national level and fitted in with the regeneration strategy, giving the personnel 
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of the Watch a broad remit. As well as "protecting the City Council's assets and 
the streets" (Ibid), Town Watch was established to give visitors "a sense that 
they feel comfortable and not fearful from crime" (Ibid). The managers of 
Town Watch were concerned to counter negative perceptions of the group as 
44yet another layer of surveillance and policing in the city centre" (Home Office 
Advisor, [GOM] ). Town Watch represented one component in the network of 
order maintenance in the city centre. As one interviewee expressed it: 
What you have to realise is it [Town Watch] is only part of the 
solution. Town Watch feeds in with an agreed strategy between 
city centre occupiers; it involves linking in with CCTV; it 
involves linking in with the police. It also involves a significant 
publicity campaign so people know why they are there. It's got 
to be marketed right Jbid). 
Thus far the chapter has discussed the interrelationship between CCTV, Crime 
Alert and Town Watch, and the problems identified by urban managers 
pertaining to the dynamics of this interrelationship and the promotion or 
marketing of these aspects of social control. The next section of the chapter will 
outline the role of the security network as a vehicle understood not just in terms 
of the techniques implicated in contemporary governance but understood also 
for the moral and normative dynamics that underpinned these techniques of 
control in shaping a social ordering strategy for the city centre. Moreover, the 
position of CCTV, Crime Alert and Town Watch within these processes was 
tactically important in that these techniques of order formed the basis for future 
ordering strategies: 
The long-term vision for a structure that would include CCTV 
and Town Watch is having a system that is in a position to make 
qualitative interventions, positive interventions in the cyclical 
process of offending. It is actually resourcing that system and 
then getting the players in that system to recognise problems and 
then intervene (Chairman, Stores' Committee, emphasis added). 
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Targeting the camera network: The proper objects of power 
As indicated earlier, the CCTV surveillance system developed within a wider 
set of debates taking place within the various partnerships concerned with the 
management of the regeneration process. The purposes of CCTV in the city 
centre, and thus how it was used and targeted, were articulated within the 
formal and informal networks of the neo-liberal state - by those responsible for 
engineering the regeneration process. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
Stores' Committee, Liverpool City Centre Partnership, the Office of Partnership 
Group and Merseyside Police played a key role in this process. These same 
partners also played a determining role in establishing the bodies and 
mechanisms aimed at consolidating and extending CCTV, and (from their point 
of view) rendering it more effective, within a wider security network which tied 
in with the operations of Crime Alert, Town Watch and public policing in the 
city centre. Thus the responsibility and management of CCTV and its attendant 
organs lay within the network of these partners. It was the Stores' Committee 
and the LCCP who initially pushed and developed all the links in the network 
and gained a greater hands-on control and responsibility for the targeting of the 
network. The issue of leadership and responsibility regarding the CCTV 
network was not a clear cut one and existed as a source of tension for the 
partners themselves (as will be discussed later in the chapter). However, 
understanding the objects of city centre surveillance must require both a 
recognition of the trajectory of neo-liberal urban management and the social 
relations out of which this trajectory was bome and, indeed, constructed. In 
other words, as the previous chapter argued, understanding the day-to-day 
operation of the surveillance system must be placed within the underlying 
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features of the emerging social order. The taken for granted assumptions of 
those operating the CCTV network that pertained to what constituted 
4suspicious' and 'incongruous' activity were reliant on, and took their cues 
from, the broader ideologies of constructing a sense of place. 
The partnerships involved in regeneration set about defining problems 
perceived to hinder the regeneration process through defining categories of 
negative and identifiable risk. In constructing the objects of their power the 
agencies involved in the network were engaged in a process of defining 
categories of 'responsibility' concerning the uses of city centre space and the 
4 appropriateness' of certain practices and behaviours against the backdrop of 
urban revitalisation. The historical material in Chapter Six highlighted the 
concerns of Liverpool's governing classes directed at particular groups and 
activities in the city centre. These activities were defined as disorderly thus 
undermining the city's sense of civic propriety. The governing classes were not 
only involved in defining disorder but also took a role in shaping the police 
response to it. The following discussion will draw attention to historical 
continuity regarding these processes, focusing on the targeting of problematic 
activities in the city centre by the city's governing fractions involved in the 
regeneration process. This historical narrative of the practice of social control 
will strengthen criticisms made earlier regarding the a-historical theorisations of 
risk and social control put forward by, for example, Feeley and Simon. 
In 1997, a move to bring coherence to the process of securing the streets of 
Liverpool was developed through the Officer Partnership 
Group which 
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developed a strategy document, which derived from meetings between the key 
players and was circulated to them. This document, introduced in the previous 
chapter, was entitled Action Plan - Regeneration Agenda for Liverpool: To 
Develop a Safer City. The document placed 'safety' as central to the 
regeneration process: 
Experience and perceptions of safety in Liverpool fundamentally 
affect quality of life across the whole of Merseyside and impact 
on inward investment and wider economic regeneration of the 
city. Developing a Safer City is an essential element of the 
holistic approach to promoting Liverpool as a safe, vibrant, 
regenerating city, which is attractive to inward investors and 
supports a high quality of life for residents and visitors 
(Liverpool City Council, 1997b: 1). 
The document identified "key elements" defined as "situational measures" to 
"make Liverpool city centre more attractive for work, commerce, leisure, 
shopping and tourism" (Ibid: 6). The document consolidated the role of the 
partners discussed so far in this chapter in placing CCTV in a pivotal position 
regarding street management. The key elements were stated as "raising a 
visible, uniformed presence in the city centre; improving litter and graffiti 
removal services; encouraging leisure and healthy life style opportunities; a 
focused media campaign; controlling street traders"; and, as a key element in 
orchestrating responses to issues of "street management and cleanliness", 
"extending closed circuit television" (Ibid). Against this backdrop the chapter 
will now turn to the themes and issues to emerge from the interview process 
regarding the objects of partnership power and the targeting of the camera 
surveillance network. 
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Purification of the streets 
The pavements here are a disgrace. They do not encourage 
investment (Field Notes: senior business executive addressing 
local conference, Merseyside: The Future, 4 July, 1997). 
The streets of the city centre formed a focus for the attention of the locally 
powerful in general and the security network in particular. The concern with 
'the look of the streets' and the 'ambience of city centre life' was central to the 
architects of regeneration discussed in the previous chapter. The focus on the 
streets as an object of power has conflated a range of problems for an orderly 
regeneration. Threats to the local urban aesthetic were identified as: the 
problem of litter; individual and travelling groups of shoplifters; the prevalence 
of litter and graffiti; sellers of the homeless magazine (The Big Issue); young 
people; licensed and unlicensed street trading; and busking. As problems 
hindering the process of regeneration, these categories were positioned in 
opposition to a more orderly vision of street life that has been constructed 
around culturally defined notions of 'carnival' and 'fun', but which were at the 
same time highly circumscribed. The streets became a locus for the new 
primary definers to instil 'spontaneity' and 'playfulness I as well as to advertise, 
through the use of banners on special posts, officially sanctioned cultural and 
other events in the city centre. Alongside the CCTV system, the LCCP 
established various campaigns to promote a city of civic propriety: 
It all stems from our 'Local and Proud' initiative, which sparked 
off a number of other projects. The city centre was obviously in 
a bad state, a free for all, if you like; buskers, fly posting, litter 
and all manner of collectors - none of it controlled and some of 
it down right offensive to visitors, tourists and shoppers. It gave 
the impression of wider dereliction and impoverishment. We 
needed to counter these kinds of things and salvage the 
architectural and cultural heritage of this city; if you like - 
marketing the city's heritage splendours, and building a more 
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family friendly environment. We're giving the city centre back 
to the people (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
Reclaiming the city centre, as a managed and controlled environment formed a 
key regeneration strategy concerned with levering inward investment. 'Street 
cleanliness' became the eclectic buzzword through which a series of initiatives 
concerned with street order were enacted: 
I am not spouting a prejudice here but as any one who cares 
about the future of this city will tell you the people of this city 
are so untidy. The streets are always filthy and that just gives us 
a bad name. Just how many more letters to the [Liverpool] Echo 
do we have to read slagging us off for the state of our streets? 
It's a big put off for shoppers and tourists (Economic 
Development Officer, Liverpool City Council ). 
Through the LCCP, street cleansing took root in an initiative entitled Gold 
Zone, launched in 1998. The initiative relied chiefly on private sector backing 
and had the support of key players that included the Stores' Committee and 
Mersey Partnership. 12 In attempting to make businesses and citizens responsible 
for their own environment, Gold Zone marked a step in the direction of 
responsibilised self governance. At the same time, the LCCP along with 
Merseyside Police and the City Council invoked a by-law to extend "alcohol 
-r__ 
. L. L, -e zones" in the city centre. This "important weapon 
in the war against street 
crime" applied to the drinking of alcohol on all main streets. Street signs were 
erected warning people that drinking in the streets would entail the risk of being 
fined up to f500 and the possibility of police arrest. The exceptions to the by- 
law were the new designated pavement cafes (Daily Post, 24 March, 2000). The 
12 Gold Zone was concerned with "the protection of central pedestrian areas" from fitter, fly 
posting and graffiti alongside the promotion of "brightening up" events such as street decoration, 
entertainments and events (Gold Zone, March 2000). Gold Zone was initiated in the more 
prestigious shopping areas of the city centre and developed a "fault finding service" in which 
local members reported unwanted or untoward activities which infringed the Gold Zone initiative. 
Along with the Gold Zone Crew, funded by Liverpool City Council, three police officers also 
patrol the Gold Zone areas (Liverpool Echo, 22 November, 1999). 
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by-law was suspended during officially sponsored festivals and events. The 
instigation of a caf6 bar culture brought with it contradictions for urban 
managers. With the proliferation of bars the fear of a city centre blighted by 
drunken disorder was seen as a threat to the desired urban ambience, outlined in 
the previous chapter, and must, therefore, be countered with the measures 
above. In this sense a careful management of street order was enacted in an 
effort not to offset the trajectory of regeneration but to reorder the nature, 
timing and location of activities in the streets. 
The mushrooming of street management schemes tied discourses of image and 
safety to the logic of investment, whether through tourism, shopping or 
attracting new businesses. Within this, the role of the CCTV network was to 
oversee a ubiquitous construction of 'street cleanliness'. This role was 
articulated in a manner that referred to 'the people'. As one CCTV manager put 
it: 
The city centre is a people's place first and foremost and CCTV 
is a people's system. It's got to be other-wise it could not be 
successful in terms of what we are trying to do (The City Centre 
Manager, LCCP). 
For this interviewee, CCTV was described as one of "the vehicles" through 
which the LCCP and its partners operated. As mentioned earlier, CCTV was 
described by one its managers as important in the process of "sustaining the 
pedestrian flow of traffic" (Ibid). In sustaining this flow, a number of obstacles 
to street order were identified by those who managed the camera network. 
These obstacles will be discussed below. 
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Homelessness 
Homelessness became an important factor for those partnerships concerned 
with image management and the creation of favourable business climates. In 
September 1995, Liverpool City Council's Social Services Committee 
considered a motion in the name of a Conservative Councillor. The motion read 
as follows: 
That the City Council, in conjunction with Merseyside Police, 
initiate a programme to remove from the streets of Liverpool all 
professional beggars in order to prevent residents of the city and 
visitors being harassed and accosted (Liverpool City Council, 
1996: 2). 13 
The Sub-Committee approved the motion. 14 The motion formalised random 
police 'checks', using the Operational Support Division, on those found 
begging and selling The Big Issue magazine in the city centre. The problem was 
articulated as one of rooting out and ridding the city of "aggressive beggars" as 
distinguished from the "genuinely homeless". During this time, one councillor 
was reported as saying that "some of these people are earning up to f-500 a 
week. It doesn't improve the city's image" (Liverpool Echo, II September, 
1995). 
In joining the Office of Partnership Group, the Stores' Committee was able to 
articulate the problem of the homeless in Liverpool that dovetailed with its, and 
others', concerns about street cleanliness and the quality of the environment. 
13 The issue of homelessness and its increased visibility on the streets of Britain through the 1980s 
and into the 1990s received growing national attention from media commentators and policy 
makers. The notion of 'professional begging' and what the then Shadow Home Secretary 
Jack 
Straw referred to as 'aggressive begging' (The Guardian, 9 September, 1995) helped to move the 
debate around homelessness into the domain of street disorder and public safety. 
14 The motion also condemned the Conservative Government of the time "for creating a situation 
in which people are driven to beg because of lack of work and lack of proper 
benefits" (Liverpool 
City Council, 1996). 
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Hostility towards the homeless was not uncommon and underpinned their 
hostility towards the presence of this group for seemingly contradicting the re- 
imagining of the city centre: 
Oh yes, there is a 'big issue' [laughter]. When people come out 
of Lime Street to do some shopping they've already passed 
seven or eight Big Issue sellers and it really pisses them off. You 
then think this city is seedy and full of beggars and homeless 
people; like something you stand on (Research Interview 1). 
The problem of homeless persons in the city centre was articulated most 
forcibly through the Stores' Committee and the LCCP: 
Well you see we have this problem with Big Issue vendors. They 
stand right outside the more popular stores in a manner intrusive 
to those entering and leaving. Some of them even go into a store 
causing mayhem. Some of them we've banned because it has 
been in our customers' interests (Chairman, Crime Alert). 
Initiatives from the partners aimed at the problem of the homeless varied from 
covert surveillance to 'educational' approaches which brought together police 
and Stores' representatives to meet with The Big Issue vendors in order to 
discuss "sensible selling strategies" (Home Office Advisor, [GOM] ): 
It is not politically acceptable to say to the Big Issue sellers 'get 
lost'. All we can do is negotiate with them and say 'do you 
realise the impact this is having on people'? I know some of 
them have taken this on board and try to sell their paper in a 
manner that is non-threatening or overtly intrusive. But some of 
them just look wrong. They do not look like someone who has 
fallen on hard times and are trying to do something for 
themselves but [look] like they are getting money for the next 
fix. Perhaps The Big Issue should consider who they accept as a 
vendor and where they are placed (Superintendent, Merseyside 
Police [GOM], emphasis in original). 
These educative strategies included discussions among key players as to the 
possibility of responsibilising The Big Issue vendors with tasks deemed more 
appropriate in a regenerating city centre. These tasks included recruiting and 
training the vendors as tourist guides along side Town Watch (Liverpool 
Echo, 
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8 January, 1997). At the same time, other initiatives included the undercover 
surveillance of the homeless in the city centre undertaken by Merseyside Police. 
The Stores' Committee pressured the police for the increased targeting of 
homeless groups. Crime Alert provided the forum for the conduct of such 
operations. These involved police officers posing as homeless people in order to 
ascertain intelligence on their movements, involvement in criminal activity, and 
whether or not they were "genuinely homeless" (Chairman, Crime Alert). 
Intelligence was then passed around private security staff regarding the 
identification of 'problem' homeless persons, which was then used for targeting 
them in the city centre. As indicated earlier in the chapter, Crime Alert provided 
a forum within which a normative bonding was nourished between private 
security and police personnel. This bonding, underpinned by open hostility 
towards identified groups, was particularly visible regarding the homeless. 
During one Crime Alert meeting, two police officers engaged in undercover 
operations led a debate about the homeless problem in Liverpool: 
Chair: It is just annoying when you read in The Sun about the 
Big Issue vendor who moans if he makes f 800 a week. 
Police Officer 1: Yeh, but as we know 99.9% of them are known 
criminals. 
Police Officer 2: Only lin 50 that we spoke to are actually 
homeless. 
Police Officer 1: We've nailed the original aggressive beggar 
now. He can't come into the city because we know him. He can't 
move outside his front door. 
Chair: The problem is there are just too many of them. They are 
always aggressive, threatening and selling at our doors... 
shoplifters, drunks, dirty sods, wandering in and out of stores. 
Private Security Guard 1: They shouldn't be allowed in stores. 
We should always check their identification. 
Private Security Guard 2: She's awful (pointing to photo). You 
can smell her before she comes round the comer. 
(Field Notes, Crime Alert). 
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The 'concerns' raised in the conversation were recorded by the Crime 
Prevention Officer who promised the Chair of Crime Alert he would report 
them to the Area Commander. Crime Alert focused its own surveillance 
measures using the radio link and CCTV to monitor the movement of Big Issue 
vendors around the city centre. This was felt necessary, as vendors in particular 
were, it was thought, trying to avoid surveillance and becoming known to 
security staff. This concern was placed alongside the futility of the 'educative' 
measures mentioned above: 
We had meetings between the Stores' Committee and The Big 
Issue office, where they put their side of the story and we put 
ours. But the situation gets no better; they just seem to be an 
uncontrollable group. They swap and change their identity 
badges amongst themselves and change pitches - it can be 
difficult to keep tabs on them. They probably have a good 
knowledge of security in the city centre but we are on to them 
(Ibid). 
The positioning of Big Issue vendors outside of store entrances was also 
deemed problematic in that they could over-hear information passed over the 
radio link: 
It has been known for them to pass on this information and even 
tip off shoplifters, some of whom have managed to get away 
(Security Manager [I], Crime Alert). 
The monitoring was felt necessary as "they are a potentially criminal group - 
we have examples of them stealing and dealing in drugs - and they intimidate 
the public in entering our stores" (Research Interview, 15). In summary, 
homeless people were the subject of intense surveillance underpinned by 
hostility towards this group for its perceived attitude in either attempting to 
avoid surveillance or in merely 'looking wrong'. 
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Street trading 
As Chapter Six highlighted, Liverpool city centre has a long tradition of 
independent street trading which dates back to the early nineteenth century and 
which has been the subject of concern and regulation by the locally powerful 
and the police. ' 5 Licensing, along with the requirement of traders to pay for the 
square footage of their pitch and parking and refuse fees, had the impact of 
cutting the number of traders as well as forcing others unwilling or unable to 
pay the licence fee off the streets and into local pubs to sell. During the 1990s, a 
number of issues emerged that underpinned a concerted effort by city centre 
partners to remove the street traders from the main city centre consumption 
zone of Church Street. Based as they are on the door step of the big city centre 
retailers, the Stores' Committee along with the Government Office and LCCP, 
vocalised a number of concerns that provided a focal point on which partners 
have agreed as to the 'unsightliness' of the traders, the rubbish they leave 
behind, the minimal licence and pitch fees compared to the business rates of 
mainstream retailers and insinuations that traders are involved in criminal 
activity. As one senior security manager put it: 
They are taking trade away from respectable retailers and we 
also feel that it is having an effect on people feeling safe within 
the city centre. Why be crowded out by people like that? 
(Chairman, Crime Alert). 
The problem of street trading was expressed in terms of the negative image for 
the city centre. These discourses emanated from established retailers organised 
through the Stores' Committee and those concerned with strategic re-imaging at 
15 Street trading derived from the secondary economy that flourished In this period and provided 
local people with income and shoppers with relatively cheap merchandise. Historically the street 
traders, as part of the secondary economy, became subject to the 'moving on' policing described 
by Brogden (1982) tied to a licensing system in the early twentieth century administered through 
the City Council. 
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the Government Office. The problem of street traders condensed around the 
issue of licensing and violations of pitch size allowable under the license. For 
those involved in the security network the battery of powers available to 
regulate traders was felt to be inept at addressing the problem: 
The regulation of pitch sizes needs to be enforced, as does the 
vetting of traders by the police. No trader should be allowed to 
operate with a criminal record. Enforcement orders against these 
people should be used without fear of a backlash. This laxity has 
led to our belief that there is a mafia out there (Representative of 
LCCP). 
This "mafia" seemed particularly well organised, with one local Labour 
Councillor among the fifty one licensed traders. The traders fought and won a 
High Court battle against having them removed from the city centre, despite 
much pressure from the Stores' Committee and the Govemment Office. The 
victory was seen as "creating a crisis of confidence in the way our city is run" 
(Liverpool Echo, 24 May, 2000). The issue of street trading has figured 
prominently in local press articles and became a central feature in debates 
around the 'proper' governance of the city alongside an alternative 
representation of the 'public interest'. In defiance of those seeking to create a 
new urban aesthetic, the traders articulated a sense of tradition clearly at odds 
with the position of the new primary definers: 
What people should realise is that the traders survive because 
people shop at our stalls. People want the barrow boys and 
flower sellers to stay. We are part of the furniture in the city. Not 
every one in the city can afford to shop at Marks and Spencer 
(Street Trader in Liverpool Echo, 20 July, 1999). 
In challenging the power of the new urban aesthetic, the traders argued that 
"if 
traders were removed [from the city centrel... it would become a soulless and 
sterile place much like high streets in other cities, but Liverpool, the 
'pool of 
life', is no other city and we do not wish it to be" (Leaflet, 
Street Trading: The 
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Facts, 1998). The local press, however, was a key vehicle in orchestrating a 
campaign against street trading. In one particular editorial, street traders in the 
city centre were derided as nineteenth century throwbacks belonging to a 
-monstrous era". Street traders were characterised as a "species" and a "pox on 
our city", who, because they represented "a curse" on the city, should be 
located "somewhere more appropriate ... like the Mersey, perhaps" (Daily Post, 
19 May, 1998). In the local press traders have, at best, been described as an 
6eyesore' and at worst as 'swagmen'. 16 For the traders a process of 
criminalistion was underway as a perquisite to their removal; "we would 
suggest that words used to describe us would normally be reserved for Nazis, 
rapists and child molesters and not people who after all, are only trying to earn 
a living" (Leaflet: Street Trading: The Facts, op. cit). 
From the point of view of the Stores' Committee and the LCCP, the longevity 
of street trading in Liverpool has been tempered by successive City Council 
administrations granting trading licences: 
These issues go back to when Adam was a lad. Rightly or 
wrongly the licensing has given the traders certain rights, which 
has bounced back on us. I know as a city we have had to set up 
this situation properly and responsibly but the other side of it is 
that a lot of them have not paid any rent for some time. There are 
not many people in this city getting anything for nothing. These 
guys are out there giving us straight competition and paying 
nothing (Representative [2] of Stores' Committee). 
Other partners outside of retailing expressed similar sentiments and spoke of 
being "educated" about the issue by other partners. The move at bringing 
16 Other press headlines have included 'War on Street Traders' (Dajlýy Post, 
19 May, 1998); 
'That's your lot' (Liverpool Echo, 21 May, 1998). 
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partners together has allowed the Stores' Committee to place street trading 
higher on the agenda of city centre regeneration at Government Office level. As 
one urban manager in the Government Office put it: 
What they [Stores' Committee] were doing and saying about 
street cleanliness was relevant and that's how they got involved. 
They were able to tell us about some of their problems like the 
number of street traders outside their doors. I personally find it 
difficult picking my way around them but I hadn't thought about 
how they were taking trade away from stores. Also a lot of stuff 
that gets nicked from the stores is sold out there as well, which is 
really galling (Home Office Advisor, [GOM] ). 
The problernatisation of street trading played a central discursive role in linking 
issues around 'quality of environment', street cleanliness and the ambience of 
the city centre in the eyes of potential inward investors: 
We bring businesses to look around Liverpool and it's worrying 
you know - by the time we get to the core trading area we are 
faced with the chaos of the traders. Shabby stalls, cheap 
merchandise and litter that says Liverpool is a low grade 
economy (Research interview 17). 
As well as the hindrance deemed to be placed against investment the problem 
of street trading (as intimated above), has also been expressed in terms of 
criminality: 
The stalls are a menace, take up space and undermine the 
business of established retail. They generate litter and provide an 
opportunity for the disposal of stolen goods and the practice of 
benefit fraud, that kind of thing. There is very little to say that's 
positive about them; they are in the wrong place (Security 
Manager [I], Crime Alert). 
Furthermore: 
This problem has been with us a long time and maybe now we 
are going to sort it. It's common knowledge that merchandise 
moves from high street chains to the stalls and into the pubs ... 
but the police, well they don't want to know (Chairman, Crime 
Alert). 
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Other partners highlighted what they thought was the 'real crime' in the 
policing of the city centre which raised issues of what should be policed at any 
particular time: 
The police will harass someone selling the Big Issue who is not doing much harm really other than making f-20 a day more than 
he should. Yet, every one of those street traders is on invalidity 
or unemployment benefit. Now who is the thief there? (Security 
Manager, non-member of Crime Alert). 
The use of Liverpool's CCTV system to monitor street trading was undertaken 
at the request of some of the major retailers, as one security manager 
sympathetic to the traders stated: 
I know people out there who work hard for a living and I also 
know that some of the stores, including this one, have wanted 
more to be done about the traders. But yes, we can, and do, use 
the CCTV system to see what's happening. One store was 
convinced a particular line of shirts that they sold was lifted and 
being sold back outside for half the price! So the system can be 
used to monitor deliveries to traders to see what they're selling 
(Research interview 11). 
The monitoring and recording of violations of pitch space was also undertaken 
and passed on to licence enforcers at the City Council. The role of Crime Alert 
in this respect was to minutely scrutinise the activities of trades in order to 
cajole relevant authorities to take action against them: 
We do believe that the stuff that is stolen from the shops ends up 
on the stalls. All the information we get is passed on to the 
Police Intelligence Unit. The proof is that street stalls have been 
raided and closed down for handling stolen goods. We also get 
members of the public complaining about them. They aren't 
controlled in any way. The way they take the mickey by 
infringing their pitch allocation is just a laugh. We record any 
extensions - how they extend their pitch, by the use of 
bars and 
verandas and boxes jutting out over the ground (Chairman, 
Crime Alert). 
Surveillance was also directed at unlicensed sellers who kept mobile around the 
city centre, selling out of suitcases and back packs. This group, was believed to 
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consist of about 30 "known traders", posed a particularly difficult problem in 
that "they don't just work the streets but inside pubs and clubs" (Ibid). 
The use of the camera network to monitor street traders was justified neither in 
a deterrent nor preventative capacity. Hostility to street trading was intense, and 
the solution to the 'problem' was, in the final analysis, seen as political. As long 
as the traders were there the camera network would perform a disciplinary 
function regardless of whether strictly criminal suspicion was present; and, in 
that sense, the camera network contributed to the wider political pressure 
brought to bear on traders, adding to the message that their presence was 
'unwelcome'. Street trading, like homelessness though not illegal 'activities', 
have never-the-less fitted into categories of suspicion defined by normative 
conceptions of place and their associated categories of 'appropriateness' and 
'responsibility'. The camera network was mobilised in a disciplinary sense so 
that it communicated and aided 'the rules of the game' in the regenerating city 
centre under prevailing definitions of 'responsibility'. Moral abjection towards 
these groups cut across the institutions for regeneration and underpinned the use 
and targeting of CCTV. The message CCTV could communicate was summed 
up thus, "they know we are watching" 17 (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). 
17 Discretionary surveillance of the homeless and traders has not been subject to any formal 
debate in Liverpool regarding the use of the camera network. In the absence of general statutory 
control over the use of CCTV systems, operations here lie to a large extent outside of the law. The 
Data Protection Act (1998) has provided some regulation in terms of the requirement to register 
information kept, the purpose of its use, and access to data subjects of their files. However, 
breaches of the Act depend on individual citizens making complaints but, as in the case of visual 
surveillance "most people [do] not know what data is kept on them by whom" (Maguire, 
1998: 
232. Furthermore, the Act made general exemptions for the purposes of data defined as relevant 
to the 'detection of crime and its prevention'. 
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Youth 
Any child or group of children without a parent with them is 
bound to arouse suspicion. Just think of the Bulger case. In a 
sense the kids are the easiest to dissuade. They know they are 
being watched and it seems like a game to them but once they 
know we aren't playing they get bored and go elsewhere 
(Security Manager, Mersey Travel Rapid Response Unit). 
Other researchers have noted the contemporary targeting of young people by 
policing agencies in urban centres, albeit with particular reference to targeting 
black youth (Norris and Armstrong, 1998b). This has taken place within the 
process of interpretive construction that has highlighted constructions as to the 
proper and legitimate use of time and space. The visibility of youth in public 
urban spaces has become linked to perceptions of disorder amongst other 
groups in the population, particularly in the context of urban revitalisation and 
the creation of safe shopping zones (Beck and Willis, 1995; Oc & Tiesdell, 
1997). Young people of school age constituted a particular concern for security 
managers in Liverpool, who perceived their presence in the city centre as 
incongruous with the 'family friendly' environment they espoused: 
There's a tradition in Liverpool of kids bunking school. They 
roam in and around the city centre on buses and hang out. The 
city centre has an appeal to the kids; they treat it as a playground 
but it isn't. They harass shoppers and staff alike. The fact that 
they aren't doing anything intimidates people, and, it seems 
almost pointless to ask where are their parents in all of this? But 
there is a time and a place for children to be in the city centre 
(Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
In dealing with these kinds of problems, a number of initiatives focusing in the 
city centre were established. In attracting custom from outside the city centre, 
public transport, and its image, was deemed a key attribute in regeneration. 
Mersey Travel and Merseyside Police, with support from the Stores' 
Committee, set about cleaning up the image of public transport in Liverpool. 
In 
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particular, the aim was "to rid the system of ticket touts". This group consists 
largely of children of school age who "use the Away Day ticket scheme to 
move aimlessly around the city, leaving litter and graffiti and intimidating 
drivers and customers" (Security Manager, Mersey Travel Rapid Response 
Unit). Mersey Travel developed their own Rapid Response Unit (RRU), a 
twenty strong security unit who were trained and to work with the police: 
On of the reasons the RRU was set up was to deal with kids 
who actually are becoming more violent. This tends to be a 
daytime problem; bored kids using the buses as a play 
ground. But since the 24-hour city initiative our buses have 
taken on more passengers in and out of the city of a weekend. 
Rowdiness, drunkenness, physical damage and even urination 
on the buses have all increased (Ibid). 
For Mersey Travel, a senior player in the regeneration process, the problem of 
youth led them to argue for linking up the city centre surveillance system with 
their own camera network covering bus stations and some buses. 18 Within 
Crime Alert, a special Juvenile Group was established to deal with young 
people to initiate Truancy Watch. This scheme was initiated to "deal with the 
scallies". The CCTV system became a key tool to help police "round up pupils 
in the city centre" who presented "a nuisance to people going about their daily 
business" 19 (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police ). 
Race 
In his Report, Lord Gifford had noted the "strikingly noticeable" (Gifford, 
1988: 70) lack of black faces as either workers or visitors in the centre of 
18 This came one step closer to fruition with the extension of Liverpool's 
CCTV scheme 
announced in October 2001. 
19 The scheme was extended in 1998 under a E315,000 government 
funded initiative that involved 
police and other agencies in stopping and questioning suspect truants. 
1,000 school children were 
stopped in 1999 and a third of these "gave a good reason for 
being out of classes" (Liverpool 
Echo, 19 June, 2000). 
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Liverpool. Both local policing and public and private sector employment 
practices were held responsible for this visible social demarcation in the City. 20 
Interestingly the issue of 'race' rarely came up during the inter-view process. 
This relative silence was not overtly picked up by nor prompted by the 
interviewer during the interview process. However, when race was articulated it 
pointed to continuity from those observations made in the 1980s and further 
back, in that: 
A colleague of mine works in Bristol they have problems with 
young black kids. We don't have as many 'darkies' as other 
towns and cities. They're just not here. They stick with their 
own kind, don't they? (Research Interview, 19). 
Another manager, when asked what groups particularly caught his attention, 
stated simply "blacks stick out". When asked what he meant by this, he stated 
"if troublesome black kids are in town they don't stand a chance - we know 
about it" (Ibid). Notwithstanding these comments, the relative silence on race 
can be attributed to the findings of local reports that have questioned 
Liverpool's cosmopolitan image, the role of public agencies, and patterns of 
local racial violence that have promoted "a devastating lack of mobility" for 
Liverpool's black population and "confined" them to their places of residence 
outside of the city centre (Gifford, 1989: 83). Race as a relative non-issue for 
security managers can be understood against the peculiar and historically 
formed politics of exclusion that has operated in Liverpool and been noted 
elsewhere. 
20 Thirteen years later, little has changed. Liverpool 8 Law Centre described the city centre as a 
46 no-go area" for black people in terms of work and leisure. Only 2% of city jobs were being filled 
by black people, which amounted to a 1% improvement since 1988 (Liverpool Echo, 3 July, 
2001). 
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In summary, this discussion around the targeting of the camera network has 
raised issues that challenge the common sense assumption that 'those who have 
nothing to hide have nothing to fear from CCTV'. The routine targeting of the 
network, and the discretion within that targeting, have been informed by local 
ideologies of place and social order that have displayed a particular historical 
trajectory that has been rearticulated and reasserted within contemporary 
partnerships for regeneration. These wider contemporary discourses pertaining 
to the legitimate uses of the revitalised city centre have therefore reinforced 
some older historical sentiments and normative judgements around what 
constitutes an 'orderly' city. The proper objects of power were identified not in 
any straightforward sense of crimes committed or on the basis of identifying 
known offenders but, rather, through the operation of a set of normative 
judgements within which legal suspicion may only play a small, if any, part. 
Thus the ideology of regeneration located within the neo-liberal state set the 
context for groups and categories that were defined as outside of city centre 
renaissance; as a threat and visual anomaly to regeneration. Thus, for example, 
surveillance of street traders was deemed legitimate in this context. Indeed, the 
surveillance of those groups and individuals described above was based on an 
implicit message to those targeted by the system, which was one of 'they will 
know we are watching'. The message itself reinforced the wider discourses 
constructed around these 'unwelcome' groups and activities as entirely negative 
- even pathological - and problematic in hindering the construction of a positive 
image for the city centre. In this sense, the CCTV network formed a 
key role in 
a neo-liberal state strategy geared towards the surveillance over, and collation 
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of information about, a given territory. The camera network ran conterminous 
to the ideological and material power to define and shape that territory. 
Tensions within the network 
The practices of social ordering in the city centre were not without their 
tensions and contradictions. Tensions between agencies engaged in social 
ordering in Liverpool city centre were identifiable at two main levels: firstly, at 
the highest strategic level within the regeneration process; secondly among 
agencies working on the ground in and around Crime Alert. It is to a 
consideration of these tensions that the chapter will now turn. 
i. Locally powerful tensions 
There is total agreement among players about the problems that 
need to be addressed but there are significant differences of 
priority - about actually doing things to address the problems and 
what those things should be. The city's renaissance is a very 
delicate thing and has to be carefully managed. Each player 
needs to think carefully about what they are doing and why 
(Representative [2] of Stores' Committee). 
As a number of writers have noted, and as Chapter Seven discussed, the 
practice of 'making partnerships work' has not been without problems. 
Bringing together different agencies with different organisational aims, 
philosophies and working practices may compound tensions between partners 
around inter-agency perceptions, designated roles and issues in leadership 
(Crawford, 1997; Loveday, 1999). Regarding these issues, Crawford Jbid: 133) 
pointed to what he called the "creative management of conflict" between multi- 
agency actors which often took place 'behind the scenes' in informal settings: 
The creativity of practice, more often than not, takes a pragmatic 
and managerial form. It tends to be about 6getting through the 
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day's business' and meeting managerial objectives, rather than 
pursuing any moral or political mission (Crawford, 1997: 135, 
emphasis added). 
In Liverpool, contrary to Crawford's argument, the context of establishing 
effective strategies and structures of city centre rule did not lead to a strict 
separation between managerial and moral discourses and practices. The public 
and private interests engaged in the regeneration process forged a strategy of 
rule that coupled a hardheaded pragmatism along-side deeper moralising 
visions that underpinned a set of social ordering practices. This is not to suggest 
that tensions did not arise among strategists in the regeneration process. In 
broad terms tensions between the new primary definers arose not in the 
meanings attributed to regeneration and order but through the strategic actions 
pursued to achieve these ends. What was deemed as 'good' and 'bad' for the 
city's image represented benchmark questions that guided senior managerial 
approaches and their ideological positioning to order maintenance practices. 
Other tensions arose not out of opposition to particular crime prevention 
practices but in their management and funding. In short, the problems for order 
were not deemed problematic, but the means to achieving order were. 
As others have noted, tensions between the goals of partnership decision- 
making processes and sections of the public have been evident (Crawford, 
1997; Audit Commission, 1999). Writers have noted the importance of 'appeals 
to community' in crime prevention strategies (Crawford, 1997). Appeals to 
4 community' in the city centre were highly circumscribed. The idea of 
4 community' in the city centre was constructed assertively rather than 
demonstrably. if 'community' was invoked at all it was as an after thought; 
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'people have nothing to fear from CCTV', 'it's a peoples system'. These 
assertions were made without any detailed assessment of what 'people' were 
being referred to, or what 'the people' thought of practices such as CCTV. 
Marketing and carefully constructed image campaigns were prioritised as part 
of these processes underpinned by the politics of persuasion rather than by any 
open channels of debate. Within the locally powerful discourses explored in the 
previous chapter, 'the public' were selectively characterised and addressed in a 
particular fashion - as themselves entrepreneurial in spirit and in tune with the 
6playfulness' of the new urban order. This fitted with the construction of the 
city centre as a commercial entity where the 'people' (or public) are regarded as 
an important potential client base (i. e., a commercial category), but are also 
absent ('outsiders' to regeneration machinations) -a transitory category to be 
kept at a distance from the processes of city centre rule. Indeed, and as noted 
elsewhere, forms of partnership rule in the urban centre "do not need to exert 
total power over the city's population to act effectively (i. e., whether through 
the ballot box or other means), but rather they merely need the power to act" 
(Hall and Hubbard, 1996: 156, emphasis in original). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the ideological basis and scope for this power to act 
inoculated the workings of local power from outside scrutiny. In this sense, 
tensions between components of the security network and 'the public' 
in the 
enactment of social ordering in the city were marginalized as non-issues. 
Instead, however, tensions arose in the networks of rule themselves. in 
particular, between and within different class fractions within the networks and 
the structures of political power. It was in this arena that 
the 'public interest' 
itself was constructed and made meaningful in relation 
to the processes of urban 
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renaissance and social ordering. These tensions will now be looked at in more 
detail. 
Militarisation, safe shopping and CCTV 
Contemporary writing around social control, documented in Chapter Two, have 
emphasised the management of risk that relies upon actuarial techniques. It has 
been argued that these techniques are outmoding 'older' forms of control 
characterised as state centred, repressive or authoritarian. Davis (1990) 
pointedly drew attention to important omissions that can be found in urban 
studies and in criminology regarding the inter-linkage between techniques of 
policing and control found within urban centres .21 As the discussion earlier in 
this chapter indicated, writings around the impact, effects and uses of CCTV in 
Britain have treated this technology as a discreet entity in policing urban space. 
In other words, CCTV has not been placed alongside other policing and 
security initiatives deployed in conjunction with camera surveillance systems 
and how these dialectically inter-relate within a strategy of social ordering. 
The characterisation offered by Davis focused on the range of practices initiated 
towards "the architectural policing of social boundaries" (1990: 223) and 
pointed to a continued interrelationship between 'old' and 'new' order 
22 
maintenance strategies . 
21 Davis argued that: "... contemporary urban theory, whether debating the role of electronic 
technologies in precipitating 'postmodern space', or discussing the dispersion of urban functions 
across poly-centered metropolitan 'galaxies', has been strangely silent about the militarization of 
city life so grimly visible at street level" (Davis, 1990: 223). 
22 This point has been reinforced by Parent, (1994: 47) in his examination of "urban militarism", 
understood as a "creeping fortress culture" concerned with "managing social inequality". 
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As discussed in Chapter Six, public order policing in Liverpool intensified 
under the banner of 'Citysafe'. The enactment of zero tolerance measures 
alongside militarised forms of policing was underpinned by discourses of 
'regeneration' that point to the kinds of authoritarian measures outlined by 
Davis. In Liverpool, the network of CCTV cameras was reinforced by a heavily 
militarised police force. 23 However, militarisation has not been universally 
welcomed among all factions within the regeneration networks in Liverpool. 
Thus coherence and uniformity of purpose regarding various policing initiatives 
in the city should not be taken as given or inevitable. As will be noted below, 
the intensification of proactive policing, - the use of highly visible and armed 
police officers on the streets of the city centre - became a source of tension 
among key players. For the police, however, the issue of armed patrols was 
represented to other players as 'necessary' to the regeneration process. As one 
police officer stated: 
We had no anticipation [that] the subversive drug trafficking in 
the seedy side of Liverpool life was going to manifest itself into 
gunfire on the streets. That was a real kick in the bollocks to 
Liverpool and the regeneration process. [The shootings] in some 
respects helped push the issue up the agenda and get something 
done about it (Superintendent, Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
One local councillor backed putting armed patrols on the streets and called for 
the use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act to arrest city gun suspects 
(Merseymart, 16 May, 1996). The armed operation in the city centre was 
commenced during Christmas in 1996 and received high profile coverage in the 
local and national press up to a year after its inception, much to the alarm of the 
23 This included armed patrols and the use of the Operational Support Division. The latter 
received record complaints in 1998. The use of CS gas received more complaints in Liverpool 
than anywhere else in England and Wales for1998 (Liverpool Echo, 5 March 1999). 
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Stores' Committee, the LCCP and Mersey Partnership. The issue highlighted 
differences in institutional logics and power, produced fractures within the 
channels of communication between key players, and undermined the stability 
of the unifying potential found within the discourse of regeneration. The role of 
highly visible and proactive public order policing became subject to scrutiny 
amongst the new primary definers, some of whom felt uncomfortable with 
certain policing practices against the backdrop of city centre re-imaging and 
regeneration. The police were put in a situation where they felt on the back-foot 
in defending certain policing practices to their partners. This problernatised the 
meaning of partnership in the city centre, as one police officer commented: 
There is liaison, yes. At the level more of informing them what 
we are going to do and why we are going to do it rather how 
would you feel if we go and do this. There is a statutory 
obligation on the police to protect life and we couldn't possibly 
fail to deliver on that. If somebody was uncomfortable with the 
sight of a police officer carrying a gun in a public place then 
they need to see that this is what we have to do operationally. 
This fact is often much more clear than how we are going to sell 
that in a positive way (Ibid). 
As identified in the previous chapter, the police's 'willingness to talk' was a 
factor in building partnerships. Within the debates that followed police gun 
patrols, this meant informing key players of intended police operations because 
this was recognised as a factor in 'regeneration' and as something that all 
partners had signed up to. Although other key players welcomed the police 
providing such informal briefings, they also questioned and expressed 
frustration around a sense of exclusivity concerning police operational matters. 
Alongside this concern was the feeling that this kind of policing was an aspect 
of order maintenance that, unlike CCTV, was out of formal and informal 
partnership control. These concerns developed into a cynicism about police 
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intentions towards their commitment to the city's renaissance. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, police justifications for placing armed patrols on the streets of the 
city varied. This was not welcomed by local businesses, developers and 
members of the city council who were working, as they saw it, for a more 
coherent approach across regeneration agencies. As one developer put it: 
When the police put armed patrols on the city streets it was 
interesting in that they were saying it was for armed raids and 
violent crime and this was picked up in the national press. Then 
after a couple of weeks they said it was because of an IRA 
threat. There is a bloody big difference between the two! I mean 
having an armed patrol walking down Church Street is bad PR 
for the city. Okay, they say it is a deterrent but some of us think 
it is a bit of egoism, bravado by the police to say 'take us 
seriously'. But in reality, and the way the press used it, it makes 
Liverpool look like a shooting range (Private Developer [1], 
affiliated to LCCP, emphasis in original). 
In other words, coherence regarding re-imaging was being undermined. Others 
expressed a frustration with the role of the police in the regeneration process, in 
that this role was not only being misplaced but also contributed to a 
misunderstanding of the fundamentals of regeneration partnerships. It was felt 
that the police were not altogether concerned about the more mundane aspects 
of policing, as perceived within a regeneration agenda: 
They are [the police] so important to a lot of things that the city 
needs to happen around enforcement - traffic congestion, illegal 
parking - as well as aspects of safety like putting normal bobbies 
on the street. A problem has been getting them on side and 
committed; because they will practically say 'we've got more 
important things to do like chase robbers'. We have to make 
them understand this is all well and good but we can only do that 
by working in partnership (Representative of LCCP). 
Frustration mounted around the view that certain aspects of policing - seen as 
central to successful regeneration - were outside of partnership control. 
The 
police were widely perceived as working to their own agenda. 
As one 
marketing strategist put it: 
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I have to talk professionally now in terms of me being an investor walking through the streets. No doubt an investor wants 
to see the bobby with his sleeves rolled up and talking to the 
granny on the corner. There is no doubt in my mind that the 
gangland issue has been exaggerated, fuelled as much by the 
national as local press. The locals [partnerships] have tried to 
handle it carefully but the police always need to show they mean 
business, and are back and in control. So they tend to present 
things artificially to the media. Like those photographs that they 
released in 1996 showing the police in flak jackets and carrying 
submachine guns. As far as the rest of the world was concerned, 
every policeman in Liverpool was dressed like that. They [the 
police] did it for very political reasons. They, as always, were 
saying 'we need more money' but it backfired on the region 
economically in terms of image (Private Developer [I], affiliated 
to LCCP). 
The channels of partnership at senior level provided the avenue to pressure the 
police and debate the merits or otherwise of armed patrols underpinned by 
police characterisations of 'rampant' armed criminality: 
Senior police contact is, I think, the biggest interrelationship 
between the investment agencies. So we could say to the Chief 
Constable that he was going on a bit - with high profile, gun 
toting policemen. We said you will kill the industry and that is 
really awful. He listened to us and put out a reverse script, which 
said murders are less in his city than elsewhere. I mean we were 
crying with the amount of adverse publicity the police were 
putting out to defend their own budget. We know that was what 
it was all about and there is some sympathy around here on this 
(Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation ). 
As the previous chapter highlighted, the police were able to reposition 
themselves through senior secondment to the Government Office as an example 
of 'best practice'. This also provided the means of testing new avenues to argue 
for increased funding. Within this forum, the issue of armed response led to 
fine-tuning and the harmonising of relations across partnerships. Here, a partial 
resolution was constructed that established a campaign aimed to counter media 
stories about Liverpool as 'gun city' whilst at the same time recognising that 
policing operations are left to the police as the statutory authority, who 
by now 
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realised the need to inform partners of key policing developments. The issue of 
armed patrols also sat along-side concerns regarding public policing in the city 
centre. The channels of strategic communication forged in the regeneration of 
Liverpool aided a process whereby Merseyside Police could be challenged 
regarding certain practices and operations through the discourse of urban 
renaissance. 'Image' was the key in this kind of criticism, set against the 
backdrop of an image of a 'family friendly city' alongside increasing tourism, 
development activity and investment. The regeneration strategy that CCTV was 
central in promoting was, it was thought, being undermined by other, 'less 
credible' policing initiatives. 24 As key actors in the regeneration process, 
Merseyside Police were not immune to these governmental strategies and, as a 
means of massaging dissent from its partners, provided information and 'greater 
openness'. 
Politics, funding and CCTV. - central - local tensions 
As discussed above, the establishment of the camera network in Liverpool was 
part funded from monies available through the Crime Prevention Agency 
established under John Major's Conservative administration (changed to the 
Crime Reduction Unit under New Labour). The process of application for funds 
24 The militarisation of city life and public places may bring its own contradictions and generate 
its own insecurities, which undercut and undermine any perceptions and feelings of security 
thought to be generated by CCTV. The essence of this contradiction was captured by the 
comments of a visitor to Liverpool: "As a visitor to your city, I read with interest the article about 
media bias and the way Liverpool is presented as being a gun capital... I saw two men carrying 
automatic weapons in the shopping precinct and went along to the police station to complain... 
But these two men carrying the automatic weapons were your policemen! They were driving 
slowly through the crowded centre on a peaceful, sunny afternoon with their guns resting like itý babies on their laps. I don't know who they were trying to impress but they frightened the life of 
me. What an image! Would those guardians of our safety really think of using those weapons in a 
crowded centre of ordinary innocent people? But I'm only a tourist" (Merseymart, 20 June, 1996). 
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both to establish and extend CCTV set out various criteria for eligibility in the 
CCTV Challenge Competition. These criteria included the establishment of 
partnerships, police involvement, parallel private sector funding and the 
identification of a local crime problem. Through these processes limitations and 
constrains were placed on Liverpool's security network. For theorists of social 
control, these 'real world' constraints are important to recognise for they 
challenge those characterisations of seamless webs of surveillance found in 
some aspects of the 'dispersal of discipline' thesis discussed in Chapter Two. 
A great deal of local effort in establishing multi-agency links and accruing local 
knowledge was a prerequisite in the bidding process. Within Liverpool city 
centre the effort of the partners was strategically directed in line with plans for 
regeneration. As already made clear, from the perspective of key players at the 
local level the establishment and extension of CCTV in Liverpool fitted in with 
an agreed agenda for the city's renaissance and underpinned both the uses of 
CCTV and where it was to be located. Those involved in drawing up and 
submitting applications to central government expressed frustration at what 
they perceived as the politicking that governed central policies on crime and 
law and order. National priorities therefore sometimes appeared to conflict with 
local agendas in terms of support funding for CCTV, and in particular where it 
could be geographically placed. The 'fickleness' of central government actors 
was a target of frustration: 
Around CCTV, as with other central government initiatives, if 
you have a Minister who is enthusiastic about a particular course 
of action then that particular course of action will find funding. 
If a Minister says it is a good idea, then it is a good idea (Home 
Office Advisor, [GOM]). 
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It was felt by key players that their local strategies for the uses of CCTV were 
not always listened to or appreciated within the arena of central government 
decision-making. It was perceived that the Home Office and central 
government generally were subject to ideological constraints and short-tenn 
political expediency regarding the allocation of funds for CCTV projects. 
Frustration expressed by key players in Liverpool was aimed at the personal 
complexions of senior ministerial personnel, but these personal idiosyncrasies 
were placed within a wider context in that "every government I've seen has 
beaten the law and order drum and there doesn't seem to be any substantial 
change in that respect" (Ibid). The changing sentiments underpinning central 
government law and order policy were seen as obstacles for the 'less 
ideological' task of establishing CCTV in Liverpool city centre. Tensions were 
apparent within the process of submitting funding applications for cameras, as 
when key players in Liverpool were looking to extend the city centre system in 
1996: 
The process is, unfortunately, transparently political. Last year in 
CCTV Challenge we were expecting an indicative allocation in 
the region of E600,000 to f-800,000. We got f 34,000 worth of 
projects funded. I was given the opportunity to comment on the 
bids before decisions were announced. The only two projects we 
got funding for, one was in a school, I had commented on as 'not 
strategically important and should be funded from mainstream 
Education Authority funding'. But they [the Home Office] 
funded it! Like it was a knee jerk reaction - to Dunblane 
perhaps? These are some of the problems we deal with. Frankly, 
the bids from Merseyside this year - the temptation has been to 
throw them in the bin. Why waste time and effort reading them 
and making recommendations because on previous showings it 
was working for nothing (Superintendent, Merseyside Police 
[GOM]). 
It was the Government Office and the seconded police officer within the Office 
that collated and passed comment on bids throughout the Merseyside region, 
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before sending them to the Home Office. The Government Office had a key 
role in shaping and submitting 'responsible' bids. The Office's desire to 
prioritise bids of 'strategic importance' was, it was felt, compromised by central 
government tendencies to use grants for CCTV to further their own political 
advantage. 
25 
The strategic vision for Liverpool developed through the Office was, it was felt, 
impeded by 'beating the law and order drum' at the national level alongside 
allocating funds to marginal constituencies in electoral terms. It was felt that 
competitive bidding for CCTV, although potentially useful particularly in 
setting up the system in Liverpool, was ideologically driven and could not be 
relied upon in the long term. Competitive bidding was seen as: 
... partly public relations and an expensive PR job at that. There have been many millions spent on CCTV through the bid 
process and this has levered significant sums of money from 
other sources. So there is an element of added value to it. It is 
just that the location of some of the funding could be questioned 
at a later stage (Home Office Advisor, [GOM] ). 
Local state managers often saw themselves as positive instigators of a 'politics 
of change' at the local level. However, this 'progressive' self-image was 
cynically contrasted to 'a politics of chance and opportunism' at the national 
level. However, the 'politics of change' was not always in conflict with 
6 national opportunism'. The two were married when CCTV was established in 
Liverpool in 1994, when local and national authorities were able to work 
2' As one interviewee stated: "We have to draw a distinction between a government strategy and 
manifesto commitments. These distinctions are unsubtle. The CCTV Challenge Competition 
has 
been patchy in its application. You have places like Bakewell, Kendall and Wigton getting 
fairly 
substantive chunks of funding for CCTV and no one on Merseyside getting anything. 
But these 
are Tory marginal seats" (Research Interview 1). 
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together to fund Liverpool's camera network and, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, legitimate it with reference to the murder of a local child. 
Central government competitive funds for CCTV, when granted, were viewed 
as a kick start in establishing strategies for local order and encouraging local 
players to add funds for such purposes. The funding of CCTV in Liverpool city 
centre and by implication its extension had, therefore, not been without its 
problems. The levering of local investment to maintain and extend CCTV is the 
subject of the next part of the chapter. 
Funding and levering local revenue 
There is a lot of good-will in terms of contributions for the 
cameras, but this is no way to run a business (The City Centre 
Manager, LCCP). 
The tensions discussed in the previous part of this chapter compounded issues 
of funding, specifically at the local level. As has already been stated earlier in 
the chapter, the key players in Liverpool grasped the opportunity of establishing 
a CCTV system without outside funding assistance in the absence of any long 
term funding plan. This had implications for the management and control of the 
system, to be discussed below. The LCCP was charged with the function of 
generating funds from local interests to secure long-term maintenance costs for 
CCTV in order to extend further installation. However, dipping into the local 
capital purse was not without its problems in terms of funding the camera 
network. Although widespread ideological support for the camera network 
existed among local businesses, this did not necessarily extend to financial 
support. Thus, although "the Liverpool City Centre Partnership proved that 
organisations would be prepared to divert funding towards establishing CCTV, 
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it could not easily sustain it" (Ibid). As the City Centre Manager stated, this was 
a source of frustration between sections of the business community and the 
LCCP: 
Part of the problem of funding for the City Centre Manager is 
having to go cap in hand and this is not good enough. You know, 
local businesses who pay rates ask 'why don't local government 
do it'? I call it the 'they syndrome' - 'they should do, they 
should do it'. That's not very helpful at all (Ibid). 
The battle to maintain local funding was centred on membership of the Stores' 
Committee. The E12,000 annual fee allowing access to the radio link was only 
available to those who could afford it, i. e., the larger retail outlets and 
businesses. These differentials in financial clout also extended to the ability to 
contribute to CCTV. The installation of each camera was costed at f-15,000 and 
the LCCP approached businesses to fund a camera. The funding process was 
made problematic by contradictions between local and national business 
interests. As one local business manager expressed it: 
I think there is a benefit to the city in having CCTV. If it is good 
for the city it is good for me as a businessman. If more people 
are coming into the city we all get a share of their custom. I took 
this point to my head office outside of Liverpool. We had 
already contributed to the capital funding of the system but, as 
far as revenue was concerned, I had to tell the LCCP 'sorry mate 
my boss said no'. I'm not saying this as a general point but my 
superiors will not go overboard in putting money into Liverpool 
when we pay high rates and they think the city has a history of 
mal-administration (Representative [2] of Stores' Committee). 
Others players, however, justified funding the cameras as it was a necessary 
feature of what they deemed to be good business practice: 
We can fund cameras in our domain. Being involved in the 
pavement caf6 culture means we want to be able to have tight 
control over anyone who gets up to mischief. So it will be very 
useful to us. It is a legitimate extension of our business interests 
and quite correctly we should pay for it and make contributions 
towards it (Private Developer [2], affiliated to LCCP). 
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The fractures within local capital led to intense debates regarding 
responsibilities for funding. As one interviewee stated, "it seems inequitable 
that other people who benefit may not necessarily be paying for it" 
(Representative of LCCP). Such comments were directed at businesses and 
police: 
If you think about what the CCTV system costs, the total 
revenue costs and you think, well, how many policemen is that? 
It is just a joke. The relative cost for CCTV is a lot, but it is just 
a drop in the ocean compared to a police car and they [the 
police] get more benefit from CCTV (Chairman, Stores' 
Committee). 
The LCCP also scorned the lack of financial input into the camera network 
because, as previously mentioned, "realistically it is a policing tool" (lbid) -a 
tool owned by the private sector but from which, as other key players observed, 
the police derived ideological and practical benefits. These issues impinged 
upon related debates concerning the management and control of CCTV. 
Management and control 
We make the point, and I think it is a very healthy one, that this 
is a separate and independent body. I think the worse thing is if 
the police had control of the system. I'm not saying anything 
improper would happen... but I think public perception and 
credibility is everything. Whilst we've got Mr and Mrs Bloggs 
on board, great (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). 
Whilst the 'independence' of the CCTV network was stressed by the LCCP, 
this masked deeper ambivalences around the management of CCTV both as a 
policing tool and as a marketable product, which needed to be sold 'properly'. 
For others in the network the positive notion of 'independence' was challenged 
by a concern that control of the system was unnecessarily ubiquitous and vague. 
The lack of 'detailed control' pointed to problems of ownership of the system: 
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At the moment responsibility for the system lies between the City Centre Manager and the private sector; the police and the City Council. Nobody owns it and everybody owns it. Everyone 
wants to promote it and nobody is actually promoting it. Nobody 
really seems to be championing the cause of CCTV in a clear 
and consistent way (Economic Development Officer, Liverpool 
City Council ). 
'Championing the cause of CCTV' pointed to a concern that its effectiveness - 
though apparent and agreed by all - needed to be marketed more aggressively. 
Such marketing needed to be directed at potential contributors to the system: 
CCTV is doing its work. The private interests behind it are quite 
progressive and, on the whole, very supportive because we have 
a long-term interest. Many others need to be convinced that they 
need to invest in this, year in year out. Funding can tend to dry 
up because people can't see the impact that CCTV is having on 
promoting the product of the city centre. It's a selling job. CCTV 
needs to be sold (Private Developer [I], affiliated to LCCP). 
Another player complained that CCTV had assumed "a hidden element" in the 
management of the city centre and that "this hybrid arrangement" regarding its 
oversight only contributed to downplaying its benefits (Ibid). The process of 
marketing CCTV and providing information as to its effectiveness was seen as 
a legitimate return for those contributing to the system: 
We would not expect full accountability for every camera in 
every street but we would legitimately expect something in 
relation to an investment. If the city is to make further inroads 
into private sector sponsorship they [LCCP] have got to show 
that the system is apprehending villains. We have to show what 
happens with CCTV, not just images of people before or after a 
misdemeanour have occurred (Private Developer [2], affiliated 
to LCCP). 
Trumpeting the benefits of CCTV, though, was not without its detractors, 
particularly if this form of selling its benefits took a more sensationalist twist in 
terms of publicity at national and international levels. The release and use of 
CCTV footage in press and broadcast media was not necessarily seen as a good 
thing regarding Liverpool: 
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The one thing about CCTV, which is a bad thing, is the crop of 
TV programmes using footage. It is interesting in talking to 
people who are involved in that because I think they miss the 
point. Sometime ago there was a programme with footage from 
Liverpool and someone said 'wasn't it good it was on W. It 
showed a man with a knife. Some of us think this is the last thing 
we want - portraying the image of what Liverpool is perceived 
to be. This kind of thing does more damage than any good that 
was done by CCTV. But peoples' egos get involved and they 
say; 'Oh aren't I clever I spotted this or I spotted that'. CCTV 
should never be used publicly, because it does more damage to 
the city (Private Developer [I], affiliated to LCCP). 
These tensions were managerial in nature and pointed to problems in presenting 
the CCTV network to important audiences. CCTV had to be managed in such a 
way so that each audience received the desired message. For the public, the 
system must be seen as 'credible'; for local capital, it must be perceived as 'cost 
effective'; and for potential outside investors, it must be seen as both of these 
things while also reinforcing the more general perception that Liverpool city 
centre as a whole was being managed effectively. The difficulties thrown up in 
managing the camera network highlighted a key problem for its supporters 
regarding how much visibility the system should have, and in what 
circumstances does high or low visibility become problematic? This was 
illustrated with the system's launch, when it was announced that the monitoring 
room was housed in a secret location in the city centre. The only people to 
know of the location were the private security monitors, the City Centre 
Manager and senior police officers. Security personnel could only contact the 
monitoring room by radio. Secrecy was thought necessary "in order to prevent 
sabotage and protect personnel" (The City Centre Manager, LCCP)- 
For others 
inside the security network the idea of secrecy was counterproductive: 
When the system was launched nobody was supposed to 
know 
where it was. All this 'we've got to keep it a secret' nonsense - 
the secret bunker! It is silly and over protective when you 
think 
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of the potential for these things to be misconceived. It's not big brother and we don't want people to think we are in a war zone here. We need a certain level of transparency about it and proper 
regulation, control and monitoring, none of which we really have. It's a situation where no one really knows what's going on (Economic Development Officer, Liverpool City Council). 
Embracing the system 
Although CCTV managers stressed the independence of the camera network, 
this was contradicted by concerns that the police were not as supportive as 
would have been liked. Thus, although "the credibility of the system is their 
[police] credibility - they take as much applause as we do", the police were 
again seen to be working to their own institutional agenda, which was seen to 
undercut the process of partnership: 
When we set the system up there were political issues around the 
police and their attitude to CCTV, which meant they could not 
pick up the initiative, nor would local government. Now that it 
has become accepted and proved itself - it is now the time. In 
fact it is long overdue for the police to actually embrace the 
system - adopt it, manage it and fund it alongside the LCCP 
(Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
For the police however, the CCTV system - though formally acknowledged and 
accepted - represented a shift away from one of their key institutional goals: an 
increase in funding and manpower. As one police officer commented: 
I will say there is the will in the police force. The police have a 
problem with the question of 'will the cameras replace peopleT 
They cannot win because when we get more cameras they will 
be asked to save money through loss of manpower. The police 
on occasion have used the 'Big Brother' argument but really it's 
about the politics of funding. The bottom line is the police 
believe they may become less visible with CCTV; they will 
become more of a prevention force (Home Office Advisor, 
[GOM]). 
For these reasons, the police in Liverpool were described as being "at arms 
length with the system" (The City Centre Manager, LCCP). Although the police 
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were involved in the bidding stage and the location of the cameras they also 
expressed an ambivalence directed at the central policy making process: 
In my experience of 22 years in the police you can do a far better job by being in a place than by looking at it through a camera. The deterrent effect by a physical presence is greater than that of CCTV. I'm not overtly enthusiastic about CCTV. I see it as a tool in the armoury but not the be all and end all. This is not a 
view shared by some ministers, unfortunately (Superintendent, 
Merseyside Police [GOM]). 
This contradiction fed directly into tensions mentioned earlier. Fears of police 
downsizing were purported to be at the nub of the police 'over playing' 'serious 
crime' and public order problems in Liverpool. On the other hand, giving a 
higher profile to these policing issues undermined the regeneration process in 
constructing Liverpool as a 'dangerous place' and one that was under-policed. 
For the police therefore, conflict also rose between the idea of the caf6 culture 
and order in the streets. On the one hand, this culture was thought to bring 
economic benefits to those investors in the service sector while, on the other 
hand, simultaneously generating disorder in the form of, for example, 
drunkenness. Thus the extension of legitimate business interests central to the 
regeneration process was also seen to promote sites of potential street disorder. 
This factor was highlighted most forcefully by the police for whom 
'regeneration' brought with it potentially negative scenarios. As one 
interviewee put it: 
"We've got to manage it [ ... ]. We recognise that we might 
actually see a rise in levels of recorded crime if the renaissance 
is successful [ ... ]. It 
is part of a trade off. The benefits of the 
vibrant twenty-four hour economy on the one hand balanced 
against the downside of more crime, more drug abuse and 
drunkenness" (Ibid). 
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Leadership 
The tensions among the key players in the regeneration process highlighted the 
salience of image and the promotion of a positive reputation for Liverpool. 
These concerns took in a wide variety of issues that dovetailed with the 
problem of responsibility for city centre rule. In this sense, businesses and 
developers readily articulated a frustration aimed at the City Council who were 
perceived as being not as enthusiastic about economic development as the 
private sector and as failing to take a leading role: 
We have to look at the negative images of this city and ask why 
people do not come here and why do the big investors not come 
here. There are issues about what happens in this city - how it is 
run. There are simple things like the state of the streets, the state 
of the pavements. We pay the highest business rates in the 
country and we seem to get some of the worst services. I was in 
York yesterday and Leeds two days before. They pay less rates 
than us but have masses of investment going into the cities and 
most importantly these places are spotless (Regeneration Co- 
ordinator, Liverpool City Council). 
Difficulties were also expressed regarding attracting particular retailers to the 
city centre who felt that doing business in Liverpool would be bad for their 
image. The negative sense of place was not only attributed to potential retailers 
but also to potential theatre patrons, shoppers and tourists. The identification of 
a leadership vacuum set in motion intense debates towards achieving greater 
clarity in managing the city centre and imbuing it with strategic direction. For 
the LCCP, financial maintenance of CCTV was tied in with broader issues to do 
with general street management: 
We need a powerful body. The LCCP can remain along with the 
City Centre Manager but they need a more powerful body with a 
powerful figurehead with responsibilities for: one, raising funds 
for the long term along with: two, the city council, who need 
think more long term than that. I know we've already got a 
problem with high council tax and rates, but a service charge 
needs to be set up where we could establish a pool in the region 
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of El million per annum. This would ensure the marketing of 
this city is backed, by ensuring total street management - clean 
streets, empty bins and secure the tenure for CCTV 
(Representative of LCCP). 
Another interviewee, who expressed the need to harness more effectively senior 
contact points and inter-institutional funding differences, echoed this: 
It is like the City Centre Partnership. It needs to be bigger and 
raise its profile with someone powerful to bring that about. We 
all talk about under resourcing but all these agencies have got 
budgets of some description but they all seem to tail off at some 
unknown point. It is like the spokes and the hub, only there is 
not really a hub in Liverpool (Chairman, Stores' Committee). 
The tensions that arose from aspects of policing and sustaining revenue funding 
plugged directly into debates about management of the city centre. In this sense, 
the establishment of the City Centre Manager was perceived as a stepping-stone 
by which the private sector could consolidate its power in the city centre along 
the lines of American style Business Improvement Districts (BIDS). 
ii. Tensions on the ground 
Police and Crime Alert 
Tensions between personnel directly involve .d in managing and staffing the 
security network were also expressed. As with the issues identified above, these 
tensions provided potentially insoluble problems as much as created 
opportunities for the development and creative extension of the work of 
partnership networks. The manifestation of these tensions was found 
in three 
main areas; police and private security relations; the problem of 
discipline 
among security personnel; and, finally, crime displacement. 
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As discussed earlier in this chapter, a key function of Crime Alert was to act as 
a pressure group upon the police to encourage them to act against problems 
identified by retailers. Shoplifting, Big Issue vendors and street traders 
represented the major problems in this respect. On the latter two issues, the 
police felt limited in what they could do and expressed concern at having to 
listen to 'griping' about issues that they felt were outside their remit: 
We understand the stores point of view but they tend to confuse 
what is actionable in a criminal sense and what is, from their 
view, a pain in the backside. Street trading used to be a police 
matter before it was licensed - okay in the old days we could 
move them on - make it difficult for them to operate. What it 
boils down to is the Stores' Committee do not like street traders 
in the middle of Church Street, selling products cheaper than 
they are. We can do very little about that because they are 
licensed other than argue they may cause an obstruction. This is 
more a public image matter rather than a police or criminal 
matter (City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside 
Police). 
The police acted as an organ of discipline upon Crime Alert. This involved 
processes towards structuring police involvement based "not on people 
moaning to the police but hard, transferable information" (Ibid). The police role 
in Crime Alert had run along educational lines. Aspects of policing carried out 
by Crime Alert members have to be underpinned by training and advice from 
the police: 
If Crime Alert highlights particular problems then part of my 
function is to go in there and say 'look do you want to discuss 
this, do you want a training session on the law, do you want a 
training session on people with aggressionT That is part of our 
function although some stores provide their own training. The 
main problem we find with Crime Alert is the paperwork side of 
it. Some of the statements we get are not up to what we require 
in court. Often we have to go down and re-interview witnesses. 
The evidence is there but they have not quite got the literal skills 
to deal with that side of it, to put it together in a statement that is 
acceptable in court (Ibid). 
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The police role in providing advice on aspects of law and training to handle 
aggressive situations was often seen as a frustrating task, but was also seen as to 
be in the interests of the police as it is they who are responsible for putting files 
together for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): "we don't want to look as 
though we don't know how to put a case together" (Chairman, Crime Alert). 
For the police, the encouragement of greater 'professionalism' within the 
security network provided some frustration. 
For members of Crime Alert, the evidential process caused difficulties but 
underlined their greater sense of frustration aimed at police and courts for not 
taking a tougher stance against categories of shoplifters. These fell into three 
main types: the professional, the opportunist and the drug addict. 
Any person on a second offence caught shoplifting is then 
banned from a store. This is where we get into problems with the 
CPS because in theory a person who has been banned from a 
store and who comes back in to the store is trespassing. If he is 
trespassing and then steals he is actually committing an act of 
burglary, but the police or the CPS will not bring a charge of 
burglary because they say that tends to prove previous bad 
character which cannot be brought out until he is found guilty of 
the offence for which he is charged. It's a Catch 22 (Security 
Manager [I], Crime Alert). 
The process of working in Crime Alert was described as a "cat and mouse 
game" where "we tiresomely see the same old faces" (op. cit. ). The group had 
been campaigning for stronger sentences against shoplifters in order for them to 
be banned from the city centre or all stores within the centre as part of their bail 
condition or sentencing. For one interviewee, the failure of the courts to give 
44 meaningful sentences" and "the dismal showing of police manpower on the 
streets, has a knock-on effect on the morale of Crime Alert members" 
(Security 
Manager [2], Crime Alert). However, the group has not been totally inactive in 
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combating its problems. Of particular concern was the identification of people 
who were banned from shops or had been issued Trespass Notices. Stills from 
in-store CCTV and external footage were distributed to help private security 
identify potential and known shoplifters thought to be in the area. In this way, 
Crime Alert was able to "make it difficult for them to move, keep them 
twitching over their shoulders so they think 'sod this I'm not staying round 
here"' (Security Manager [3], Crime Alert). 
Police scepticism toward working with some elements within the private 
security industry was also in evidence: 
They do have a fairly mixed bunch here in tenns of experience 
and practice in the security field. But that's the situation - some 
are ex-army or with no authoritative experience at all. Others are 
from established security firms, vetted and trained. But you 
know you are not talking to a uniform bunch - some are probably 
in it for the wrong reasons, looking like street fighters. Some are 
claiming benefits and working... others are more professional. 
The problem is a lack of regulation in this industry - they are 
badly paid and some have dodgy backgrounds (City Centre 
Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police ). 
This extended to worries expressed by police officers over the handling of 
intelligence by private security: 
There is one thing that has always been a contentious issue in 
this grey area. That is giving photographs to non-police 
personnel. We are the legal authority and they have more limited 
powers so we are working towards Crime Alert taking on the 
responsibility of collating and distributing photo files which we 
can have access to. I don't think the police should be handing 
out photos to God knows who. It's also like we are saying 'do 
our job'. Which they can't. we have to be more careful with our 
intelligence (Ibid, emphasis added). 
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Network discipline 
The process of handling, swapping and collating intelligence within Crime 
Alert was, as part of its function, a means to engender discipline upon private 
security personnel regarding what their work entailed on any particular day. 
However, keeping members of Crime Alert 'alert' as to what and whom they 
were meant to be targeting was not without its problems and caused frustration 
for security managers. For managers, this pointed to gaps in the system due to 
"human error" which manifested itself on the airwaves of the radio link. Radios 
therefore were often used "inappropriately" (Security Manager [11, Crime 
Alert). At a Crime Alert meeting, the chair relayed a story to those assembled to 
illustrate his frustration regarding the need to maintain radio discipline: 
The other day one of our number alerted the CCTV control room 
to a group of youths roaming in town, clearly up to no good and 
doing some swiping. When it was decided to call the police in 
we lost visual contact because of radio interference. We can't 
tolerate this and use of radios for personal use has to stop. It 
wastes police time and the time of the boys in the control room. 
Anyone caught blocking radio messages gets their fingers 
chopped off! (Field Notes). 
'Blocking' referred to security personnel chatting over the network. This meant 
using the radio in a distracting manner to talk about, and track, women through 
the city centre, football, and up-and-coming leisure activities. Allied to this 
problem was the fact that subscriptions for the 60 radios were not always paid 
up and some of them would go missing. Threats to confiscate radios and 
barring 
deviants from the network were not uncommon at Crime Alert meetings. Lack 
of professionalism was also a criticism from outside Crime Alert. 
There were 
some store security personnel who were linked to the radio network who would 
not attend Crime Alert meetings because of what they perceived 
to be its 
unprofessional nature. Although in agreement with the necessity of 
information 
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swapping and the role of Crime Alert as a useful early warning system, the 
meetings themselves were criticised as being "an open forum for people to get 
11 shot of frustrations' . 
To work in the city you should need qualifications rather than 
just walk in off the street, be given a radio - which is voiced 
across the city - and start talking rubbish on it. Some have had 
no formal training; they've been thrust into it. What they do only 
drags us all down (Research Interview, 18). 
Not all security managers wanted to associate with Crime Alert because of "off- 
putting uniforms" and "untidy guards" (Ibid). Perceptions of different standards 
of professionalism divided those on the network. 
Displacement of crime and expansion of the CCTV security network 
The acceptance and utilisation of CCTV within processes of order maintenance 
has within itself produced a form of logic for its own expansion. Concerns 
about the displacement of crime and disorder also produced a source of tension 
amongst key players involved in establishing CCTV schemes in the city 
centre. 26 Tensions were apparent among the wider business community within 
two years of the establishment of CCTV in Liverpool city centre. The cameras 
were seen to be having a displacement effect in Allerton, an affluent suburb 
lying 3 miles south of the city centre. The Allerton Traders' Association 
identified the city centre camera network as the reason for increases in thefts, 
and argued that retailers in the area faced mounting problems in terms of 
finding and funding more advanced forms of security to combat these issues 
26 The problem of the displacement of crime to areas that lie outside of camera coverage 
has been 
officially recognised as a potential negative impact of CCTV schemes (Home 
Office, 1994: 9). 
Among critical commentators, displacement of crime to relatively 'unprotected' areas will 
reinforce existing social polarisation in that CCTV is "likely to displace crime 
from rich to poorer 
parts of cities" (Graham, 1998: 100). 
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(Merseymart, 7 March, 1996). While displacement has become a concern for 
many of those who comment on CCTV, there has been less analysis conducted 
on the contradictions and tensions within and between local business coalitions 
in managing 'insecurity'. Also, any implications arising from the displacement 
of crime for expanding surveillance and security networks has received little 
attention. In Liverpool the issue of displacement in the form of 'travelling 
shoplifters' illustrated this issue and pointed to how public and private policing 
agencies across the urban centre are increasingly having to find ways of 
coordinating their efforts against what one interviewee described as "flying 
wrongdoers" (Chairman, Crime Alert). Thus local partnerships began to 
coordinate their work, which was taking on an extra-local dimension: 
At a recent meting I spoke to a security manager in Birkenhead 
who happened to mention that a lot of Liverpool scallies were 
getting picked up in Birkenhead. That got us thinking and we 
made inquiries in North Wales and other towns and cities. It 
became apparent that shoplifters and even beggars were moving 
around - out of Liverpool - because of our CCTV and the work 
of Crime Alert. We helped Birkenhead set up something similar 
to our system because it was becoming blatantly obvious our 
thieves were travelling. So if our thieves were travelling to the 
likes of Sheffield, Leeds and Wrexham then their thieves must 
be going somewhere. We realised they were coming to us 
because our operatives and security didn't recognise them. 
That's how it stared. We now have regular meetings of up to 50 
or 60 people from all over the region; police, private security and 
CCTV operators. It's a way of swapping information on who is 
travelling, where and with whom and finding out how we can 
target them. It is a way of us getting to know who is coming to 
our area and who we are exporting to other areas (Security 
Manager [2], Crime Alert). 
Sharing information across networks included passing names, addresses and 
photographs of known and potential criminals. This information could then be 
used to monitor and restrict movement between places. For example, such 
information on travelling groups and individuals had been passed to British 
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Transport Police in Liverpool so they can feed back to Crime Alert regarding 
who was entering or leaving the city. Although initially a source of tension, the 
issue of displacement helped to extend and intensify the work of security 
networks within different locations. 27 The success of these initiatives was 
measured in terms of the greater power conferred by collaboration in 
information exchange and surveillance, so that those targeted "get tired of 
trying to dodge us; they feel harassed and go elsewhere" (Chairman, Crime 
Alert). The obvious tensions between inter-local collaboration and, at the same 
time, the displacement of 'troublemakers' to other locations formed a central 
contradiction in the operation of the security network. This was a contradiction 
that fed itself: 
We are working towards an attitude of 'not on our patch' and 
information exchange helps in deterring troublemakers coming 
in to the city. But if we are successful they only go to other 
similar patches for our colleagues to have to deal with. So we 
send them more information to help get rid of them and 
eventually they may end up back with us (City Centre Crime 
Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police ). 
Such arguments and frustrations expressed by Liverpool security managers fed 
into the more general desire for more security and surveillance in the city 
centre. The 'success' of the system and the continual discovery of 'blind spots' 
or gaps in the network fed calls for extensions, fine-tuning and greater 
sophistication of the overall network. These calls from Crime Alert personnel 
for extending and refining the network came together with the aspirations of 
senior regeneration personnel for the same end. These desires for the future 
27 This has taken place alongside concerted efforts by local business-led networks to intensify 
surveillance and the evidence gathering process in order to pressure local magistrates to increase 
fines and sentences for those who have broken exclusion orders (The Guardian, 19 November, 
1997). More recently, 'Exclusion Notice Schemes' have been developed for the greater collation 
of intelligence that can keep targets on file indefinitely and be used in gaining stiffer sentences in 
the case of thieves (Dobie, 2000: 25). 
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expansion of CCTV can be qualitatively distinguished: the former emerged 
from a 'hands on' experience of working the system, whilst the new primary 
definers took their cues for network expansion from wider political and 
economic considerations that underpinned their ideas of a proper and orderly 
regeneration. In this sense, the development of the CCTV network generated 
further perceptions of insecurity ('blind spots', 'escape routes'), which, in turn, 
fuelled calls for more security that would cover more areas of city centre and 
outlying space. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the empirical material gathered during the course of 
the research in order to examine the aims of this thesis in tracing the 
development of social control within a neo-liberal state form. Building on a 
theoretical understanding of this state form (discussed in Chapter Three), its 
role in building the 'entrepreneurial city' (explored in Chapter Five), and its 
development in Liverpool (discussed in Chapter Seven), this chapter has traced 
the development of the camera network in Liverpool and understood it as part 
of these wider processes that have defined and articulated underlying features 
of local social order. In so doing, the CCTV network has been placed within a 
wider set of social relations and frameworks of political power that have been 
understood as processes that the camera network has both reflected and 
reinforced. This, it has been noted, has not been an unproblernatic process 
for 
senior managers in the neo-liberal state. Tensions regarding the 
instigation of 
social control practices have been subject to negotiation and compromise. 
However, the formation of the camera network in Liverpool and the negotiation 
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of a social ordering strategy have been characteristic, of and given direction to, 
the circuits of power in a neo-liberal strategy of rule. In building upon 
arguments in the previous chapter, this chapter has focused upon the degree of 
ideological unity in these processes that gave the camera network a social 
meaning. It was also argued that identifying, in ideological terms, the problems 
for order was far less problematic than establishing, in a managerial sense, the 
means to achieve it. The next, and final, chapter will conclude the thesis in 
drawing together the central themes and issues raised within it in order to 
discuss the interpretation of contemporary social control practices. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
lain Bundred's whole life is a movie. Every step he takes is captured 
on unseen cameras as secret watchers see his life unfold. It may 
seem like a plot for Jim Careys's Hollywood hit The Truman Show. 
But this is the reality in Liverpool today, not just for lain but for all 
of us. [ ... ]. The watchers do not care how we live our lives, as long 
as we stay within the law. But the pickpocket, the mugger, the 
armed robber, or the drunken driver knows that those hidden eyes 
are out there. Today the Echo takes you behind the scenes to show 
you a day in the life of an ordinary Merseyside citizen, through the 
eyes of the CCTV cameras (Liverpool Echo, I September, 2000). 
The 'story' above which covers "a day in the life of an ordinary Merseyside 
citizen" was told using closed circuit television (CCTV) stills which showed Ian 
Bundred, smartly dressed in suit and tie, as he went about his normal daily routine. 
Iain, in his car, was captured: going to work; entering the office; at work at his 
desk; doing a spot of shopping on his lunch break; buying a paper in a newsagents; 
driving out of the city on his way home; going back into the city by train for the 
evening; buying a ticket at a theatre; having a drink in a caf6-bar; and, finally, on 
his way home by train at 11.15pm. The story of lain as told in the local newspaper 
evoked the 'responsiblised citizen' for its readers, as someone who has "nothing to 
fear" from visual surveillance and cares not for outmoded arguments concerned 
with "invasions of privacy" (lbid). lain, a "volunteer" for this Echo "investigation", 
like the central character in The Truman Show was "astounded" to learn that his 
every move was caught on camera. Unlike Jim Carey's incarnation, however, he 
more optimistically retorted, "it does make you feel safe" (Ibid). In Liverpool the 
press have played a central role in "representing order" understood as a 
"morality. 
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procedural form and social hierarchy" that is both symbolically and visually 
persuasive (Ericson et al, 1991: 1). The 'responsible citizen' presented in the article 
mirrored the idealised consumer-worker befitting of a 'new' urban sensibility as 
articulated by the city renaissance managers discussed in Chapter Seven. The 
mundane and seemingly disinterested discourses of responsibility have 
underpinned the wider social ordering strategy, of which CCTV has played a key 
role and that this thesis has explored. 
This responsibilisation strategy has been reinforced as Chapters Two and Three 
illustrated by the contested relationship between three key domains: social control, 
the nature of power and social order. This thesis has argued that the relations 
between these three domains remain critical. In this sense, the thesis has sought to 
understand the materiality of Liverpool's surveillance network as part of a project 
of regeneration and social ordering within a city that has rescaled its institutional 
power to act. The thesis has therefore sought to explore the surveillance network 
not for its effectiveness in reducing categories of crime, but in terms of how it has 
been located and utilised within wider social relations. In other words, CCTV has 
been analysed for its qualitative dimensions as a vehicle of social ordering. As a 
local case study the thesis has made no claims towards generalisation, although, as 
the discussion in Chapter Four indicated, it has presented a set of empirical data 
that has sought to contribute to wider theoretical arguments concerning the nature 
of power, social order and social control in contemporary cities. 
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In light of the literature on social control, and in critical response to it, this thesis 
has argued its case within a series of analytical concerns outlined in Chapters Four 
and Five, and illustrated in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Firstly, CCTV has been understood as a contemporary form of social control, 
which has been located within an understanding of state institutions discussed in 
Chapter Three. Therefore, CCTV has been analysed as a tool in the reordering of 
power through the local neo-liberal state. Power in Liverpool was not analysed in 
isolated segments, as either 'private' or public', but as the outcome of term setting 
alliances between and across these shifting domains. The ideological and material 
terms established through these alliances underpinned strategies for sovereign 
control over city centre space. Thus CCTV played an important part in excavating 
a form of sovereign territorial control. 
Secondly, CCTV has been explored as a normative strategy of social control. In 
other words, it has been understood as a practice of contemporary social ordering 
geared toward an ideologically motivated cleansing of the streets of Liverpool city 
centre. In doing this, the thesis has thus offered a correction to neo-Foucauldian 
approaches, which have prioritised the technical over the normative in this field. 
Thirdly, and related to the above, CCTV has been explored within the material and 
ideological context of its emergence - namely within the 'entrepreneurial' 
forms of 
rule identified in Chapter Five. Within the research process this involved 'studying 
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up' in order to identify the locally powerful, to assess the meanings they attribute 
to the objects of their power, and to understand how they initiated a 
responsibilisation process in order to coordinate partnerships. 
Fourthly, in light of the historical material pertaining to Liverpool in Chapter Six, 
CCTV in the city has been understood as marking historical continuities in the 
power to consolidate social divisions and define and target problem groups thought 
to hinder projects for socially ordered space. CCTV has not been understood as 
denoting a wholesale shift in the strategies of social control. In other words, the 
normative demarcation of social space found in the nineteenth century city has a 
contemporary correspondence with the processes of articulating the proper objects 
of partnership power discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
In concluding the thesis this chapter will reflect upon and draw together the central 
arguments made in the preceding chapters. Thus what follows will consider the 
research and its contribution to the acadernic debates in the interpretation of 
contemporary social control. 
The research process focused upon the locally powerful within a neo-liberal state 
form and the attendant ideologies that informed the meanings attributed to urban 
space and form. A central claim has been made for the understanding of social 
ordering practices as both technical and moral-ideological in character. 
Thus 
CCTV and associated ordering initiatives have been situated within the 
discourses 
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of renaissance and censure articulated by the locally powerful. In arguing against a 
strict separation between these two - the technical and the ideological - aspects of 
social control in contemporary societies the thesis returned to an understanding of 
social control, identified in Chapter Two, as "a metaphor for pragmatic thinking 
about morality and social solidarity in times of acute social tension" (Sumner, 
1997b: 6-7). Also discussed in that chapter was Durkheim's notion that construed 
social control as unproblematically reflective of popular sentiment. As the opening 
quote to this chapter illustrated, the Durkheirnian view of social control would be 
acknowledged, and made welcome, within the official discourses that have sought 
to present technologies of rule, such as CCTV, as expressive of the public interest 
and demonstrative of 'community empowerment'. However, legal, technical or 
state forms of control, as later theorists suggested, "do not simply 'express' such 
sentiments - they also seek to transform and shape them in accordance with a 
particular vision of society" (Garland, 1990: 54). Similarly, studies directed at 
contemporary 'governmentalities' or so-called risk orientated management 
strategies have been indicative of a view of social control without 'the social' 
element; in their depictions of 'post-disciplinary' control techniques and/or 
individually manifest 'mentalities' of 'freedom'. Earlier derivatives of the neo- 
Foucauldian approach strongly suggested the impossibility of holistic, 
universalising or, what this work would prefer to call, 'totalising' theoretical 
understandings of contemporary "control societies" (Rose, 2000: 325). This 
detachment of control strategies from centres of power and ideological frameworks 
was thought useful for the avoidance of crude 'functionalism' and 'reductionism', 
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but as this thesis has illustrated any such detachment fails to account for the 
normative aspects of power, control and their location. Indeed, it was these 
normative and ideological aspects of power that guided the 'diffusion' of tasks and 
responsibilities to 'responsible" partners in the regeneration process. ' Moreover, 
there has been "a tendency among risk theorists to overstate the importance of cold, 
actuarial calculus as the determining form of responding to system breakdown" 
(Rigakos, 1999: 145) within what this thesis has identified as social ordering 
strategies. In thinking about the normative nature of order alongside, and not as an 
alternative to, techniques involved in the regulation of social space, CCTV, it was 
argued, has to be analysed as more than just a piece of crime prevention technology 
and instead situated as a vehicle for reproducing and sustaining a particular social 
order, one that embodied a complex nexus of commercial as well as ideological 
and moral imperatives. In the construction of a local "regime of truth" (to borrow 
Foucault's phrase, 1985: 93) or 'a politics of truth', the locally powerful were 
engaged in a process of defining problems, of a normative and technical nature, 
that hindered a particular governmental programme. Thus the reinforcement of 
particular and established definitions of crime; the privileging of 'public' 
discourses of risk over 'private' and the marginalisation of other dangers in the 
urban environment (including sexual and racial harassment, insecurities generated 
by homelessness, pollution in the urban realm and white collar crime), were part of 
I The term 'diffusion' suggests a pluralisation of power, though, as this thesis has argued, the 
'diffusion' of power in Liverpool has been strategically coordinated in a manner that 
has reflected and 
reinforced established power relations. Thus changes, instigated through partnerships, In the structure 
and objects of city centre rule, have inaugurated a refinement and not a transformation in 
the 
ideological and political centres of power. 
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this process and can be understood as having operationalised, in the 'public 
interest', a local truth-claiming strategy. The articulation of these discourses was 
illustrated in Chapters Eight and Nine, through an examination of the ideological 
outlooks of the locally powerful and the attendant security network. The powerful 
linkages between various local 'expert' domains within the neo-liberal state were 
nil able, albeit not without internal conflict, to articulate a vision for the city that 
encompassed an idealised citizenry and a desired urban utility. Chapter Seven 
explored how, in general terms, threats deemed to hinder the renaissance project 
were constructed and articulated. In 'studying up' and casting a gaze upon the 
locally powerful, the thesis challenged notions of the 'risk society' that have 
dernaterialised processes involved in the power to define risk and 'public safety' 
These definitional processes were bound up with attempts to align strategically the 
players in the partnership programme itself. 
This thesis has argued that the quest for a form of 'joined up' social ordering 
within Liverpool was itself a dilemma and predicament of strategic importance that 
focused the minds of regeneration managers who, faced with scarce funds, 
fractured budgets and a feeling of being let down by local and central governments, 
defined and rescaled their own power to act within the process of urban 
restructuring. They strove for and inaugurated 'joined up' governmental 
programmes as a means of overcoming peculiar tensions and perceptions of 
mistrust between agencies at the local level. In this sense, the quest 
for 'joined up' 
governing was integral to the process of responsibilisation - of 
defining who and 
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what were to be included as relevant to the social ordering strategy. Furthermore, 
these processes can be understood as integral to state rescaling which illustrate 
shifts in authority over physical space. 
Both the responsibilisation strategy and targeted, 'hot-spot' policing fall under the 
remit of the Crime and Disorder Act, discussed in Chapter Five, with its emphasis 
on partnership building, auditing and more 4 effective, pinpointed policing. What 
this thesis has argued is that the trajectory and meaning of responsibilisation has 
been developed within the networks of the new primary definers. In setting the 
parameters of urban rule, the locally powerful have generated particular images and 
categories of dangerousness which target the economically marginalized as a group 
who appeared "unable to learn the lesson that neo-liberalism now expects of its 
subjects" (Pratt,, 1997: 181). Such lessons in 'civility' and 'responsibility' were 
discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine. A self-defined remit of those directing the 
responsibilisation process, as Chapters Eight and Nine illustrated, was to identify, 
manage and contain 'the locally dangerous' under the gaze of the city centre 
security network. 2 
In sum, the quest for 'making partnerships work' can be thought through as 
highlighting issues in the agency and manoeuvrability of the local state which has 
been less diminished and more redirected through novel institutional and 
2 'Responsibilisation' was understood in Chapter Three as a political process conducted through neo- 
liberal networks engaged in assigning authority to accredited bodies as a forerunner to 
implementing 
agreed social ordering measures. This process was seen to prescribe a public interest through 
forging a 
discourse that promoted a particular vision for 'the city as a whole'. 
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ideological networks towards the creation and management of social and physical 
spaces. 3 The exponential growth and development of CCTV provision and the 
discourses that have accompanied it have provided evidence of the endurance of 
sovereign forms of state power over territory. 
Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Three, and contrary to some aspects of neo- 
Foucauldian approaches, claims over sovereignty have been reconfigured within 
the rescaled state. Chapter Seven provided empirical material to show how a range 
of locally powerful actors articulated their visions for the city centre of Liverpool. 
The public-private partnerships that have underpinned CCTV have, as this thesis 
has argued, been engaged in setting the ideological and material limits and 
possibilities for social sovereignty. As argued in Chapter Four, social control 
practices need to be analysed for the normative prescriptions that underpin them. It 
is these normative frameworks that lead into an exploration of sovereignty. In other 
words, issues arose between partners over 'who runs the city' and of how 
articulations for an ordered urban realm could serve as a rationale for rule over 
territory. Exploring these issues challenged the governmentality literature for its 
descriptive and overly technical focus and its reluctance to move beyond what 
some have referred to as neutral observation (Rigakos, 1999; Garland, 1997). This 
has been the result of a failure to examine the normative dimensions of 
contemporary social control -a failure to materialise and place control 
discourses 
and practices within particular social relations, and therefore explore as central the 
3 Such spaces have been constructed with concerns of 'civility' and a certain 
'quality of life' at their 
core. 
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normative claims to sovereignty over a physical and symbolic space. Indeed, others 
have framed this in terms of a de-politicisation process that has enshrined the 
contemporary 'managerial state' (Clarke and Newman, 1997). The technicist and 
managerial discourses emanating from this state have, in many instances, been 
incorporated into theorisations of risk. 
The construction and targeting of the historical and contemporary 'proper objects 
of power', identified in Chapters Six and Seven, have demonstrated continuity 
through processes of 'social defence' within the urban centre. 4 Allied to this 
targeting process has been the intensification in repressive and coercive state 
practices, explicitly rejected in some governmentality studies as unnecessary for 
managing socia or er (Barry et al, 1996). This thesis has located CCTV not as an 
alternative to 'state control', but as interrelated with other practices of social 
ordering - including the intensification of military forms of policing which have 
proliferated during the late 1990s in Liverpool particularly, and more generally in 
cities in both in the UK and the USA. 5 The visibility of public order policing - 
particularly in its more acute paramilitary guises - does not, as Chapter Seven 
demonstrated, always sit easily with the more broadly conceived project of urban 
renaissance as envisaged by key partnership players. 6 The thesis has therefore 
4 As Rigakos stated, cannot these processes of constructing enemies "be necessary and routine"? He 
cautioned scholars "not to misread risk systems as operating on a separate or detached logic from 
unscientific' impulses such as racism, heterosexism, classicism ... " (Rigakos, 
1999: 146). 
5 Others have commented on this interrelationship such as Coleman and Sim, (1998), Parenti. (1999) 
and Herbert, (1999). 
6 Coercive displays of rule, however, have sat alongside a local and national language of 
'war on 
crime' that constructs 'yob cultures' and un-aesthetical urban wastelands in 
both the UK and USA 
(Parenti, 1999; Garland, 1996). In Liverpool, the targeted deployment of militaristic policing to 
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highlighted continuities in social control practices which belie any 'clean break' 
with an 'older penology' in terms of both those groups targeted and the ideological 
basis of that targeting. For the purposes of neo-liberal state rule the reclamation of 
city centre space was underpinned by discourses of moral abjection and corrective 
severity. 7 
On balance, contemporary risk theorists have operated within an implicit 
demarcation between institutional forms and their supposed polar mentalities. 
Thus, the state has been depicted as the pole of retribution/coercion and non-state 
agencies as the pole of instrumentalism/risk (Shearing, 2001). As this thesis has 
argued, there can be no easy separation here in terms of exclusivity of institutional 
forms or 'mentalities'. As discussed in Chapter Seven, private agencies have not 
been solely directed by a risk mentality and have utilised a language of moral 
condemnation in order to pressure formal criminal justice agencies to 'get tough' 
on problems relevant for them. Furthermore, another assumption can also be 
questioned regarding whether "the mechanisms of coercion within criminal justice 
[will] come to be seen less as a device for inflicting pain and more as set of 
resources to be considered in reducing risk" (Shearing, 2001: 217). On the 
contrary, the components of spatial reordering need to be analysed in dialectical 
defined 'hot spots', along with the racialised use of stop and search and the development of 'yob 
maps', have maintained a central role in local social ordering (Coleman, Sim and Whyte, 2002). 
7 As argued elsewhere, "modern penal severity" has been, and continues to be, central to "modern 
states' development". Furthermore, "as tools of governance ... measures of repression, containment, 
reclamation or exclusion reappear in remarkably similar forms, remarkably intact in both justification 
and procedure, when social and political change creates a space for their application" (Brown, 2002: 
32). 
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interrelation and as belonging to a strategy of social ordering, not always uniform 
and coherent. This thesis has explored those processes that have constructed the 
legitimate and 'safe' uses of public space and of how the proper objects of 
partnership power came to identify social categories as 'deserving' of exclusionary, 
sometimes oppressive, monitoring. These processes of social censure, along with 
definitions of responsibility, have, it was argued, been framed within the rescaled 
state form in Liverpool, and as such point to the necessity of retaining a focus on 
shifts in state form and power. For one writer the state remains central for thinking 
n, k auOUt the operation of power and challenges to it: 
... it is exactly through the state (at what ever scale) that the 
position and role of the citizen and his/her relationship with society 
is defined, institutionalised and, on occasion, contested and 
challenged [ ... ]. If we are concerned with formulating emancipatory 
policies and strategies, the state and other forms of governance 
remain key areas for challenging processes of exclusion and 
disempowerment (Sywngedouw, 1996,1502, emphasis added) 
The shifts identified in Chapter Five towards partnership rule in the urban setting 
have linked urban renaissance, 'quality of life', and crime and disorder. These 
linkages can be understood as situated within, and characteristic of, state rescaling. 
Maintaining a theoretical focus on the state has enabled this thesis, firstly, to 
identify the condensation of power and strategies of coordination and formalisation 
involved in state formation and, secondly, to identify the fractures and 
contradictions within these processes. Issues of coordination and strategic direction 
in the process of orchestrating partnerships were analysed in Chapter Seven as 
attributes of state rescaling itself. Understanding these processes has necessitated a 
contingent analysis that has stressed the heterogeneity of state structures and 
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action, which, in terms of the analysis presented in this thesis, has included an 
exploration of the tensions and contradictions between state institutions and actors. 
Within the governmentality literature explored in Chapter Two, CCTV can be 
understood as helping to create public spaces for 'free', 'responsible' consumer 
orientated citizens who independently choose their autonomous role in the life of 
the city. Such analyses have run conterminous with official discourses that have 
provided legitimacy for CCTV as an empowering' technology that has enabled 
consumers to have the "freedom and safety to shop" (Home Office, 1994: 9). As 
the thesis has argued this discourse has ignored the material context within which 
these developments have taken place. The power to promote and redefine a 
'responsible citizenry' can be seen as indicators of a new politics of legitimacy 
processed within, and aiding the reproduction of, a rescaled state. Keeping 'Mr and 
Mrs Bloggs on board' with local entrepreneurial initiatives was a key concern of 
the interviewees in this thesis, and underlined the importance they attached to a re- 
channelled decision-making process that has set a course beyond democratic 
structures as conceived for local government in the post war period. 8 
Within Liverpool, the process of promoting business and consumer confidence was 
set alongside ideas pertaining to the legitimate use of the city centre and the desired 
moral order which underpinned it. In representing CCTV as 'a people's system', a 
larger orchestration was enacted to construct a consensualised ideal of a benign 
8 As Chapter Seven indicated, the development of partnerships attempted to forge a new consensus 
around an entrepreneurial and local promotional spirit that at the same time attacked 
'older' avenues 
of political action as redundant and not in the interests of the 'city as a whole'. 
In this sense, the 
locally powerful were engaged in political struggle towards reformulating the 
'public interest' 
coterminous with the strategic direction of partnership power. 
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authoritative power over territory. Thus, as Chapter Seven illustrated, partnerships 
have been engaged in a constant battle in formulating and marketing 
c entrepreneurial strategies' of rule. Their power to act channelled large sums of 
money into campaign strategies that have driven a powerful promotionalism 
through place marketing aimed at local and national audiences. II It has been argued 
that CCTV cannot be understood in isolation from these wider strategies, and 
instead has formed a vehicle for their potential realisation. 
The conclusions and findings from this thesis have raised further questions for 
future research. A study of the locally powerful does not preclude a complimentary 
study of the experiences of those targeted by urban surveillance networks. In this 
thesis the voices of the homeless, young people and street traders, as subjects of a 
powerful and detrimental labelling process, have remained relatively silent. Their 
perception of 'city life' and the world of meaning they hold represent an untapped 
reservoir of knowledge that, if studied, could yield a fuller and more enriched 
understanding of the processes described in this thesis, namely: the unfolding of 
entrepreneurial forms of rule and their impact upon 'the urban experience'. More 
broadly, and as the thesis has argued, the hegemony of neo-liberal rule cannot be 
taken as given and will therefore be incomplete and open to contestation. Thus, 
resistance to local state projects from local publics and bodies needs to be 
Such a locally powerful promotional vernacular included discourses around particular images of 
street crime as harmful to citywide regeneration and in need of policing. The process of coalition 
building endeavoured to link discourses of Liverpool as a 'safe place to do business' with a rhetoric of 
partnership, identified in Chapter Five, that claimed an apolitical stance in shaping a orderly 
regeneration of city spaces. 
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researched, particularly - as Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrated - these 
projects themselves often assume rather than demonstrate local community 
participation. Research into the meaning and practice of contemporary local 
democracy - including processes of communal exclusion and Oppositional 
appropriation by locally powerful networks - would itself further enhance our 
appreciation of the trajectory of neo-liberal rule. Taken together, these are 
important silences that have been marginalized in both criminological and 
geographical literature and need to be incorporated into a wider understanding of 
neo-liberal cities. These kinds of questions can also find application between urban 
locations to explore similarities and differences of practice and experience 
regarding partnerships for crime prevention (Edwards and Hughes, 2002; Stenson, 
2002) and entrepreneurial rule more generally (Hall and Hubbard, 1996). Such 
studies would contribute to debates concerned with the tensions between 
theoretical generalisation and empirical findings from particular politico-cultural 
locations. As stated elsewhere, and reinforced in this thesis, "the best of the 
literature on the entrepreneurial city seeks to demonstrate that the political 
economy of place and the cultural politics of place are intimately intermeshed" 
jbid: 170). 
Not with standing these areas of theoretical dispute, this thesis has sought to make 
a contribution to these debates in arguing for a sociological understanding of 
contemporary social control mechanisms that takes into account how the interests 
of the locally powerful are organised institutionally, along with their normative 
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representations of city centre space. In placing CCTV within a broader appreciation 
of prevailing social relations this thesis has argued that the camera network has 
constituted more than a technology for the prevention of crime. Alternatively, this 
technology can be understood as part of a wider social ordering strategy that has a 
material and ideological basis within the neo-liberal state. It is out of these 
processes that the realisation of particular and tendentious visions of socially 
ordered space, its 'proper' and 'responsible' uses, has been developed and 
reproduced by the locally powerful. 
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Appendix One 
List of interviewees identified by either occupational title and/or 
institution. 
Research Interviewee by Occupational title and institution 
Superintendent, Merseyside Police, Government Office for 
Merseyside [GOM] 
Chairman, Stores' Committee 
Home Office Advisor, Govemment Office for Merseyside 
Marketing Director, Mersey Partnership 
Liverpool City Council, Economic Development Officer 
Chairman, Merseyside Development Corporation 
City Centre Crime Prevention Officer, Merseyside Police 
The City Centre Manager, Liverpool City Centre Partnership (LCCP) 
Private Developer [1], affiliated to LCCP 
Regeneration Co-ordinator, Liverpool City Council, 
Representative [1] of Stores' Committee 
Private Developer [2], affiliated to LCCP 
Chairman, Crime Alert 
Security Manager [I], Crime Alert 
Security Manager [2], Crime Alert 
Representative of LCCP 
Representative [2] of Stores Committee 
Security manager, non-member of Crime Alert 
Security Manager [3], Crime Alert 
Security Manager, Mersey Travel Rapid Response Unit 
Total of twenty 
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Appendix Two 
Specimen letter to interviewees 
Ref: ROAD/1-30 
23 March 1997 
Marketing Manager 
The Mersey Partnership 
Cunard Building 
Pier Head 
Liverpool 
U IET 
Dear 
I am a researcher at Liverpool John Moores University, School of Social Science 
and am conducting research coordinated by Professor Joe Sim. I am undertaking 
a major study into the perceptions and definitions of security and insecurity in 
Liverpool city centre. Initially, the investigation seeks to ascertain the views of a 
range of city centre agencies at senior management level who are involved in the 
process of defining and responding to security problems. I am therefore writing 
to ask if you would agree to participate in this research as a senior agency 
representative by taking part in a semi-structured interview. The interview would 
last a maximum of two hours and covers the following areas: 
i) The nature of the organisation/employment duties. 
ii) Organisational perceptions of insecurity and security in the city. 
Involvement through partnership with other city centre agencies for 
purposes of security (e. g. CCTV, Stores Committee, Image management, 
etc. ) 
iv) General views of security/insecurity within the current regeneration of 
LiverpoQl city centre. 
I would like to stress at the outset that organisational and 
individual 
confidentiality are guaranteed and information used in the research will not 
be 
identified with any one agency or individual. As one of its outcomes the research 
findings will be made available to interested parties providing a collation of 
security initiatives and their effectiveness. 
Initially then I wish to interview corporate managers but in order to ensure 
the full 
range of views in this area, and with your permission, we would 
like to interview 
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those within your organisation responsible for security management 'on the 
ground' (for example, and if appropriate, the nature of their work with Crime 
Alert etc). I should like to conduct interviews in the corporate sector from the 
beginning of May 1997, subject to the time schedules and availability of an 
appropriate manager. If you have any queries regarding this project, do not 
hesitate to get in contact with myself on 0151 231 4072 or 0151 231 4043 
(Secretary). I appreciate your time and assistance in responding to this matter and 
look forward to hearing from you. 
Yours faithfully 
Roy Coleman 
Liverpool John Moores University 
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Appendix Three 
ProMpt: 
in the letter). 
Name: 
Location: 
Interview Schedule 
Explain research, aims, outcomes, and confidentiality (i. e., points 
Date of Interview Start time 
I Name 
Gender 
3 Age 
4 Ethnic Origin 
(Self identifying) White British 
White 
Afro-Caribbean 
Asian 
Black British 
Chinese 
Other 
5 Home Area/Residence 
6 Education 
To what level are you qualified? 
(Prompt: '0'/'A' levels, Degree etc. ) 
Where were you educated? 
7 Previous EMployment: 
Title: 
Dates: 
8 Present EmployMent: 
i) Job title 
Duties/Responsibilities: 
How long have you been at this post? 
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iii) Duties/responsibilities: 
Part B: 
Prompt: I would now like to move on and ask about how security is 
managed 
within your organization. 
9 How do you define security within your organization/institution? 
10 What are the main security threats to your business? 
11 What do you identify as your main vulnerabilities? 
12 What 'in-house' measures do you operate to combat security problems 
and create a secure environment? Do you use any of the following? 
a) Extemal Advisors? 
No 
If yes, who are these advisors? 
(Prompt: Police, private consultants, others? ) 
Yes 
b) Do you have 'in-house' security managers? Yes 
No 
If yes, how long have you had a security manager and what are the 
duties 
and responsibilities of this position? 
c) Do you undertake staff training for security purposes? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, what does this training involve? 
(Literature for staff, courses? ) 
d) How often is staff training undertaken? 
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(refresher courses? ) 
Do you have on-site uniformed security guards? Yes 
No 
If yes, how many do you have and who are they? 
How do you define their role in your organization? 
e) Do you have on site CCTV? 
If yes, how do you define its role? 
f) Who monitors your CCTV system? 
Yes 
No (go to (i) page 12) 
What happens to the material collected from CCTV? 
Who has access to this material? 
(e. g. Police, Crime Alert etc. ) 
g) Is your CCTV system overt and publicly visible? 
Yes 
No 
h) Do you use a covert system? 
Yes 
No 
If you use covert CCTV how do you view its role? 
i) How important is the design and layout of your premises in terms of 
security measures? 
(Prompt: to control access, movement (pedestrian flow), staff and 
security) 
345 
Are their any other security measures that you use that have not been 
mentioned? 
(e. g. Aural surveillance) 
13 What prompted you to adopt your security measures? 
(Prompt: level of crime, loss of stock, police advice, competitor practices? ) 
14 In terms of dealing with incidents of crime involving the public during 
business hours (e. g. shoplifting) what are the procedures you adopt? 
(Prompt: Formal or informal, and what is involved in these different procedures? ) 
15 Overall, what is the role of the security measures you have adopted? 
16 How do you measure the effectiveness and level of success of your 
security measures? 
(Prompt: How do you know they work? ) 
17 How have concerns with security changes since you first joined the 
organization? 
18 More generally, what is your view about how concerns with security have 
changed over the last 20 years? Have things become worse or better and 
what do you think are the reasons for any change? 
19 What are the main constraints that your organization faces in adopting 
security measures? 
(Prompt: Fiscal, putting the public off .... ) 
20 How do you see future of your in-house security provision and its 
development? 
(Prompt: Increasing in complexity/sophistication and relationship to other 
organizations? ) 
Part C: 
Prompt: Having discussed your in-house security process we would like to 
now 
move on to the relationship between your organization and 
security initiatives in Liverpool City Centre. 
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21 What local initiatives and collective programmes are you involved in to 
promote insecurity? 
(e. g. Stores Committee, Crime Alert, Crime Stoppers, others) 
22 How did you hear about these initiatives and how did you become 
involved? 
23 What is the purpose of your involvement in these initiatives? 
24 What do you regard as the benefits that such involvement brings to your 
organisation? 
25 Are you involved in the Liverpool City Centre CCTV initiative? 
Yes 
No 
(no, go to 
question 30) 
25 If yes, how did you hear about this and how did you become involved? 
27 What is the nature and level of your involvement? 
(Prompt: funding, meetings, intelligence-targeting? ) 
28 What are the benefits of being involved in Liverpool's CCTV scheme? 
(Prompt: is 
it value for money? Crime prevention? ) 
29 Are their any disadvantages or problems with your involvement in the 
CCTV 
scheme? 
30 For what reasons are you not involved in the CCTV scheme? 
Would you like to be? 
, 
Part D: 
(Prompt: I would like to ask some questions about your views on security 
within the regeneration of Liverpool city centre) 
31 Are you involved with any partnerships concerned with regeneration? 
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What does regeneration mean to you and your organization? 
What does partnership mean to you and your organization? 
32 What are your views on the current regeneration of Liverpool city centre? 
What 
does it mean for your organization / business? 
33 What, if any, do you perceive as the obstacles that hinder this 
regeneration? 
Prompt: Political / administrative / inter-agency dealings? 
Security / policing / order-disorder / groups / categories? 
34 In your view have the security measures you have described helped in the 
regeneration of Liverpool? What are the reasons for your views? 
35 More generally, how important is security in the current regeneration 
drive? 
Finally regarding Your organizational role are there any other points that you wish 
to make regarding security and insecurity in Liverpool city centre? 
Thank you for your time and assistance in this interview. 
Finish time: 
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